Analytic philosophy

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Analytic philosophy is a broad school of thought or style in contemporary Western philosophy, especially anglophone philosophy, with an emphasis on analysis, clear prose, rigorous arguments, formal logic, mathematics, and the natural sciences (with less emphasis on the humanities). It is further characterized by the linguistic turn, or a concern with language and meaning.

Analytic philosophy is often contrasted with continental philosophy, a catch-all term for other methods prominent in continental Europe, most notably existentialism, phenomenology, and Hegelianism. The distinction has also been drawn between "analytic" being academic or technical philosophy and "continental" being literary philosophy.

The proliferation of analytic philosophy began around the turn of the twentieth century and has been dominant since the second half of the century. Central figures in its history include Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Other important figures include Franz Brentano, the logical positivists (especially Rudolf Carnap), and the ordinary language philosophers. Wilfrid Sellars, W. V. O. Quine, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and others, led a decline of logical positivism and a subsequent revival in metaphysics.…

Analytic philosophy is a broad school of thought or style in contemporary Western philosophy, especially anglophone philosophy, with an emphasis on analysis, clear prose, rigorous arguments, formal logic, mathematics, and the natural sciences (with less emphasis on the humanities). It is further characterized by the linguistic turn, or a concern with language and meaning.

Analytic philosophy is often contrasted with continental philosophy, a catch-all term for other methods prominent in continental Europe, most notably existentialism, phenomenology, and Hegelianism. The distinction has also been drawn between "analytic" being academic or technical philosophy and "continental" being literary philosophy.

The proliferation of analytic philosophy began around the turn of the twentieth century and has been dominant since the second half of the century. Central figures in its history include Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Other important figures include Franz Brentano, the logical positivists (especially Rudolf Carnap), and the ordinary language philosophers. Wilfrid Sellars, W. V. O. Quine, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and others, led a decline of logical positivism and a subsequent revival in metaphysics.

Analytic philosophy has also developed several new branches of philosophy and logic, notably philosophy of language, mathematics, and science, and modern predicate and mathematical logic. For the sentence 'three is half of six', the is of identity means that "x is the same as y" (x=y). From about 1910 to 1930, analytic philosophers emphasized creating an ideal language for philosophical analysis, which would be free from the ambiguities of ordinary language that, in their opinion, often led philosophers astray.

Word and Object

In his magnum opus Word and Object (1960), Quine introduces the idea of radical translation, an introduction to his theory of the indeterminacy of translation, and specifically to prove the inscrutability of reference. The gavagai thought experiment tells about a linguist, who tries to find out what the expression gavagai means when uttered by a speaker of a yet-unknown native language upon seeing a rabbit.

At first glance, it seems that gavagai simply translates with rabbit. Quine points out there is no way to tell that the speaker did not mean, for instance, "undetached rabbit-part" (such as its ear) as well as several other scenarios.

On What There Is

Quine's essay on ontology, "On What There Is" (1948) elucidates Russell's theory of descriptions. Quine uses Pegasus instead of "the present King of France" and dubs the problem of nonexistence Plato's beard. The essay contains Quine's famous dictum of ontological commitment, "To be is to be the value of a variable".

One is committed to the entities his theory posits by use of the existential quantifier, like "There are some so-and-sos". Other parts of speech do not commit one to entities and so for Quine are syncategorematic.

Two Dogmas of Empiricism

Also among the developments that resulted in the decline of logical positivism and the revival of metaphysics was Quine's attack on the analytic–synthetic distinction in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951), published in The Philosophical Review, a paper "sometimes regarded as the most important in all of twentieth-century philosophy". The paper made Quine the most dominant philosopher in America before Kripke.

Naming and Necessity

Especially important was Kripke's book Naming and Necessity (1980). According to one author, Naming and Necessity "played a large role in the implicit, but widespread, rejection of the view—so popular among ordinary language philosophers—that philosophy is nothing more than the analysis of language."

Kripke argued proper names are rigid designators, or designate the same thing in all possible worlds, unlike descriptions. For example, an election may have turned out differently, so the description "winner of the 1968 US presidential election" might have designated Hubert Humphrey instead of Richard Nixon.

However, the name "Richard Nixon" designates the man Richard Nixon, regardless of the election results. Kant stated in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) that necessity is the criterion for a priori knowledge.

Kripke argued that necessity is a metaphysical notion distinct from the epistemic notion of a priori, and that there are necessary truths that are known a posteriori, such as that water is H 2 O, or gold is atomic number 79. Kripke and Quine's colleague Hilary Putnam argued for realism about natural kinds. Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiment is used to argue water is a natural kind.

Logical pluralism

Many-valued and non-classical logics have been popular since the Polish logician Jan Łukasiewicz. Graham Priest is a dialetheist, denying the law of non-contradiction, seeing it as the most natural solution to problems such as the liar paradox. JC Beall, together with Greg Restall, is a pioneer of a widely discussed version of logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one correct logic.

Principia Ethica

The first strain is based on G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica (1903), which advances non-naturalist moral realism. The work is known for the open question argument and identifying the naturalistic fallacy, major topics for analytic philosophers. According to Moore, goodness is sui generis, a simple (undefinable), non-natural property.

Contemporary philosophers, such as Russ Shafer-Landau in Moral Realism: A Defence (2003), still defend ethical non-naturalism. After Moore's work, not much was done in analytic philosophy with ethics until the 1950s and 1960s, when there was a renewed interest in traditional moral philosophy.

Philippa Foot defended naturalist moral realism and contributed several essays attacking other theories. Foot introduced the famous "trolley problem" into the ethical discourse. A student and friend of Wittgenstein, Elizabeth Anscombe, wrote a monograph Intention (1957) with an influential treatment of action.

Her article "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958) criticized consequentialism.

Emotivism

The second strain is founded on logical positivism and its attitude that unverifiable statements are meaningless. As a result, they avoided normative ethics and instead pursued meta-ethics. The logical positivists thought statements about value—including all ethical and aesthetic judgments—are non-cognitive.

As a result, they adopted an emotivist theory, also known as the hurrah/boo theory, according to which valuing judgments expressed the attitude of the speaker. On this view, saying, "Murder is wrong", is equivalent to saying, "Boo to murder", or saying the word "murder" with a particular tone of disapproval.

J. O. Urmson gave his own "grading theory" in "On Grading" (1950) and was admiring but critical of emotivism in The Emotive Theory of Ethics (1968). Emotivism evolved into more sophisticated non-cognitivist theories, such as the expressivism of Charles Stevenson in Ethics and Language (1944), and the universal prescriptivism of R. M. Hare, which was based on Austin's philosophy of speech acts.

Other anti-realist moral theorists include Australian John Mackie, who in Ethics: Inventing Right And Wrong (1977) defended error theory and the argument from queerness. Bernard Williams also influenced ethics by advocating a kind of moral relativism and rejecting all other theories.

Paradox of fiction

Colin Radford and Michael Weston introduced the paradox of fiction in their paper "How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?" (1975) The paper discusses emotional responses to fiction, such as Leo Tolstoy's novel Anna Karenina. Their question is how people can be moved by things that do not exist.

The paper concluded people's emotional responses to fiction are irrational. American philosopher Kendall Walton's paper "Fearing Fictions" (1978) addresses the paradox. This paper served as the impetus for make-believe theory.

Semantics

John Searle advocated Russell's descriptivism and tried to elaborate it with a "cluster theory" of descriptions. Kripke challenged the descriptivist theory with a causal theory of reference in Naming and Necessity. According to one author, "In the philosophy of language, Naming and Necessity is among the most important works ever."

Ruth Barcan Marcus also challenged descriptivism with a direct reference theory, in her case a tag theory of names. Keith Donnellan too challenged descriptivism. Hilary Putnam used the Twin Earth and brain in a vat thought experiments to argue for semantic externalism, or the view that the meanings of words are not psychological.

Donald Davidson uses the thought experiment of Swampman to advocate for semantic externalism. Tyler Burge uses the thought experiment of arthritis in one's thigh. Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982) provides a skeptical, rule-following paradox, undermining the possibility of our ever following rules, and so calls into question the idea of meaning.

Kripke writes this paradox is "the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date". The portmanteau "Kripkenstein" has been coined as a term for a fictional person who holds the views expressed by Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein. Alonzo Church pioneered intensional logic.

Czech philosopher Pavel Tichý developed transparent intensional logic.

See also

History of logic Paradox of analysis

Primary

Included in History, Labour, and Freedom (1988), pp. 209–238. Included in History, Labour, and Freedom (1988) pp. 255–285

      Further reading

      The London Philosophy Study Guide offers many suggestions on what to read, depending on the student's familiarity with the subject: Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein Barker-Plummer, D., Barwise, J., Etchemendy, J. (2011). Language, Proof, and Logic. United States: CSLI Publications.

      Beaney, Michael (ed.) (1997). Frege Reader. Cambridge: Wiley-Blackwell.

      Berman, Scott (2020). Platonism and the Objects of Science. London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.

      Dennett, Daniel (ed.) (1978). Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Bradford Books.

      Hirschberger, Johannes. (1976). A Short History of Western Philosophy, ed. Clare Hay.

      Short History of Western Philosophy, A. Layman, C. Stephen. (2007). Letters to Doubting Thomas: A Case for the Existence of God.

      OUP USA. Passmore, John. (1966). A Hundred Years of Philosophy, revised ed. New York: Basic Books.

      Potter, Michael (2017). Early Analytic Philosophy: From Frege to Ramsey. Routledge.

      Priest, Graham (1995). Beyond the limits of thought. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

      Priest, Graham (2008). An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

      Putnam, Hilary (1987). The Many Faces of Realism. Open Court.

      Quine, Willard Van Orman (1941). Elementary Logic: Revised Edition. Boston, MA, USA: Ginn.

      Quine, Willard Van Orman (1987). Quiddities: an intermittently philosophical dictionary. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

      Russell, Bertrand (1917). Mysticism and Logic, and Other Essays. Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble.

      Salmon, Nathan (1981). Reference and Essence. United Kingdom: Princeton University Press.

      Sorensen, Roy (2005). A Brief History of the Paradox: Philosophy and the Labyrinths of the Mind. New York: OUP USA. van Heijenoort, Jan (ed.) (1967).

      From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931 Weitz, Morris, ed. (1966). Twentieth Century Philosophy: The Analytic Tradition. New York: Free Press.

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