Explanatory indispensability argument
The explanatory indispensability argument is an argument in the philosophy of mathematics for the existence of mathematical objects.
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The explanatory indispensability argument is an argument in the philosophy of mathematics for the existence of mathematical objects. It claims that rationally we should believe in mathematical objects such as numbers because they are indispensable to scientific explanations of empirical phenomena.
An altered form of the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument, it differs from that argument in its increased focus on specific explanations instead of whole theories and in its shift towards inference to the best explanation as a justification for belief in mathematical objects rather than confirmational holism. Specific explanations proposed as examples of mathematical explanations in science include why periodical cicadas have prime-numbered life cycles, why bee honeycomb has a hexagonal structure, and the solution to the Seven Bridges of Königsberg problem.
Objections to the argument include the idea that mathematics is only used as a representational device, even when it features in scientific explanations; that mathematics does not need to be true to be explanatory because it could be a useful fiction; and that the argument is circular and so begs the question in favour of mathematical objects.
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