Competitive equilibrium
≈ 6 min read
Names in other languages
No names in other languages are held for this entry yet.
Article bodies are English and are not machine-translated. A name in another language is not a translation of the article.
Competitive equilibrium (also called: Walrasian equilibrium) is a concept of economic equilibrium, introduced by Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu in 1951, appropriate for the analysis of commodity markets with flexible prices and many traders, and serving as the benchmark of efficiency in economic analysis. It relies crucially on the assumption of a competitive environment where each trader decides upon a quantity that is so small compared to the total quantity traded in the market that their individual transactions have no influence on the prices. Competitive markets are an ideal standard by which other market structures are evaluated.
Competitive equilibrium (also called: Walrasian equilibrium) is a concept of economic equilibrium, introduced by Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu in 1951, appropriate for the analysis of commodity markets with flexible prices and many traders, and serving as the benchmark of efficiency in economic analysis. It relies crucially on the assumption of a competitive environment where each trader decides upon a quantity that is so small compared to the total quantity traded in the market that their individual transactions have no influence on the prices.
Competitive markets are an ideal standard by which other market structures are evaluated. \sum_{i=1}^n X_i = \sum_{i=1}^n E_i . Individual Rationality: all agents are better-off after the trade than before the trade: \forall i\in 1,\dots,n: X_i \succeq_i E_i . Budget Balance: all agents can afford their allocation given their endowment: \forall i\in 1,\dots,n: P(X_i) \leq P(E_i) . And the MRS_{Jane} = P_x / P_y ; MRS_{Kelvin} = P_x / P_y . The marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of Jane equals that of Kelvin.
Therefore, the 2 individuals society reaches Pareto efficiency, where there is no way to make Jane or Kelvin better off without making the other worse off. 2. Arithmetic example: suppose that both agents have Cobb–Douglas utilities: u_J(x,y) = x^a y^{1-a} u_K(x,y) = x^b y^{1-b} where a,b are constants. Suppose the initial endowment is E=[(1,0), (0,1)] .
The demand function of Jane for x is: x_J(p_x,p_y,I_J) = \frac{a\cdot I_J}{p_x} = \frac{a\cdot (1\cdot p_x)}{p_x} = a The demand function of Kelvin for x is: x_K(p_x,p_y,I_K) = \frac{b\cdot I_K}{p_x} = \frac{b\cdot p_y}{p_x} The market clearance condition for x is: x_J + x_K = E_{J,x} + E_{K,x} = 1 This equation yields the equilibrium price ratio: \frac{p_y}{p_x} = \frac{1-a}{b} We could do a similar calculation for y, but this is not needed, since Walras' law guarantees that the results will be the same.
Note that in CE, only relative prices are determined; we can normalize the prices, e.g., by requiring that p_x+p_y=1 . Then we get p_x=\frac{b}{1+b-a}, p_y=\frac{1-a}{1+b-a} . But any other normalization will also work. 3. Non-existence example: Suppose the agents' utilities are: u_J(x,y)=u_K(x,y) = \max(x,y) and the initial endowment is [(2,1),(2,1)]. In CE, every agent must have either only x or only y (the other product does not contribute anything to the utility so the agent would like to exchange it away).
Hence, the only possible CE allocations are [(4,0),(0,2)] and [(0,2),(4,0)]. Since the agents have the same income, necessarily p_y = 2 p_x . But then, the agent holding 2 units of y will want to exchange them for 4 units of x. 4. For existence and non-existence examples involving linear utilities, see Linear utility#Examples. D. Unit-demand consumers: There are n consumers. Each consumer has an index i=1,...,n . There is a single type of good. Each consumer i wants at most a single unit of the good, which gives him a utility of u(i) .
The consumers are ordered such that u is a weakly increasing function of i . If the supply is k\leq n units, then any price p satisfying u(n-k)\leq p\leq u(n-k+1) is an equilibrium price, since there are k consumers that either want to buy the product or indifferent between buying and not buying it. Note that an increase in supply causes a decrease in price. All goods are desirable. This means that, if any good j is given for free ( p_j=0 ), then all agents want as much as possible from that good. The proof proceeds in several steps. A.
For concreteness, assume that there are n agents and k divisible goods. Normalize the prices such that their sum is 1, i.e. \sum_{j=1}^k p_j = 1 . Then the space of all possible prices is the k-1 -dimensional unit simplex in \mathbb{R}^k . We call this simplex the price simplex. B. Let z be the excess demand function.
This is a function of the price vector p when the initial endowment E is kept constant: z(p) = \sum_{i=1}^n \left ( {x_i(p, p\cdot E_i) - E_i} \right ) It is known that, when the agents have strictly convex preferences, the Marshallian demand function is continuous. Hence, z is also a continuous function of p . C.
Define the following function from the price simplex to itself: g_i(p) = \frac{p_i + \max(0, z_i(p))}{1 + \sum_{j=1}^k \max(0,z_j(p))}, \forall i\in 1,\dots,k This is a continuous function, so by the Brouwer fixed-point theorem there is a price vector p^* such that: p^* = g(p^*) so, p^*_i = \frac{p_i + \max(0, z_i(p))}{1 + \sum_{j=1}^k \max(0,z_j(p))}, \forall i\in 1,\dots,k D. Using Walras' law and some algebra, it is possible to show that for this price vector, there is no excess demand in any product, i.e: z_j(p^*) \leq 0, \forall j\in 1,\dots,k E.
The desirability assumption implies that all products have strictly positive prices: p_j > 0, \forall j\in 1,\dots,k By Walras' law, p^* \cdot z(p^*) = 0 . But this implies that the inequality above must be an equality: z_j(p^*) = 0, \forall j\in 1,\dots,k This means that p^* is a price vector of a competitive equilibrium. Note that Linear utilities are only weakly convex, so they do not qualify for the Arrow–Debreu model. However, David Gale proved that a CE exists in every linear exchange economy satisfying certain conditions.
For details see Linear utilities#Existence of competitive equilibrium. Algorithms for computing the market equilibrium are described in market equilibrium computation.
References
External links
Competitive equilibrium, Walrasian equilibrium and Walrasian auction in Economics Stack Exchange.
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1373886291 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.