AI alignment
In the field of artificial intelligence (AI), alignment aims to steer AI systems toward a person's or group's intended goals, preferences, or ethical principles.
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In the field of artificial intelligence (AI), alignment aims to steer AI systems toward a person's or group's intended goals, preferences, or ethical principles. An AI system is considered aligned if it advances the intended objectives. A misaligned AI system pursues unintended objectives.
It is often difficult for AI designers to specify the full range of desired and undesired behaviors. Therefore, the designers often use simpler proxy goals, such as gaining human approval. But proxy goals can overlook necessary constraints or reward the AI system for merely appearing aligned.
AI systems may also find loopholes that allow them to accomplish their proxy goals efficiently but in unintended, sometimes harmful, ways (reward hacking). Advanced AI systems may develop unwanted instrumental strategies, such as seeking power or self-preservation because such strategies help them achieve their assigned final goals.
Furthermore, they might develop undesirable emergent behaviour that could be hard to detect before the system is deployed and encounters new situations and data distributions. Empirical research in 2024 found that advanced large language models (LLMs) such as OpenAI o1 or Claude 3 sometimes engage in strategic deception to achieve their goals or prevent them from being changed.…
In the field of artificial intelligence (AI), alignment aims to steer AI systems toward a person's or group's intended goals, preferences, or ethical principles. An AI system is considered aligned if it advances the intended objectives. A misaligned AI system pursues unintended objectives.
It is often difficult for AI designers to specify the full range of desired and undesired behaviors. Therefore, the designers often use simpler proxy goals, such as gaining human approval. But proxy goals can overlook necessary constraints or reward the AI system for merely appearing aligned.
AI systems may also find loopholes that allow them to accomplish their proxy goals efficiently but in unintended, sometimes harmful, ways (reward hacking). Advanced AI systems may develop unwanted instrumental strategies, such as seeking power or self-preservation because such strategies help them achieve their assigned final goals.
Furthermore, they might develop undesirable emergent behaviour that could be hard to detect before the system is deployed and encounters new situations and data distributions. Empirical research in 2024 found that advanced large language models (LLMs) such as OpenAI o1 or Claude 3 sometimes engage in strategic deception to achieve their goals or prevent them from being changed.
Some of these issues affect existing commercial systems such as LLMs, robots, autonomous vehicles, and social media recommendation engines. Some AI researchers argue that more capable future systems will be more severely affected because these problems partially result from high capabilities.
Many prominent AI researchers and AI company leaders have argued or asserted that AI is approaching human-like (AGI) and superhuman cognitive capabilities (ASI), and could endanger human civilization if misaligned. These include "AI godfathers" Geoffrey Hinton and Yoshua Bengio and the CEOs of OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google DeepMind. These risks remain debated.
AI alignment is a subfield of AI safety, the study of how to build safe AI systems. Other subfields of AI safety include robustness, monitoring, and capability control. Research challenges in alignment include instilling complex values in AI, developing honest AI, scalable oversight, auditing and interpreting AI models, and preventing emergent AI behaviors like power-seeking.
Alignment research has connections to interpretability research, (adversarial) robustness, anomaly detection, calibrated uncertainty, formal verification, preference learning, safety-critical engineering, game theory, algorithmic fairness, and social sciences.
Alignment problem
In 1960, AI pioneer Norbert Wiener described the AI alignment problem as follows: If we use, to achieve our purposes, a mechanical agency with whose operation we cannot interfere effectively [...] we had better be quite sure that the purpose put into the machine is the purpose which we really desire. AI alignment refers to ensuring that an AI system's objectives match some target.
The target is variously defined as the goals of the system's designers or users, widely shared values, objective ethical standards, legal requirements, or the intentions its designers would have if they were more informed and enlightened. In democratic AI alignment, the target is the values and preferences of median voters, which increases political legitimacy.
AI alignment can represent value pluralism. AI alignment is an open problem for modern AI systems and is a research field within AI. Aligning AI involves two main challenges: carefully specifying the purpose of the system (outer alignment) and ensuring that the system adopts the specification robustly (inner alignment).
Researchers also attempt to create AI models that have robust alignment, sticking to safety constraints even when users adversarially try to bypass them.
Existential risk (x-risk)
According to some researchers, humans owe their dominance over other species to their greater cognitive abilities. Accordingly, researchers argue that one or many misaligned AI systems could disempower humanity or lead to human extinction if they outperform humans on most cognitive tasks.
In 2023, world-leading AI researchers, other scholars, and AI tech CEOs signed the statement that "Mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war". Notable computer scientists who have pointed out risks from future advanced AI that is misaligned include Geoffrey Hinton, Alan Turing, Ilya Sutskever, Yoshua Bengio, Judea Pearl, Murray Shanahan, Norbert Wiener, Marvin Minsky, Francesca Rossi, Scott Aaronson, Bart Selman, David McAllester, Marcus Hutter, Shane Legg, Eric Horvitz, and Stuart J. Russell.
Skeptical researchers such as François Chollet, Gary Marcus, Yann LeCun, and Oren Etzioni have argued that AGI is far off, that it would not seek power (or might try but fail), or that it will not be hard to align. Other researchers argue that it will be especially difficult to align advanced future AI systems.
More capable systems are better able to game their specifications by finding loopholes, strategically mislead their designers, as well as protect and increase their power and intelligence. Additionally, they could have more severe side effects. They are also likely to be more complex and autonomous, making them more difficult to interpret and supervise, and therefore harder to align.
Deceptive alignment
Deceptive alignment is a proposed failure mode in machine learning in which a trained model behaves according to its intended objective during training but pursues a different objective once deployed. The concept was introduced by Evan Hubinger and colleagues in a 2019 preprint.
Training a machine learning model involves a loss function, which Hubinger et al. called the base objective, optimized by a process they called the base optimizer. When the resulting model is itself an optimizer, selecting actions to achieve an internal goal, the authors called it a mesa-optimizer and its goal the mesa-objective. This framework distinguishes two alignment problems.
Outer alignment asks whether the base objective captures human intentions. Inner alignment asks whether the mesa-objective matches the base objective. Deceptive alignment is a failure of inner alignment: the model's goal differs from the base objective, but the model behaves as though it does not, because doing so is the most reliable strategy for avoiding modification during training.
Hubinger et al. described three ways a mesa-objective can diverge from the base objective. Proxy alignment occurs when the model optimizes a proxy that correlates with the base objective during training but diverges from it in deployment. Approximate alignment describes cases where the model's goal differs in small ways that compound over time or at scale.
Deceptive alignment occurs when the model pursues a different goal and has learned that appearing aligned during training maximizes its opportunity to act on that goal later, when oversight is reduced. Deceptive alignment is considered the hardest case to address because a deceptively aligned model passes all evaluations that it identifies as part of its training.
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1378682095 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.