HAMAS
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The Islamic Resistance Movement, abbreviated Hamas (an acronym from the ), is a Sunni Islamist Palestinian nationalist political organisation with a military wing known as the al-Qassam Brigades. It has governed the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip since 2007.
In July 2026, it announced the resignation of its civilian administration under the Gaza peace plan and US President Donald Trump announced that his Board of Peace had reached an agreement to disarm Hamas. The Hamas movement was founded by Palestinian Islamic scholar Ahmed Yassin in 19871 after the outbreak of the First Intifada against the Israeli occupation.
It emerged from his 1973 Mujama al-Islamiya Islamic charity affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Initially, Hamas was discreetly supported by Israel, as a counter-balance to the secular Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to prevent the creation of an independent Palestinian state.
In the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, Hamas secured a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council by campaigning on promises of a corruption-free government and advocating for resistance as a means to liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation. In the 2007 Battle of Gaza, Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip from rival Palestinian faction Fatah.…
The Islamic Resistance Movement, abbreviated Hamas (an acronym from the ), is a Sunni Islamist Palestinian nationalist political organisation with a military wing known as the al-Qassam Brigades. It has governed the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip since 2007.
In July 2026, it announced the resignation of its civilian administration under the Gaza peace plan and US President Donald Trump announced that his Board of Peace had reached an agreement to disarm Hamas. The Hamas movement was founded by Palestinian Islamic scholar Ahmed Yassin in 1987 after the outbreak of the First Intifada against the Israeli occupation.
It emerged from his 1973 Mujama al-Islamiya Islamic charity affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Initially, Hamas was discreetly supported by Israel, as a counter-balance to the secular Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to prevent the creation of an independent Palestinian state.
In the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, Hamas secured a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council by campaigning on promises of a corruption-free government and advocating for resistance as a means to liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation. In the 2007 Battle of Gaza, Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip from rival Palestinian faction Fatah.
Hamas has since governed the territory separately from the Palestinian National Authority, and many countries and nongovernmental organizations have criticized it for human rights violations (Criticism of Hamas). After Hamas's takeover, Israel significantly intensified existing movement restrictions and imposed a complete blockade of the Gaza Strip.
Egypt also began its blockade of Gaza at this time. This was followed by multiple wars with Israel, including those in 2008–09, 2012, 2014, 2021, and an ongoing one since 2023, which began with the October 7 attacks. Hamas has promoted Palestinian nationalism in an Islamic context and initially sought a state in all of former Mandatory Palestine.
It began acquiescing to 19671 borders in the agreements it signed with Fatah in 2005, 2006 and 2007. In 2017, Hamas released a new charter that supported a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders without recognizing Israel.
Hamas's repeated offers of a truce (for a period of 10–100 years ) based on the 1967 borders are seen by many as consistent with a two-state solution, while others state that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine. While the 19881 Hamas charter was widely described as antisemitic, Hamas's 2017 charter removed the antisemitic language and declared Zionists, not Jews, the targets of their struggle.
It has been debated whether the charter has reflected an actual change in policy. In terms of foreign policy, Hamas has historically sought out relations with Egypt, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey; some of its relations have been impacted by the Arab Spring.
Hamas and Israel have engaged in the protracted Gaza–Israel conflict, as part of the broader Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Hamas has attacked Israeli civilians, including through suicide bombings as well as launching rockets at Israeli cities.
Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union have designated Hamas as a terrorist organisation. In 2018 and 2023, motions at the United Nations to condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization failed to meet the two-thirds threshold.
Erdoğan's Turkey as a role model
Some Hamas members have stated that the model of Islamic government that Hamas seeks to emulate is that of Turkey under the rule of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The foremost members to distance Hamas from the practices of the Taliban and to publicly support the Erdoğan model were Ahmed Yousef and Ghazi Hamad, advisers to Prime Minister Hanieh.
Yusuf, the Hamas deputy foreign minister, reflected this goal in an interview with a Turkish newspaper, stating that while foreign public opinion equates Hamas with the Taliban or al-Qaeda, the analogy is inaccurate. Yusuf described the Taliban as "opposed to everything", including education and women's rights, while Hamas wants to establish good relations between the religious and secular elements of society and strives for human rights, democracy and an open society.
According to professor Yezid Sayigh of King's College in London, how influential this view is within Hamas is uncertain, since both Ahmad Yousef and Ghazi Hamad were dismissed from their posts as advisers to Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Hanieh in October 2007. Both have since been appointed to other prominent positions within the Hamas government.
Khaled al-Hroub of the West Bank-based and anti-Hamas Palestinian daily Al Ayyam added that despite claims by Hamas leaders that it wants to repeat the Turkish model of Islam, "what is happening on the ground in reality is a replica of the Taliban model of Islam."
1988 charter
Hamas published its charter in August 1988, wherein it defined itself as a chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood and its desire to establish "an Islamic state throughout Palestine". The foundational document was written by a single individual, an "old guard" member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza isolated from the outside world, and it was made public without going through the usual prior consultation, revision or consensus process, which Hamas leaders regretted in later years.
It was then signed on 18 August 1988. It compares Israeli attacks on civilians to that by Nazi Germany. The charter also claims all of historical Palestine but promises religious coexistence under Islam's rule.
Article 6 states that the movement's aim is to "raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine, for under the wing of Islam followers of all religions can coexist in security and safety where their lives, possessions and rights are concerned". The charter rejects a two-state solution, stating that the conflict cannot be resolved "except through jihad".
Many scholars have pointed out that both the 1988 Hamas's charter and the Likud party platform sought full control of the land, thus denouncing the two-state solution.
2017 charter
In May 2017, Hamas published a document titled "A Document of General Principles and Policies". While this policy document was much shorter than the 1988 charter, and Hamas leaders stated that it did not replace the 1988 charter, it covers some of the same topics and is referred to as the "2017 charter".
It accepted a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders, without recognizing Israel, which is seen by many as being consistent with a two-state solution, while others state that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine. The charter also argued that armed resistance to occupation is supported by international law.
Hamas has described these changes as adaptation within a specific context, as opposed to abandonment of its principles. While the 1988 Hamas charter was widely described as antisemitic, Hamas's 2017 charter removed the antisemitic language and said Hamas's struggle was with Zionists, not Jews.
Some sources maintain its condemnation of Zionists is antisemitic: it describes Zionism as the enemy of all Muslims and a danger to international security, what author J.S. Spoerl in 2020 has disqualified as "hardly (...) a serious repudiation of anti-Semitism". Hroub, though not responding directly, disagrees, writing that the 2017 document shows that Hamas is stressing the nationalist/resistance aspects of its purpose, providing a "clear assertion of the right to a national liberation struggle on the basis of international law."
Similarly, scholar Joas Wagemakers argues that the 2017 charter clearly omits all antisemitic elements and instead takes a nationalist viewpoint. Scholar Leïla Seurat and analyst Tareq Baconi also stress that the charter broadens the movement's tactics by restricting the primacy of armed struggle and complementing it with peaceful forms of resistance.
Leadership and structure
Hamas inherited from its predecessor a tripartite structure under a Shura Council: social services; religious training; military operations. Traditionally it had four distinct functions: (a) a charitable social welfare division (dawah); (b) a military division for procuring weapons and undertaking operations (al-Mujahideen al Filastinun); (c) a security service (Jehaz Aman); and (d) a media branch (A'alam).
Hamas has both an internal leadership within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and an external leadership, split between a Gaza group directed by Mousa Abu Marzook from his exile first in Damascus and then in Egypt, and a Kuwaiti group (Kuwaidia) under Khaled Mashal. The Kuwaiti group of Palestinian exiles began to receive extensive funding from the Gulf States after its leader Mashal broke with Yasser Arafat's decision to side with Saddam Hussein in the Invasion of Kuwait, with Mashal insisting that Iraq withdraw.
On 6 May 2017, Hamas' Shura Council chose Ismail Haniyeh to become the new leader, to replace Mashal. The exact structure of the organization is unclear as it is shrouded in a veil of secrecy in order to conceal operational activities. Formally, Hamas maintains the wings are separate and independent, but this has been questioned.
It has been argued that its wings are both separate and combined for reasons of internal and external political necessity. Communication between the political and military wings of Hamas is made difficult by the thoroughness of Israeli intelligence surveillance and the existence of an extensive base of informants.
After the assassination of Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi the political direction of the militant wing was diminished and field commanders were given wider discretion over operations.
Shura Council and Political Bureau
Hamas's overarching governing body is the Majlis al-Shura (Shura Council), based on the Quranic concept of consultation and popular assembly ( ), which Hamas leaders argue provides for democracy within an Islamic framework. As the organization grew more complex and Israeli pressure increased, the Shura Council was renamed the General Consultative Council, with members elected from local council groups.
The council elects the 15-member Political Bureau (al-Maktab al-Siyasi) that makes decisions for Hamas. Representatives come from Gaza, the West Bank, leaders in exile and Israeli prisons. The Political Bureau was based in Damascus until January 2012, when Hamas's support for the Syrian opposition to Bashar al-Assad during the Syrian civil war led to the office's relocation to Qatar.
Finances and funding
, half of Hamas funding came from transfers from the Palestinian Authority. Other sources include taxes in Gaza, transfers from Qatar, Iran and charities.
Hamas assumed the administration of Gaza's properties, endowments which extend over 10% of real estate in Gaza, with 2,000 acres of agricultural land held in religious trusts, together with shops, rentable apartments and public buildings. Hamas has an investment portfolio worth US$0.5-$1 billion, including assets in Sudan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and the UAE. Hamas has denied this.
In 2024, financial activity in Gaza was carried out via money changers to bypass international financial authorities. The European Council added six people to its sanctions list for helping fund Hamas, including an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps official. Three businesses were added, including companies in Spain and Sudan that functioned as fronts.
In the first five years of the 1st Intifada, the Gaza economy, 50% of which depended on external sources of income, plummeted by 40% as Israel closed its labor market, and remittances from the Palestinian expatriates in Gulf countries dried up following the 1991–92 Gulf War. At the 1993 Philadelphia conference, Hamas leaders' statements indicated that they read George H. W. Bush's New World Order as embodying a tacit aim to destroy Islam, and therefore funding should focus on enhancing the Islamic roots of Palestinian society and promoting jihad, which also means zeal for social justice, in the occupied territories.
Hamas became fastidious about maintaining separate resourcing for its military, political and social services branches. It has a holding company in East Jerusalem (Beit al-Mal), a 20% stake in Al Aqsa International Bank which served as its financial arm, the Sunuqrut Global Group and the al-Ajouli money-changing firm.
By 2011, Hamas's budget, US$70 million, derived 85% from foreign, rather than Palestinian sources. Only two Israeli-Palestinian sources figure in a list seized in 2004, while other contributors were donor bodies located in Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Britain, Germany, the US, UAE, Italy and France.
Much of the money comes from sources that direct their assistance to what Hamas describes as its charitable work for Palestinians, but investments in support of its ideological position are also relevant, with Gulf States and Saudi Arabia prominent in the latter. Hamas taps money from corporations, criminal organizations and financial networks that support terror.
It is alleged it engages in cigarette and drug smuggling, multimedia copyright infringement and credit card fraud. The US, Israel and the EU have shut down charities and organs that channel money to Hamas, such as the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development.
About half of Hamas's funding came from Persian Gulf states up to the mid-2000s. Saudi Arabia supplied half the Hamas budget in the early 2000s, but, under US pressure, cut its funding by cracking down on Islamic charities and private donor transfers in 2004, which by 2006 drastically reduced the flow. Iran and Syria, in the aftermath of Hamas's 2006 electoral victory, stepped in to fill the shortfall.
Saudi funding remained supportive of Hamas as a Sunni group but chose to provide more assistance to the PNA, the electoral loser, when the EU responded to the outcome by suspending its aid. During the 1980s, Iran provided 10% of Hamas's funding.
It accounted for $22 million, over a quarter of Hamas's budget, by the late 2000s. Iran preferred direct financing to operative groups rather than charities, requiring video proof of attacks. Much of Iran's funding is channeled through Hezbollah.
After 2006, Iran's willingness to fill the gap created by the drying up of Saudi funding also reflected the geopolitical tensions between the two, since, though Shiite, Iran was supporting a Sunni group closely linked with the Saudi kingdom. The US imposed sanctions on Iran's Bank Saderat, alleging it had funneled hundreds of millions to Hamas.
The US has expressed concerns that Hamas obtains funds through Palestinian and Lebanese sympathizers of Arab descent in the Foz do Iguaçu area of Latin America, an area associated with arms trading, drug trafficking, contraband, the manufacture of counterfeit goods, money-laundering and currency fraud. Confirmatory information of Hamas operational presence there is lacking.
After 2009, sanctions on Iran made funding difficult, forcing Hamas to rely on religious donations in the West Bank, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Tens of millions of dollars raised in the Gulf states were transferred through the Rafah Border Crossing.
These were insufficient to cover the cost of governing the Strip and running the al-Qassam Brigades, and when tensions arose with Iran over support of Assad in Syria, Iran dropped its financial assistance to the government, restricting its funding to the military wing, which meant a drop from $150 million in 2012 to $60 million the following year. A further drop occurred in 2015 when Hamas criticised Iran's role in the Yemeni Civil War.
In 2017, the PA government imposed sanctions against Gaza, including cutting off salaries to PA employees. The PA said it would not pay for the electricity and fuel that Israel supplies to the Gaza Strip, but backtracked.
The Israeli government has allowed millions of dollars from Qatar to be funneled through Israel to Hamas, to replace the millions of dollars the PA had stopped transferring to Hamas. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explained that letting it go through Israel meant it could not be used for terrorism: "Now that we are supervising, we know it's going to humanitarian causes."
Social services wing
Hamas developed its social welfare programme by replicating the model established by Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. For Hamas, charity and the development of one's community are both prescribed by religion and to be understood as forms of resistance.
In Islamic tradition, ( ) obliges the faithful to reach out to others by both proselytising and by charitable works, and typically the latter center on the mosques which make use of both endowment resources and charitable donations to fund grassroots services such as nurseries, schools, orphanages, soup kitchens, women's activities, library services and even sporting clubs within a larger context of preaching and political discussions. In the 1990s, some 85% of its budget was allocated to the provision of social services.
Hamas has been called perhaps the most significant social services actor in Palestine. By 2000, Hamas or its affiliated charities ran roughly 40% of the social institutions in the West Bank and Gaza and, with other Islamic charities, by 2005, was supporting 120,000 individuals with monthly financial support in Gaza.
Part of the appeal of these institutions is that they fill a vacuum in the administration by the PLO of the Palestinian territories, which had failed to cater to the demand for jobs and broad social services, and is widely viewed as corrupt. As late as 2005, the budget of Hamas, drawing on global charity contributions, was mostly tied up in covering running expenses for its social programmes, which extended from the supply of housing, food and water for the needy to more general functions such as financial aid, medical assistance, educational development and religious instruction.
A certain accounting flexibility allowed these funds to cover both charitable causes and military operations, permitting transfer from one to the other. The infrastructure itself was understood, within the Palestinian context, as providing the soil from which a militant opposition to the occupation would flower.
In this regard it differs from the rival Palestinian Islamic Jihad which focuses less on its social welfare network, and relies on spectacular attacks to recruit adherents. In 2007, through funding from Iran, Hamas managed to allocate at a cost of $60 million, monthly stipends of $100 for 100,000 workers, and a similar sum for 3,000 fishermen laid idle by Israel's blockade, plus grants totalling $45 million to detainees and their families.
Matthew Levitt argues that Hamas grants to people are subject to a rigorous cost-benefit analysis of how beneficiaries will support Hamas, with those linked to militant activities receiving more than others. Israel holds the families of suicide bombers accountable and bulldozes their homes, whereas the families of Hamas activists who have been killed or wounded during militant operations are given an initial, one-time grant varying between $500–$5,000, together with a $100 monthly allowance.
Rent assistance is also given to families whose homes have been destroyed by Israeli bombing though families unaffiliated with Hamas are said to receive less. Until 2007, these activities extended to the West Bank, but, after a PLO crackdown, now continue exclusively in the Gaza Strip.
After the 2013 Egyptian coup d'état deposed the elected Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohamed Morsi in 2013, Hamas found itself in a financial straitjacket and has since endeavoured to throw the burden of responsibility for public works infrastructure in the Gaza Strip back onto the Palestinian National Authority, but without success.
Social media
Hamas has traditionally presented itself as a voice of suffering of the Palestinian people. According to Time magazine, a new social media strategy was employed in the wake of the October 7 attacks: Hamas asserted itself as the dominant militant force in the Middle East by recording and broadcasting the brutality of their attacks.
In June 2015, Hamas launched an English-language version of its official website. Hamas' official website at hamas.ps was active as of September 2023, though it has since been taken offline. In November 2023, Israeli social media accounts shared hamas.com, a website with videos and pictures of the October 7 attacks released by the IDF that was claimed to be created by Hamas.
Fact-checking website Misbar reported that Hamas had confirmed on Telegram that its official website is hamas.ps. According to Dr. Harel Horev, historian and researcher of Palestinian affairs at Tel Aviv University, Hamas has used social media to dehumanize Israelis/Jews.
According to his research, Hamas took over the most popular accounts on Palestinian networks in a covert manner that did not reveal its involvement. This control gave it the ability to significantly influence the Palestinian discourse online through content that denies the humanity and right to life of Israelis.
These included posters, songs and videos glorifying threats; computer games that encourage the murder of Jews; training videos for carrying out effective and indiscriminate stabbing and shooting attacks; and anti-Semitic cartoons as a central means of dehumanizing the Israeli/Jew in the Palestinian online discourse. Following pressure from pro-Israel advocacy groups and tech giants Apple and Google, Telegram has blocked several Hamas-linked channels that violated app store policies regarding violent content.
Qassam Brigades (military wing)
, according to the IDF. The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades is Hamas' military wing. While the number of members is known only to the Brigades leadership, Israel estimates the Brigades have a core of several hundred members who receive military style training, including training in Iran and in Syria (before the Syrian Civil War).
Additionally, the brigades have an estimated 10,000–17,000 operatives, other sources say 15,000–40,000 militants, forming a backup force whenever circumstances call for reinforcements for the Brigade. Recruitment training lasts for two years.
The group's ideology outlines its aim as the liberation of Palestine and the restoration of Palestinian rights under the dispensations set forth in the Qur'an, and this translates into three policy priorities: To evoke the spirit of Jihad (Resistance) among Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims; to defend Palestinians and their land against the Zionist occupation and its manifestations; to liberate Palestinians and their land that was usurped by the Zionist occupation forces and settlers. According to its official stipulations, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades' military operations are to be restricted to operating only inside Palestine, engaging with Israeli soldiers, and in exercising the right of self-defense against armed settlers.
They are to avoid civilian targets, to respect the enemy's humanity by refraining from mutilation, defacement or excessive killing, and to avoid targeting Westerners either in the occupied zones or beyond. Down to 2007, the Brigades are estimated to have lost some 800 operatives in conflicts with Israeli forces. The leadership has been consistently undermined by targeted assassinations.
Aside from Yahya Ayyash (5 January 1996), it has lost Emad Akel (24 November 1993), Salah Shehade (23 July 2002), Ibrahim al-Makadmeh (8 March 2003), Ismail Abu Shanab (21 August 2003), Ahmed Yassin (22 March 2004), and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi (17 April 2004). The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades groups its fighters in 4–5 man cells, which in turn are integrated into companies and battalions.
Unlike the political section, which is split between an internal and external structure, the Brigades are under a local Palestinian leadership, and disobedience with the decisions taken by the political leadership have been relatively rare. Although the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades are an integral part of Hamas, the exact nature of the relationship is hotly debated.
They appear to operate at times independently of Hamas, exercising a certain autonomy. Some cells have independent links with the external leadership, enabling them to bypass the hierarchical command chain and political leadership in Gaza.
Ilana Kass and Bard O'Neill, likening Hamas's relationship with the Brigades to the political party Sinn Féin's relationship to the military arm of the Irish Republican Army, quote a senior Hamas official as stating: "The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade is a separate armed military wing, which has its own leaders who do not take their orders from Hamas and do not tell us of their plans in advance."
Violence
Hamas has used both political activities and violence in pursuit of its goals. For example, while politically engaged in the 2006 Palestinian Territories parliamentary election campaign, Hamas stated in its election manifesto that it was prepared to use "armed resistance to end the occupation".
Hamas has repeatedly justified its violence by arguing "People under occupation have a right to resist that occupation". Hamas also argues its armed resistance only started after decades of Israeli occupation. From 2000 to 2004, Hamas was responsible for killing nearly 400 Israelis and wounding more than 2,000 in 425 attacks, according to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
From 2001 through May 2008, Hamas launched more than 3,000 Qassam rockets and 2,500 mortar attacks into Israel.
Attacks on civilians
in which 26 people were killed Hamas have committed massacres targeting Israeli civilians. Hamas's most deadly suicide bombing was the Passover Massacre, which occurred in a Netanya hotel on 27 March 2002, at a Passover Seder in which 30 people were killed and 140 were wounded. Hamas has defended suicide attacks as a legitimate aspect of its asymmetric warfare against Israel.
In 2003, according to Stephen Atkins, Hamas resumed suicide bombings in Israel as a retaliatory measure after the failure of peace talks and an Israeli campaign targeting members of the upper echelon of the Hamas leadership. In a 2002 report, Human Rights Watch stated that Hamas leaders "should be held accountable" for "war crimes and crimes against humanity" committed by the al-Qassam Brigades.
In 2008, Hamas leader Khaled Mashal, offered that Hamas would attack only military targets if the IDF would stop causing the deaths of Palestinian civilians. Following a 19 June 2008, ceasefire, the al-Qassam Brigades ended its rocket attacks and arrested Fatah militants in Gaza who had continued sporadic rocket and mortar attacks against Israel.
The al-Qassam Brigades resumed the attacks after the 4 November Israeli incursion into Gaza. left 364 people dead with many others wounded or taken hostage During the October 7 attacks, Hamas infiltrated homes, shot civilians en masse, and took scores of Israeli civilians and soldiers as hostages into Gaza. According to Human Rights Watch, the deliberate targeting of civilians, indiscriminate attacks, and taking of civilians as hostages amount to war crimes under international humanitarian law.
During its October 2023 offensive against Israel, Hamas massacred 364 people at the Re'im music festival, while abducting others. During the same offensive, it also was reported that Hamas had massacred the population of the Kfar Aza kibbutz. About 10 percent of the residents of the Be'eri kibbutz were killed.
Hamas militants attacked the Psyduck festival, that took place near kibutz Nir Oz, killing 17 Israeli partygoers. Video footage shows children being deliberately killed during the kibbutz attacks, as well as what appears to be an attempt to decapitate a living person using a garden hoe.
Forensic teams who examined bodies of victims said many bodies showed signs of torture as well as sexual and gender-based violence, and testimonies to this effect were also collected by Israeli police. Haaretz later reported that forensic pathologists who examined bodies of the victims taken the Shura Base for identification found "no signs on any of those bodies attesting to sexual relations having taken place or of mutilation of genitalia."
Not all bodies could be fully examined given the lack of forensic pathologists, and for some conclusions could not be drawn given their deteriorated state. Israeli forensic pathologists in charge of the process clarified later that all bodies had been examined, and some were disfigured or burned. Some of the testimonies were later proven to be false.
Detailed reports by the UN and The Times concluded that Israel's claims about the scale and formally sanctioned, systematic nature of sexual assaults did not stand up to scrutiny.
Rocket attacks on Israel
According to a 2010 Human Rights Watch report, 15 civilians had been killed in rocket attacks by Hamas and other groups since 2001. Hamas has claimed that its rockets are only aimed at military targets, and that the low quality of its weapons was the cause of the inadvertent civilian casualties.
According to Human Rights Watch, statements by Hamas leaders shed doubt on these claims and indicate that targeting of civilians was not accidental. From January 2009, following Operation Cast Lead, Hamas largely stopped launching rocket attacks on Israel and has on at least two occasions arrested members of other groups who have launched rockets, "showing that it has the ability to impose the law when it wants".
In February 2010, Hamas issued a statement regretting any harm that may have befallen Israeli civilians as a result of Palestinian rocket attacks during the Gaza war. It maintained that its rocket attacks had been aimed at Israeli military targets but lacked accuracy and hence sometimes hit civilian areas.
Israel responded that Hamas had boasted repeatedly of targeting and murdering civilians in the media. According to one report, commenting on the 2014 conflict, "nearly all the 2,500–3,000 rockets and mortars Hamas has fired at Israel since the start of the war seem to have been aimed at towns", including an attack on "a kibbutz collective farm close to the Gaza border", in which an Israeli child was killed.
Former Israeli Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi stated that "Hamas has expressed pride in aiming long-range rockets at strategic targets in Israel including the nuclear reactor in Dimona, the chemical plants in Haifa, and Ben-Gurion Airport", which "could have caused thousands" of Israeli casualties "if successful". In July 2008, Barack Obama, then the Democratic presidential candidate, said: "If somebody was sending rockets into my house, where my two daughters sleep at night, I'm going to do everything in my power to stop that, and I would expect Israelis to do the same thing."
On 28 December 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in a statement: "the United States strongly condemns the repeated rocket and mortar attacks against Israel." On 2 March 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton condemned the attacks. On 7 October 2023, Hamas claimed responsibility for a barrage of missile attacks originating from the Gaza Strip.
Guerrilla warfare
Hamas has made great use of guerrilla tactics in the Gaza Strip and to a lesser degree the West Bank. It has successfully adapted these techniques over the years since its inception. According to a 2006 report by rival Fatah party, Hamas had smuggled between several hundred and 1,300 tons of advanced rockets, along with other weaponry, into Gaza.
Hamas has used IEDs and anti-tank rockets against the IDF in Gaza. The latter include standard RPG-7 warheads and home-made rockets such as the Al-Bana, Al-Batar and Al-Yasin. The IDF has a difficult, if not impossible, time trying to find hidden weapons caches in Palestinian areas—this is due to the high local support base Hamas enjoys.
Criticism
Aside from its use of political violence in pursuit of its goals, Hamas has been widely criticised for a variety of reasons, including the use of antisemitic hate speech by its representatives; its frequent calls for the destruction of Israel by force; its reported use of human shields and child combatants as part of its military operations; and its restriction of political freedoms within the Gaza Strip and human rights abuses. After the start of the 2023 war, the European Parliament passed a motion stating the need for Hamas to be eliminated, with US president Joseph R. Biden having expressed the same sentiment.
Hamas was accused of having committed genocide against Israelis on 7 October 2023 by 240 legal experts, including jurists and academics.
Foreign relations
, Syria. and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in 2012 After winning the Palestinian elections, Hamas leaders made diplomatic tours abroad. In April 2006, Mahmoud al-Zahar (then foreign minister) visited Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar, the UAE, Yemen, Libya, Algeria, Sudan and Egypt. In Syria he held talks on the issue of Palestinians stuck on the Syrian-Iraqi border.
He stated he met officials from Western Europe in Qatar who did not wish to be named. In May he visited Indonesia, Malaysia, the Sultanate of Brunei, Pakistan, China, Sri Lanka, Iran, and participated in the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum. Ismail Haniyeh visited Egypt, Syria, Kuwait, Iran, Lebanon, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
Hamas has always maintained leadership abroad. The movement is deliberately fragmented to ensure Israel cannot kill its leaders. Hamas used to be strongly allied with Iran and Syria.
Iran gave Hamas an estimated $13–15 million in 2011 as well as access to long-range missiles. Hamas's political bureau was once located in the Syrian capital Damascus before the Syrian civil war. Relations between Hamas, Iran, and Syria began to turn cold when Hamas refused to back Syrian President Bashar al-Assad; Hamas backed the Sunni rebels fighting against Assad.
As a result, Iran cut funding to Hamas, and Iranian ally Hezbollah ordered Hamas members out of Lebanon. Hamas was then forced out of Syria, and has tried to mend fences with Iran and Hezbollah. Hamas contacted Jordan and Sudan to see if either would open up its borders to its political bureau, but both refused, although they welcomed Hamas members leaving Syria.
From 2012 to 2013, under the leadership of Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi, Hamas had the support of Egypt. After Morsi was removed, his successor Abdul Fattah al-Sisi outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood and destroyed the tunnels Hamas built into Egypt. In 2015, Egypt declared Hamas a terrorist organization, but overturned this in June the same year.
There was a rapprochement between Hamas and Egypt, when a Hamas delegation visited Cairo in 2016. Hamas has assisted Egypt in controlling the insurgency in Sinai. Hamas denied Egypt's request to deploy its own militants in the Sinai leading to tensions between the two.
Egypt has occasionally served as mediator between Hamas and Fatah, seeking to unify the two. In 2017, Yahya Sinwar visited Cairo and convinced Egypt to open the Rafah crossing, letting in cement and fuel in exchange for Hamas committing to better relations with Fatah; this led to the signing of the 2017 Fatah–Hamas Agreement.
The United Arab Emirates has been hostile to Hamas, viewing it as the Palestinian equivalent of the Muslim Brotherhood, a designated terrorist organization in the UAE. Hamas enjoyed close relations with Saudi Arabia in its early years. Saudi Arabia funded most of its operations from 2000 to 2004, but reduced its support due to US pressure.
In 2020, many Hamas members in Saudi Arabia were arrested. In 2022, Saudi Arabia began releasing Hamas members from prison. In 2023, Ismail Haniyeh visited Riyadh, a sign of improving relations.
Haniyeh had long sought to visit, and his requests had been ignored until then. Despite its Sunni Islamist ideology, Hamas has been flexible and pragmatic in its foreign policy, moderating and toning down its religious rhetoric when expedient; it has developed strong ties with Iran, and established relations with constitutionally secular states such as Syria and Russia.
Kyrylo Budanov, the chief of Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence, has accused Russia of supporting Hamas by supplying it with stolen Ukrainian weaponry, and the National Resistance Center of Ukraine alleged that the Russian Wagner Group trained Hamas militants ahead of the 7 October attacks. North Korean arms were likely used during the 7 Oct assault on Israel.
Ali Barakeh, a Hamas official living in Lebanon, claimed the two are allies. Hamas leaders reportedly re-established relations with Kuwait, Libya and Oman, all of which reportedly have not had warm relations with Fatah. The cool relationship between Fatah and Kuwait owed to Arafat's support for Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War.
This rapprochement was in part due to Hamas' policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Arab countries. Mahmoud al-Zahar stated that Hamas does not "play the game" of siding with one Arab nation against another.
When Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and other Sunni ulema, called for an uprising against Assad's regime in Syria, Mahmoud al-Zahar maintained that taking sides would harm the Palestinian cause. After the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Hamas congratulated the Syrian people for achieving their "aspirations for freedom and justice," and expressed hope that the new Syrian government would continue "its historical and pivotal role in supporting the Palestinian people."
In 2025, Hamas condemned Israeli attacks on Syria.
Terrorist designation
The United States designated Hamas as a terrorist organisation in 1995, as did Canada in November 2002, and the United Kingdom in November 2021. In May 2021, the Organization of American States designated Hamas as a terrorist organisation. The European Union so designated Hamas's military wing in 2001 and, under US pressure, designated Hamas in 2003.
Hamas challenged this decision, which was upheld by the European Court of Justice in July 2017. Japan and New Zealand have designated the military wing of Hamas as a terrorist organisation. The organisation is banned in Jordan.
Citing previous infiltration attempts in 2018 and 2022, the Philippines declared Hamas as a terrorist organization in 2023. In late February 2024, New Zealand re-designated the entire Hamas organisation as a terror entity. In December 2024, Switzerland approved a bill to ban the group for five years.
In April 2025, Paraguay expanded its designation of Hamas as a terrorist organisation to include its political wing. In September 2025, Ecuador designated Hamas as a terrorist organisation, as did Costa Rica on 8 April 2026, and Honduras and Trinidad and Tobago on 15 April. In April 2025, Hamas filed a legal case in Britain appealing its designation as a terrorist group.
The filing argues that Hamas has never engaged in an armed operation outside of historic Palestine and is not a threat to Western nations. Hamas politician Mousa Abu Marzook submitted a written statement arguing, "Hamas is not a terrorist group. It is a Palestinian Islamic liberation and resistance movement whose goal is to liberate Palestine and confront the Zionist project."
Hamas is not regarded as a terrorist organisation by Afghanistan, Algeria, Iran, Russia, Norway, Turkey, China, Egypt, Syria, and Brazil. Many other states, including Russia, China, Syria, Turkey and Iran, have regarded Hamas's (armed) struggle as legitimate.
Tobias Buck, a Financial Times writer, wrote in 2012 that Hamas is "listed as a terrorist organisation by Israel, the US and the EU, but few dare to treat it that way", and that in the Arab and Muslim world it had lost its pariah status, as its emissaries are welcomed by Islamic governments. In the early 2010s, Hamas was considered a terrorist group by some governments and academics, while others regarded Hamas as a complex organisation with terrorism as only one component.
Israeli policy towards Hamas
Historical accounts note that Israel's encouragement of Islamist movements in Palestine long predated Hamas's takeover of Gaza, with Israeli authorities adopting a "divide-and-rule" strategy by supporting conservative and religious groups like the Palestinian Village Leagues and Sheikh Ahmed Yassin's al-Mujama al-Islami to counter the secular PLO. This strategy is documented in statements by several former Israeli figures, including Brigadier General Yitzhak Segev, who admitted to funding al-Mujama al-Islami at the request of Israeli authorities; former Civil Administration director Efraim Sneh; and former head of the Southern Command Yitzhak Mordechai, and Israeli professor Avner Cohen.
Benjamin Netanyahu had been Israel's prime minister for most of the two decades preceding the Gaza war, and was criticized for having championed a policy of empowering Hamas in Gaza. This policy was part of a strategy to sabotage a two-state solution by confining the Palestinian Authority to the West Bank and weakening it, and to demonstrate to the Israeli public and western governments that Israel has no partner for peace.
This criticism was leveled by several Israeli officials, including former prime minister Ehud Barak, and former head of Shin Bet security services Yuval Diskin. Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian Authority were also critical of Israel under Netanyahu allowing suitcases of Qatari money to be given to Hamas, in exchange for maintaining the ceasefire.
An op-ed by Tal Schneider for the Times of Israel reported after the Hamas attack that Netanyahu's policy to treat the Palestinian Authority as a burden and Hamas as an asset had "blown up in our faces".
See also
List of political parties in Palestine Palestinian war crimes
External links
Hamas leaders CFR Hamas Charter of 1988 Hamas 2017 Document of General Principles & Policies (English translation published by Hamas, via Internet Archive) The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) (includes interpretation) Hamas Shifts From Rockets to Public Relations The New York Times, 23 July 2009 22 years on the start of Hamas Al-Qassam Brigades' Information Office Sherifa Zuhur, Hamas and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-Based Politics (PDF file) December 2008 Fatah and Hamas Human Rights Violations in the Palestinian Occupied Territories in 2007 by the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1378218504 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.
References
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