Common value auction
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In common value auctions the value of the item for sale is identical amongst bidders, but bidders have different information about the item's value. This stands in contrast to a private value auction where each bidder's private valuation of the item is different and independent of peers' valuations. A classic example of a pure common values auction is when a jar full of quarters is auctioned off. The jar will be worth the same amount to anyone. However, each bidder has a different guess about how many quarters are in the jar.
Other, real-life examples include Treasury bill auctions, initial public offerings, spectrum auctions, very prized paintings, art pieces, antiques etc. One important phenomenon occurring in common value auctions is the winner's curse. Bidders have only estimates of the value of the good. If, on average, bidders are estimating correctly, the highest bid will tend to have been placed by someone who overestimated the good's value. This is an example of adverse selection, similar to the classic "lemons" example of Akerlof.
Rational bidders will anticipate the adverse selection, so that even though their information will still turn out to have been overly optimistic when they win, they do not pay too much on average.…
In common value auctions the value of the item for sale is identical amongst bidders, but bidders have different information about the item's value. This stands in contrast to a private value auction where each bidder's private valuation of the item is different and independent of peers' valuations. A classic example of a pure common values auction is when a jar full of quarters is auctioned off. The jar will be worth the same amount to anyone. However, each bidder has a different guess about how many quarters are in the jar.
Other, real-life examples include Treasury bill auctions, initial public offerings, spectrum auctions, very prized paintings, art pieces, antiques etc. One important phenomenon occurring in common value auctions is the winner's curse. Bidders have only estimates of the value of the good. If, on average, bidders are estimating correctly, the highest bid will tend to have been placed by someone who overestimated the good's value. This is an example of adverse selection, similar to the classic "lemons" example of Akerlof.
Rational bidders will anticipate the adverse selection, so that even though their information will still turn out to have been overly optimistic when they win, they do not pay too much on average. Sometimes the term winner's curse is used differently, to refer to cases in which naive bidders ignore the adverse selection and bid sufficiently more than a fully rational bidder would that they actually pay more than the good is worth.
This usage is prevalent in the experimental economics literature, in contrast with the theoretical and empirical literatures on auctions. Common-value auctions and private-value auctions are two extremes. Between these two extremes are interdependent value auctions (also called: affiliated value auctions), where bidder's valuations (e.g., \theta_i = \theta + \nu_i ) can have a common value component ( \theta ) and a private value ( \nu_i ) component.
The two components can be correlated so that one bidder's private valuation can influence another bidder's valuation. These types of auctions comprise most real-world auctions and are sometimes confusingly referred to as common value auctions also. PROOF: Suppose that there was such an equilibrium b. This is a function from a signal to a bid, i.e., a player with signal x bids b(x). Clearly b(low)=0, since a player with low signal knows with certainty that the true value is 0 and does not want to pay anything for it.
Also, b(high) ≤ V, otherwise there will be no gain in participation. Suppose bidder 1 has b1(high)=B1 > 0. We are searching the best-response for bidder 2, b2(high)=B2. There are several cases: The other bidder bids B2 B1. Then, his expected gain is 1/2 times −B2, plus 1/2 times [V− B2] (since in that case, he wins the item with probability 1). The total expected gain is (2 V − 4 B2)/4. The latter expression is positive only when B2 v_i = a\cdot s_i + b\cdot s_{-i} where a,b are constants ( a=1,b=0 means private values; a=b means common values).
Here, there is a unique SBNE in which each player bids: b(s_i) = (a+b)\cdot s_i This result is in contrast to the private-value case, where in SBNE each player truthfully bids her value (see second-price sealed-bid auction). Xenia sees X := A + B ; Yakov sees Y := B + C ; The common value of the item is V := (X+Y)/2 = (A + 2B + C)/2 . Below we consider several auction formats and find a SBNE in each of them. For simplicity we look for SBNE in which each bidder bids r times his/her signal: Xenia bids r\cdot X and Yakov bids r\cdot Y .
We try to find the value of r in each case. In a sealed-bid second-price auction, there is a SBNE with r=1 , i.e., each bidder bids exactly his/her signal. PROOF: The proof takes the point-of-view of Xenia. We assume that she knows that Yakov bids r Y , but she does not know Y . We find the best response of Xenia to Yakov's strategy. Suppose Xenia bids Z . There are two cases: Z\geq r Y . Then Xenia wins and enjoys a net gain of V - r Y = (X + Y - 2 r Y)/2 . Z . Then Xenia loses and her net gain is 0.
All in all, Xenia's expected gain (given her signal X) is: \int_{Y=0}^{Z / r} {X + Y - 2 r Y\over 2}\cdot f(Y|X) dY where f(Y|X) is the conditional probability-density of Y given X. By the Fundamental theorem of calculus, the derivative of this expression as a function of Z is just {1\over r}{X + Z/r - 2 Z\over 2}\cdot f(Z/r|X) . This is zero when X = 2 Z - Z/r . So, the best response of Xenia is to bid Z = {r X \over 2r-1} . In a symmetric BNE, Xenia bids Z = r X . Comparing the latter two expressions implies that r=1 .
The expected auctioneer's revenue is: = E[\min(X,Y)] = E[B+\min(A,C)] = E[B] + E[\min(A,C)] = 18 + 12 = 30 In a Japanese auction, the outcome is the same as in the second-price auction, since information is revealed only when one of the bidders exits, but in this case the auction is over. So each bidder exits at his observation. In the above example, in a first-price sealed-bid auction, there is a SBNE with r=2/3 , i.e., each bidder bids 2/3 of his/her signal. PROOF: The proof takes the point-of-view of Xenia.
We assume that she knows that Yakov bids r Y , but does not know Y . We find the best response of Xenia to Yakov's strategy. Suppose Xenia bids Z . There are two cases: Z\geq r Y . Then Xenia wins and enjoys a net gain of V-Z = (X+Y-2Z)/2 . Z . Then Xenia loses and her net gain is 0. All in all, Xenia's expected gain (given her signal X and her bid Z) is: G(X,Z) = \int_{Y=0}^{Z/r} {X+Y-2Z \over 2}\cdot f(Y|X) dY where f(Y|X) is the conditional probability-density of Y given X.
Since Y = X + C - A , the conditional probability-density of Y is: f(Y|X) = Y-(X-1) when X-1\leq Y\leq X f(Y|X) = (X+1)-Y when X\leq Y\leq X+1 Substituting this into the above formula gives that the gain of Xenia is: G(X,Z) = {1\over r^3} (X Z^2 r / 2 + Z^3 / 3 - Z^3 r) This has a maximum when Z = {r X \over 3r-1} . But, since we want a symmetric BNE, we also want to have Z = r X . These two equalities together imply that r = 2/3 .
The expected auctioneer's revenue is: = E[\max(f X,f Y)] = (2/3) E[B+\max(A,C)] = (2/3) (E[B] + E[\max(A,C)]) = (2/3) (18 + 24) = 28 Note that here, the revenue equivalence principle does NOT hold—the auctioneer's revenue is lower in a first-price auction than in a second-price auction (revenue-equivalence holds only when the values are independent).
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