GSM
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The Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) is a family of standards to describe the protocols for second-generation (2G) digital cellular networks, as used by mobile devices such as mobile phones and mobile broadband modems. GSM is also a trademark owned by the GSM Association. "GSM" may also refer to the voice codec initially used in GSM.
2G networks were developed as a replacement for first generation (1G) analog cellular networks. The original GSM standard, which was developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), originally described a digital, circuit-switched network optimized for full duplex voice telephony, employing time division multiple access (TDMA) between stations.
This expanded over time to include data communications, first by circuit-switched transport, then by packet data transport via its upgraded standards, GPRS and then EDGE. GSM exists in various versions based on the frequency bands used. GSM was first implemented in Finland in December 1991.
It became the global standard for mobile cellular communications, with over 2 billion GSM subscribers globally in 2006, far above its competing standard, CDMA. Its share reached over 90% market share by the mid-2010s, and operating in over 219 countries and territories.…
The Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) is a family of standards to describe the protocols for second-generation (2G) digital cellular networks, as used by mobile devices such as mobile phones and mobile broadband modems. GSM is also a trademark owned by the GSM Association. "GSM" may also refer to the voice codec initially used in GSM.
2G networks were developed as a replacement for first generation (1G) analog cellular networks. The original GSM standard, which was developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), originally described a digital, circuit-switched network optimized for full duplex voice telephony, employing time division multiple access (TDMA) between stations.
This expanded over time to include data communications, first by circuit-switched transport, then by packet data transport via its upgraded standards, GPRS and then EDGE. GSM exists in various versions based on the frequency bands used. GSM was first implemented in Finland in December 1991.
It became the global standard for mobile cellular communications, with over 2 billion GSM subscribers globally in 2006, far above its competing standard, CDMA. Its share reached over 90% market share by the mid-2010s, and operating in over 219 countries and territories.
The specifications and maintenance of GSM passed over to the 3GPP body in 2000, which at the time developed third-generation (3G) UMTS standards, followed by the fourth-generation (4G) LTE Advanced and the fifth-generation 5G standards, which do not form part of the GSM standard. Beginning in the late 2010s, various carriers worldwide started to shut down their GSM networks; nevertheless, as a result of the network's widespread use, the acronym "GSM" is still used as a generic term for the plethora of G mobile phone technologies evolved from it or mobile phones itself.
Initial European development
In 1983, work began to develop a European standard for digital cellular voice telecommunications when the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) set up the Groupe Spécial Mobile (GSM) committee and later provided a permanent technical-support group based in Paris. Five years later, in 1987, 15 representatives from 13 European countries signed a memorandum of understanding in Copenhagen to develop and deploy a common cellular telephone system across Europe, and EU rules were passed to make GSM a mandatory standard.
The decision to develop a continental standard eventually resulted in a unified, open, standard-based network which was larger than that in the United States. In February 1987 Europe produced the first agreed GSM Technical Specification.
Ministers from the EU Big Four (France, West Germany, United Kingdom and Italy) cemented their political support for GSM with the Bonn Declaration on Global Information Networks in May and the GSM MoU was tabled for signature in September. The MoU drew in mobile operators from across Europe to pledge to invest in new GSM networks to an ambitious common date.
In this short 38-week period the whole of Europe (countries and industries) had been brought behind GSM, as guided by four public officials: Armin Silberhorn (Germany), Stephen Temple (UK), Philippe Dupuis (France), and Renzo Failli (Italy). In 1989 the Groupe Spécial Mobile committee was transferred from CEPT to the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).
The IEEE/RSE awarded to Thomas Haug and Philippe Dupuis the 2018 James Clerk Maxwell medal for their "leadership in the development of the first international mobile communications standard with subsequent evolution into worldwide smartphone data communication". The GSM (2G) has evolved into 3G, 4G and 5G.
GSM security
GSM was intended to be a secure wireless system. It has considered the user authentication using a pre-shared key and challenge–response, and over-the-air encryption. However, GSM is vulnerable to different types of attack, each of them aimed at a different part of the network.
Research findings indicate that GSM faces susceptibility to hacking by script kiddies, a term referring to inexperienced individuals utilizing readily available hardware and software. The vulnerability arises from the accessibility of tools such as a DVB-T TV tuner, posing a threat to both mobile and network users.
Despite the term "script kiddies" implying a lack of sophisticated skills, the consequences of their attacks on GSM can be severe, impacting the functionality of cellular networks. Given that GSM continues to be the main source of cellular technology in numerous countries, its susceptibility to potential threats from malicious attacks is one that needs to be addressed.
The development of UMTS introduced an optional Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) that uses a longer authentication key to give greater security, as well as mutually authenticating the network and the user, whereas GSM only authenticates the user to the network (and not vice versa). The security model therefore offers confidentiality and authentication, but limited authorization capabilities, and no non-repudiation.
GSM uses several cryptographic algorithms for security. The A5/1, A5/2, and A5/3 stream ciphers are used for ensuring over-the-air voice privacy. A5/1 was developed first and is a stronger algorithm used within Europe and the United States; A5/2 is weaker and used in other countries.
Serious weaknesses have been found in both algorithms: it is possible to break A5/2 in real-time with a ciphertext-only attack, and in January 2007, The Hacker's Choice started the A5/1 cracking project with plans to use FPGAs that allow A5/1 to be broken with a rainbow table attack. The system supports multiple algorithms so operators may replace that cipher with a stronger one.
Since 2000, different efforts have been made in order to crack the A5 encryption algorithms. Both A5/1 and A5/2 algorithms have been broken, and their cryptanalysis has been revealed in the literature. As an example, Karsten Nohl developed a number of rainbow tables (static values which reduce the time needed to carry out an attack) and have found new sources for known plaintext attacks.
He said that it is possible to build "a full GSM interceptor ... from open-source components" but that they had not done so because of legal concerns. Nohl claimed that he was able to intercept voice and text conversations by impersonating another user to listen to voicemail, make calls, or send text messages using a seven-year-old Motorola cellphone and decryption software available for free online.
GSM uses General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) for data transmissions like browsing the web. The most commonly deployed GPRS ciphers were publicly broken in 2011. The researchers revealed flaws in the commonly used GEA/1 and GEA/2 (standing for GPRS Encryption Algorithms 1 and 2) ciphers and published the open-source "gprsdecode" software for sniffing GPRS networks.
They also noted that some carriers do not encrypt the data (i.e., using GEA/0) in order to detect the use of traffic or protocols they do not like (e.g., Skype), leaving customers unprotected. GEA/3 seems to remain relatively hard to break and is said to be in use on some more modern networks.
If used with USIM to prevent connections to fake base stations and downgrade attacks, users will be protected in the medium term, though migration to 128-bit GEA/4 is still recommended. The first public cryptanalysis of GEA/1 and GEA/2 (also written GEA-1 and GEA-2) was done in 2021.
It concluded that although using a 64-bit key, the GEA-1 algorithm actually provides only 40 bits of security, due to a relationship between two parts of the algorithm. The researchers found that this relationship was very unlikely to have happened if it was not intentional. This may have been done in order to satisfy European controls on export of cryptographic programs.
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1368871808 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.