Evolutionarily stable set
≈ 1 min read
Names in other languages
No names in other languages are held for this entry yet.
Article bodies are English and are not machine-translated. A name in another language is not a translation of the article.
In game theory an evolutionarily stable set (ES set), sometimes referred to as evolutionary stable sets, is a set of strategies, which score equally against each other, each of which would be an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) were it not for the other members of the set. ES sets were first defined by Thomas (1985ab).
In game theory an evolutionarily stable set (ES set), sometimes referred to as evolutionary stable sets, is a set of strategies, which score equally against each other, each of which would be an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) were it not for the other members of the set. ES sets were first defined by Thomas (1985ab). ==References== ==Further reading== Balkenborg, D. & Schlag, K. H. (2001) Evolutionarily stable sets. International Journal of Game Theory 29:571–595. Thomas, B. (1985a) On evolutionarily stable sets. Journal of Mathematical Biology 22:105—115. Thomas, B. (1985b) Evolutionary stable sets in mixed-strategist models. Theoretical Population Biology 28:332–341.
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1350256502 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.