Judicial independence
, one of the Founding Fathers of the United States, by portraitist John Trumbull c. 1792.
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, one of the Founding Fathers of the United States, by portraitist John Trumbull c. 1792. In The Federalist No. 78, published 28 May 1788, Hamilton wrote: "The complete independence of the courts of justice is particularly essential in a limited constitution." : legislature, executive (government) and judiciary.
Judicial independence is the concept that the judiciary should be independent from the other branches of government, meaning that courts should not be subject to improper influence from those branches or from private or partisan interests. Judicial independence is an important component of the separation of powers.
Different countries deal with the idea of judicial independence through different means of judicial selection, that is, choosing judges. One method seen as promoting judicial independence is by granting life tenure or long tenure for judges, as it would ideally free them to decide cases and make rulings according to the rule of law and judicial discretion, even if those decisions are politically unpopular or opposed by powerful interests.
This concept can be traced back to 18th-century England.
Foundation of rule of law
Judicial independence serves as a safeguard for rights and privileges from a limited government and prevents executive and legislative encroachment upon those rights. It serves as a foundation for the rule of law and democracy. The rule of law means that all authority and power must come from an ultimate source of law.
Under an independent judicial system, the courts and their officers are free from inappropriate intervention in judicial affairs. With this independence, the judiciary can safeguard people's rights and freedoms which ensure equal protection for all.
The effectiveness of the law, and the respect that people have for the law and the government which enacts it, is dependent upon the judiciary's independence to mete out fair decisions. Furthermore, judicial independence is a pillar of economic growth, as multinational businesses and investors have confidence to invest in the economy of a nation which has a strong and stable judiciary that is insulated from interference.
The judiciary's role in deciding the validity of presidential and parliamentary elections also necessitates judicial independence.
Judicial misconduct
The disadvantages of having a judiciary that is seemingly too independent include possible abuse of power by judges. Self-interest, ideological dedication and even corruption may influence the decisions of judges without any checks and balances in place to prevent this abuse of power if the judiciary is completely independent.
The relationship between the judiciary and the executive is a complex series of dependencies and inter-dependencies which counter-check each other and must be carefully balanced. One can be too independent of the other.
Furthermore, judicial support of the executive is not as negative as it seems as the executive is the branch of government with the greatest claim to democratic legitimacy. Roger K. Warren writes that if the judiciary and executive are constantly feuding, no government can function well. Judicial supremacy could potentially promote an elitist autocracy.
Judicial aggrandizement describes the process when judges displace or subordinate the authority of elected branches, which undermines political legitimacy and can facilitate democratic backsliding.
Judicial accountability
An extremely independent judiciary would also lack judicial accountability, which is the duty of a public decision-maker to explain and justify a decision and to make amendments where a decision causes injustice or problems. Judges are not required to give an entire account of their rationale behind decisions, and are shielded against public scrutiny and protected from legal repercussions.
However judicial accountability can reinforce judicial independence as it could show that judges have proper reasons and rationales for arriving at a particular decision. Warren opines that while indirectly elected judges are not directly democratically accountable to the people, the key is for judges to achieve equilibrium between accountability and independence to ensure that justice is upheld.
Judges are directly elected in some cases, including Mexican judicial elections, Bolivian judicial election and . Judicial elections can increase political polarization. Judicial retention elections were found to have an impact on the accountability of judges.
Development
The development of judicial independence has been argued to involve a cycle of national law having an impact on international law, and international law subsequently impacting national law. This is said to occur in three phases: the first phase is characterized by the domestic development of the concept of judicial independence, the second by the spread of these concepts internationally and their implementation in international law, and the third by the implementation in national law of these newly formulated international principles of judicial independence.
A notable example illustrating this cycle is the United Kingdom. The first phase occurred in England with the original conception of judicial independence in the Act of Settlement 1701.
The second phase was evident when England's concepts regarding judicial independence spread internationally, and were adopted into the domestic law of other countries; for instance, England served as the model for Montesquieu's separation of powers doctrine, and the Founding Fathers of the US Constitution used England as their dominant model in formulating the Constitution's Article III, which is the foundation of American judicial independence. Other common law countries, including Canada, Australia, and India, also adopted the British model of judicial independence.
In recent decades the third phase of judicial independence has been evident in the UK, as it has been significantly influenced by judicial independence principles developed by international human rights constitutional documents. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has had a significant impact on the conceptual analysis of judicial independence in England and Scotland.
This process began in the 1990s with the ECtHR hearing UK cases and, more significantly, in the application of the European Convention on Human Rights in British law through the Human Rights Act 1998, which came into force in the UK in 2000. Where British national law had previously impacted the international development of judicial independence, the British Constitutional Reform Act 2005 marked a shift, with international law now impacting British domestic law.
The Constitutional Reform Act dramatically reformed government control over the administration of justice in England and Wales; importantly, it discontinued the position of the Lord Chancellor, one of the country's oldest constitutional offices, who was entrusted with a combination of legislative, executive, and judicial capacities. The Lord Chancellor served as speaker of the Upper House of Parliament, the House of Lords; as a member of the executive branch and member of the senior cabinet; and as the head of the judiciary.
Historically, the appellate function had a connection with the executive branch due to the types of cases typically heard – impeachment and the hearing of felony charges against peers. The Constitutional Reform Act established new lines of demarcation between the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary, transferring all the judicial functions to the judiciary and entrusting the Lord Chancellor only with what are considered administrative and executive matters.
In addition, the Constitutional Reform Act replaced the Lord Chancellor by the Lord Chief Justice as head of the judiciary, separated the judicial Appellate Committee of the House of Lords from the legislative parliament, reforming it as the Supreme Court, and creating a Judicial Appointments Commission. The creation of the Supreme Court was important, for it finally separated the highest court of appeal from the House of Lords.
Thus, the United Kingdom, where judicial independence began over three hundred years ago, illustrates the interaction over time of national and international law and jurisprudence in the area of judicial independence. In this process, concepts and ideas have become enriched as they have been implemented in successive judicial and political systems, as each system has enhanced and deepened the concepts and ideas it actualized.
In addition to the UK, similar developments of conceptual cross-fertilization can be seen internationally, for example in European Union law, in civil law countries such as Austria, and in other common law jurisdictions including Canada. In recent years, the principle of judicial independence has been described as one of the core values of the justice system.
International standards
The International Association of Judicial Independence and World Peace produced the Mt. Scopus International Standards of Judicial Independence between 2007 and 2012. These built on the same association's New Delhi Minimum Standards on Judicial independence adopted in 1982 and their Montréal Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice in 1983.
Other influences they cite for the standards include the UN Basic Principles of Judicial Independence from 1985, the Burgh House Principles of Judicial Independence in International Law (for the international judiciary), Tokyo Law Asia Principles, Council of Europe Statements on judicial independence (particularly the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the independence, efficiency and role of judges), the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct 2002, and the American Bar Association's revision of its ethical standards for judges.
History in England and Wales
During the Middle Ages, under the Norman monarchy of the Kingdom of England, the king and his Curia Regis held judicial power. Judicial independence began to emerge during the early modern period; more courts were created and a judicial profession grew. By the fifteenth century, the king's role in this feature of government became small.
Nevertheless, kings could still influence courts and dismiss judges. The Stuart dynasty used this power frequently in order to overpower the Parliament of England. After the Stuarts were removed in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, some advocated guarding against royal manipulation of the judiciary.
King William III approved the Act of Settlement 1701, which established tenure for judges unless Parliament removed them.
Federal courts
Article III of the United States Constitution establishes the federal courts as part of the federal government. The Constitution provides that federal judges, including judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, are appointed by the President "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate".
Once appointed, federal judges: Federal judges vacate office only upon death, resignation, or impeachment and removal from office by Congress; only 13 federal judges have been impeached . The phrase "during good behavior" predates the Declaration of Independence.
John Adams equated it with quamdiu se bene gesserint in a letter to the Boston Gazette published on 11 January 1773, a phrase that first appeared in section 3 of the Act of Settlement 1701 in England. The president, while free to appoint any person to the federal bench, typically consults with the American Bar Association, whose Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary rates each nominee "Well Qualified", "Qualified" or "Not Qualified".
State courts
State courts deal with independence of the judiciary in many ways, and several forms of judicial selection are used for both trial courts and appellate courts (including state supreme courts), varying between states and sometimes within states. In some states, judges are elected (sometime on a partisan ballot, other times on a nonpartisan one), while in others they are appointed by the governor or state legislature.
The 2000 case of Bush v. Gore, in which a majority of the Supreme Court, including some appointees of President George H. W. Bush, overruled challenges to the election of George W. Bush then pending in the Florida Supreme Court, whose members had all been appointed by Democratic governors, is seen by many as reinforcing the need for judicial independence, both with regard to the Florida Supreme Court and the US Supreme Court. This case has increased focus and attention on judicial outcomes as opposed to the traditional focus on judicial qualifications.
See also
Algorithmic transparency Central bank independence Civil control of the military Civil service independence Consent of the governed Constitutional patriotism Constitutionalism Counter-majoritarian difficulty Editorial independence Independent media Indeterminacy debate in legal theory Judiciary corruption Judicial discretion Judicial immunity Judicial interpretation Judicial populism Kritarchy Liberal legalism Miscarriage of justice Open government List of national legal systems Regulatory capture Responsible government Political question Political naturalism Rule according to higher law Primacy of European Union law Supremacy Clause (USA) Rule of law Salus populi suprema lex esto Separation of church and state Social contract Statutory interpretation
External links
Independence of the judicial system Part I. The Independence of Judges Part II - the Prosecution Service Venice Commission, 2010
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1377413527 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.
References
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