Konfrontasi

The , also known as the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation or Borneo confrontation, was an armed conflict from 1963 to 1966 that stemmed from Indonesia's opposition to the creation of the state of Malaysia.

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The , also known as the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation or Borneo confrontation, was an armed conflict from 1963 to 1966 that stemmed from Indonesia's opposition to the creation of the state of Malaysia. Vital precursors to the conflict included Indonesia's policy of confrontation against Dutch New Guinea from March to August 1962 and the Indonesia-backed Brunei revolt in December 1962.

Malaysia had direct military support from the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Indonesia had indirect support from the Soviet Union and China, thus making it an episode of the Cold War in Asia.

The conflict was an undeclared war with most of the action occurring in the border area between Indonesia and East Malaysia on the island of Borneo (known as Kalimantan in Indonesia), with lower intensity covert actions conducted by Indonesia on the Malay Peninsula and in Singapore. The conflict was characterised by restrained and isolated ground combat, set within tactics of low-level brinkmanship.

Combat was usually conducted by company- or platoon-sized operations on either side of the border. Indonesia's campaign of infiltrations into Borneo sought to exploit how ethnically and religiously diverse Sabah and Sarawak were compared to that of Malaya and Singapore, with the intent of unravelling the proposed state of Malaysia.…

The , also known as the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation or Borneo confrontation, was an armed conflict from 1963 to 1966 that stemmed from Indonesia's opposition to the creation of the state of Malaysia. Vital precursors to the conflict included Indonesia's policy of confrontation against Dutch New Guinea from March to August 1962 and the Indonesia-backed Brunei revolt in December 1962.

Malaysia had direct military support from the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Indonesia had indirect support from the Soviet Union and China, thus making it an episode of the Cold War in Asia.

The conflict was an undeclared war with most of the action occurring in the border area between Indonesia and East Malaysia on the island of Borneo (known as Kalimantan in Indonesia), with lower intensity covert actions conducted by Indonesia on the Malay Peninsula and in Singapore. The conflict was characterised by restrained and isolated ground combat, set within tactics of low-level brinkmanship.

Combat was usually conducted by company- or platoon-sized operations on either side of the border. Indonesia's campaign of infiltrations into Borneo sought to exploit how ethnically and religiously diverse Sabah and Sarawak were compared to that of Malaya and Singapore, with the intent of unravelling the proposed state of Malaysia.

The jungle terrain of Borneo and the lack of roads straddling the Indonesia–Malaysia border forced both Indonesian and Commonwealth forces to conduct long foot patrols. Both sides relied on light infantry operations and air transport, although Commonwealth forces enjoyed the advantage of better helicopter deployment and resupply to forward operating bases.

Rivers were also used as a method of transport and infiltration. Although combat operations were primarily conducted by ground forces, airborne forces played a vital support role and naval forces ensured the security of the sea flanks.

The British provided most of the defensive effort, although Malaysian forces steadily increased their contributions, and there were periodic contributions from Australian and New Zealand forces within the combined Far East Strategic Reserve stationed then in Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore. Initially, Indonesian attacks on East Malaysia relied heavily on local volunteers trained by the Indonesian Army.

Over time, the infiltration forces became more organised with the inclusion of a more substantial component of Indonesian forces. To deter and disrupt Indonesia's growing campaign of infiltrations, the British responded in 1964 by launching their own covert operations into Indonesian Kalimantan under the code name Operation Claret.

Claret was successful in gaining the initiative for the British Commonwealth forces, keeping the Indonesians on the defensive. Coinciding with Sukarno announcing a 'year of dangerous living' and the 1964 race riots in Singapore, Indonesia launched an expanded campaign of operations into Peninsular Malaysia on 17 August 1964, albeit without military success.

A build-up of Indonesian forces on the Kalimantan border in December 1964 saw the UK commit significant forces from the UK-based Army Strategic Command. Australia and New Zealand deployed roulement combat forces from Peninsular Malaysia to Borneo in 1965–66.

The intensity of the conflict began to subside following the coup d'état of October 1965 and Sukarno's loss of power to General Suharto. A round of serious peace negotiations between the two sides began in May 1966, and a final peace agreement was signed on 11 August 1966 with Indonesia formally recognising Malaysia.

Infiltration campaign

Even as peace talks progressed and stalled, Indonesia maintained its campaign of infiltrations. On 14 August, a headman reported an incursion in the 3rd Division and a follow-up indicated they were about 50 strong. A series of contacts ensued as 2/6 Gurkhas deployed patrols and ambushes, and after a month, 15 had been killed and three captured.

The Gurkhas reported that they were well trained and professionally led, but their ammunition expenditure was high, and their fire discipline broke down. The prisoners reported 300 more invaders within a week and 600 in a fortnight.

The Battle of Long Jawai was the first major incursion for the centre of the 3rd Division, directed by an RPKAD Major Mulyono Soerjowardojo, who had been sent to Nangabadan earlier in the year. The proclamation of Malaysia in September 1963 meant that Malaysian Army units deployed former British Borneo now known as East Malaysia.

The deliberate attack by Indonesian forces on Malaysian troops did not enhance Sukarno's "anti-imperialist" credentials, although the Indonesian government tried blaming their Navy Commando Corps ( , KKO) as enthusiastic idealists acting independently. They also produced Azahari, who claimed that Indonesian forces were playing no part in active operations.

Sukarno next launched a peace offensive and, in late January, declared he was ready for a ceasefire (despite having denied direct Indonesia involvement). Talks started in Bangkok, but border violations continued, and the talks soon failed.

They resumed mid-year in Tokyo and failed within days but allowed time for a Thai mission to visit Sarawak and witness, well-equipped Indonesian soldiers withdrawing across the border, which they had crossed a short distance away earlier in the day. Meanwhile, the Indonesian armed forces led by Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani became increasingly concerned with the worsening domestic situation in Indonesia and began secretly contacting the Malaysian government, while obstructing the confrontation, reducing it to a minimal level.

This was implemented to preserve an already exhausted army which had recently conducted Operation Trikora in Western New Guinea, while also maintaining its political position in Indonesian politics, especially against the Communist Party of Indonesia, the ardent supporters of the confrontation.

Final actions

At the same time with Indonesia's political hiatus beginning to stabilise (it had stopped a major RPKAD operation to capture a British prisoner), the RPKAD linked up with PGRS to establish guerrilla forces in Sabah and Sarawak. The Sabah effort never crossed the border; however, two groups entered Sarawak in February and May and obtained support from local sympathisers.

The first group, despite losses in several contacts, lasted until June and exfiltrated on hearing about the end of Konfrontasi. Survivors of the second, after contact with Australian troops, also made it back to Indonesia. The final Indonesian incursion was in May and June.

Signs of a substantial force were found crossing into Central Brigade. This was some 80 strong, mostly volunteers, led by Lieutenant Sombi (or Sumbi) and a team from 600 Raider Company. They moved fast towards Brunei with 1/7 Gurkhas pursuing and ambushing them; almost all were accounted for.

In response to this, a final Claret operation was launched, which was a successful artillery ambush by 38 Light Battery.

Treaty

and Adam Malik signing the Bangkok Agreement, 11 August 1966. The end of confrontation marks the beginning of ASEAN. On 28 May, at a conference in Bangkok, the Malaysian and Indonesian governments declared the conflict was over.

However, it was unclear if Suharto was in full control of Indonesia (rather than Sukarno), and vigilance in Borneo could not be relaxed. By June, both sides had agreed in principle to a peace settlement, following meetings between Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak and Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam Malik.

With Suharto's co-operation a peace treaty was signed on 11 August and ratified two days later, ending the undeclared war. The treaty provided for the cessation of hostilities, the immediate restoration of diplomatic relations, and an opportunity for the people of Sabah and Sarawak to reaffirm their position within Malaysia through democratic processes.

Aftermath

Although the Indonesians had conducted a few amphibious raids and an airborne operation against Malaya, the war remained limited throughout its duration and was largely a land conflict. For either side to have escalated to large-scale air or naval attacks "would have incurred disadvantages greatly outweighing the marginal military effect that they might have produced".

For Indonesia and Sukarno, the military and diplomatic elements of the confrontation came to nothing - the Commonwealth forces easily defeated every single one of the latter's incursions. For Malaysia the Indonesian hostility cemented their national identity rather than undermining it.

After Indonesia had left the United Nations, none of their allies followed suit, diminishing the influence and unity of the Non-Aligned Movement. For Britain the conflict had been an unqualified success. The UK Secretary of State for Defence at the time, Denis Healey, described the campaign as "one of the most efficient uses of military forces in the history of the world".

A rising Communist power in Asia had been subdued and prevented the 'domino effect' from taking off. From a purely tactical standpoint, it had been a strong performance from British troops and commanders, as they had managed to confine a small bush war with relatively small human cost and stabilised a potentially dangerous political situation in Southeast Asia.

For the benefit of the West, an anti-communist purge spread throughout Indonesia. Suharto's steady consolidation of power after the events of 30 September allowed him to form a new government and in March 1967 Suharto was able to form a new cabinet that excluded Sukarno.

For Indonesia and Malaysia, the end of Konfrontasi contributed to the normalization of regional relations after several years of confrontation, forming a basis of order and enabling them to coexist peacefully. This coexistence was shaped by common identities and shared strategic interests, which together fostered closer relations between Indonesia and Malaysia.

In this context, both states worked to create a more friendly and cooperative regional climate in Southeast Asia, helping to lay the groundwork for subsequent regional cooperation, including the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. British operations such as Claret were only publicly disclosed by Britain in 1974, while the Australian government did not officially acknowledge its involvement until 1996.

Bibliography

Poulgrain, G. J. (2014). The genesis of konfrontasi: Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, 1945–1965. General Assembly 15th Session – The Trusteeship System and Non-Self-Governing Territories (pages: 509–510) General Assembly 18th Session – the Question of Malaysia (pages: 41–44) Anonymous.

1964. Gelora Konfrontasi Mengganjang Malaysia. Djakarta: Departemen Penerangan.

(Contains Joint Statements of the Manila Agreements, Indonesian presidential decrees and all transcripts of Sukarno's public speeches from July 1963 to May 1964 pertaining the Konfrontasi)

Britain's Small Wars – Borneo Scourge of Sukarno: the Gurkhas in Borneo

Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1378630471 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.

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