Existential generalization

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In predicate logic, existential generalization[1][2] (also known as existential introduction, ∃I) is a valid rule of inference that allows one to move from a specific statement, or one instance, to a quantified generalized statement, or existential proposition. In first-order logic, it is often used as a rule for the existential quantifier (∃) in formal proofs.

Example: "Rover loves to wag his tail. Therefore, something loves to wag its tail."

Example: "Alice made herself a cup of tea. Therefore, Alice made someone a cup of tea."

Example: "Alice made herself a cup of tea. Therefore, someone made someone a cup of tea."

In the Fitch-style calculus: Q(a)→ ∃xQ(x), where Q(a) is obtained from Q(x) by replacing all its free occurrences of x (or some of them) by a.[3]

Quine

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According to Willard Van Orman Quine, universal instantiation and existential generalization are two aspects of a single principle, for instead of saying that ∀xx=x implies Socrates=Socrates, we could as well say that the denial Socrates≠Socrates implies ∃xx≠x. The principle embodied in these two operations is the link between quantifications and the singular statements that are related to them as instances. Yet it is a principle only by courtesy. It holds only in the case where a term names and, furthermore, occurs referentially.[4]

See also

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References

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  1. ^ Copi, Irving M.; Cohen, Carl (2005). Introduction to Logic. Prentice Hall.
  2. ^ Hurley, Patrick (1991). A Concise Introduction to Logic 4th edition. Wadsworth Publishing. ISBN 9780534145156.
  3. ^ pg. 347. Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy, Language proof and logic Second Ed., CSLI Publications, 2008.
  4. ^ Willard Van Orman Quine; Roger F. Gibson (2008). "V.24. Reference and Modality". Quintessence. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. OCLC 728954096. Here: p.366.

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