Inductive reasoning
Inductive reasoning refers to a variety of methods of reasoning in which the conclusion of an argument is supported not with deductive certainty, but at best with some degree of probability.
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Inductive reasoning refers to a variety of methods of reasoning in which the conclusion of an argument is supported not with deductive certainty, but at best with some degree of probability. Unlike deductive reasoning (such as mathematical induction), where the conclusion is certain, given the premises are correct, inductive reasoning produces conclusions that are at best probable, given the premises provided.
Enumerative induction
Enumerative induction is an inductive method in which a generalization is constructed based on the number of instances that support it. The more supporting instances, the stronger the conclusion. The most basic form of enumerative induction reasons from particular instances to all instances and is thus an unrestricted generalization.
If one observes 100 swans, and all 100 were white, one might infer a probable universal categorical proposition of the form All swans are white. As this reasoning form's premises, even if true, do not entail the conclusion's truth, this is a form of inductive inference. The conclusion might be true, and might be thought probably true, yet it can be false.
Questions regarding the justification and form of enumerative inductions have been central in philosophy of science, as enumerative induction has a pivotal role in the traditional model of the scientific method. All life forms so far discovered are composed of cells. Therefore, all life forms are composed of cells.
This is enumerative induction, also known as simple induction or simple predictive induction. It is a subcategory of inductive generalization. In everyday practice, this is perhaps the most common form of induction.
For the preceding argument, the conclusion is tempting but makes a prediction well in excess of the evidence. First, it assumes that life forms observed until now can tell us how future cases will be: an appeal to uniformity. Second, the conclusion All is a bold assertion.
A single contrary instance foils the argument. And last, quantifying the level of probability in any mathematical form is problematic. By what standard do we measure our Earthly sample of known life against all (possible) life?
Suppose we do discover some new organism—such as some microorganism floating in the mesosphere or an asteroid—and it is cellular. Does the addition of this corroborating evidence oblige us to raise our probability assessment for the subject proposition?
It is generally deemed reasonable to answer this question "yes", and for a good many this "yes" is not only reasonable but incontrovertible. So then just how much should this new data change our probability assessment? Here, consensus melts away, and in its place arises a question about whether we can talk of probability coherently at all with or without numerical quantification.
All life forms so far discovered have been composed of cells. Therefore, the next life form discovered will be composed of cells. This is enumerative induction in its weak form.
It truncates "all" to a mere single instance and, by making a far weaker claim, considerably strengthens the probability of its conclusion. Otherwise, it has the same shortcomings as the strong form: its sample population is non-random, and quantification methods are elusive.
Ancient philosophy
For a move from particular to universal, Aristotle in the 300s BCE used the Greek word epagogé, which Cicero translated into the Latin word inductio.
Aristotle and the Peripatetic School
Aristotle's Posterior Analytics covers the methods of inductive proof in natural philosophy and in the social sciences. The first book of Posterior Analytics describes the nature and science of demonstration and its elements: including definition, division, intuitive reason of first principles, particular and universal demonstration, affirmative and negative demonstration, the difference between science and opinion, etc.
Pyrrhonism
The ancient Pyrrhonists were the first Western philosophers to point out the problem of induction: that induction cannot, according to them, justify the acceptance of universal statements as true.
Ancient medicine
The Empiric school of ancient Greek medicine employed epilogism as a method of inference. 'Epilogism' is a theory-free method that looks at history through the accumulation of facts without major generalization and with consideration of the consequences of making causal claims.
Epilogism is an inference which moves entirely within the domain of visible and evident things, it tries not to invoke unobservables. The Dogmatic school of ancient Greek medicine employed analogismos as a method of inference. This method used analogy to reason from what was observed to unobservable forces.
Early modern philosophy
In 1620, early modern philosopher Francis Bacon repudiated the value of mere experience and enumerative induction alone. His method of inductivism required that minute and many-varied observations that uncovered the natural world's structure and causal relations needed to be coupled with enumerative induction in order to have knowledge beyond the present scope of experience. Inductivism therefore required enumerative induction as a component.
David Hume
The empiricist David Hume's 1740 stance found enumerative induction to have no rational, let alone logical, basis; instead, induction was the product of instinct rather than reason, a custom of the mind and an everyday requirement to live. While observations, such as the motion of the sun, could be coupled with the principle of the uniformity of nature to produce conclusions that seemed to be certain, the problem of induction arose from the fact that the uniformity of nature was not a logically valid principle, therefore it could not be defended as deductively rational, but also could not be defended as inductively rational by appealing to the fact that the uniformity of nature has accurately described the past and therefore, will likely accurately describe the future because that is an inductive argument and therefore circular since induction is what needs to be justified.
Since Hume first wrote about the dilemma between the invalidity of deductive arguments and the circularity of inductive arguments in support of the uniformity of nature, this supposed dichotomy between merely two modes of inference, deduction and induction, has been contested with the discovery of a third mode of inference known as abduction, or abductive reasoning, which was first formulated and advanced by Charles Sanders Peirce, in 1886, where he referred to it as "reasoning by hypothesis." Inference to the best explanation is often, yet arguably, treated as synonymous to abduction as it was first identified by Gilbert Harman in 1965 where he referred to it as "abductive reasoning," yet his definition of abduction slightly differs from Pierce's definition.
Regardless, if abduction is in fact a third mode of inference rationally independent from the other two, then either the uniformity of nature can be rationally justified through abduction, or Hume's dilemma is more of a trilemma. Hume was also skeptical of the application of enumerative induction and reason to reach certainty about unobservables and especially the inference of causality from the fact that modifying an aspect of a relationship prevents or produces a particular outcome.
Immanuel Kant
Awakened from "dogmatic slumber" by a German translation of Hume's work, Kant sought to explain the possibility of metaphysics. In 1781, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason introduced rationalism as a path toward knowledge distinct from empiricism. Kant sorted statements into two types.
Analytic statements are true by virtue of the arrangement of their terms and meanings, thus analytic statements are tautologies, merely logical truths, true by necessity. Whereas synthetic statements hold meanings to refer to states of facts, contingencies.
Against both rationalist philosophers like Descartes and Leibniz as well as against empiricist philosophers like Locke and Hume, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is a sustained argument that in order to have knowledge we need both a contribution of our mind (concepts) as well as a contribution of our senses (intuitions). Knowledge proper is for Kant thus restricted to what we can possibly perceive (phenomena), whereas objects of mere thought ("things in themselves") are in principle unknowable due to the impossibility of ever perceiving them.
Reasoning that the mind must contain its own categories for organizing sense data, making experience of objects in space and time (phenomena) possible, Kant concluded that the uniformity of nature was an a priori truth. A class of synthetic statements that was not contingent but true by necessity, was then synthetic a priori.
Kant thus saved both metaphysics and Newton's law of universal gravitation. On the basis of the argument that what goes beyond our knowledge is "nothing to us," he discarded scientific realism. Kant's position that knowledge comes about by a cooperation of perception and our capacity to think (transcendental idealism) gave birth to the movement of German idealism.
Hegel's absolute idealism subsequently flourished across continental Europe and England.
Late modern philosophy
Positivism, developed by Henri de Saint-Simon and promulgated in the 1830s by his former student Auguste Comte, was the first late modern philosophy of science. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, fearing society's ruin, Comte opposed metaphysics.
Human knowledge had evolved from religion to metaphysics to science, said Comte, which had flowed from mathematics to astronomy to physics to chemistry to biology to sociology—in that order—describing increasingly intricate domains. All of society's knowledge had become scientific, with questions of theology and of metaphysics being unanswerable.
Comte found enumerative induction reliable as a consequence of its grounding in available experience. He asserted the use of science, rather than metaphysical truth, as the correct method for the improvement of human society. According to Comte, scientific method frames predictions, confirms them, and states laws—positive statements—irrefutable by theology or by metaphysics.
Regarding experience as justifying enumerative induction by demonstrating the uniformity of nature, the British philosopher John Stuart Mill welcomed Comte's positivism, but thought scientific laws susceptible to recall or revision and Mill also withheld from Comte's Religion of Humanity. Comte was confident in treating scientific law as an irrefutable foundation for all knowledge, and believed that churches, honouring eminent scientists, ought to focus public mindset on altruism—a term Comte coined—to apply science for humankind's social welfare via sociology, Comte's leading science.
During the 1830s and 1840s, while Comte and Mill were the leading philosophers of science, William Whewell found enumerative induction not nearly as convincing, and, despite the dominance of inductivism, formulated "superinduction". Whewell argued that "the peculiar import of the term Induction" should be recognised: "there is some Conception superinduced upon the facts", that is, "the Invention of a new Conception in every inductive inference".
The creation of Conceptions is easily overlooked and prior to Whewell was rarely recognised. Whewell explained: These "superinduced" explanations may well be flawed, but their accuracy is suggested when they exhibit what Whewell termed consilience—that is, simultaneously predicting the inductive generalizations in multiple areas—a feat that, according to Whewell, can establish their truth.
Perhaps to accommodate the prevailing view of science as inductivist method, Whewell devoted several chapters to "methods of induction" and sometimes used the phrase "logic of induction", despite the fact that induction lacks rules and cannot be trained. In the 1870s, the originator of pragmatism, C S Peirce performed vast investigations that clarified the basis of deductive inference as a mathematical proof (as, independently, did Gottlob Frege).
Peirce recognized induction but always insisted on a third type of inference that Peirce variously termed abduction or retroduction or hypothesis or presumption. Later philosophers termed Peirce's abduction, etc., Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE).
Bertrand Russell
Having highlighted Hume's problem of induction, John Maynard Keynes posed logical probability as its answer, or as near a solution as he could arrive at. Bertrand Russell found Keynes's Treatise on Probability the best examination of induction, and believed that if read with Jean Nicod's Le Probleme logique de l'induction as well as R B Braithwaite's review of Keynes's work in the October 1925 issue of Mind, that would cover "most of what is known about induction", although the "subject is technical and difficult, involving a good deal of mathematics".
Two decades later, Russell followed Keynes in regarding enumerative induction as an "independent logical principle". Russell found:
Gilbert Harman
In a 1965 paper, Gilbert Harman explained that enumerative induction is not an autonomous phenomenon, but is simply a disguised consequence of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). IBE is otherwise synonymous with C S Peirce's abduction. Many philosophers of science espousing scientific realism have maintained that IBE is the way that scientists develop approximately true scientific theories about nature.
Problem of induction
Although philosophers at least as far back as the Pyrrhonist philosopher Sextus Empiricus have pointed out the unsoundness of inductive reasoning, the classic philosophical critique of the problem of induction was given by the Scottish philosopher David Hume. Although the use of inductive reasoning demonstrates considerable success, the justification for its application has been questionable.
Recognizing this, Hume highlighted the fact that our mind often draws conclusions from relatively limited experiences that appear correct but which are actually far from certain. In deduction, the truth value of the conclusion is based on the truth of the premise. In induction, however, the dependence of the conclusion on the premise is always uncertain.
For example, let us assume that all ravens are black. The fact that there are numerous black ravens supports the assumption. Our assumption, however, becomes invalid once it is discovered that there are white ravens.
Therefore, the general rule "all ravens are black" is not the kind of statement that can ever be certain. Hume further argued that it is impossible to justify inductive reasoning: this is because it cannot be justified deductively, so our only option is to justify it inductively.
Since this argument is circular, with the help of Hume's fork he concluded that our use of induction is not logically justifiable. Hume nevertheless stated that even if induction were proved unreliable, we would still have to rely on it.
So instead of a position of severe skepticism, Hume advocated a practical skepticism based on common sense, where the inevitability of induction is accepted. Bertrand Russell illustrated Hume's skepticism in a story about a chicken who, fed every morning without fail and following the laws of induction, concluded that this feeding would always continue, until his throat was eventually cut by the farmer.
In 1963, Karl Popper wrote, "Induction, i.e. inference based on many observations, is a myth. It is neither a psychological fact, nor a fact of ordinary life, nor one of scientific procedure." Popper's 1972 book Objective Knowledge—whose first chapter is devoted to the problem of induction—opens, "I think I have solved a major philosophical problem: the problem of induction".
In Popper's schema, enumerative induction is "a kind of optical illusion" cast by the steps of conjecture and refutation during a problem shift. An imaginative leap, the tentative solution is improvised, lacking inductive rules to guide it. The resulting, unrestricted generalization is deductive, an entailed consequence of all explanatory considerations.
Controversy continued, however, with Popper's putative solution not generally accepted. Donald A. Gillies argues that rules of inferences related to inductive reasoning are overwhelmingly absent from science, and describes most scientific inferences as "involv[ing] conjectures thought up by human ingenuity and creativity, and by no means inferred in any mechanical fashion, or according to precisely specified rules."
Gillies also provides a rare counterexample "in the machine learning programs of AI."
Biases
Inductive reasoning is also known as hypothesis construction because any conclusions made are based on current knowledge and predictions. As with deductive arguments, biases can distort the proper application of inductive argument, thereby preventing the reasoner from forming the most logical conclusion based on the clues.
Examples of these biases include the availability heuristic, confirmation bias, and the predictable-world bias. The availability heuristic is regarded as causing the reasoner to depend primarily upon information that is readily available. People have a tendency to rely on information that is easily accessible in the world around them.
For example, in surveys, when people are asked to estimate the percentage of people who died from various causes, most respondents choose the causes that have been most prevalent in the media such as terrorism, murders, and airplane accidents, rather than causes such as disease and traffic accidents, which have been technically "less accessible" to the individual since they are not emphasized as heavily in the world around them. Confirmation bias is based on the natural tendency to confirm rather than deny a hypothesis.
Research has demonstrated that people are inclined to seek solutions to problems that are more consistent with known hypotheses rather than attempt to refute those hypotheses. Often, in experiments, subjects will ask questions that seek answers that fit established hypotheses, thus confirming these hypotheses.
For example, if it is hypothesized that Sally is a sociable individual, subjects will naturally seek to confirm the premise by asking questions that would produce answers confirming that Sally is, in fact, a sociable individual. The predictable-world bias revolves around the inclination to perceive order where it has not been proved to exist, either at all or at a particular level of abstraction.
Gambling, for example, is one of the most popular examples of predictable-world bias. Gamblers often begin to think that they see simple and obvious patterns in the outcomes and therefore believe that they are able to predict outcomes based on what they have witnessed. In reality, however, the outcomes of these games are difficult to predict and highly complex in nature.
In general, people tend to seek some type of simplistic order to explain or justify their beliefs and experiences, and it is often difficult for them to realise that their perceptions of order may be entirely different from the truth.
Inductive inference
Around 1960, Ray Solomonoff founded the theory of universal inductive inference, a theory of prediction based on observations, for example, predicting the next symbol based upon a given series of symbols. This is a formal inductive framework that combines algorithmic information theory with the Bayesian framework.
Universal inductive inference is based on solid philosophical foundations and 'seems to be an inadequate tool for dealing with any reasonably complex or real-world environment', and can be considered as a mathematically formalized Occam's razor. Fundamental ingredients of the theory are the concepts of algorithmic probability and Kolmogorov complexity.
Inductive inference typically considers hypothesis classes with a countable size. A recent advance established a sufficient and necessary condition for inductive inference: a finite error bound is guaranteed if and only if the hypothesis class is a countable union of online learnable classes.
Notably, this condition allows the hypothesis class to have an uncountable size while remaining learnable within this framework.
See also
Analogy Argument Argumentation theory Bayesian probability Counterinduction Explanation Failure mode and effects analysis Falsifiability Grammar induction Inductive logic programming Inductive probability Inductive programming Inductive reasoning aptitude Inductivism Inquiry Intuitive statistics Lateral thinking Laurence Jonathan Cohen Logic Logical reasoning Logical positivism Marcus Hutter Minimum description length Minimum message length New riddle of induction Open world assumption Plausible reasoning Raven paradox Recursive Bayesian estimation Statistical inference Stephen Toulmin
External links
Four Varieties of Inductive Argument from the Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Greensboro , a psychological review by Evan Heit of the University of California, Merced. The Mind, Limber, an article which employs the film The Big Lebowski to explain the value of inductive reasoning
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