Evolutionarily stable state
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Names in other languages
- EnglishEvolutionarily stable state
- 中文演化稳定状态
- 中文演化稳定状态
- 简体中文演化稳定状态
Article bodies are English and are not machine-translated. A name in another language is not a translation of the article.
A population can be described as being in an evolutionarily stable state when that population's "genetic composition is restored by selection after a disturbance, provided the disturbance is not too large" (Maynard Smith, 1982). This population as a whole can be either monomorphic or polymorphic. This is now referred to as convergence stability.
A population can be described as being in an evolutionarily stable state when that population's "genetic composition is restored by selection after a disturbance, provided the disturbance is not too large" (Maynard Smith, 1982). This population as a whole can be either monomorphic or polymorphic. This is now referred to as convergence stability. One of the base mathematical models for identifying an evolutionarily stable state was outlined by Taylor & Jonker in 1978. Their base equilibrium model for ES states stipulates that A state p is called an ESS (evolutionary stable state) if for every state q ≠ p, if we let p̅ =(1-ε)p + εq (the perturbed state), then F(q|p̅) 0. In greater detail, the Taylor & Jonker model can be understood this way In a game of individuals in competition with each other there are (N) possible strategies available. Thus each individual is using one of these (N) strategies. If we denote each strategy as I we let S_i be the proportion of individuals who are currently using strategy I. Then S=(S_1 -> S_n) is a probability vector (i.e. S ≥ 0 and S_1 + S_2... + S_n = 1) this is called the state vector of the population. Using this the function F(i|s) can be made, F(i|s) refers to the fitness of I in state S. The state vector of the population (S) is not static. The idea behind it is that the more fit a strategy at the moment the more likely it is to be employed in the future, thus the state vector (S) will change. Using game theory we can look how (S) changes over time and try to figure out in what state it has reached an equilibrium. Let K be the set of all probability vectors of length N, this is the state space of the population. Thus element P in K represents a possible strategy mix. A state P in K is called an equilibrium state if F(i|p) is equal for all pure strategies i for which P_i > 0, That is, supp(p) = {i :p,≠0}. If Q is in K: F(q|p) + (ΣQ_1 x F(i|p). We can see F(q|p) as the expected fitness of an individual using mixed strategy Q against the population in state P. If P is an equilibrium state and the supp(q) is contained in supp(p) then F(q|p) = F(q|p).(supp(p) are the I's for which P_i > 0). Thus a state p is called an ESS (evolutionary stable state) if for every state Q ≠ P, if we let p̅=(1-ε)p + εq (the perturbed state), then F(q|p) 0 In summary, a state P is evolutionarily stable whenever a small change from P to state p̅ the expected fitness in the perturbed state is less than the expected fitness of the remaining population. \dot{x_i}=x_i\left(\left(Ax\right)_i-x^TAx\right), The state \hat{x} is said to be evolutionarily stable if for all x \neq \hat{x} in some neighborhood of \hat{x} . x^TAx
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