Judicial immunity
Judicial immunity is a form of sovereign immunity, which protects judges and others employed by the judiciary from liability resulting from their judicial actions.
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Judicial immunity is a form of sovereign immunity, which protects judges and others employed by the judiciary from liability resulting from their judicial actions. It is intended to ensure that judges can make decisions free from improper influence exercised on them, contributing to the impartiality of the judiciary and the rule of law.
In modern times, the main purpose of "judicial immunity [is to shield] judges from the suits of ordinary people", primarily litigants who may be dissatisfied with the outcome of a case decided by the judge. In some countries judges are immune to lawsuits.
Alternatives
In some countries absolute immunity is considered contrary to the rule of law and state liability. Depending on the jurisdiction, judges may be criminally charged for some forms of courtroom behavior.
The method by which judges are removed varies by the judicial system in question; they include removal by other judges on the same or a higher court (in the United States, a judicial council), by a recall election, by the next regular election, or following impeachment by a legislature. In some countries judges have been imprisoned, for example judges in the Kids for cash scandal.
To increase public trust in the judiciary and judicial accountability to voters judicial reforms have been proposed, including improving nonpartisanship and increasing judicial liability for judicial wrongs.
History
Judicial immunity developed gradually over time, evolving into its current-day position. The early origins of the doctrine may be, according to some sources, traced to the preservation of judicial independence from the political forces of the day, although today judicial independence is regarded as a separate principle, and immunity mainly justified from the judge's distance and independence from the parties to a case.
Whilst scholars disagree on the exact history of judicial immunity at common law, most generally agree that its key purposes include preserving the impartiality of the judge, and avoiding attacks on judicial officers as an alternative or a bypass to appeals.
United States
The United States, upon independence, inherited from England a common-law heritage of judicial immunity, the Supreme Court even holding that "[f]ew doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction". Notably, in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 US (13 Wall.)
335, the Supreme Court, referring in dicta to contemporary precedent in England, held that an action ought not to be entertained against a judge for their judicial acts even where allegedly done "maliciously and corruptly", at 349. The breadth of this view, however is often disputed.
In the United States, judicial immunity is among a handful of forms of absolute immunity, along with prosecutorial immunity, legislative immunity, and witness immunity. The U.S. Supreme Court has characterized judicial immunity as providing "the maximum ability [of judges] to deal fearlessly and impartially with the public".
The justification is as follows: because of the likelihood of innocent individuals being convicted in a court of law under false claims, the "burden" of being subjected to a court of law (a trial) would "dampen" the judges "enthusiasm" or "passion". Opponents of judicial immunity argue that this doctrine is not adequately justified.
For example, judges could be shielded from any personal capacity liability, and still be subject to official capacity liability so that they may be held accountable for their injurious acts – thus "balancing" the "evil" to better protect the fundamental rights of victims. Judicial immunity does not protect judges from suits stemming from administrative decisions made while off the bench, like hiring and firing decisions.
But immunity generally does extend to all judicial decisions in which the judge has proper jurisdiction, even if a decision is made with "corrupt or malicious intent". By way of counterexample: in 1997 West Virginia Judge Troisi became so irritated with a rude defendant, he stepped down from the bench, took off his robe, and bit the defendant on the nose.
He pleaded no contest to state charges but was acquitted of federal charges of violating the defendant's civil rights. He spent five days in jail and was put on probation.
Because the immunity is attached to the judicial nature of the acts, not the official title of the officeholder, judicial immunity also applies to administrative hearings, although in some situations, only qualified immunity applies. In determining whether absolute or qualified immunity applies, the U.S. Supreme Court has identified the following factors, according to the Shriver Center's Federal Practice Manual for Legal Aid Attorneys:
External links
The Horrifying Extent of Absolute Judicial Immunity
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1360696012 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.