HMAC

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In cryptography, an HMAC (sometimes expanded as either keyed-hash message authentication code or hash-based message authentication code) is a specific type of message authentication code (MAC) involving a cryptographic hash function and a secret cryptographic key. As with any MAC, it may be used to simultaneously verify both the data integrity and authenticity of a message. An HMAC is a type of keyed hash function that can also be used in a key derivation scheme or a key stretching scheme. HMAC can provide authentication using a shared secret instead of using digital signatures with asymmetric cryptography. It trades off the need for a complex public key infrastructure by delegating the key exchange to the communicating parties, who are responsible for establishing and using a trusted channel to agree on the key prior to communication.

In cryptography, an HMAC (sometimes expanded as either keyed-hash message authentication code or hash-based message authentication code) is a specific type of message authentication code (MAC) involving a cryptographic hash function and a secret cryptographic key. As with any MAC, it may be used to simultaneously verify both the data integrity and authenticity of a message. An HMAC is a type of keyed hash function that can also be used in a key derivation scheme or a key stretching scheme. HMAC can provide authentication using a shared secret instead of using digital signatures with asymmetric cryptography. It trades off the need for a complex public key infrastructure by delegating the key exchange to the communicating parties, who are responsible for establishing and using a trusted channel to agree on the key prior to communication.

Definition

This definition is taken from RFC 2104: \begin{align} \operatorname{HMAC}(K, m) &= \operatorname{H}\Bigl(\bigl(K' \oplus opad\bigr) \parallel \operatorname{H} \bigl(\left(K' \oplus ipad\right) \parallel m\bigr)\Bigr) \\ K' &= \begin{cases} \operatorname{H}\left(K\right) & \text{if}\ K\text{ is larger than block size} \\ K & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \end{align} where \operatorname{H} is a cryptographic hash function. m is the message to be authenticated. K is the secret key. K' is a block-sized key derived from the secret key, K; either by padding to the right with 0s up to the block size, or by hashing down to less than or equal to the block size first and then padding to the right with zeros. \parallel denotes concatenation. \oplus denotes bitwise exclusive or (XOR). opad is the block-sized outer padding, consisting of repeated bytes valued 0x5c. ipad is the block-sized inner padding, consisting of repeated bytes valued 0x36.

Implementation

The following pseudocode demonstrates how HMAC may be implemented. The block size is 512 bits (64 bytes) when using one of the following hash functions: SHA-1, MD5, RIPEMD-128. function hmac is input: key: Bytes // Array of bytes message: Bytes // Array of bytes to be hashed hash: Function // The hash function to use (e.g. SHA-1) blockSize: Integer // The block size of the hash function (e.g. 64 bytes for SHA-1) // Compute the block sized key block_sized_key = computeBlockSizedKey(key, hash, blockSize) o_key_pad ← block_sized_key xor [0x5c blockSize] // Outer padded key i_key_pad ← block_sized_key xor [0x36 blockSize] // Inner padded key return hash(o_key_pad ∥ hash(i_key_pad ∥ message)) function computeBlockSizedKey is input: key: Bytes // Array of bytes hash: Function // The hash function to use (e.g. SHA-1) blockSize: Integer // The block size of the hash function (e.g. 64 bytes for SHA-1) // Keys longer than blockSize are shortened by hashing them if (length(key) > blockSize) then key = hash(key) // Keys shorter than blockSize are padded to blockSize by padding with zeros on the right if (length(key) HMAC(k, m) is computed as HMAC(H(k), m) . This property is sometimes raised as a possible weakness of HMAC in password-hashing scenarios: it has been demonstrated that it's possible to find a long ASCII string and a random value whose hash will be also an ASCII string, and both values will produce the same HMAC output. In 2006, Jongsung Kim, Alex Biryukov, Bart Preneel, and Seokhie Hong showed how to distinguish HMAC with reduced versions of MD5 and SHA-1 or full versions of HAVAL, MD4, and SHA-0 from a random function or HMAC with a random function. Differential distinguishers allow an attacker to devise a forgery attack on HMAC. Furthermore, differential and rectangle distinguishers can lead to second-preimage attacks. HMAC with the full version of MD4 can be forged with this knowledge. These attacks do not contradict the security proof of HMAC, but provide insight into HMAC based on existing cryptographic hash functions. In 2009, Xiaoyun Wang et al. presented a distinguishing attack on HMAC-MD5 without using related keys. It can distinguish an instantiation of HMAC with MD5 from an instantiation with a random function with 2 97 queries with probability 0.87. In 2011 an informational RFC 6151 was published to summarize security considerations in MD5 and HMAC-MD5. For HMAC-MD5 the RFC summarizes that – although the security of the MD5 hash function itself is severely compromised – the currently known "attacks on HMAC-MD5 do not seem to indicate a practical vulnerability when used as a message authentication code", but it also adds that "for a new protocol design, a ciphersuite with HMAC-MD5 should not be included". In May 2011, RFC 6234 was published detailing the abstract theory and source code for SHA-based HMACs.

Examples

Here are some HMAC values, assuming 8-bit ASCII for the input and hexadecimal encoding for the output: HMAC_MD5("key", "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog") = 80070713463e7749b90c2dc24911e275 HMAC_SHA1("key", "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog") = de7c9b85b8b78aa6bc8a7a36f70a90701c9db4d9 HMAC_SHA256("key", "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog") = f7bc83f430538424b13298e6aa6fb143ef4d59a14946175997479dbc2d1a3cd8 HMAC_SHA512("key", "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog") = b42af09057bac1e2d41708e48a902e09b5ff7f12ab428a4fe86653c73dd248fb82f948a549f7b791a5b41915ee4d1ec3935357e4e2317250d0372afa2ebeeb3a

See also

HMAC-based one-time password

References

External links

Online HMAC Generator / Tester Tool FIPS PUB 198-1, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) C HMAC implementation Python HMAC implementation Java implementation Rust HMAC implementation

Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1376152783 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.

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