Four-dimensionalism
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In philosophy, four-dimensionalism (also known as the doctrine of temporal parts) is the ontological position that an object's persistence through time is like its extension through space. Thus, an object that exists in time has temporal parts in the various subregions of the total region of time it occupies, just like an object that exists in a region of space has at least one part in every subregion of that space. Four-dimensionalists typically argue for treating time as analogous to space, usually leading them to endorse the doctrine of eternalism. This is a philosophical approach to the ontological nature of time, according to which all points in time are equally "real", as opposed to the presentist idea that only the present is real. As some eternalists argue by analogy, just as all spatially distant objects and events are as real as those close to us, temporally distant objects and events are as real as those currently present to us. Perdurantism—or perdurance theory—is a closely related philosophical theory of persistence and identity, according to which an individual has distinct temporal parts throughout its existence, and the persisting object is the sum or set of all of its temporal parts. This sum or set is colloquially referred to as a "space-time worm", which has earned the perdurantist view the moniker of "the worm view".…
In philosophy, four-dimensionalism (also known as the doctrine of temporal parts) is the ontological position that an object's persistence through time is like its extension through space. Thus, an object that exists in time has temporal parts in the various subregions of the total region of time it occupies, just like an object that exists in a region of space has at least one part in every subregion of that space. Four-dimensionalists typically argue for treating time as analogous to space, usually leading them to endorse the doctrine of eternalism. This is a philosophical approach to the ontological nature of time, according to which all points in time are equally "real", as opposed to the presentist idea that only the present is real. As some eternalists argue by analogy, just as all spatially distant objects and events are as real as those close to us, temporally distant objects and events are as real as those currently present to us. Perdurantism—or perdurance theory—is a closely related philosophical theory of persistence and identity, according to which an individual has distinct temporal parts throughout its existence, and the persisting object is the sum or set of all of its temporal parts. This sum or set is colloquially referred to as a "space-time worm", which has earned the perdurantist view the moniker of "the worm view". While all perdurantists are plausibly considered four dimensionalists, at least one variety of four dimensionalism does not count as perdurantist in nature. This variety, known as exdurantism or the "stage view", is closely akin to the perdurantist position. They also countenance a view of persisting objects that have temporal parts that succeed one another through time. However, instead of identifying the persisting object as the entire set or sum of its temporal parts, the exdurantist argues that any object under discussion is a single stage (time-slice, temporal part, etc.), and that the other stages or parts that comprise the persisting object are related to that part by a "temporal counterpart" relation. Though they have often been conflated, eternalism is a theory of what time is like and what times exist, while perdurantism is a theory about persisting objects and their identity conditions over time. Eternalism and perdurantism tend to be discussed together because many philosophers argue for a combination of eternalism and perdurantism. Sider (1997) uses the term four-dimensionalism to refer to perdurantism, but Michael Rea uses the term "four-dimensionalism" to mean the view that presentism is false as opposed to "perdurantism", the view that endurantism is false and persisting objects have temporal parts.
A-series and B-series
J.M.E. McTaggart in The Unreality of Time identified two descriptions of time, which he called the A-series and the B-series. The A-series identifies positions in time as past, present, or future, and thus assumes that the "present" has some objective reality, as in both presentism and the growing block universe. The B-series defines a given event as earlier or later than another event, but does not assume an objective present, as in four-dimensionalism. Much of the contemporary literature in the metaphysics of time has been taken to spring forth from this distinction, and thus takes McTaggart's work as its starting point.
Contrast with three-dimensionalism
Unlike the four dimensionalist, the three dimensionalist considers time to be a unique dimension that is not analogous to the three spatial dimensions: length, width and height. Whereas the four dimensionalist proposes that objects are extended across time, the three dimensionalist adheres to the belief that all objects are wholly present at any moment at which they exist. While the three dimensionalist agrees that the parts of an object can be differentiated based on their spatial dimensions, they do not believe an object can be differentiated into temporal parts across time. For example, in the three dimensionalist account, "Descartes in 1635" is the same object as "Descartes in 1620", and both are identical to Descartes, himself. However, the four dimensionalist considers these to be distinct temporal parts.
See also
Extended modal realism Four-dimensional space Light cone Multiple occupancy view Rietdijk–Putnam argument advocating this position Spacetime World line
References
Sources
Armstrong, David M. (1980) "Identity Through Time", pages 67,8 in Peter van Inwagen (editor), Time and Cause, D. Reidel. Hughes, C. (1986) "Is a Thing Just the Sum of Its Parts?", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85: 213-33. Heller, Mark (1984). "Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects", Philosophical Studies 46: 323-34. Reprinted in Rea 1997: 12.-330. Heller, Mark (1990) The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-dimensional Hunks of Matter, Cambridge University Press. Heller, Mark (1992) "Things Change", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 695-304 Heller, Mark (1993) "Varieties of Four Dimensionalism", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 47-59. Lewis, David (1983). "Survival and Identity", in Philosophical Papers, Volume 1, 55-7. Oxford University Press. With postscripts. Originally published in Amelie O. Rorty, editor (1976) The Identities of Persons University of California Press, pages 17-40. Lewis, David (1986a). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Lewis, David (1986b). Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McTaggart John Ellis (1908) The Unreality of time, originally published in Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 17: 456-473. (1976) "Survival and identity", pages 17-40 in editor, The identities of persons. Berkeley: University of California Press. Google books (2004) "A defense of presentism", pages 47-82 in editor, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 1, Oxford University Press. Google books (2005) Review of Four-dimensionalism: an ontology of persistence and time by Theodore Sider, Ars Disputandi 5 (1985) "Can amoebae divide without multiplying?", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63(3): 299–319.
External links
Rea, M. C., "Four Dimensionalism" in The Oxford Handbook for Metaphysics. Oxford Univ. Press. Describes presentism and four-dimensionalism. "Time" in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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