Electronic evidence

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Electronic evidence consists of these two sub-forms: * analog (no longer so prevalent, but still existent in some sound recordings e.g), and * digital evidence (see longer article) This rather complex relationship can be depicted graphically as shown in this part of an EU-funded project on the topic embedded here at the right. Chapter 10 of the associated 2018 book goes into more detail, as does the website, http://www.evidenceproject.eu/categorization Electronic evidence can be abbreviated as e-evidence; this shorter term is gaining in acceptance in Continental Europe. This page covers mainly activity there and on the international level.

Electronic evidence consists of these two sub-forms: analog (no longer so prevalent, but still existent in some sound recordings e.g), and digital evidence (see longer article) This rather complex relationship can be depicted graphically as shown in this part of an EU-funded project on the topic embedded here at the right. Chapter 10 of the associated 2018 book goes into more detail, as does the website, http://www.evidenceproject.eu/categorization Electronic evidence can be abbreviated as e-evidence; this shorter term is gaining in acceptance in Continental Europe. This page covers mainly activity there and on the international level.

United Nations

Late in 2019 Russia and China initiated a move to consider drafting a global cybercrime convention. Western democracies are conspicuously absent from the sponsoring parties. Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have issued a protest letter claiming the Russian initiative would potentially infringe upon human rights. The General Assembly, to the surprise of many observers, approved both the proposals of the United States and Russia.

United Kingdom

The UK government announced that the new "UK-US Bilateral Data Access Agreement will dramatically speed up investigations and prosecutions by enabling law enforcement, with appropriate authorisation, to go directly to the tech companies to access data, rather than through governments, which can take years." "It gives effect to the Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Act 2019, which received Royal Assent in February this year and was facilitated by the CLOUD Act in America, passed last year." "The Agreement does not change anything about the way companies can use encryption and does not stop companies from encrypting data." On encryption, the US, UK and Australia are contacting Facebook directly The agreement means that UK officials can now apply to the US via the Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Act 2019.

United States

The basis for obtaining cross-border access is the Stored Communications Act as amended by the CLOUD Act. A new agreement with the UK was negotiated and it "will enter into force following a six-month Congressional review period mandated by the CLOUD Act, and the related review by UK’s Parliament."

Controversy

One of the most controversial cases brought yet to a court has been the 2013 Microsoft Corp. v. United States case. Potential conflicts between the EU regime and the US CLOUD Act have led legal scholars Jennifer Daskal and Peter Swire to propose a US/EU agreement. Those authors have also assembled a set of FAQ seeking to address questions specifically that have arisen from the European Union in connection with the CLOUD Act.

Highlighting differences from the status quo, the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs commissioned a study and held a hearing; the study is available.

Europeans discussing ‘Co-operating in the Digital Age’ in the Internet Governance Forum have been critical of the EU's proposals, fearing that "companies and businesses [might] implement stronger filtering and blocking mechanisms in order to avoid sanctions or reputational damages." Later in November at the Internet Governance Forum 2019 in Berlin panelists described new initiatives in Brazil and Russia respectively.

Some problems quite different from those in the Microsoft case alluded to above have been found and described in an article in the German weekly ZEIT dated 19 December 2018 with 167 comments on the proposed direct access tracks described above under "European Union"; the journalist Martin Klingst entitled it "Nackt per Gesetz" (Naked by Law, meaning exposed to foreign observation by domestic law). Klingst is appalled at the thought that an EU member state like Hungary might demand his data.

Apparently Katharina Barley, German Federal Minister of Justice, agrees. Germany has protections against infringements on one's "informational self-determination" that are the strongest of any EU member state. The European Arrest Warrant is another example of the national limits placed on EU rights in some conditions. Besides, Klingst sees a contradiction between having Internet companies be the guardians of right and wrong, whereas in a new draft German law they might be punished themselves.

Would other MSs respect Germany's interpretation of who maintains confidentiality? he asks rhetorically. E-evidence could become the first case, Klingst predicts, testing whether Germany's top judges have reserved enough room for the most basic protections. Much evidence is plain text; but some evidence is encrypted. In 2015 and 2016, another chapter was added to the long-standing encryption controversy with the FBI-Apple encryption dispute.

That controversy continues in 2019 with multiple nation-states pressuring Facebook to put a backdoor in its messenger service.

Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1356246481 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.

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