chaebol
≈ 9 min read
Names in other languages
- Englishchaebol
- EspañolChaebol
- Françaischaebol
- ItalianoChaebol
- MagyarCsebol
- Polskiczebol
- Русскийчеболь
- 한국어재벌
Article bodies are English and are not machine-translated. A name in another language is not a translation of the article.
A chaebol ( ; ) is a type of large industrial South Korean conglomerate run and controlled by an individual or family. A chaebol often consists of multiple diversified affiliates, controlled by a person or group. Several dozen large South Korean family-controlled corporate groups fall under this definition. The term first appeared in English text in 1972. Chaebol have also played a significant role in South Korean politics. In 1988, a member of a chaebol family, Chung Mong-joon, president of Hyundai Heavy Industries, successfully ran for the National Assembly of South Korea. Other business leaders were also chosen to be members of the National Assembly through proportional representation. Hyundai has made efforts in the thawing of North Korean relations, despite some controversy. Many South Korean family-run chaebol have been criticized "for low dividend payouts and other governance practices that favor controlling shareholders at the expense of ordinary investors."
A chaebol ( ; ) is a type of large industrial South Korean conglomerate run and controlled by an individual or family. A chaebol often consists of multiple diversified affiliates, controlled by a person or group. Several dozen large South Korean family-controlled corporate groups fall under this definition. The term first appeared in English text in 1972. Chaebol have also played a significant role in South Korean politics. In 1988, a member of a chaebol family, Chung Mong-joon, president of Hyundai Heavy Industries, successfully ran for the National Assembly of South Korea. Other business leaders were also chosen to be members of the National Assembly through proportional representation. Hyundai has made efforts in the thawing of North Korean relations, despite some controversy. Many South Korean family-run chaebol have been criticized "for low dividend payouts and other governance practices that favor controlling shareholders at the expense of ordinary investors."
1990–present
Group, once the second-largest conglomerate in South Korea By the 1990s, South Korea was one of the largest newly industrialised countries and boasted a standard of living comparable to industrialized countries. President Kim Young-sam began to challenge the chaebol, but it was not until the 19971 Asian financial crisis that the weaknesses of the system were widely understood. Initially, the crisis was caused by a speculative attack on the Thai baht, which lead to a sharp drop in its value and immediate cash flow concerns needed to pay foreign debts; widespread foreign investment and financial deregulation across East Asia allowed foreign investors to attack the values of the national currencies of other countries in the region, including South Korea, which spread the financial crisis to the affected countries and caused a downward spiral in the value of the South Korean won. As a result, chaebols, which at this point were overleveraged in short-term debts and already suffering from falling export prices, started going bankrupt: of the 30 largest chaebols, 11 collapsed during the financial crisis. The remaining chaebols also became far more specialized in their focus. For example, with a population ranked 26th in the world, before the crisis, the country had seven major automobile manufacturers. Afterward, only two major manufacturers remained intact, though two additional ones continued, in a smaller capacity, under General Motors and Renault. Chaebol debts were not only to state industrial banks but also to independent banks and their financial services subsidiaries. The scale of the loan defaults meant that banks could neither foreclose nor write off bad loans without themselves collapsing, so the failure to service these debts quickly caused a systemic banking crisis, and South Korea turned to the IMF for assistance. The most spectacular example came in mid-1999, with the collapse of the Daewoo Group, which had some US$80 billion in unpaid debt. At the time, it was the largest corporate bankruptcy in history. Investigations also exposed widespread corruption in the chaebols, particularly fraudulent accounting, and bribery. South Korea recovered quickly from the crisis, and most of the blame for economic problems was shifted to the IMF, which had forced the government to adopt 30% interest rate in exchange for a US$55 billion bailout. The remaining chaebols have grown substantially since the crisis, but they have maintained far lower debt levels. In 2019, the revenue of the largest chaebol, Samsung, was worth about of the South Korean GDP with the company holding billions of dollars in cash. In 2023, the revenue of the top four chaebols (Samsung, SK, Hyundai, and LG) was of the South Korean GDP, and the top thirty chaebol were of GDP.
Emergence and inflation
The origins of the modern chaebol system in South Korea came as a consequence of the Korean War. The war resulted in much destruction and halted industrial production, which led the government to print money to pay for the war and meet the requirements of the United Nations forces for the Korean currency, all of which caused mass inflation. This inflation caused many commodity prices to double every six months. The government had to react and so devised a plan in providing strong financial incentives to private companies between the 1960s and 1970s. These included the government's choosing to select various family businesses to distribute the incentives (imported raw materials, commodities, bank loans). The impact was immediate, and most of the businesses flourished rapidly. The protection of infant companies allowed them to develop because of the highly regulated market, which prevented foreign companies from entering. Many companies that were not in the circle of businesses saw the system as flawed and corrupted. Corruption scandals have occurred periodically in all chaebols. Such incidents suggest a form of "crony capitalism" which is common in developing countries.
Internal market transactions accountability
Because the government gave out incentives to help businesses, it had a lot of control over them. However, there was no way to ensure the businesses would use the incentives effectively and efficiently. In other words, there was no external monitoring system to monitor chaebols and ensure that they were efficient in the allocation of resources. All businesses undertake internal market transactions, which constitute "purchase and sale of intermediate inputs, the provision and receipt of loan collaterals, and the provision and receipt of payment guarantees among member firms in a business group". There is the question of efficiency, especially in production and management. Therefore, the chaebol system was not very transparent. Behind the scenes, businesses were provided with subsidiary financing and intragroup transactions. This allowed them easy loans to cover their deficits, and before the 1997 Asian financial crisis, huge debts had accumulated, many of which were hidden. That gave the illusion that the system was flourishing into the 1990s.
Relationship with foreign investors
According to the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, the majority of South Korea's economy is driven by exports. South Korea is one of the leading exporters worldwide. Additionally, the majority of investors in the Korean stock market are foreign investors. Out of 711 listed companies in the Korean stock market, approximately 683 have shares that are held by foreign investors. Nearly a third of the market's value is owned by foreigners, a trend that is expected to continue. Because of their major role in the Korean stock market, foreign investors play a massive part in whether or not chaebol conglomerates remain financially successful. Foreign investors tend to avoid chaebols, especially those that displayed heavy political influence in South Korea, like Samsung and Hyundai. Investors are reluctant to invest in large control-ownership disparity businesses because these companies tended to cheat shareholders to have higher personal financial gain. This information is extremely helpful, especially when it comes to determining how these corrupt conglomerates are still heavily supported, considering foreign investors show little interest in them. However, a study published in the Journal of the Japanese and International Economies found that after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, foreign investment behavioural patterns changed drastically. While foreign investors like to hold shares in large companies with high profit and liquidity margins, they do not show any particular interest in either chaebol or non-chaebol companies. As of January 2025, many Chaebol corporations have a high share of foreign investors, with Samsung Electronics at , Hyundai Motors at , and SK Hynics at . Nonetheless, chaebols are still able to survive, highlighting just how much power and aid they receive from the Korean government.
"Too big to fail"
During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, bankers feared that chaebols would go bankrupt so they allowed these businesses to roll over their loans each time they were unable to repay their debts. Many did not believe that the chaebols were capable of collapsing and that the more they borrowed, the safer they were. However, the theory was proven wrong when many businesses collapsed during the crisis. Since they were linked through debt guarantees, many of the companies fell into a chain reaction. The focus on capacity expansion created debt that was manageable when the economy was growing. However, when the economy stalled, debt-to-equity ratios became a huge problem. Since the crisis, chaebols had less debt and were less vulnerable to similar crises, as was demonstrated in the 2008 crisis. With the growth of the fewer remaining chaebols, however, each of them occupies a larger portion of the economy, with the largest chaebols making up (by sales revenue) a substantial portion of South Korea's GDP.
Regulation
Some competition laws were passed to attempt to limit the expansion of chaebol: Law for separate finance from industry ( ): Chaebols may no longer have banks since 1982 Law for the limit of investment ( ): A chaebol's growth by M&A was limited until 2009 Law for the limit of assurance ( ): Defends the insolvency of a chaebol's affiliates
Notes
Citations
"Unfinished Business," The Economist, 17 April 2003 "Web site: South Korean conglomerates," The Economist, 11 December 1997 Whitmore, Stuart and Nakarmi, Laxmi. "Guide to the Groups: The pecking order of the top 20 chaebols," Asiaweek, 10 October 1997. S.Korea's Samsung president resigns over corruption scandal
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1378806559 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.