Gilbert Ryle
≈ 7 min read
Names in other languages
No names in other languages are held for this entry yet.
Article bodies are English and are not machine-translated. A name in another language is not a translation of the article.
Gilbert Ryle (19 August 1900 – 6 October 1976) was a British philosopher, principally known for his critique of Cartesian dualism, for which he coined the phrase "ghost in the machine". Some of Ryle's ideas in philosophy of mind have been called logical behaviourist. In his best-known book, The Concept of Mind (1949), he writes that the "general trend of this book will undoubtedly, and harmlessly, be stigmatised as 'behaviourist'." Having studied the philosophers Bernard Bolzano, Franz Brentano, Alexius Meinong, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger, Ryle suggested that the book instead "could be described as a sustained essay in phenomenology, if you are at home with that label."
Gilbert Ryle (19 August 1900 – 6 October 1976) was a British philosopher, principally known for his critique of Cartesian dualism, for which he coined the phrase "ghost in the machine". Some of Ryle's ideas in philosophy of mind have been called logical behaviourist. In his best-known book, The Concept of Mind (1949), he writes that the "general trend of this book will undoubtedly, and harmlessly, be stigmatised as 'behaviourist'." Having studied the philosophers Bernard Bolzano, Franz Brentano, Alexius Meinong, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger, Ryle suggested that the book instead "could be described as a sustained essay in phenomenology, if you are at home with that label."
Biography
Later life
In retirement he lived with his twin sister Mary.
Philosophy
Ryle has been characterized as an "ordinary language" philosopher, a style of philosophy he helped pioneer. According to Bryan Magee, Ryle's paper "Systematically Misleading Expressions" (1931) contains the "first clear public statement of the view of philosophy that has come to be known as Linguistic Philosophy", while G.J. Warnock says of his book, The Concept of Mind, that "it was one of the first, and hence has been one of the most widely influential, attacks in the new style upon an old family of problems".
The Concept of Mind
In The Concept of Mind, Ryle argues that dualism involves category mistakes and philosophical nonsense, two philosophical topics that continued to inform Ryle's work. He rhetorically asked students in his 1967–68 Oxford audience what was wrong with saying that there are three things in a field: two cows and a pair of cows. They were also invited to ponder whether the bunghole of a beer barrel is part of the barrel or not.
Knowing-how and knowing-that
A distinction deployed in The Concept of Mind, between 'knowing-how' and 'knowing-that', has attracted independent interest. This distinction is also the origin of procedural (knowing-how) and declarative (knowing-that) models of long-term memory. This distinction is widely accepted in philosophy. An example of the distinction can be knowing how to tie a reef knot and knowing that Queen Victoria died in 19011.
Philosophy as cartography
Ryle thought it no longer possible to believe that a philosopher's task is to study mental as opposed to physical objects. In its place, Ryle saw a tendency of philosophers to search for objects whose nature was neither physical nor mental. Ryle believed, instead, that "philosophical problems are problems of a certain sort; they are not problems of an ordinary sort about special entities." Ryle analogises philosophy to cartography. Competent speakers of a language, Ryle believes, are to a philosopher what ordinary villagers are to a mapmaker: the ordinary villager has a competent grasp of his village, and is familiar with its inhabitants and geography. But when asked to interpret a map of that knowledge, the villager will have difficulty until he is able to translate his practical knowledge into universal cartographic terms. The villager thinks of the village in personal and practical terms, while the mapmaker thinks of the village in neutral, public, cartographic terms. By mapping the words and phrases of a particular statement, philosophers are able to generate what Ryle calls implication threads: each word or phrase of a statement contributes to the statement in that, if the words or phrases were changed, the statement would have a different implication. The philosopher must show the directions and limits of different implication threads that a "concept contributes to the statements in which it occurs." To show this, he must be tugging at neighbouring threads, which, in turn, must also be tugging. Philosophy, then, searches for the meaning of these implication threads in the statements in which they are used.
Legacy
Ryle's notion of thick description has been an important influence on cultural anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz. Peter Strawson, a contemporary of Ryle, paid tribute to him by noting that "by reason of his energy, his authority, and his vision—besides the brilliance and inventiveness displayed in his own philosophical writing—contributed perhaps more than any other single person to the flowering of the subject in England in the years after the war". The Concept of Mind was recognised on its appearance as an important contribution to philosophical psychology, and an important work in the ordinary language philosophy movement. But in the 1960s and 1970s, the rising influence of the cognitivist theories of Noam Chomsky, Herbert A. Simon, Jerry Fodor, and others in the neo-Cartesian school became predominant. The two major postwar schools in philosophy of mind, Fodor's representationalism and Wilfrid Sellars's functionalism, posited precisely the internal cognitive states that Ryle had argued against. Philosopher Daniel Dennett, a student of Ryle's, has said that recent trends in psychology such as embodied cognition, discursive psychology, situated cognition, and others in the post-cognitivist tradition, have provoked a renewed interest in Ryle's work. Dennett provided a sympathetic foreword to the 2000 edition of The Concept of Mind. Author Richard Webster endorsed Ryle's arguments against idealist philosophies, suggesting in Why Freud Was Wrong (1995) that they implied that "theories of human nature which repudiate the evidence of behaviour and refer solely or primarily to invisible mental events will never in themselves be able to unlock the most significant mysteries of human nature."
Personal life
He was a lifelong bachelor, and never married.
Works
1949. The Concept of Mind 1954. Dilemmas: The Tarner Lectures 1953, a collection of shorter pieces 1962. A Rational Animal, Auguste Comte Memorial Lecture delivered on 26 April 1962 at the London School of Economics and Political Science 1966. Plato's Progress 1971. Collected Essays 1929–1968, in two volumes, 57 essays 1977. Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy, editor 1979. On Thinking
References
Further reading
Stroll, A. (2001). "Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976)" in A Companion to Analytic Philosophy (edited A. P. Martinich and D. Sosa).
External links
"Ordinary Language", Gilbert Ryle, The Philosophical Review LXII (1953) "Symposium: Use, Usage and Meaning". Gilbert Ryle; J. N. Findlay, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 35 (1961): 223–242. The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy – Issue 7, 2002 (Issue dedicated to Ryle) The Gilbert Ryle Collection at Linacre College, Oxford. Linacre College houses Gilbert Ryle's library along with a collection of his papers "Gilbert Ryle, British 'Philosopher Of Mind,' Dead in Yorkshire at 76" The New York Times, 20 October 1976 (obituary)
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1370627236 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.
References
- ↩Wikipedia “Gilbert Ryle” date of death (×1) · confidence 0.95 revision URL