Exposure Notification
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The (Google/Apple) Exposure Notification System (GAEN) is a framework and protocol specification developed by Apple Inc. and Google to facilitate digital contact tracing during the COVID-19 pandemic. When used by health authorities, it augments more traditional contact tracing techniques by automatically logging close approaches among notification system users using Android or iOS smartphones. Exposure Notification is a decentralized reporting protocol built on a combination of Bluetooth Low Energy technology and privacy-preserving cryptography. It is an opt-in feature within COVID-19 apps developed and published by authorized health authorities. Unveiled on April 10, 2020, it was made available on iOS on May 20, 2020, as part of the iOS 13.5 update and on December 14, 2020, as part of the iOS 12.5 update for older iPhones. On Android, it was added to devices via a Google Play Services update, supporting all versions since Android Marshmallow. The Apple/Google protocol is similar to the Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T) protocol created by the European DP-3T consortium and the Temporary Contact Number (TCN) protocol by Covid Watch, but is implemented at the operating system level, which allows for more efficient operation as a background process. Since May 2020, a variant of the DP-3T protocol is supported by the Exposure Notification Interface.…
The (Google/Apple) Exposure Notification System (GAEN) is a framework and protocol specification developed by Apple Inc. and Google to facilitate digital contact tracing during the COVID-19 pandemic. When used by health authorities, it augments more traditional contact tracing techniques by automatically logging close approaches among notification system users using Android or iOS smartphones. Exposure Notification is a decentralized reporting protocol built on a combination of Bluetooth Low Energy technology and privacy-preserving cryptography. It is an opt-in feature within COVID-19 apps developed and published by authorized health authorities. Unveiled on April 10, 2020, it was made available on iOS on May 20, 2020, as part of the iOS 13.5 update and on December 14, 2020, as part of the iOS 12.5 update for older iPhones. On Android, it was added to devices via a Google Play Services update, supporting all versions since Android Marshmallow. The Apple/Google protocol is similar to the Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T) protocol created by the European DP-3T consortium and the Temporary Contact Number (TCN) protocol by Covid Watch, but is implemented at the operating system level, which allows for more efficient operation as a background process. Since May 2020, a variant of the DP-3T protocol is supported by the Exposure Notification Interface. Other protocols are constrained in operation because they are not privileged over normal apps. This leads to issues, particularly on iOS devices where digital contact tracing apps running in the background experience significantly degraded performance. The joint approach is also designed to maintain interoperability between Android and iOS devices, which constitute nearly all of the market. The ACLU stated the approach "appears to mitigate the worst privacy and centralization risks, but there is still room for improvement". In late April, Google and Apple shifted the emphasis of the naming of the system, describing it as an "exposure notification service", rather than "contact tracing" system. The respective API services that powered Exposure Notification were shut down on September 18, 2023. It was later removed from iOS in 2024 with the iOS 18 release, and from Android in a 2023 Google Play Services update. To generate encounter identifiers, first a persistent 32-byte private Tracing Key ( tk ) is generated by a client. From this a 16 byte Daily Tracing Key is derived using the algorithm dtk_i = HKDF(tk, NULL, \text{'CT-DTK'}||D_i, 16) , where HKDF(\text{Key, Salt, Data, OutputLength}) is a HKDF function using SHA-256, and D_i is the day number for the 24-hour window the broadcast is in starting from Unix Epoch Time. These generated keys are later sent to the central reporting server should a user become infected. From the daily tracing key a 16-byte temporary Rolling Proximity Identifier is generated every 10 minutes with the algorithm RPI_{i,j} = \text{Truncate}(HMAC(dtk_i, \text{'CT-RPI'}||TIN_j),16) , where HMAC(\text{Key, Data}) is a HMAC function using SHA-256, and TIN_j is the time interval number, representing a unique index for every 10 minute period in a 24-hour day. The Truncate function returns the first 16 bytes of the HMAC value. When two clients come within proximity of each other they exchange and locally store the current RPI_{i,j} as the encounter identifier. Once a registered health authority has confirmed the infection of a user, the user's Daily Tracing Key for the past 14 days is uploaded to the central reporting server. Clients then download this report and individually recalculate every Rolling Proximity Identifier used in the report period, matching it against the user's local encounter log. If a matching entry is found, then contact has been established and the app presents a notification to the user warning them of potential infection. Unlike version 1.0 of the protocol, version 1.1 does not use a persistent tracing key, rather every day a new random 16-byte Temporary Exposure Key ( tek_i ) is generated. This is analogous to the daily tracing key from version 1.0. Here i denotes the time is discretized in 10 minute intervals starting from Unix Epoch Time. From this two 128-bit keys are calculated, the Rolling Proximity Identifier Key ( RPIK_i ) and the Associated Encrypted Metadata Key ( AEMK_i ). RPIK_i is calculated with the algorithm RPIK_i = HKDF(tek_i, NULL, \text{'EN-RPIK'},16) , and AEMK_i using the algorithm AEMK_i = HKDF(tek_i, NULL, \text{'EN-AEMK'},16) . From these values a temporary Rolling Proximity Identifier ( RPI_{i,j} ) is generated every time the BLE MAC address changes, roughly every 15–20 minutes. The following algorithm is used: RPI_{i,j} = AES128(RPIK_i, \text{'EN-RPI'} || \mathtt{0x000000000000} || ENIN_j) , where AES128(\text{Key, Data}) is an AES cryptography function with a 128-bit key, the data is one 16-byte block, j denotes the Unix Epoch Time at the moment the roll occurs, and ENIN_j is the corresponding 10-minute interval number. Next, additional Associated Encrypted Metadata is encrypted. What the metadata represents is not specified, likely to allow the later expansion of the protocol. The following algorithm is used: \text{Associated Encrypted Metadata}_{i,j} = AES128\_CTR(AEMK_i, RPI_{i,j}, \text{Metadata}) , where AES128\_CTR(\text{Key, IV, Data}) denotes AES encryption with a 128-bit key in CTR mode. The Rolling Proximity Identifier and the Associated Encrypted Metadata are then combined and broadcast using BLE. Clients exchange and log these payloads. Once a registered health authority has confirmed the infection of a user, the user's Temporary Exposure Keys tek_i and their respective interval numbers i for the past 14 days are uploaded to the central reporting server. Clients then download this report and individually recalculate every Rolling Proximity Identifier starting from interval number i , matching it against the user's local encounter log. If a matching entry is found, then contact has been established and the app presents a notification to the user warning them of potential infection.
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1372759977 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.