Hylomorphism
Hylomorphism is a philosophical doctrine developed by the Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, which conceives every physical entity or being (ousia) as a compound of matter (potency) and substantial form (act), with the generic form as…
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Hylomorphism is a philosophical doctrine developed by the Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, which conceives every physical entity or being (ousia) as a compound of matter (potency) and substantial form (act), with the generic form as immanently real within the individual. The word is a 19th-century term formed from the Greek words ὕλη (hyle: "wood, matter") and μορφή (morphē: "form").
Hylomorphic theories of physical entities have been undergoing a revival in contemporary philosophy, especially since the 2000s.
Basic theory
Aristotle applies his theory of hylomorphism to living things. He defines a soul as that which makes a living thing alive. Life is a property of living things, just as knowledge and health are.
Therefore, a soul is a form—that is, a specifying principle or cause—of a living thing. Furthermore, Aristotle says that a soul is related to its body as form to matter. Hence, Aristotle argues, there is no problem in explaining the unity of body and soul, just as there is no problem in explaining the unity of wax and its shape.
Just as a wax object consists of wax with a certain shape, so a living organism consists of a body with the property of life, which is its soul. On the basis of his hylomorphic theory, Aristotle rejects the Pythagorean doctrine of metempsychosis, ridiculing the notion that just any soul could inhabit just any body.
According to Timothy Robinson, it is unclear whether Aristotle identifies the soul with the body's structure. According to one interpretation of Aristotle, a properly organized body is already alive simply by virtue of its structure. However, according to another interpretation, the property of life—that is, the soul—is something in addition to the body's structure.
Robinson uses the analogy of a car to explain this second interpretation. A running car is running not only because of its structure but also because of the activity in its engine.
Likewise, according to this second interpretation, a living body is alive not only because of its structure but also because of an additional property: the soul, which a properly organized body needs in order to be alive. John Vella uses Frankenstein's monster to illustrate the second interpretation: the corpse lying on Frankenstein's table is already a fully organized human body, but it is not yet alive; when Frankenstein activates his machine, the corpse gains a new property, the property of life, which Aristotle would call the soul.
Teleology and ethics
Aristotle holds a teleological worldview: he sees the universe as inherently purposeful. Basically, Aristotle claims that potentiality exists for the sake of actuality. Thus, matter exists for the sake of receiving its form, as an organism has sight for the sake of seeing.
Now, each thing has certain potentialities as a result of its form. Because of its form, a snake has the potential to slither; we can say that the snake ought to slither. The more a thing achieves its potential, the more it succeeds in achieving its purpose.
Aristotle bases his ethical theory on this teleological worldview. Because of his form, a human being has certain abilities. Hence, his purpose in life is to exercise those abilities as well and as fully as possible.
Now, the most characteristic human ability, which is not included in the form of any other organism, is the ability to think. The ability to deliberate makes it possible to choose the course of action that reason deems best—even if it is emotionally undesirable. Contemporary Aristotelians tend to stress exercising freedom and acting wisely as the best way to live.
Aristotle argued that the best type of happiness is acting in accord with moral virtue. Either way, for Aristotle the best human life is a life lived rationally.
Universal hylomorphism
The Neoplatonic philosopher Avicebron (Solomon ibn Gabirol) proposed a Neoplatonic version of this Aristotelian concept, according to which all things, including soul and intellect, are composed of matter and form. Hasdai Crescas imagines that celestial-body is like Hylé but as matter in actuality, sure over the opposition about this, i.e. in potential existence.
Matter and form is always presents in all but celestial-bodies are without form because of their nature; so Hasdai Crescas finds the solution also about this paradox.
Medieval modifications
Thomas Aquinas emphasized the act/potency understanding of form/matter whereby form activates the potency of matter and existence activates souls. The angels are accordingly composites of esse (potentiality) and existence (actuality) that activates immaterial souls, while God alone is per se existence, pure act without any potencies.
Medieval theologians, newly exposed to Aristotle's philosophy, applied hylomorphism to Christian doctrines such as the transubstantiation of the Eucharist's bread and wine into the body and blood of Jesus. Theologians such as Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas developed Christian applications of hylomorphism.
Aristotle's texts on the agent intellect have given rise to diverse interpretations. Some following Averroes (Ibn Rushd 1126–1198) argue that Aristotle equated the active intellect with a divine being who infuses concepts into the passive intellect to aid human understanding.
Others following Aquinas (1225–74) argue that the Neoplatonic interpretation is a mistake: the active intellect is actually part of the human soul.
Substantial form, accidental form, and prime matter
Medieval philosophers who used Aristotelian concepts frequently distinguished between substantial forms and accidental forms. A substance necessarily possesses at least one substantial form. It may also possess a variety of accidental forms.
For Aristotle, a "substance" (ousia) is an individual thing—for example, an individual man or an individual horse. Within every physical substance, the substantial form determines what kind of thing the physical substance is by actualizing prime matter as individualized by the causes of that thing's coming to be.
For instance, the chick comes to be when the substantial form of chickens actualizes the hen's egg and that actualization is possible insofar as that egg is in potency to being actualized both as a chicken due to the receptivity of its prime matter to the substantial form of chickens and into a chick with certain colored feathers due to the individualization of the egg given by its parents. So while the individualized matter determines individualized properties, the substantial form determines essential properties.
The substantial form of a substance S consists of its essence and essential properties (the properties that S needs in order to be the kind of substance that S is). Substantial change destroys the ability of a substantial form to actualize individualized prime matter without affecting prime matter's ability to be actualized by a new substantial form; e.g., when the wolf eats the chick, the chick's rearranged matter becomes part of the wolf, and is thence animated by the wolf's substantial form.
In contrast, the accidental forms of S are its non-essential properties —properties that S can lose or gain without changing into a different kind of substance: the chick can lose its feathers (due to, e.g., parasites or the like) without ceasing to be an individual chicken.
Plurality vs. unity of substantial form
Many medieval theologians and philosophers followed Aristotle in seeing a living being's soul as that being's form—specifically, its substantial form. However, they disagreed about whether X's soul is X's only substantial form.
Some medieval thinkers argued that X's soul is X's only substantial form animating the entire body of X. In contrast, other medieval thinkers argued that a living being contains at least two substantial forms—(1) the shape and structure of its body, and (2) its soul, which makes its body alive.
Modern physics
The idea of hylomorphism can be said to have been reintroduced to the world when Werner Heisenberg invented his duplex world of quantum mechanics. In his 1958 text Physics and Philosophy, Heisenberg states: A hylomorphic interpretation of Bohmian mechanics has been suggested, in which the cosmos is a single substance that is composed of both material particles and a substantial form.
There is also a hylomorphic interpretation of the collapse of the wave function.
See also
Endurantism Hylotheism Hylozoism Inherence Moderate realism Sacramental matter and form Substance theory Tripartitism Vitalism
Sources
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External links
Hylomorphism -- Encyclopædia Britannica
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