Bid rigging
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Bid rigging is a fraudulent scheme in a procurement action that enables companies to submit non-competitive bids. It can be performed by corrupt officials, by firms in an orchestrated act of collusion, or by officials and firms acting together. This form of collusion is illegal in most countries. It is a form of price fixing and market allocation, often practiced where contracts are determined by a call for bids, for example in the case of government construction contracts. The typical objective of bid rigging is to enable the "winning" party to obtain contracts at uncompetitive prices (i.e., at higher prices if they are sellers, or lower prices if they are buyers). The other parties are compensated in various ways, for example, by cash payments, or by being designated to be the "winning" bidder on other contracts, or by an arrangement where some parts of the successful bidder's contract will be subcontracted to them. In this way, they "share the spoils" among themselves. Bid rigging almost always results in economic harm to the agency which is seeking the bids, and to the public, who ultimately bear the costs as taxpayers or consumers.
Bid rigging is a fraudulent scheme in a procurement action that enables companies to submit non-competitive bids. It can be performed by corrupt officials, by firms in an orchestrated act of collusion, or by officials and firms acting together. This form of collusion is illegal in most countries. It is a form of price fixing and market allocation, often practiced where contracts are determined by a call for bids, for example in the case of government construction contracts. The typical objective of bid rigging is to enable the "winning" party to obtain contracts at uncompetitive prices (i.e., at higher prices if they are sellers, or lower prices if they are buyers). The other parties are compensated in various ways, for example, by cash payments, or by being designated to be the "winning" bidder on other contracts, or by an arrangement where some parts of the successful bidder's contract will be subcontracted to them. In this way, they "share the spoils" among themselves. Bid rigging almost always results in economic harm to the agency which is seeking the bids, and to the public, who ultimately bear the costs as taxpayers or consumers.
Forms
As acts of corruption
Change order abuse occurs when a contractor colludes with project officials, wins a low bid, and asks to change the contract afterwards. That is approved by officials, resulting in a much higher bid being retroactively approved. Bidder exclusion allows project officials to essentially choose their bid. There are multiple methods to achieve that, like the following: Instituting unreasonable qualification parameters, excluding non-preferred firms, or effectuating the same by shortening the time of acceptance periods for new bids following a request. Advertising projects to select bidders or bidding markets, thereby reducing publicity of bid procurement. Bundling of contracts to exclude bidders. Coercion and intimidation can also be used, as well as the simple rejection of individual bids over trivial matters. Purchase splitting to reduce the minimum bid amount. That functions as contracts are split up to reduce the actual procurement amount and keep it under a threshold value. That reduces competitive bidding and enables less oversight at the project level as bid prices drop and kickbacks can be allotted. Leaking of bid information, which requires a relationship of some degree between the project and a bidder as the bidder is handed information to gain an unfair advantage. Bid manipulation is another method for officials to choose the bidder of their choice but occurs after receipt of bids. The methods for this would include either changing bid parameters, evaluation processes, or other activity to effectively select the bidder of choice. Rigged Specifications allow more bidder exclusion by officials by either tailoring requests to individual bidders or creating a vague criterion to reasonably choose a preferred bidder. Unbalanced bidding involves high bid prices for commencing phases of development and low prices for later stages. That effectively increases the flow of funds for the bidding firm. This occurs when bidders cite high prices for items, intending to raise the number of units and purchase them at a competitive rate while simultaneously skimming profits from the artificially high bid price. Additionally, bidders may give low quotes for non-necessary items (knowledge gained through collusion or experience) to disadvantage other firms as their bid amount is more competitive. This also serves to increase the cost of entry for new firms. Unjustified sole source awards are bids chosen on criteria unrelated to their competitiveness. That can be performed blatantly, by falsifying bids, or by price splitting.
Detection
In the UK, the Competition and Markets Authority published an open letter in 20161 aiming to promote good practice among procurement and supply staff, and detailing indications they should watch out for.
Remediation
Bid rigging is an illegal practice under the criminal or competition laws of most developed countries. Depending on the jurisdiction, it is punishable by fines, imprisonment or both. At a very basic level, there would likely be more competitive bidding if there were more firms present in a market, outside of a cartel, as evidence shows that bids lessen in value as the number of firms rises. Furthermore, collusion becomes less frequent with better market competitiveness, a result of reduced ability to compromise. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in its work on bid-rigging and cartels in public procurement, makes the following suggestions for better tenders: Developing expertise and awareness of the market for which a tender is being designed. Maximizing the number of bids and potential contractors for enhanced competition among proposals. Striving for clarity in requirements and details. Reducing the potential for communication between bidders and procurement officials and adhering to a strict criterion and process of evaluation. Suggestions for ameliorating procurement auctions have also been put forth. Lengstein and Wolfstetter suggest that when a particular bidder is preferred, disregarding cost, possible reforms include a sealed Vickrey auction, or if there is reason to believe that officials and bidders are in contact, an open auction is preferred to sidestep potential bribery. When officials are engaged in more competitive procurement processes with regard to price but are suspected of kickbacks, a potential solution is the open auction to prevent clandestine arrangements such as change order abuse. If a closed or sealed auction process is preferred, the use of electronic bidding and investment in tamper-resistant systems is suggested. Bid rigging occurs frequently in the construction industry in Switzerland. In 2007, seventeen different firms were involved in a bid rigging scheme, but there was no prosecution as the ring had disbanded before colluding. In 2009, a ring of seven electricity firms from Bern was charged with bid rigging and fined two million Swiss francs. In Aargau, in 2011, a bid rigging scheme was discovered wherein seventeen firms were fined eight million Swiss francs, though the appeals are ongoing. Multiple other cases are still ongoing.
Japan
Although both a violation of Japanese criminal law and the Japan Anti-Monopoly Law, bid rigging is still a habitual practice of the Japanese construction industry. It has been shown by a number of academic studies both in Japan and in the US to be a system which considerably inflates the cost of construction projects, and in the Japanese public sector, considerably wasteful of annual tax money amounting to billions of Japanese yen. Dango refers to collusion in Japanese, or more precisely, "conference", and is an extremely prevalent system in Japan. Dango can be understood as a mutually beneficial system of bureaucracy and government and the private construction industry wherein bid rigging is incredibly common, benefiting colluding firms and officials alike in the form of kickbacks. The system of dango is often supported, though, as allowing small firms to continue to compete, though detractors are quick to point to the economic inefficiencies presented by a non-competitive market. The US Government, specifically the United States Trade Representative Office and Department of Commerce, made fierce efforts in the late 1980s and early 1990s to urge the Japanese government to reform dango as a de facto non-tariff barrier to foreign firms in the Japanese construction market. Despite years of negotiations, including promises by the Japanese government in the Structural Impediment Initiative (SII) trade talks, the practice was never fully stamped out and continued to flourish. In 2006, Tadahiro Ando, the then governor of Miyazaki Prefecture, resigned over a series of bid rigging allegations and was subsequently sentenced to over three years in jail. As of 2008, thirteen lawsuits were still pending over 1990s' bid rigging for local government contracts to supply incinerator plants.
See also
Bribery Cartel Collusion Corruption Operation Car Wash Organized crime Price fixing
Further reading
References
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1373034784 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.