Algerian War

The Algerian War, also known as the Algerian Revolution, the Franco-Algerian War, or the Algerian War of Independence, was an armed conflict between France and the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) from 1954 to 1962, which led to…

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The Algerian War, also known as the Algerian Revolution, the Franco-Algerian War, or the Algerian War of Independence, was an armed conflict between France and the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) from 1954 to 1962, which led to Algeria winning its independence from France. An important decolonization war, it was a complex conflict characterized by guerrilla warfare and war crimes.

The conflict also became a civil war between the different communities and within the communities. The war took place mainly on the territory of French Algeria, with repercussions in metropolitan France.

Effectively started by members of the FLN on 1 November 1954, during the ("Red All Saints' Day"), the conflict led to serious political crises in France, causing the fall of the Fourth Republic (1946–1958), to be replaced by the Fifth Republic with a strengthened presidency. The brutality of the methods employed by the French forces failed to win hearts and minds in Algeria, alienated support in metropolitan France, and discredited French prestige abroad.

As the war dragged on, the French public slowly turned against it and many of France's key allies, including the United States, switched from supporting France to abstaining in the UN debate on Algeria. After major demonstrations in Algiers and several other cities in favor of independence (1960) and a United Nations resolution recognizing the right to independence, Charles de Gaulle, the first president of the Fifth Republic, decided to open a series of negotiations with the FLN.

These concluded with the signing of the Évian Accords in March 1962. A referendum took place on 8 April 1962 and the French electorate approved the Évian Accords. The final result was 91% in favor of the ratification of this agreement and on 1 July, the Accords were subject to a second referendum in Algeria, where 99.72% voted for independence and just 0.28% against.

The planned French withdrawal led to a state crisis. This included various assassination attempts on de Gaulle as well as some attempts at military coups.

Most of the former were carried out by the (OAS), an underground organization formed mainly from French military personnel supporting a French Algeria, which committed a large number of bombings and murders both in Algeria and in the homeland to stop the planned independence. The war caused the deaths of between 400,000 and 1.5 million Algerians, 25,600 French soldiers, and 6,000 Europeans.

War crimes committed during the war included massacres of civilians, rape, and torture; the French destroyed over 8,000 villages, used chemical weapons against both fighters and civilians, and relocated over 2 million Algerians to concentration camps. Upon independence in 1962, 900,000 European-Algerians ( ) fled to France within a few months for fear of the FLN's revenge.

The French government was unprepared to receive such a vast number of refugees, which caused turmoil in France. The majority of Algerian Muslims who had worked for the French were disarmed and left behind, as the agreement between French and Algerian authorities declared that no actions could be taken against them.

However, the Harkis in particular, having served as auxiliaries with the French army, were regarded as traitors and by the FLN or by lynch mobs, often after being abducted and tortured. About 20,000 Harki families (around 90,000 people1) managed to flee to France, some with help from their French officers acting against orders, and today they and their descendants form a significant part of the population of Algerians in France.

In early 1959, France launched the Challe Plan, regaining control over large parts of northern Algeria and inflicting heavy damage upon separatist troops. Colonel Bigeard, whose elite paratrooper unit fought at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, told journalist Jean Lartéguy, (source) During this period in France, however, popular opposition to the conflict was growing, notably in the French Communist Party, then one of the country's strongest political forces, which supported the Algerian Revolution.

Thousands of relatives of conscripts and reserve soldiers suffered loss and pain; revelations of torture and the indiscriminate brutality of the army against the Muslim population prompted widespread revulsion, and a significant constituency supported the principle of national liberation. By 1959, it was clear that the status quo was untenable and France could either grant Algeria independence or allow real equality with the Muslims.

De Gaulle told an advisor: "If we integrate them, if all the Arabs and the Berbers of Algeria were considered French, how could they be prevented from settling in France, where the living standard is so much higher? My village would no longer be called Colombey-les-Deux-Églises but Colombey-les-Deux-Mosquées".

International pressure was also building on France to grant Algeria independence. Since 19551, the UN General Assembly annually considered the Algerian question, and the FLN position was gaining support.

France's seeming intransigence in settling a colonial war that tied down half the manpower of its armed forces was also a source of concern to its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. In a 16 September 1959 statement, de Gaulle dramatically reversed his stand and uttered the words "self-determination" as the third and preferred solution, which he envisioned as leading to majority rule in an Algeria formally associated with France.

In Tunis, Abbas acknowledged that de Gaulle's statement might be accepted as a basis for settlement, but the French government refused to recognize the GPRA as the representative of Algeria's Muslim community.

Historiography

Although the opening of the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after a 30-year lock-up enabled some new historical research on the war, including Jean-Charles Jauffret's book, La Guerre d'Algérie par les documents (The Algerian War According to the Documents), many remain inaccessible. The recognition in 1999 by the National Assembly permitted the Algerian War to enter the syllabi of French schools.

In France, the war was known as "la guerre sans nom" ("the war without a name") while it was being fought. The government variously described the war as the "Algerian events", the "Algerian problem" and the "Algerian dispute"; the mission of the French Army was "ensuring security", "maintaining order" and "pacification" but was never described as fighting a war.

The FLN were referred to as "criminals", "bandits", "outlaws", "terrorists", and "fellagha" (a derogatory Arabic word meaning "road-cutters" but often mistranslated as "throat-cutters" in reference to the FLN's frequent method of execution, which made people wear the "Kabylian smile" by cutting their throats, pulling their tongues out, and leaving them to bleed to death). After reports of the widespread use of torture by French forces started to reach France in 1956–1957, the war become commonly known as la sale guerre ("the dirty war"), a term that is still used today and reflects the very negative memory of the war in France.

Lack of commemoration

As the war was officially a "police action", no monuments were built for decades to honour the about 25,000 French soldiers killed in the war, and the Defense Ministry refused to classify veterans as veterans until the 1970s. When a monument to the Unknown Soldier of the Algerian War was erected in 1977, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, in his dedication speech, refused to use the words war or Algeria but instead used the phrase "the unknown soldier of North Africa".

A national monument to the French war dead was not built until 1996 and, even then spoke only of those killed fighting in Afrique du nord and was located in a decrepit area of Paris rarely visited by tourists, as if to hide the monument. Further adding to the silence were the vested interests of French politicians.

François Mitterrand, the French president 1981 to 1995, had been the Interior Minister from 1954 to 1955 and the Justice Minister from 1955 to 1957, when he had been deeply involved in the repression of the FLN, and it was only after Mitterrand's death in 1996, that his French Socialist Party started to become willing to talk about the war and, even then, remained very guarded about his role. Likewise, de Gaulle had promised in the Évian Agreements that the pieds-noirs could remain in Algeria, but after independence, the FLN freely violated the accords and led to the entire pied-noir population fleeing to France, usually with only the clothes they were wearing, as they had lost everything they had in Algeria, a circumstance further embarrassing the defeated nation.

English-language historiography

One of the first books about the war in English, A Scattering of Dust by the American journalist Herb Greer in 1962, depicted very favorably the Algerian struggle for independence. Most work in English in the 1960s and 1970s were the work of left-wing scholars, who were focused on explaining the FLN as a part of a generational change in Algerian nationalism and depicted the war as a reaction to intolerable oppression and/or an attempt by the peasants, impoverished by French policies, to improve their lot.

One of the few military histories of the war was The Algerian Insurrection, by the retired British Army officer Edgar O'Ballance, who wrote with unabashed admiration for French high command during the war and saw the FLN as a terrorist group. O'Ballance concluded that the tactics which won the war militarily for the French lost the war for them politically.

In 1977, the British journalist Alistair Horne published A Savage War of Peace, regarded by some authors as the leading book written on the subject in English, though written from a French, rather than Algerian perspective. Fifteen years after the end of the war, Horne was accused of not being concerned about "right or wrong" but rather about "cause and effect".

Living in Paris at the time of the war, Horne had condemned French intervention during the Suez Crisis and the French bombing of the Tunisian village of Sakiet Sidi Youssef in 1958. He'd argued that the "inflexibility" of the FLN had won Algeria independence, creating a sense of Algerian national identity, and leading the Front to rule over authoritarian but "progressive" FLN regime.

In a 1977 review published in The Times Literary Supplement, Iraqi-born British historian Elie Kedourie attacked Horne as an "apologist for terrorism." Kedourie wrote that far from being a mass movement, the FLN were a "small gang" of "murderous intellectuals" who used brutal, terrorist tactics against the French citizens and military, and against any Muslim loyal to the French.

Kedourie charged that de Gaulle had cynically sacrificed the colons and the harkis, disregarding his constitutional oath as president to protect all Frenchmen. In 1992, American historian John Ruedy, the focus of whose research was the history of the Maghreb and French colonialism in Algeria, published Modern Algeria: Origins and Development of a Nation.

Ruedy wrote that under French rule the traditional social structure had been so completely destroyed that when the FLN launched its independence struggle in 1954, the only way of asserting one's interests was through "the law of the gun", which explains why the FLN was so violent not only in regards to its enemies but also within the movement. The FLN, thus, according to Ruedy, formed the basis of an "alternative political culture", based on "brute force" that has persisted ever since.

In film

Before the war, Algeria was a popular setting for French films; the British professor Leslie Hill having written: "In the late 1920s and 1930s, for instance, North Africa provided film-makers in France with a ready fund of familiar images of the exotics, mingling, for instance, the languid eroticism of Arabian nights with the infinite and hazy vistas of the Sahara to create a powerful confection of tragic heroism and passionate love." During the war itself, French censors banned the entire subject of the war.

Since 1962, when film censorship relating to the war eased, French films dealing with the conflict have consistently portrayed the war as a set of conflicting memories and rival narratives (which ones being correct are left unclear), with most films dealing with the war taking a disjointed chronological structure in which scenes before, during and after the war are juxtaposed out of sequence with one film critic referring to the cinematic Algeria as "an ambiguous world marked by the displacements and repetitions of dreams". The consistent message of French films dealing with the war is that something horrible happened, but what happened, who was involved and why are left unexplained.

Atrocities, especially torture by French forces are acknowledged, the French soldiers who fought in Algeria were and are always portrayed in French cinema as the "lost soldiers" and tragic victims of the war who are more deserving of sympathy than the FLN people they tortured, which are almost invariably portrayed as vicious, psychopathic terrorists, an approach to the war that has raised anger in Algeria.

Reminders

From time to time, the memory of the Algerian War surfaced in France. In 1987, when SS-Hauptsturmführer Klaus Barbie, the "Butcher of Lyon", was brought to trial for crimes against humanity, graffiti appeared on the walls of the banlieues, the slum districts in which most Algerian immigrants in France live, reading: "Barbie in France! When will Massu be in Algeria!".

Barbie's lawyer, Jacques Vergès, adopted a tu quoque defence that asked the judges "is a crime against humanity is to be defined as only one of Nazis against the Jews or if it applies to more seriously crimes... the crimes of imperialists against people struggling for their independence?". He went on to say that nothing that his client had done against the French Resistance that was not done by "certain French officers in Algeria" who, Vergès noted, could not be prosecuted because of de Gaulle's amnesty of 1962.

In 19971, when Maurice Papon, a career French civil servant was brought to trial for crimes against humanity for sending 1600 Jews from Bordeaux to be killed at Auschwitz in 1942, it emerged over the course of the trial that on 17 October 1961, Papon had organized a massacre of between 100 and 200 Algerians in central Paris, which was the first time that most French had ever heard of the massacre. The revelation that hundreds of people had been killed by the Paris Sûreté was a great shock in France and led to uncomfortable questions being raised about what had happened during the Algerian War.

The American historian William Cohen wrote that the Papon trial "sharpened the focus" on the Algerian War but not provide "clarity", as Papon's role as a civil servant under Vichy led to misleading conclusions in France that it was former collaborators who were responsible for the terror in Algeria, but most of the men responsible, like Guy Mollet, General Marcel Bigeard, Robert Lacoste, General Jacques Massu and Jacques Soustelle, had actually all been résistants in World War II, which many French historians found to be very unpalatable. On 15 June 2000, Le Monde published an interview with Louisette Ighilahriz, a former FLN member who described in graphic detail her torture at the hands of the French Army and made the sensational claim that the war heroes General Jacques Massu and General Marcel Bigeard had personally been present when she was being tortured for information.

What made the interview very touching for many French people was that Ighilahriz was not demanding vengeance but wished to express thanks to Dr. François Richaud, the army doctor who extended her much kindness and who, she believed, saved her life by treating her every time she was tortured. She asked if it were possible for her to see Dr. Richaud one last time to thank him personally, but it later turned out that Dr. Richaud had died in 1997.

As Ighilahriz had been an attractive woman in her youth, university-educated, secular, fluent in French and fond of quoting Victor Hugo, and her duties in the FLN had been as an information courier, she made for a most sympathetic victim since she was a woman who did not come across as Algerian. William Cohen commented that had she been an uneducated man who had been involved in killings and was not coming forward to express thanks for a Frenchman, her story might not have resonated the same way.

The Ighiahriz case led to a public letter signed by 12 people who have been involved in the war to President Jacques Chirac to ask October 31 be made a public day of remembrance for victims of torture in Algeria. In response to the Ighilahriz case, General Paul Aussaresses gave an interview on 23 November 2000 in which he candidly admitted to ordering torture and extrajudicial executions and stated he had personally executed 24 fellagha.

He argued that they were justified, as torture and extrajudicial executions were the only way to defeat the FLN. In May 2001, Aussaresses published his memoirs, Services spéciaux Algérie 1955–1957, in which he presented a detailed account of torture and extrajudicial killings in the name of the republic, which he wrote were all done under orders from Paris; that confirmed what had been long suspected.

As a result of the interviews and Aussaresses's book, the Algerian War was finally extensively discussed by the French media, which had ignored the subject as much as possible for decades, but no consensus emerged about how to best remember the war. Adding to the interest was the decision by one war veteran, Georges Fogel, to come forward to confirm that he had seen Ighiahriz and many others tortured in 1957, and the politician and war veteran Jean Marie Faure decided in February 2001 to release extracts from the diary that he had kept and showed "acts of sadism and horror" that he had witnessed.

The French historian Pierre Vidal-Naquet called that a moment of "catharsis" that was "explainable only in near-French terms: it is the return of the repressed". In 2002, Une Vie Debout: Mémoires Politiques by Mohammed Harbi, a former advisor to Ben Bella, was published in which Harbi wrote: "Because they [the FLN leaders] weren't supported at the moment of their arrival on the scene by a real and dynamic popular movement, they took power of the movement by force and they maintained it by force.

Convinced that they had to act with resolution in order to protect themselves against their enemies, they deliberately chose an authoritarian path."

Continued controversy in France

The Algerian War remains a contentious event. According to the historian Benjamin Stora, one of the leading historians on the war, memories concerning the war remain fragmented, with no common ground to speak of: There is no such thing as a history of the Algerian War; there is just a multitude of histories and personal paths through it.

Everyone involved considers that they lived through it in their own way, and any attempt to understand the Algerian War globally is immediately rejected by protagonists. Even though Stora has counted 3,000 publications in French on the war, there still is no work produced by French and Algerian authors co-operating with each other.

Although according to Stora, there can "no longer be talk about a 'war without a name', a number of problems remain, especially the absence of sites in France to commemorate" the war. Furthermore, conflicts have arisen on an exact commemoration date to end the war.

Although many sources as well as the French state place it on 19 March 1962, the Évian Agreements, others point out that massacres of harkis and the kidnapping of pieds-noirs took place later. Stora further points out, "The phase of memorial reconciliation between the two sides of the sea is still a long way off."

That was evidenced by the National Assembly's creation of the law on colonialism on 23 February 2005 that asserted that colonialism had overall been "positive". Alongside a heated debate in France, the February 23, 2005, law had the effect of jeopardising the treaty of friendship that President Chirac was supposed to sign with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, which was no longer on the agenda.

Following that controversial law, Bouteflika has talked about a cultural genocide, particularly referring to the 1945 Sétif massacre. Chirac finally had the law repealed by a complex institutional mechanism. Another matter concerns the teaching of the war as well as of colonialism and decolonization, particularly in French secondary schools.

Hence, there is only one reference to racism in a French textbook, one published by Bréal publishers for terminales students, those passing their baccalauréat. Thus, many are not surprised that the first to speak about the 1961 Paris massacre were musical groups, including hip-hop groups such as Suprême NTM (les Arabes dans la Seine) and La Rumeur.

Indeed, the Algerian War is not even the subject of a specific chapter in the textbook for terminales. Henceforth, Benjamin Stora stated: As Algerians do not appear in an "indigenous" condition, and their sub-citizens status, as the history of nationalist movement, is never evoked as their being one of great figures of the resistance, such as Messali Hadj and Ferhat Abbas.

They neither emerge nor are being given attention. No one is explaining to students what colonization has been. We have prevented students from understanding why the decolonization took place.

Socioeconomic situation of French Algerians

In Metropolitan France in 1963, 43% of French Algerians lived in bidonvilles (shanty towns). Thus, Azouz Begag, the delegate Minister for Equal Opportunities, wrote an autobiographic novel, Le Gone du Chaâba, about his experiences while living in a bidonville in the outskirts of Lyon.

It is impossible to understand the third-generation of Algerian immigrants to France without recalling the bicultural experience. An official parliamentary report on the "prevention of criminality", commanded by Interior Minister Philippe de Villepin and made by the deputy Jacques-Alain Bénisti, claimed, "Bilingualism (bilinguisme) was a factor of criminality" (sic ).

Following outcries, the definitive version of the report finally made bilingualism an asset, rather than a fault.

French recognition of historical use of torture

After having denied or downplayed its use for 40 years, France has finally recognized its history of torture, but there was never an official proclamation about it. General Paul Aussaresses was sentenced following his justification of the use of torture for "apology of war crimes".

As they occurred during wartime, France claimed torture to be isolated acts, instead of admitting its responsibility for the frequent use of torture to break the insurgents' morale, not, as Aussaresses had claimed, to "save lives" by gaining short-term information which would stop "terrorists". The state now claims that torture was a regrettable aberration because of the context of the exceptionally-savage war.

However, academic research has proved both theses to be false. "Torture in Algeria was engraved in the colonial act; it is a 'normal' illustration of an abnormal system", wrote Nicolas Bancel, Pascal Blanchard and Sandrine Lemaire, who discussed the phenomena of "human zoos".

From the enfumades (slaughter by smoke inhalation) of the Darha caves in 1844 by Aimable Pélissier to the 1945 riots in Sétif, Guelma and Kherrata, the repression in Algeria used the same methods. Following the Sétif massacres, other riots against the European presence occurred in Guelma, Batna, Biskra, and Kherrata that resulted in 103 deaths among the pieds-noirs.

The suppression of the riots officially saw 1,500 other deaths, but N. Bancel, P. Blanchard and S. Lemaire estimate the number to be between 6,000 and 8,000.

INA archives

Note: concerning the audio and film archives from the Institut national de l'audiovisuel (INA), see Benjamin Stora's comments on their politically-oriented creation . Cinq Colonnes à la une, Rushes Interview Pied-Noir, ORTF, July 1, 1962. Cinq Colonnes à la une, Rétrospective Algérie, ORTF, June 9, 1963 (concerning these INA archives, see also Benjamin Stora's warning about the conditions of creation of these images).

Contemporary publications

Trinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, 1961. Leulliette, Pierre, St. Michael and the Dragon: Memoirs of a Paratrooper, Houghton Mifflin, 1964.

Galula, David, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 1964. Jouhaud, Edmond. O Mon Pays Perdu: De Bou-Sfer a Tulle.

Paris: Librarie Artheme Fayard, 1969. Maignen, Etienne Treillis au djebel – Les Piliers de Tiahmaïne Yellow Concept, 2004. Derradji, Abder-Rahmane, The Algerian Guerrilla Campaign Strategy & Tactics, The Edwin Mellen Press, New York, 1997.

Feraoun, Mouloud, Journal 1955–1962, University of Nebraska Press, 2000. Pečar, Zdravko, Alžir do nezavisnosti. Beograd: Prosveta; Beograd: Institut za izučavanje radničkog pokreta, 1967.

English-language

Aussaresses, General Paul. The Battle of the Casbah, New York: Enigma Books, 2010, . Maran, Rita (1989).

Torture: The Role of Ideology in the French-Algerian War, New York: Prager Publishers. Windrow, Martin. The Algerian War 1954–62.

London: Osprey Publishing, 1997. . Arslan Humbaraci. Algeria: a revolution that failed.

London: Pall mall Press Ltd, 1966. Samia Henni: Architecture of Counterrevolution. The French Army in Northern Algeria, gta Verlag, Zürich 2017. .

French language

Translations may be available for some of these works. See specific cases. Benot, Yves (1994).

Massacres coloniaux, La Découverte, coll. "Textes à l'appui", Paris. Jauffret, Jean-Charles.

La Guerre d'Algérie par les documents (first tome, 1990; second tome, 1998; account here). Rey-Goldzeiguer, Annie (2001). Aux origines de la guerre d'Algérie, La Découverte, Paris.

Robin, Marie-Monique. Escadrons de la mort, l'école française,453 pages. La Découverte (15 September 2004).

Collection: Cahiers libres. ( ) (Spanish transl.: Los Escuadrones De La Muerte/ the Death Squadron), 539 pages. Sudamericana; Édition: Translatio (October 2005) ( ).

Mekhaled, Boucif (1995). Chroniques d'un massacre. 8 mai 1945.

Sétif, Guelma, Kherrata, Syros, Paris, 1995. Slama, Alain-Gérard (1996). La Guerre d'Algérie.

Histoire d'une déchirure, Gallimard, coll. "Découvertes Gallimard" (n° 301), Paris. Vidal-Naquet, Pierre.

La Torture sous la République (1970) and many others, more recent (see entry). Roy, Jules (1960). "La guerre d'Algérie" ("The War in Algeria", 1961, Grove Press).

Etienne Maignen. Treillis au djebel- Les Piliers de Tiahmaïne Yellow Concept 2004. Gilbert Meynier.

Histoire intérieure du FLN 1954–1962 Fayard 2004.

Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1376905462 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.

Words in each sectionRemindersRemindersReminders: 958 words958English-language histor…English-language historiographyEnglish-language historiography: 494 words494Continued controversy i…Continued controversy in FranceContinued controversy in France: 487 words487Contemporary publicatio…Contemporary publicationsContemporary publications: 403 words403Lack of commemorationLack of commemorationLack of commemoration: 277 words277HistoriographyHistoriographyHistoriography: 265 words265In filmIn filmIn film: 265 words265French recognition of h…French recognition of historical use of tortureFrench recognition of historical use of torture: 254 words254Socioeconomic situation…Socioeconomic situation of French AlgeriansSocioeconomic situation of French Algerians: 116 words116INA archivesINA archivesINA archives: 68 words68
Words in each section. Measured from the stored article body; sections below the minimum are not plotted.

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