Lesson plan
Is–ought problem
raised the is–ought problem in his book A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40). The is–ought problem is the question of whether moral statements about what ought to be can be inferred from objective statements about what is. It was first articulated by the 18th-century Scottish philosopher David Hume, who saw a significant difference between descriptive statements (about what is) and prescriptive statements (about what ought to be). He argued that it is not obvious how one can coherently transition from descriptive statements to prescriptive ones. Hume's law or Hume's guillotine is the thesis that an ethical or judgemental conclusion cannot be inferred from purely descriptive factual statements. A similar view is defended by G. E. Moore's open-question argument, intended to refute any identification of moral properties with natural properties, which is asserted by ethical naturalists, who do not deem the naturalistic fallacy a fallacy. The is–ought problem is closely related to the fact–value distinction in epistemology. Though the terms are often used interchangeably, academic discourse concerning the latter may encompass aesthetics in addition to ethics.
Article summary
raised the is–ought problem in his book A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40). The is–ought problem is the question of whether moral statements about what ought to be can be inferred from objective statements about what is. It was first articulated by the 18th-century Scottish philosopher David Hume, who saw a significant difference between descriptive statements (about what is) and prescriptive statements (about what ought to be). He argued that it is not obvious how one can coherently transition from descriptive statements to prescriptive ones. Hume's law or Hume's guillotine is the thesis that an ethical or judgemental conclusion cannot be inferred from purely descriptive factual statements. A similar view is defended by G. E. Moore's open-question argument, intended to refute any identification of moral properties with natural properties, which is asserted by ethical naturalists, who do not deem the naturalistic fallacy a fallacy. The is–ought problem is closely related to the fact–value distinction in epistemology. Though the terms are often used interchangeably, academic discourse concerning the latter may encompass aesthetics in addition to ethics.
Key claims
No claims recorded.
Discussion questions
- Summarise the article in your own words. Which single claim would you verify first, and why?
- Which claim in this article is most likely to be revised as the sources update? How would you check its current status?
- If two sources disagreed about one of these facts, what would you need in order to trust one over the other?
Bibliography
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Key claims and bibliography are generated from the same tracked claims and sources as the article page.