Belisarius
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Flavius Belisarius ( ; March 565) was a military commander of the Byzantine Empire under Emperor Justinian I. Belisarius was instrumental in the reconquest of much of the Mediterranean territory belonging to the former Western Roman Empire, which had been lost less than a century prior. He is considered one of the greatest military commanders of Byzantium and in history generally. One of the defining features of Belisarius's career was his success despite varying levels of available resources. He is frequently cited as being among the "Last of the Romans". He conquered the Vandal Kingdom of North Africa in the Vandalic War in nine months and conquered much of Italy during the Gothic War. He also defeated the Vandal armies in the battle of Ad Decimum and played an important role at Tricamarum, compelling the Vandal king, Gelimer, to surrender. During the Gothic War, despite being significantly outnumbered, he and his troops recaptured the city of Rome and then held out against great odds during the siege of Rome. After a setback at Thannurin, he won a battle against the Persians at Dara but was defeated at Callinicum. He successfully repulsed a Hunnic incursion at Melantias. He was also known for military deception; he repulsed a Persian invasion by deceiving their commander and lifted the siege of Ariminum without a fight.
Flavius Belisarius ( ; March 565) was a military commander of the Byzantine Empire under Emperor Justinian I. Belisarius was instrumental in the reconquest of much of the Mediterranean territory belonging to the former Western Roman Empire, which had been lost less than a century prior. He is considered one of the greatest military commanders of Byzantium and in history generally. One of the defining features of Belisarius's career was his success despite varying levels of available resources. He is frequently cited as being among the "Last of the Romans". He conquered the Vandal Kingdom of North Africa in the Vandalic War in nine months and conquered much of Italy during the Gothic War. He also defeated the Vandal armies in the battle of Ad Decimum and played an important role at Tricamarum, compelling the Vandal king, Gelimer, to surrender. During the Gothic War, despite being significantly outnumbered, he and his troops recaptured the city of Rome and then held out against great odds during the siege of Rome. After a setback at Thannurin, he won a battle against the Persians at Dara but was defeated at Callinicum. He successfully repulsed a Hunnic incursion at Melantias. He was also known for military deception; he repulsed a Persian invasion by deceiving their commander and lifted the siege of Ariminum without a fight.
Early life and career
Belisarius was born around 500, probably in Germaneia (modern Sapareva Banya, Bulgaria), a fortified town of which some archaeological remains still exist, within the borders of Thrace and Paeonia. He may have been born into an Thraco-Roman or Illyro-Roman family, but his ancestry is unknown. By 526, he had become a senior-level guardsman of Justinian, the nephew of Emperor Justin I. How he became one is unrecorded. He was later given permission by the emperor to form a bucellarii regiment. It consisted of elite heavy cavalry that he later expanded into a personal household regiment, 7,000 strong. Belisarius's guards formed the nucleus of all the armies he would later command. Armed with lances, (possibly Hunnish style) composite bows, and spatha (long sword), they were fully armoured to the standard of heavy cavalry of the day. A multi-purpose unit, these bucellarii were capable of shooting at a distance with bows, like the Huns, or act as heavy shock cavalry, charging an enemy with lance and sword.
Vandal War
Battle of Ad Decimum
The Byzantines were between the Vandal forces to the north and south. Gelimer needed a victory at Ad Decimum to unite his forces. With 10,000–12,000 men, the Vandals were outnumbered. The valley in which the ambush was to take place was narrow, and as two of the three roads to Carthage became one in the valley, it seemed like a great spot for an ambush to Gelimer. Ammatus, with 6,000–7,000 men, was ordered to block the northern exit and attack the Byzantines head-on, then drive them further back into the valley and cause disorder. Meanwhile, 5,000–6,000 Vandals under Gelimer were already advancing towards Belisarius from the south, as the earlier clash showed; these would be in the near vicinity when Belisarius entered the valley and would attack them from behind, after all the Byzantines had moved into the valley. Brogna states that this plan was doomed to fail, as coordination over dozens of miles was needed. However, Hughes disagrees and calls the plan "elegant and simple", but does state that the plan relied too much on hard-to-pull-off timing and synchronisation. The battle consisted of four separate stages. Four miles (6.5 km) from Ad Decimum, Belisarius found an ideal spot to camp. Leaving the infantry behind to build a camp, he rode out with his cavalry to meet the Vandals, whom he suspected were nearby. This way he left his infantry, baggage, and wife in a secure position. Unlike the large infantry force, he would easily be able to control this small force of cavalry, which was the main strength of the Byzantine army. When Belisarius arrived at the battlefield, the first three stages of the battle had already taken place. The Byzantines sent ahead to scout and the Huns guarding the flank had routed the numerically superior forces opposing them. Before Belisarius arrived at the field of battle, he encountered some units routed by Gelimer's army, who informed him of the situation in the third stage, when Gelimer himself arrived. As Belisarius arrived, Gelimer saw his brother Ammatus killed in combat. Mourning, he remained idle and allowed Belisarius to attack his force while it was in a disorganised state in the fourth and last stage of the battle.
Gothic War
In 535, Justinian commissioned Belisarius to attack the Ostrogothic Kingdom in Italy. The Ostrogothic king Theodahad had gained the throne by marriage. Power had been held, however, by the pro-Byzantine queen Amalasuintha, until Theodahad had her imprisoned and then killed. Seeing internal division similar to that in Africa, Justinian expected the Goths to be weak. Belisarius assembled 4,000 troops, which included regular troops and possibly foederati, 3,000 Isaurians, 300 Berbers and 200 Huns. In total, including his personal guards, his force numbered roughly 8,000. Belisarius landed in Sicily and took the island in order to use it as a base against Italy, while Mundus recovered Dalmatia. Justinian wanted to pressure Theodahad into relinquishing his throne and to then annex his kingdom through diplomacy and limited military action. This worked at first, but the army in the Balkans retreated. and the war continued. Belisarius pushed on in Sicily. The only Ostrogothic resistance came at Panormus, which fell after a quick siege. Here Belisarius used archer fire from the top of the masts of his ships to subdue the garrison. He made a triumphal entry to Syracuse on 31 December 535. The preparations for the invasion of the Italian mainland were interrupted in Easter 536 when Belisarius sailed to Africa to counter an uprising of the local army (as described above). His reputation made the rebels abandon the siege of Carthage, and Belisarius pursued and defeated them at Membresa. Afterwards he returned to Sicily and then crossed into mainland Italy, where he captured Naples in November and Rome in December 536. Before reaching Naples, he had met no resistance as the troops in southern Italy were disgusted by Theodahad and switched sides. At Naples a strong Gothic garrison resisted the Byzantines using its strong fortifications. Belisarius could not operate safely at Rome with such a strong garrison in his rear. He could neither storm the strong fortifications nor conduct a lengthy siege which could be interrupted by Gothic reinforcements, while bribery and negotiation attempts also failed. He couldn't use his fleet either as there was artillery on the wall. Then Belisarius cut the aqueduct, but the city had enough wells, so he resorted to making many costly, failed assaults. After their failure, Belisarius planned on abandoning the siege and marching on Rome. By chance, however, an entrance to the city via an aqueduct was found and a small Byzantine force entered the city. When this force had entered the city, Belisarius launched an all-out assault so the Goths couldn't concentrate against the intruders. Despite having taken the city by force, he showed leniency to the city and garrison, so as to entice as many other Goths to join his side or surrender later on; this way he would avoid costly action as much as possible and preserve his small force. The failure to reinforce the city caused Theodahad to be deposed. While the new Gothic king, Vitiges, had sent a garrison to Rome, the city was left undefended as the troops fled after noticing the pro-Byzantine attitude of the population. Much of Tuscany submitted willingly to Belisarius's troops at this point. Belisarius garrisoned towns on the supply lines from the Gothic heartland in the north to Rome, forcing Vitiges to besiege these towns before he could march on Rome.
Siege of Rome
]] From March 537 to March 538 Belisarius successfully defended Rome against the much larger army of Vitiges. He inflicted heavy casualties by launching many successful sorties. While the range of the horse archers Belisarius used has often been credited with the success of these raids in the terrain around Rome, this wouldn't make sense. Instead, it was the Gothic unpreparedness and the command expertise of Byzantine officers which made sure the Goths were unable to respond. When Vitiges tried to post units to prevent these raids, Belisarius sent out bigger units that encircled them; the Gothic officers proved unable to counter this. Eighteen days into the siege, the Goths launched an all-out assault, and Belisarius ordered a number of archers to shoot at the oxen pulling the siege equipment. As a result, the assault failed with heavy casualties. When the Goths retreated from a certain section of the wall, Belisarius launched an attack on their rear, inflicting extra casualties. However, when he tried to end the siege by sallying out with a large force, Vitiges used his numbers to absorb the attack and then to counter-attack, winning the battle. Regardless, Vitiges was losing the siege, so he decided to make one last attempt on the wall which ran along the Tiber, where the wall was much less formidable. He bribed men to give the guards drugged wine, but the plot was revealed and Belisarius had a traitor tortured and mutilated as a punishment. An armistice had been signed shortly before, but with both the Goths and the Byzantines openly breaking it, the war continued. By then Byzantine forces had captured Ariminum (Rimini) and approached Ravenna, so Vitiges was forced to retreat. The siege had lasted from March 537 to March 538. Belisarius sent 1,000 men to support the population of Mediolanum (Milan) against the Goths. These forces captured much of Liguria, garrisoning the major towns in the region. Belisarius captured Urbinum (Urbino) in December 538, when the Gothic garrison ran out of water after a three-day siege.
Deposition of Pope Silverius
During the siege of Rome, an incident occurred for which the general would be long condemned: Belisarius was commanded by the Empress Theodora, who supported Miaphysite Christianity, to depose the reigning Pope, who had been installed by the Goths. This Pope was the former subdeacon Silverius, the son of Pope Hormisdas. Belisarius was to replace him with the Deacon Vigilius, Apocrisarius of Pope John II in Constantinople. Vigilius had in fact been chosen in 531 by Pope Boniface II to be his successor, but this choice was strongly criticised by the Roman clergy and Boniface eventually reversed his decision. In 537, at the height of the siege, Silverius was accused of conspiring with the Gothic king and several Roman senators to secretly open the gates of the city. According to Liber Pontificalis, this accusation was levelled by Antonina, Belisarius's wife. Belisarius had him stripped of his vestments and exiled to Patara in Lycia in Asia Minor. Following the advocacy of his innocence by the bishop of Patara, he was ordered to return to Italy at the command of the Emperor Justinian, and if cleared by investigation, reinstated. However, Vigilius had already been installed in his place. Silverius was intercepted before he could reach Rome and exiled once more, this time on the island of Palmarola (Ponza), where by one account he is said to have starved to death, while others say he left for Constantinople. However that may be, he remains the patron saint of Ponza today. Belisarius, for his part, built a small oratory on the site of the present church of Santa Maria in Trivio in Rome as a sign of his repentance. He also built two hospices for pilgrims and a monastery, which have since disappeared.
Belisarius and Narses
Belisarius ordered the cavalry garrison of Ariminum to be replaced by infantry. In this way the cavalry could join with other cavalry forces and use their mobility outside of the city, while the infantry under some obscure commander guarding the city would draw less attention to the city than a strong cavalry force under John. Vitiges sent a large army to retake Mediolanum while he moved to besiege Ariminum himself. Vitiges tried to hinder the Byzantine movement by garrisoning an important tunnel on the road to Ancona. This garrison was defeated, while Vitiges had to manoeuvre himself around a number of Byzantine garrisons to avoid losing time in fighting useless engagements. Ultimately, the Byzantines were successful in reinforcing Ariminum, however, John refused to leave the city. John managed to prevent the siege tower used by the Goths from reaching the walls which caused Vitiges to withdraw. John wanted to prevent this withdrawal and sallied out but was, like Belisarius at Rome, defeated, which caused Vitiges to keep besieging the now weakened garrison. Needing fewer men, as no assault was to be made, Vitiges sent troops against Ancona and reinforced Auximus. Belisarius could either take Auximus and move on Ariminum with a secure rear, or bypass Auximus to save time. If it took too long to get there, Ariminum might fall. The Byzantines were divided into two groups; one led by Narses who wanted to move on Ariminum immediately, while the other wanted to first take Auximus. A message from John eventually convinced Belisarius to move to Ariminum. During this operation Belisarius would station a part of his forces near Auximus to secure his rear. The arrival of a Byzantine relief force under Belisarius and Narses compelled the Ostrogoths to give up the siege and retreat to their capital of Ravenna. The force had been too small to actually challenge the Goths, but through deception, Belisarius had managed to convince the Goths otherwise. Belisarius had approached from multiple sides including over the sea, which convinced the Goths they faced a huge force. The troops were also ordered by Belisarius to light more campfires than necessary to strengthen the deception. John made it a point to thank Narses for his rescue instead of Belisarius or Ildiger, the first officer to reach the city. This might have been to insult Belisarius or to avoid being indebted according to the Roman patronage tradition of which some remnants were probably still part of Byzantine culture. John (and Narses) might not have been convinced of Belisarius's competence, as the Vandals and Goths were by then perceived as weak, while he had been relatively unsuccessful against the Persians. Narses's supporters tried to turn Narses against Belisarius, claiming that a close confidant of the emperor should not take orders from a "mere general". Belisarius, in turn, warned Narses that his followers were underestimating the Goths. He pointed out that their current position was surrounded by Gothic garrisons, and proposed to relieve Mediolanum and besiege Auximus simultaneously. Narses accepted the plan, with the provision that he and his troops would move into the region of Aemilia. This would pin down the Goths at Ravenna, and as such put Belisarius's forces in a secure position, as well as preventing the Goths from reclaiming Aemilia. Narses claimed that if this wasn't done, the rear of the troops besieging Auximus would be open to attack. Belisarius ultimately decided against this, as he was afraid this would spread his troops too thin. He showed a letter from Justinian that said that he had absolute authority in Italy to act "in the best interests of the state" to force Narses into accepting the decision. Narses replied that Belisarius was not acting in the best interests of the state. From the later part of the siege of Rome onwards, reinforcements had arrived in Italy; during the siege of Ariminum, another 5,000 reinforcements landed in Italy, close to the siege where they were needed, clearly by design. The last group of reinforcements was 7,000 strong and led by Narses. After these arrived, the Byzantines had around 20,000 troops in Italy in total. John claimed that about half of the troops were loyal to Narses instead of Belisarius. Belisarius gave up his original plan and instead of sending forces to besiege Urviventus (Orvieto) and himself besieging Urbinus. Narses refused to share a camp with Belisarius and he and John claimed the city could not be taken by force and abandoned the siege. As Belisarius sent the assault forwards, the garrison surrendered, as the well in the city stopped working. Narses reacted by sending John to take Caesena. While that attack failed miserably, John quickly moved to surprise the garrison at Forocornelius (Imola), and so secured Aemilia for the Byzantines. Shortly after Belisarius's arrival, the Urviventus garrison ran out of supplies and surrendered. In late December, shortly after the siege of Urbinus and Urviventus, Belisarius sent troops to reinforce Mediolanum. Unsure of the Gothic numbers, they requested aid from John and other troops under Narses. John and the other commanders refused to follow Belisarius's order to assist, stating that Narses was their commander. Narses repeated the order but John fell ill and they paused for him to recover. Meanwhile, the revolt at Mediolanum was bloodily suppressed by the Goths. The desperate garrison had been promised safety in return for abandoning the city, which they subsequently did. As the population had revolted, they were considered traitors and many were slaughtered. Subsequently, the other cities in Liguria surrendered to avoid the same fate. Narses was subsequently recalled.
Against Persia
For his next assignment, Belisarius went to the east to fight the Persians. Unlike during the Gothic and Vandalic wars, he wasn't accompanied by his wife. The Byzantines expected that Khosrow, like in the previous year, would move through Mesopotamia, but instead, Khosrow attacked Lazica, where the population was treated poorly by the Byzantines. The Lazicans had invited Khosrow, who concealed his movement by claiming he was going to fight the Huns in the north while instead, the Huns assisted Khosrow. When Belisarius arrived in the east he sent spies to gather information. He was told that the Persians were moving north to fight the Huns. Meanwhile, Belisarius had trained and organised his troops who had been terrified of the Persians before his arrival. He decided he could attack Persia in relative safety. Some of Belisarius's officers protested, as staging an offensive would leave the Lakhmids free to raid the eastern provinces. Belisarius pointed out that the Lakhmids would be filling the next months with religious celebrations and that he would be back within two months. With the same reasoning he used in Italy for the siege of Auximus and other sieges and the marching column in Africa, he determined that Nisibis had to be taken first to secure his rear if he moved further into Persia. Meanwhile, the war was going poorly for the Byzantines to the north, Lazica was taken and a significant Byzantine garrison changed sides, possibly not having been paid for years. When Belisarius approached Nisibis he ordered a camp to be set up at a significant distance from the city. His officers protested at this, but he explained to them that this was so that if the Persians sallied out and were defeated, the Byzantines would have more time to inflict casualties during the retreat. At the battle of Rome, during the siege of Rome, Belisarius had been defeated, but much of his army was able to retreat the short distance back to the city, something which he did not want to occur when the roles were reversed. Some of his officers disagreed so vehemently that they left the main force and camped close to the city. Belisarius warned them that the Persians would attack just before the first Byzantine meal, but the officers still sent their men to get food at this time and as a result, were caught in disorder by an attack. Belisarius observed what was going on and was already marching to their aid before messengers requesting aid even arrived. He turned the tide and won the battle. Having defeated the garrison but still not being in a strong enough position to storm the fortifications, he moved past the city. He didn't fear being attacked from the rear by the garrison any more, mostly because their confidence was broken. While he besieged Sisauranon, he sent troops to raid the rich lands beyond the Tigris. While Belisarius's assaults on the city were repulsed by its 800-strong garrison and suffered heavy losses, the city ran out of supplies and the garrison changed sides. At this point, the troops raiding Persia returned home without informing Belisarius. At this point, up to a third of Belisarius's forces had caught a fever, and the Lakhmids were about to take up arms again. As he did with other major decisions, Belisarius asked his officers' opinions; they concluded they should retreat. Procopius heavily criticised this, claiming that Belisarius could have marched on and taken Ctesiphon. He had disregarded the fact that no information on Persian dispositions was available and Belisarius hadn't been able to take Sisauranon by force, making it unlikely he could have stormed Ctesiphon. In the campaign of 542, Belisarius got the Persians to call off their invasion using trickery. Khosrow had wanted to raid Byzantine territory again but Belisarius moved to the area. When Khosrow sent an ambassador, Belisarius took 6,000 of his best men with him for a meeting. Taking only hunting equipment with them, it seemed like it was a hunting party from a larger equally high-quality force. Fooled by the deception, the Persians, knowing that if they were defeated they would be trapped in Byzantine territory, retreated. Belisarius also sent 1,000 cavalry into the Persian retreat route; if an engagement was fought this might have pointed out Byzantine weakness. During the retreat, Belisarius constantly kept the pressure on, preventing Khosrow from raiding. In return for the Persian withdrawal from imperial lands, the Byzantines sent ambassadors, as the Persian ambassador had requested from Belisarius at their meeting. The meeting had been just a ruse to spy on the Byzantine troops, and as such, when Belisarius took the pressure off, Khosrow attacked some Byzantine towns. Sacking Callinicum, Khosrow could claim success. Some claimed that by not harassing Khosrow, Belisarius had made a serious error, but this view was not brought up in court. Despite Callinicum, Belisarius was acclaimed throughout the East for his success in repelling the Persians. Crucial to the success of Belisarius's deception had been Khosrow's fear of catching the plague if he remained in Byzantine territory for too long, which made maintaining a tactical position in Byzantine territory highly dangerous. By showing his best troops in the open, Belisarius made clear that his army was not weakened by the plague and seemingly not afraid to catch it.
Later life
In 562, Belisarius stood trial in Constantinople, having been accused of participating in a conspiracy against Justinian. His case was judged by the prefect of Constantinople, named Prokopius. This may have been his former secretary Procopius of Caesarea, but it is unclear. Belisarius was found guilty and remained in house arrest, but not long after, Justinian pardoned him, ordered his release, and restored him to favour at the imperial court, contrary to a later legend that Belisarius had been blinded. Belisarius and Justinian, whose partnership had increased the size of the empire by 45 per cent, died within a few months of each other in 565. Belisarius owned an estate in Rouphinianai, on the Asiatic side of the Constantinople suburbs (modern Caddebostan, Istanbul). He may have died there and been buried near one of the two churches in the area, perhaps Saints Peter and Paul.
Relationship with Antonina
In the first five chapters of his Secret History, whose reliability is debated by scholars, Procopius characterises Belisarius as a cuckolded husband, who was emotionally dependent on his debauched wife, Antonina, a former prostitute. According to the historian, Antonina had an affair with her adopted son, the young Theodosios, while on the same time she turned against her biological son Photios. Particular interest has the story where Belisarius catches Antonina and Theodosios in the basement but believes Antonina's excuse regardless of Theodosios' pants being loosen: Photios sides with Belisarius against Theodosios, while the lowest point is when Belisarius begs Photios to help him against Antonina, and to kill Theodosios. Procopius claims that the love affair was well known in the imperial court and the general was regarded as weak and ridiculous. Empress Theodora reportedly saved Antonina when Belisarius tried to charge his wife at last. Belisarius and Antonina had one daughter named Ioannina, who was engaged to Anastasios, the grandson of Theodora.
Assessment
According to military historian B.H. Liddell Hart, Belisarius, though usually outnumbered and ill-supplied, was "a master of the art of converting his weakness into strength; and the opponent's strength into a weakness": Hart concluded that, "[t]here is no parallel in history for such a series of conquests by abstention from attack."
Tactics
During his first Persian campaign, Belisarius was on the winning side once, at Dara. In his first few battles he did not hold overall command and as he was promoted soon after these defeats, his performance was probably positive. At Dara, he won a resounding victory by predicting and influencing enemy movement. When the enemy concentrated and broke through, he moved against their rear and defeated them. At the next battle, at Callinicum, he probably tried to copy his own success at Dara. However, he positioned himself at the low ground and was not able to see it when the enemy concentrated to breakthrough. He had created no reserve at all, so he was not able to plug the gap, despite superior numbers. Belisarius's failure to position himself properly, make a cohesive plan, take advantage of the terrain, and plug the created gap caused a disastrous defeat. Once the Persians had concentrated for a decisive attack, they held numerical superiority at the point of pressure, despite inferior numbers overall. In Africa, he walked accidentally into the battle of Ad Decimum. His ability to see an opportunity to gain the advantage and to take it contrasts positively with Gelimer's inactivity. As such, Hughes judges his generalship during that battle to be superior. In Italy, he mostly relied on sieges to defeat the Goths. At this he was so efficient that Totila refused to engage in them until Belisarius was unable to take the initiative due to supply shortages.
Character
At both Thannuris and Callinicum, he fled before the battle was over. While not improving the battlefield situation, this did prevent his own troops from being destroyed. At the battle of Dara, he refused to duel with a Persian champion, and instead sent a champion of his own. At Rome, however, he fought at the frontline with his soldiers. While he was not willing to take an unnecessary risk in the form of a duel, he wanted, and was able, to inspire his men in combat, and seems not to have lacked bravery. Procopius's portrayal of Belisarius being weak-willed can often also be explained with a good understanding of politics; taking action against his wife, for example, would not have been appreciated by empress Theodora at all. Just like the weak-mindedness in relation to his wife, the influence his soldiers had on him was probably not enough to convince him to move out of Rome. Instead, it was probably overconfidence on his own part. For the rest of his career, he became a cautious commander, which is in line with the notion that Belisarius knew his limits and tried to act within them. He often moved out with only a small force, with which he would have no control and communication problems. Another example of this is when at the battle of Tricamerum he merely advised John, not taking full command. He recognised John was competent and knew more about the situation, and as such John remained in overall command, winning a great victory. One of the attributes of Belisarius's campaigns was his benevolence towards soldiers and civilians alike. This caused the local population to support him, which was vital to winning, for example, the battle of Ad Decimum. Many enemy garrisons also changed sides, as they could expect leniency. It also put Gelimer under time constraints, and as such forced him to fight the battle of Tricamerum. He is also noted for his calmness in danger. At Rome, when a rumour spread that the Goths were already in the city, and his men begged him to flee, he instead sent men to verify whether the claim was true and made clear to the officers that it was his job and his alone to deal with such a situation.
Battle record
Legend as a blind beggar
, by François-André Vincent (1776). Belisarius, blinded, a beggar, is recognised by one of his former soldiers.]] According to a story that gained popularity centuries after his death, Justinian is said to have ordered Belisarius's eyes to be put out, and reduced him to the status of a homeless beggar near the Pincian Gate of Rome, condemned to asking passers-by to "give an obolus to Belisarius" ( ), before pardoning him. Philip Stanhope, a 19th-century British philologist who wrote Life of Belisarius, believed the story to be true, based on his review of the available primary sources. However, most modern scholars believe the story to be apocryphal. (1779)]] After the publication of Jean-François Marmontel's novel Bélisaire (1767), this account became a popular subject for progressive painters and their patrons in the later 18th century, who saw parallels between the actions of Justinian and the repression imposed by contemporary rulers. For such subtexts, Marmontel's novel received a public censure by Louis Legrand of the Sorbonne, which contemporary theologians regarded as a model exposition of theological knowledge and clear thinking. , as depicted in popular legend, in the painting by Jacques-Louis David (1781)]] Marmontel and the painters and sculptors depicted Belisarius as a kind of secular saint, sharing the suffering of the downtrodden poor—for example, the bust of Belisarius by the French sculptor Jean-Baptiste Stouf. The most famous of these paintings, by Jacques-Louis David, combines the themes of charity (the alms giver), injustice (Belisarius), and the radical reversal of power (the soldier who recognises his old commander). Others portray him being helped by the poor after his rejection by the powerful.
Notes
References
Sources
Primary sources
Procopius, The Secret History of the Court of Justinian, online at Gutenberg Project
Secondary sources
"Belisarius" Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 27 April 2009 R. Boss, R. Chapman, P. Garriock, Justinian's War: Belisarius, Narses and the Reconquest of the West, Montvert Publications, 1993, Glanville Downey, Belisarius: Young general of Byzantium, Dutton, 1960 Edward Gibbon has much to say on Belisarius in The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Chapter 41 online. Lillington-Martin, Christopher 2006–2013: "Pilot Field-Walking Survey near Ambar & Dara, SE Turkey", British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara: Travel Grant Report, Bulletin of British Byzantine Studies, 32 (2006), pp. 40–45 "Archaeological and Ancient Literary Evidence for a Battle near Dara Gap, Turkey, AD 530: Topography, Texts and Trenches" in: BAR – S1717, The Late Roman Army in the Near East from Diocletian to the Arab Conquest Proceedings of a colloquium held at Potenza, Acerenza and Matera, Italy edited by Ariel S. Lewin and Pietrina Pellegrini, pp. 299–311 "Roman tactics defeat Persian pride" in Ancient Warfare edited by Jasper Oorthuys, Vol. II, Issue 1 (February 2008), pp. 36–40 "Procopius, Belisarius and the Goths" in: Journal of the Oxford University History Society,(2009) Odd Alliances edited by Heather Ellis and Graciela Iglesias Rogers. , pp. 1–17, Issue 7 (Special Issue – Colloquium 2009) jouhsinfo "Source for a handbook: Reflections of the Wars in the Strategikon and archaeology" in: Ancient Warfare edited by Jasper Oorthuys, Vol. IV, Issue 3 (2010), pp. 33–37 "Secret Histories", Secret Histories, with Christopher Lillington-Martin "Hard and Soft Power on the Eastern Frontier: a Roman Fortlet between Dara and Nisibis, Mesopotamia, Turkey, Prokopios' Mindouos?" in: The Byzantinist, edited by Douglas Whalin, Issue 2 (2012), pp. 4–5, ** "La defensa de Roma por Belisario" in: Justiniano I el Grande (Desperta Ferro) edited by Alberto Pérez Rubio, 18 (July 2013), pp. 40–45, "Procopius on the struggle for Dara and Rome" in: War and Warfare in Late Antiquity: Current Perspectives (Late Antique Archaeology 8.1–8.2 2010–11) by Sarantis A. and Christie N. (eds.) (Brill, Leiden), pp. 599–630, Lord Mahon, [http://www.evolpub.com/CRE/CREseries.html#CRE1 The Life of Belisarius, 1848. Reprinted 2006 (unabridged with editorial comments) Evolution Publishing, Ancient Warfare magazine, Vol. IV, Issue 3 (Jun/Jul 2010), was devoted to "Justinian's fireman: Belisarius and the Byzantine empire", with articles by Sidney Dean, Duncan B. Campbell, Ian Hughes, Ross Cowan, Raffaele D'Amato, and Christopher Lillington-Martin Hanson, Victor Davis. The Savior Generals: How Five Great Commanders Saved Wars That Were Lost. Bloomsbury Press, 2013. online edition
Further reading
External links
Military History magazine article
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1378997828 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.