Fallibilism

Uses your system voice; voice and rate in settings.

Snapshot

≈ 3 min read

Names in other languages

No names in other languages are held for this entry yet.

Article bodies are English and are not machine-translated. A name in another language is not a translation of the article.

Originally, fallibilism (from Medieval Latin: fallibilis, "liable to error") is the philosophical principle that propositions can be accepted even though they cannot be conclusively proven or justified, or that neither knowledge nor belief is certain. The term was coined in the late 19th century by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce in response to foundationalism. Theorists, following Austrian-British philosopher Karl Popper, may also refer to fallibilism as the notion that knowledge might turn out to be false. Furthermore, fallibilism is said to imply corrigibilism, the principle that propositions are open to revision. Fallibilism is often juxtaposed with infallibilism.

Originally, fallibilism (from Medieval Latin: fallibilis, "liable to error") is the philosophical principle that propositions can be accepted even though they cannot be conclusively proven or justified, or that neither knowledge nor belief is certain. The term was coined in the late 19th century by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce in response to foundationalism. Theorists, following Austrian-British philosopher Karl Popper, may also refer to fallibilism as the notion that knowledge might turn out to be false. Furthermore, fallibilism is said to imply corrigibilism, the principle that propositions are open to revision. Fallibilism is often juxtaposed with infallibilism.

Philosophical skepticism

Fallibilism should not be confused with local or global skepticism, which is the view that some or all types of knowledge are unattainable. Fallibilism claims that legitimate epistemic justifications can lead to false beliefs, whereas academic skepticism claims that no legitimate epistemic justifications exist (acatalepsy). Fallibilism is also different to epoché, a suspension of judgement, often accredited to Pyrrhonian skepticism.

Criticism

Nearly all philosophers today are fallibilists in some sense of the term. Few would claim that knowledge requires absolute certainty, or deny that scientific claims are revisable, though in the 21st century some philosophers have argued for some version of infallibilist knowledge. Historically, many Western philosophers from Plato to Saint Augustine to René Descartes have argued that some human beliefs are infallibly known. John Calvin espoused a theological fallibilism towards others' beliefs. Plausible candidates for infallible beliefs include logical truths ("Either Jones is a Democrat or Jones is not a Democrat"), immediate appearances ("It seems that I see a patch of blue"), and incorrigible beliefs (i.e., beliefs that are true in virtue of being believed, such as Descartes's "I think, therefore I am"). Many others, however, have taken even these types of beliefs to be fallible.

See also

Defeasible reasoning Logical holism Nihilism Multiverse (set theory) Pancritical rationalism Perspectivism Probabilism Projectivism

References

Further reading

Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings, by Philip P. Wiener (Dover, 1980) Charles S. Peirce and the Philosophy of Science, by Edward C. Moore (Alabama, 1993) Treatise on Critical Reason, by Hans Albert (Tübingen, 1968; English translation, Princeton, 1985)

External links

"Fallibilism" by Stephen Hetherington in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy "Fallibilism" by Nicholas Rescher in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1367494896 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.

Sources cited in this revision

27 named source(s) extracted from the cited revision. A source with no author is shown by its publication; nothing is invented.