EFAIL
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Efail, also written EFAIL, is a security hole in email systems with which content can be transmitted in encrypted form. This gap allows attackers to access the decrypted content of an email if it contains active content like HTML or JavaScript, or if loading of external content has been enabled in the client. Affected email clients include Gmail, Apple Mail, and Microsoft Outlook. Two related Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures IDs, , have been issued. The security gap was made public on 13 May 2018 by Damian Poddebniak, Christian Dresen, Jens Müller, Fabian Ising, Sebastian Schinzel, Simon Friedberger, Juraj Somorovsky and Jörg Schwenk as part of a contribution to the 27th USENIX Security Symposium, Baltimore, August 2018. As a result of the vulnerability, the content of an attacked encrypted email can be transmitted to the attacker in plain text by a vulnerable email client. The used encryption keys are not disclosed.
Efail, also written EFAIL, is a security hole in email systems with which content can be transmitted in encrypted form. This gap allows attackers to access the decrypted content of an email if it contains active content like HTML or JavaScript, or if loading of external content has been enabled in the client. Affected email clients include Gmail, Apple Mail, and Microsoft Outlook. Two related Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures IDs, , have been issued. The security gap was made public on 13 May 2018 by Damian Poddebniak, Christian Dresen, Jens Müller, Fabian Ising, Sebastian Schinzel, Simon Friedberger, Juraj Somorovsky and Jörg Schwenk as part of a contribution to the 27th USENIX Security Symposium, Baltimore, August 2018. As a result of the vulnerability, the content of an attacked encrypted email can be transmitted to the attacker in plain text by a vulnerable email client. The used encryption keys are not disclosed. [...] Content-Type: multipart/mixed;boundary="BOUNDARY" [...] --BOUNDARY Content-Type: text/html --BOUNDARY ... The email client first breaks down the multipart message into its individual parts using the --BOUNDARY tag and then decrypts the encrypted parts. It then reassembles the multipart message, and receives the message in this way: [...] Content-Type: multipart/mixed;boundary="BOUNDARY" [...] --BOUNDARY Content-Type: text/html --BOUNDARY ... This message now contains the decrypted content of the email in the src= attribute of the tag and is passed by the email program as URL to the web server attacker.chosen.url controlled by the attacker, when this content is requested. The attacker can now retrieve the content of the encrypted message from its web server logs. In a variant of the attack, the attacker uses a vulnerability in the CBC (S/MIME) and CFB (OpenPGP) operating modes of the encryption algorithms used. This allows them to change the ciphertext by inserting gadgets. As a side effect of this manipulation, the originally contained plain text becomes illegible. If this was known, the attacker can correct this by inserting additional gadgets. The attacker can hide unknown plain text by inserting certain HTML tags. The result is a message with a similar structure as described above.
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1284298817 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.