Fannie Mae
The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), commonly known as Fannie Mae, is a United States government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) that has been a publicly traded company since 1968.
≈ 19 min read
Names in other languages
No names in other languages are held for this entry yet.
Article bodies are English and are not machine-translated. A name in another language is not a translation of the article.
The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), commonly known as Fannie Mae, is a United States government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) that has been a publicly traded company since 1968. Founded in 19381 during the Great Depression as part of the New Deal, the corporation was established to expand the secondary mortgage market.
It does this by securitizing mortgage loans into mortgage-backed securities (MBS), which allows lenders to reinvest their assets into additional lending. This process effectively increases the number of mortgage lenders by reducing reliance on local savings and loan associations (or "thrifts").
Its sister organization is the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), better known as Freddie Mac. As of 2025, Fannie Mae held over $4.3 trillion in assets, making it the largest company in the United States and the fifth largest company in the world by that metric. In the 2025 Fortune Global 500 rankings it placed 50th globally by total revenue.
In terms of profit, Fannie Mae is the 17th most profitable company in the United States and the 32nd in the world.
Background and early decades
Historically, most housing loans in the early 1900s in the United States were short term mortgage loans with balloon payments. The Great Depression weakened the U.S. housing market, as people lost their jobs and were unable to make payments. By 1933, an estimated 20 to 25% of the nation's outstanding mortgage debt was in default.
This resulted in foreclosures in which nearly 25% of America's homeowners lost their homes to banks. To address this, Fannie Mae was established by the U.S. Congress in 1938 by amendments to the National Housing Act as part of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal.
Originally chartered as the National Mortgage Association of Washington, the organization's explicit purpose was to provide local banks with federal money to finance home loans in an attempt to raise levels of home ownership and the availability of affordable housing. Fannie Mae created a liquid secondary mortgage market and thereby made it possible for banks and other loan originators to issue more housing loans, primarily by buying Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insured mortgages.
For the first thirty years following its inception, Fannie Mae held a monopoly over the secondary mortgage market. Other considerations may have motivated the New Deal focus on the housing market: about a third of the nation's unemployed were in the building trade, and the government had a vested interest in getting them back to work by giving them homes to build.
Fannie Mae was acquired by the Housing and Home Finance Agency from the Federal Loan Agency as a constituent unit in 1950. In 1954, an amendment known as the Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act made Fannie Mae into "mixed-ownership corporation", meaning that federal government held the preferred stock while private investors held the common stock; in 1968 it converted to a privately held corporation, to remove its activity and debt from the federal budget.
In the 1968 change, arising from the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Fannie Mae's predecessor (also called Fannie Mae) was split into the current Fannie Mae and the Government National Mortgage Association ("Ginnie Mae"). Ginnie Mae, which remained a government organization, guarantees FHA-insured mortgage loans as well as Veterans Administration (VA) and Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) insured mortgages.
As such, Ginnie Mae is the only home-loan agency explicitly backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government. In 1970, the federal government authorized Fannie Mae to purchase conventional loans, i.e. those not insured by the FHA, VA, or FmHA, and created the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), colloquially known as Freddie Mac, to compete with Fannie Mae and thus facilitate a more robust and efficient secondary mortgage market.
That same year FNMA went public on New York and Pacific Exchanges. In 1981, Fannie Mae issued its first mortgage pass-through and called it a mortgage-backed security.
Ginnie Mae had guaranteed the first mortgage pass-through security of an approved lender in 1968 and in 1971 Freddie Mac issued its first mortgage pass-through, called a participation certificate, composed primarily of private mortgage loans.
The mortgage crisis from late 2007
Following their mission to meet federal Housing and Urban Development (HUD) housing goals, GSEs such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks) had striven to improve home ownership of low and middle income families and underserved areas generally through special affordable methods such as "the ability to obtain a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage with a low down payment ... and the continuous availability of mortgage credit under a wide range of economic conditions". Then in 2003–2004, the subprime mortgage crisis began.
The market shifted away from regulated GSEs and radically toward Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) issued by unregulated private-label securitization (PLS) conduits, typically operated by investment banks. As loan originators began to distribute more and more of their loans through private label PLS's, the GSEs lost the ability to monitor and control loan originators.
Competition between the GSEs and private securitizers for loans further undermined GSEs' power and strengthened mortgage originators. This contributed to a decline in underwriting standards and was a major cause of the 2008 financial crisis. Investment bank securitizers were more willing to securitize risky loans because they generally retained minimal risk.
Whereas the GSEs guaranteed the performance of their mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), private securitizers generally did not, and might only retain a thin slice of risk. Often, banks would offload this risk to insurance companies or other counterparties through credit default swaps, making their actual risk exposures extremely difficult for investors and creditors to discern.
The shift toward riskier mortgages and private label MBS distribution occurred as financial institutions sought to maintain earnings levels that had been elevated during 2001–2003 by an unprecedented refinancing boom due to historically low interest rates. Earnings depended on volume, so maintaining elevated earnings levels necessitated expanding the borrower pool using lower underwriting standards and new products that the GSEs would not (initially) securitize.
Thus, the shift away from GSE securitization to private-label securitization (PLS) also corresponded with a shift in mortgage product type, from traditional, amortizing, fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) to nontraditional, structurally riskier, nonamortizing, adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM's), and to the start of a sharp deterioration in mortgage underwriting standards. The growth of PLS, however, forced the GSEs to lower their underwriting standards in an attempt to reclaim lost market share to please their private shareholders.
Shareholder pressure pushed the GSEs into competition with PLS for market share, and the GSEs loosened their guarantee business underwriting standards in order to compete. In contrast, the wholly public FHA/Ginnie Mae maintained their underwriting standards and instead ceded market share.
The growth of private-label securitization and lack of regulation in this part of the market resulted in the oversupply of underpriced housing finance. That led, in 2006, to an increasing number of borrowers, often with poor credit, who were unable to pay their mortgages – particularly with adjustable rate mortgage loans (ARM), causing a precipitous increase in home foreclosures.
As a result, home prices declined as increasing foreclosures added to the already large inventory of homes and stricter lending standards made it more difficult for borrowers to get loans. This depreciation in home prices led to growing losses for the GSEs, which back the majority of US mortgages.
In July 2008, the government attempted to ease market fears by reiterating their view that "Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac play a central role in the US housing finance system". The US Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve took steps to bolster confidence in the corporations, including granting both corporations access to Federal Reserve low-interest loans (at similar rates as commercial banks) and removing the prohibition on the Treasury Department to purchase the GSEs' stock.
Despite these efforts, by August 2008, shares of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had tumbled more than 90% from their one-year prior levels.
Business
Fannie Mae makes money partly by borrowing at low rates, and then reinvesting its borrowings into whole mortgage loans and mortgage backed securities. It borrows in the debt markets by selling bonds, and provides liquidity to loan originators by purchasing whole loans.
It purchases whole loans and then securitizes them for the investment market by creating MBS that are either retained or sold. As a Government Sponsored Enterprise, or GSE, Fannie Mae is compelled by law to provide liquidity to loan originators in all economic conditions. It must legally ignore adverse market conditions which appear to be unprofitable.
If there are loans available for purchase that meet its predetermined underwriting standards, it must purchase them if no other buyers are available. Because of the size, scale, and scope of the United States single-family residential and commercial residential markets, market participants viewed Fannie Mae corporate debt as having a very high probability of being repaid.
Fannie Mae is able to borrow very inexpensively in the debt markets as a consequence of market perception. There usually exists a large difference between the rate at which it can borrow and the rate at which it can "lend". This was called "The big, fat gap" by Alan Greenspan.
By August 2008, Fannie Mae's mortgage portfolio was in excess of $700 billion ( ). Fannie Mae also earns a significant portion of its income from guaranty fees it receives as compensation for assuming the credit risk on mortgage loans underlying its single-family Fannie Mae MBS and on the single-family mortgage loans held in its retained portfolio.
Investors, or purchasers of Fannie Mae MBSs, are willing to let Fannie Mae keep this fee in exchange for assuming the credit risk; that is, Fannie Mae's guarantee that the scheduled principal and interest on the underlying loan will be paid even if the borrower defaults. Fannie Mae's charter has historically prevented it from guaranteeing loans with a loan-to-values over 80% without mortgage insurance or a repurchase agreement with the lender; however, in 2006 and 2007 Fannie Mae did purchase subprime and Alt-A loans as investments.
Business mechanism
Fannie Mae is a purchaser of mortgages loans and the mortgages that secure them, which it packages into mortgaged-backed securities (MBS). Fannie Mae buys loans from approved mortgage sellers and securitizes them; it then sells the resultant mortgage-backed security to investors in the secondary mortgage market, along with a guarantee that the stated principal and interest payments will be timely passed through to the investor.
In addition, Fannie MBS, like those of Freddie Mac MBS and Ginnie Mae MBS, are eligible to be traded in the "to-be-announced" or "TBA" market. By purchasing the mortgages, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac provide banks and other financial institutions with fresh money to make new loans. This gives the United States housing and credit markets flexibility and liquidity.
In order for Fannie Mae to provide its guarantee to mortgage-backed securities it issues, it sets the guidelines for the loans that it will accept for purchase, called "conforming" loans. Fannie Mae produced an automated underwriting system (AUS) tool called Desktop Underwriter (DU) which lenders can use to automatically determine if a loan is conforming; Fannie Mae followed this program up in 2004 with Custom DU, which allows lenders to set custom underwriting rules to handle nonconforming loans as well.
The secondary market for nonconforming loans includes jumbo loans, which are loans larger than the maximum that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will purchase. In early 2008, the decision was made to allow TBA (To-be-announced)-eligible mortgage-backed securities to include up to 10% "jumbo" loans.
Accounting
FNMA is a financial corporation which uses derivatives to "hedge" its cash flow. Derivative products it uses include interest rate swaps and options to enter interest rate swaps ("pay-fixed swaps", "receive-fixed swaps", "basis swaps", "interest rate caps and swaptions", "forward starting swaps").
Duration gap is a financial and accounting term for the difference between the duration of assets and liabilities, and is typically used by banks, pension funds, or other financial institutions to measure their risk due to changes in the interest rate.
Accounting controversy
In late 2004, Fannie Mae was under investigation for its accounting practices. The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight released a report on September 20, 2004, alleging widespread accounting errors. Fannie Mae was expected to spend more than $1 billion ( ) in 2006 alone to complete its internal audit and bring it closer to compliance.
The necessary restatement was expected to cost $10.8 billion, but was completed at a total cost of $6.3 billion in restated earnings as listed in Fannie Mae's Annual Report on Form 10-K. Concerns with business and accounting practices at Fannie Mae predate the scandal itself. On June 15, 2000, the House Banking Subcommittee On Capital Markets, Securities And Government-Sponsored Enterprises held hearings on Fannie Mae.
On December 18, 2006, U.S. regulators filed 101 civil charges against chief executive Franklin Raines; chief financial officer J. Timothy Howard; and the former controller Leanne G. Spencer. The three were accused of manipulating Fannie Mae earnings to maximize their bonuses.
The lawsuit sought to recoup more than $115 million ( ) in bonus payments, collectively accrued by the trio from 1998 to 2004, and about $100 million in penalties for their involvement in the accounting scandal. After 8 years of litigation, in 2012, a summary judgment was issued clearing the trio, indicating the government had insufficient evidence that would enable any jury to find the defendants guilty.
Conflict of interest
In June 2008, The Wall Street Journal reported that two former CEOs of Fannie Mae, James A. Johnson and Franklin Raines, had received loans below market rate from Countrywide Financial. Fannie Mae was the biggest buyer of Countrywide's mortgages.
The "Friends of Angelo" VIP Countrywide loan program included many people from Fannie Mae; lawyers, executives, etc. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have given contributions to lawmakers currently sitting on committees that primarily regulate their industry: The House Financial Services Committee; the Senate Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs Committee; or the Senate Finance Committee. The others have seats on the powerful Appropriations or Ways & Means committees, are members of the congressional leadership or have run for president.
2011 SEC charges
In December 2011, six Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac executives, including Daniel Mudd, were charged by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission with securities fraud. "The SEC alleges they 'knew and approved of' misleading statements claiming the companies had minimal exposure to subprime loans at the height of home mortgage bubble."
Former Freddie chief financial officer Anthony "Buddy" Piszel, who in February 2011, was CFO of CoreLogic, "had received a notice from the SEC that the agency was considering taking action against him". He then resigned from CoreLogic. Piszel was not among the executives charged in December 2011.
Piszel had been succeeded at Freddie by David Kellermann. Kellermann committed suicide during his tenure at Freddie. A contemporaneous report on the SEC charges continued: The SEC said Mudd's misconduct included knowingly giving false testimony to Congress.
Mudd said last week that the government approved Fannie Mae's disclosures during his tenure. "Now it appears that the government has negotiated a deal to hold the government, and government-appointed executives who have signed the same disclosures since my departure, blameless – so that it can sue individuals it fired years ago," he said in a statement last week.
Daniel Mudd settled his case with the SEC in August 2016, ending one of the agency’s last civil actions tied to the housing crisis; the settlement did not include an admission of wrongdoing. Other defendants reached earlier settlements: the three former Freddie Mac executives (including Richard Syron, Patricia Cook and David Bisenius) settled their cases previously, and two former Fannie Mae executives (Enrico Dallavecchia and Thomas Lund) also reached settlements before Mudd’s resolution.
The SEC had sought disgorgement, civil penalties, injunctive relief and officer-and-director bars in its complaints, and the settlements generally allowed the defendants to resolve the civil claims without admitting liability.
2011 lawsuits
In 2011, the agency had a number of other big banks in the crosshairs as well. JPMorgan Chase was one of 18 financial institutions the FHFA sued back in 2011, accusing them of selling to Fannie and Freddie securities that "had different and more risky characteristics than the descriptions contained in the marketing and sales materials".
The proposed JPMorgan settlement covered only civil charges, and would not settle the question of whether any individual executives engaged in wrongdoing. In November 2013, JPMorgan reached a $13 billion settlement with the U.S. government and various state and federal entities to resolve civil claims arising from its issuance, packaging, marketing and sale of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), including assets acquired via Washington Mutual (WaMu) and Bear Stearns.
There is an ongoing federal criminal probe based in Sacramento, Calif., the state where Washington Mutual was based. JPMorgan originally sought to be protected from any criminal charges as part of this deal, but that request was rejected by the government.
Fannie and Freddie, the government-backed housing finance firms, sustained massive losses on mortgage-backed securities as the housing market imploded, requiring a bailout of over $187 billion. The firms have been controlled by the FHFA since their 2008 rescue.
Swiss lender UBS has already reached an $885 million settlement with the FHFA in connection with losses Fannie and Freddie sustained on over $6.4 billion worth of mortgage securities. The agency also settled for undisclosed sums earlier that year with Citigroup and General Electric.
Later, details revealed that the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) settled with Citigroup for $250 million and with General Electric (GE) for $6.25 million over losses Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac sustained on mortgage-backed securities. These settlements, reached in 2013, resolved claims that Citigroup misled the agencies on roughly $3.5 billion in securities and that GE did so on $549 million sold to Freddie Mac.
Both amounts were initially undisclosed but later confirmed in FHFA's summaries of its private-label securities litigation. The FHFA was reportedly seeking $4 billion from JPMorgan to resolve its claims over $33 billion worth of securities sold to Fannie and Freddie by JPMorgan, Bear Stearns and WaMu.
Bank of America (BAC), which acquired Countrywide and Merrill Lynch during the 2008 financial crisis, could be liable for even more. The Charlotte-based firm was facing claims from the FHFA over $57 billion worth of mortgage bonds.
The matter was resolved in 2014, when the firm agreed to a settlement valued at 9.33 billion USD, consisting of cash payments and the repurchase of certain securities. In all, the 18 FHFA lawsuits cover more than $200 billion in allegedly misrepresented securities. The question of whether any individual bankers will be held to account is another matter.
Thus, by far, the criminal cases related to packaging and sale of mortgage-backed securities have been conspicuously absent.
2013 allegations of kickbacks
On May 29, 2013, the Los Angeles Times reported that a former foreclosure specialist at Fannie Mae has been charged but pleaded "not guilty" to accepting a kickback from an Arizona real estate broker in a Santa Ana Federal court. Another lawsuit filed earlier in Orange County Superior Court, this one for wrongful termination, has been filed against Fannie Mae by an employee who claims she was fired when she tried to alert management to kickbacks.
The employee claims that she started voicing her suspicions in 2009.
Related legislation
On May 8, 2013, Representative Scott Garrett introduced the Budget and Accounting Transparency Act of 2014 (H.R. 1872; 113th Congress) into the United States House of Representatives during the 113th United States Congress. The bill, if it were passed, intended to modify the budgetary treatment of federal credit programs, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
The bill would require that the cost of direct loans or loan guarantees be recognized in the federal budget on a fair-value basis using guidelines set forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board. The changes made by the bill wmant that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were counted on the budget instead of considered separately and would mean that the debt of those two programs would be included in the national debt.
These programs themselves would not be changed, but how they are accounted for in the United States federal budget would be. The goal of the bill was to improve the accuracy of how some programs are accounted for in the federal budget. On April 7, 2014, the House passed the bill (230–165).
The bill was received in the Senate on April 8, 2014, then read twice and referred to the Senate Budget Committee. No further action is recorded. Because the bill was never passed by the Senate, it did not become law.
That means its changes (e.g., to require “fair-value” accounting of federal credit programs such as those involving Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) were not adopted.
See also
Farmer Mac Freddie Mac Ginnie Mae Sallie Mae Eaton v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n State of New York Mortgage Agency – New York equivalent Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation – Canadian equivalent
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1371810747 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.
References
1 claim could not be tied to a specific sentence and is listed in the table below instead.
- ↩Wikipedia “Fannie Mae” date of foundation (×1) · confidence 0.95 revision URL