Lesson plan

Group strategyproofness

Group strategyproofness (GSP), also called coalitional strategyproofness, is a property of mechanisms and voting rules in social choice theory and mechanism design. A mechanism is group-strategyproof if no coalition of agents can all gain by jointly misreporting their private information: there is no group of agents and no joint deviation from truthful reporting that makes at least one member of the group strictly better off without making any other member of the group worse off. It is a strengthening of ordinary strategyproofness (also called individual strategyproofness, or SP), which only requires that no single agent can gain by misreporting. It also strengthens Pareto efficiency, which only requires that the set of all agents cannot gain by misreporting. Group strategyproofness is desirable because individual strategyproofness alone does not protect a mechanism against coordinated behaviour. Even when no agent can profit by lying on their own, a group of agents who communicate and coordinate may be able to manipulate the outcome to their mutual advantage. Mechanisms that are merely individually strategyproof can therefore be vulnerable in settings where collusion is plausible, while group-strategyproof mechanisms are robust to such joint deviations.…

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Article summary

Group strategyproofness (GSP), also called coalitional strategyproofness, is a property of mechanisms and voting rules in social choice theory and mechanism design. A mechanism is group-strategyproof if no coalition of agents can all gain by jointly misreporting their private information: there is no group of agents and no joint deviation from truthful reporting that makes at least one member of the group strictly better off without making any other member of the group worse off. It is a strengthening of ordinary strategyproofness (also called individual strategyproofness, or SP), which only requires that no single agent can gain by misreporting. It also strengthens Pareto efficiency, which only requires that the set of all agents cannot gain by misreporting. Group strategyproofness is desirable because individual strategyproofness alone does not protect a mechanism against coordinated behaviour. Even when no agent can profit by lying on their own, a group of agents who communicate and coordinate may be able to manipulate the outcome to their mutual advantage. Mechanisms that are merely individually strategyproof can therefore be vulnerable in settings where collusion is plausible, while group-strategyproof mechanisms are robust to such joint deviations.…

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  1. Summarise the article in your own words. Which single claim would you verify first, and why?
  2. Which claim in this article is most likely to be revised as the sources update? How would you check its current status?
  3. If two sources disagreed about one of these facts, what would you need in order to trust one over the other?

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