Cestui que
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( ; also , ) is a historical Law French term denoting beneficiary status in a trust. Specifically, the term refers to any person or persons for whose benefit the trust is explicitly created. Unless restricted by the trust instrument, any such party is fully entitled to the equitable interests as outlined such as annual rents/produce/interest of the property forming the trust assets in question. The term is no longer common in modern trusts law.
( ; also , ) is a historical Law French term denoting beneficiary status in a trust. Specifically, the term refers to any person or persons for whose benefit the trust is explicitly created. Unless restricted by the trust instrument, any such party is fully entitled to the equitable interests as outlined such as annual rents/produce/interest of the property forming the trust assets in question. The term is no longer common in modern trusts law.
Etymology
The term itself is derived from a longer Law French phrase of medieval English invention: " ", . The shortened version appears in a number of legal phrases, including , , or . and trust are often used interchangeably, and in some medieval documents this is sometimes also written as . In the discourse of jurisprudence as well as legal history, cestui que has frequently been used in reference to the relative novelty of the trust as a legal concept.
Uses and subcategories
There are two subsets of cestui que: cestui que use and cestui que trust. These are shown in the following examples. Land is granted to or held by A, for the use of B in trust for the duration of his or her life. When B dies, the remainder goes to C. In this case, A is the trustee, B is , and C is the trust. If B and C are the same person, which is often the case, the two terms will both refer to that same person. While common, a life-long duration is not essential; it can also last for a term of years, a shorter period, or for the life of another person. While still used by some members of the judiciary and legal writers, cestui que and its derived terms have fallen out of everyday use in most modern legal parlance. In general trust law, it has largely been supplanted by the term beneficiary (where a similar sub-distinction is made: the life tenant and the beneficiary in remainder).
Original purposes
Both of the aforementioned categories of are rooted in the feudal law dominant in most of European Christendom during the Middle Ages. As a concept, it originated as a means to avoid feudal levies (most forms of servitude) due to an overlord by passing land on for the use of another person, namely one free of such obligations. The law of tended to defer jurisdiction to courts of equity as opposed to the less flexible common law courts. The device was often used by people who might be absent from the kingdom for an extended time (as on a Crusade, or a business venture), who held a tenancy in the land and in return owed feudal incidents (services) to the landlord. This would allow the land to be left for the use of a third party. Any such "in trust" legal status was partly to circumvent the Statute of Mortmain, which sought to end the relatively common practice of leaving real property (land, milling rights, markets, fisheries) to the Church (meaning any of its branches) following the tenant's death, so as to avoid dues (inquisitions post mortem) which could, if left unpaid, lead to reversion or repossession of the tenancy to the landlord. Two concepts explain the origin of ("dead hand"): first, it can be interpreted in reference to the desire of the deceased donor and former owner to pass on properties to the Church; second, because the Church (a legal person recognized by the common law) is not a person but an institution that could never die or be declared dead in the legal sense, the land never leaves its "dead hand". Before Edward I issued the statutes between 1278 and 1290, vast tracts of land were left directly to the Church, which never relinquished it. Other land could be transferred to anyone, inherited only through a family line (sometimes only the male line), or revert to an over-lord or the Crown upon the death of the tenant. The Church's accumulation of land had been a source of contention between the Crown and the Church for centuries. Creating a trust in such a way allowed the Church to continue reaping material benefit from the lands in question, because the legal title of ownership (meaning right to transfer if needed and gain or lose in capital) would be transferred to a corporation of lawyers or other entities (trustees) legally separate from but acting on behalf of the Church to maintain the status quo before the statute.
Society for Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of New Haven (1823)
The 1823 case of Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of New Haven looked at the issue of lands granted to an English corporate body, the "Society" which had a religious purpose. The land had been granted by King George III of Great Britain in New Hampshire in 1761. It was held in corporation by a form of . On 30 October 1794, the State of Vermont passed a statute whereby the land of the Society would be appropriated by the state. The Supreme Court was divided in its opinion. It ruled that the property of English corporations at the time of the Revolution were protected by the Treaty of Peace, 1783. See Treaty of Paris (1783), Treaty of Versailles (1783). There could be no confiscations of such corporate holdings or lands because of the treaty.
United States case law of recovery from disseisee in cestui que
A few American jurisdictions place unusual burdens on a purchaser to ensure their transaction will be upheld. A purchaser or grantee from a person whose land is adversely held is precluded from maintaining an action in their own name to oust the adverse possessor and any other legal possessor. A conveyance of such land is champertous and void. The limited (adverse) title to the land remains in the grantor and the grantee cannot maintain an action for breach of the covenant in the conveyance. The fact that the transaction was fair and bona fide (with no legal connection between the parties being at arm's length, without notice and for value) does not change the rule. It has been said that the common law doctrine is obsolete, not being suitable to conditions and circumstances of the people of this country. Possession by a trust is not adverse to his trustee, and such possession will not void the latter to be champertous.
Examples of the rule against perpetuities
Example 1: Alex leaves property in trust to Bill to hold for the benefit of Alex's children during their lives and on the death of the last survivor of Alex's children, to distribute the principle to Alex's grandchildren then living. At Alex's death he has three children living, C1, C2 and C3. It is certain that the remainder to the grandchildren will vest at the death of one of the three whose life will span both the time of the creation of the interest (Alex's death) and the vesting of the interest (his own death). It is unnecessary to determine whether it will be C1, C2 or C3. Example 2: Alphonse leaves property to Brandon in a trust to pay the income to St. John's Church, located in Anytown, so long as it conducts its regular services in accordance with the Book of Common Prayer, 1789 Version. If at any time it should discontinue this practice, then the trust income reverts to St. Matthew's Church. This is a valid contingency. Example 3: Beth leaves property in trust to hold for Mary's children for life and on the death of Mary's last surviving child, the property reverts to Mary's living female grandchildren. If no female grandchild is living, then the property reverts to the Cathedral School for Girls. Mary is living at the time of Beth's death. The gift to the Cathedral School is void. Example 4: Albert leaves property to Thomas in trust to pay the income to St. Mark's Church so long as it conducts its regular services in accordance with the Book of Common Prayer, 1789 Version. If at any time in the future, it should discontinue to so conduct its services in such a manner, the income passes to Robert, or Robert's heirs then living. The gift over is void because it may remain contingent for a period longer than the rule against perpetuities. It makes no difference that it is preceded by a gift to charity. Example 5: Martin leaves property to Joseph in trust to hold for the benefit of St. Vincent's Church if it should adopt a new liturgy proposed by the religious convention held in 1970. The gift is void. The contingency may not occur within the period of the Rule. There is no exception for a gift to charity under such circumstances.
Wait and see rule
A wait and see approach time-fetters litigants seeking to void a trust on the grounds of a potential, later or residuary use invalidity, due to alleged perpetuity. Under this, the court may decide validity of future estates only once the prior estate has vested in another or ended and then tests whether the interest violates the rule by the events which have actually happened rather than adjudicating on all the possibilities drawn up.
See also
Trust law
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1365294937 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.