Korean War

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The Korean War (25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953) was an armed conflict fought on the Korean Peninsula between North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea; DPRK) and South Korea (Republic of Korea; ROK) and their allies. North Korea was supported by China and the Soviet Union, while South Korea was supported by the United Nations led by the United States under the auspices of the United Nations Command (UNC).

After the end of World War II in 1945, Korea, which had been a Japanese colony for 35 years, was divided by the Soviet Union and the United States into two occupation zones at the 38th parallel, with plans for a future independent state. The zones formed their own governments in 19481 due to political disagreements. North Korea was led by Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang, and South Korea by Syngman Rhee in Seoul; both claimed to be the sole legitimate government of all of Korea.

Both sides engaged in extensive border clashes while Rhee's government suppressed communist uprisings at Jeju and Yeosu-Suncheon. On 25 June 1950, North Korea launched an invasion of South Korea. In the absence of the Soviet Union's representative, the UN Security Council denounced the invasion, calling on member states to help repel the invasion. UN forces under the unified command comprised 21 countries, with the US providing around 90% of military personnel. On 27 June 1950 President Harry S.…

The Korean War (25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953) was an armed conflict fought on the Korean Peninsula between North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea; DPRK) and South Korea (Republic of Korea; ROK) and their allies. North Korea was supported by China and the Soviet Union, while South Korea was supported by the United Nations led by the United States under the auspices of the United Nations Command (UNC).

After the end of World War II in 1945, Korea, which had been a Japanese colony for 35 years, was divided by the Soviet Union and the United States into two occupation zones at the 38th parallel, with plans for a future independent state. The zones formed their own governments in 1948 due to political disagreements. North Korea was led by Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang, and South Korea by Syngman Rhee in Seoul; both claimed to be the sole legitimate government of all of Korea.

Both sides engaged in extensive border clashes while Rhee's government suppressed communist uprisings at Jeju and Yeosu-Suncheon. On 25 June 1950, North Korea launched an invasion of South Korea. In the absence of the Soviet Union's representative, the UN Security Council denounced the invasion, calling on member states to help repel the invasion. UN forces under the unified command comprised 21 countries, with the US providing around 90% of military personnel. On 27 June 1950 President Harry S. Truman ordered US air and sea forces to aid South Korea.

Seoul was captured by the KPA on 28 June, and by early August, the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) and its allies were nearly defeated, holding onto only the Pusan Perimeter in the peninsula's southeast. On 15 September, UN forces landed at Inchon near Seoul, cutting off KPA troops and supply lines. UN forces broke out from the perimeter on 18 September, recaptured Seoul, and invaded North Korea in October, capturing Pyongyang and advancing towards the Yalu River (border with China).

On 19 October, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) crossed the Yalu and entered the war on the side of the North. UN forces retreated from North Korea in December, following the PVA's first and second offensive. Communist forces captured Seoul again in January 1951 before losing it to a UN counter-offensive two months later. After an abortive Chinese spring offensive, UN forces retook territory roughly up to the 38th parallel.

Armistice negotiations began in July 1951, but dragged on as the fighting became a war of attrition and the North suffered devastating damage from UN bombing, destroying virtually all of North Korea's major cities. Combat ended on 27 July 1953 with the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement, which allowed the exchange of prisoners and created a 4-kilometre wide (2.5 mile) Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) along the frontline, with a Joint Security Area at Panmunjom.

The industrial warfare was defined by armored offensives, with the North's initial invasion and later by UN forces, tunnel warfare by Chinese forces, and the first large jet aircraft battles. The conflict caused around one million military deaths and an estimated 1.5 million to 3 million civilian deaths. Alleged war crimes include the mass killing of alleged communists by South Korea, the Seoul National University Hospital massacre by North Korea, and the carpet bombing of North Korea by the UNC.

North Korea became one of the most heavily bombed countries in history. No peace treaty has been signed; the Korean conflict remains a frozen conflict, which has occasionally flared, such as in the 1966–1969 DMZ Conflict.

Names

In South Korea, the war is usually referred to as the "625 War" ( ), the "625 Upheaval" ( ), or simply "625", reflecting the date of its commencement on 25 June. In North Korea, the war is officially referred to as the "Fatherland Liberation War" ( ) or commonly the "Chosŏn [Korean] War" ( ). In the United States, the war was initially described by President Harry S. Truman as a "police action" as the US never formally declared war and its military actions in Korea were conducted under the auspices of the UN flag.

It has sometimes been referred to in the English-speaking world as "The Forgotten War" or "The Unknown War" because of the lack of public attention it received relative to World War II and the Vietnam War. In China, the segment of the war after the intervention of the People's Volunteer Army is commonly and officially known as the "War to Resist America and Assist Korea" ( ), while the segment preceding that is officially called the "Korean Civil War" ( ). The term "Chosŏn War" ( ) is sometimes used unofficially.

The term "Hán (Korean) War" ( ) is most used in Taiwan (Republic of China), Hong Kong and Macau.

Background

Joint US-Soviet occupation (1945–1948)

On 7 September 1945, General Douglas MacArthur issued Proclamation No. 1 to the people of Korea, announcing US military control over Korea south of the 38th parallel and establishing English as the official language during military control. On 8 September, US Lieutenant General John R. Hodge arrived in Incheon to accept the Japanese surrender south of the 38th parallel. Appointed as military governor, Hodge directly controlled South Korea as head of the US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK 1945–48).

In December 1945, Korea was administered by the US–Soviet Union Joint Commission, as agreed at the Moscow Conference, to grant independence after a five-year trusteeship. Waiting five years for independence was unpopular among Koreans, and riots broke out. The Communist Party supported the trusteeship, while Kim Ku and Syngman Rhee led the anti-trusteeship movement against both the US Army Military Government in Korea and the Soviet military administration.

To contain them, the USAMGIK banned strikes on 8 December and outlawed the PRK Revolutionary Government and People's Committees on 12 December. Following further civilian unrest, the USAMGIK declared martial law. Citing the inability of the Joint Commission to make progress, the United Nations (UN) decided to hold an election under UN auspices to create an independent Korea, as stated in UN General Assembly Resolution 112. The Soviet authorities and Korean communists refused to participate in the election.

The final attempt to establish a unified government was thwarted by North Korea's refusal. Due to concerns about division caused by an election without North Korea's participation, many South Korean politicians boycotted it. The 1948 South Korean general election was held in May. The resultant South Korean government promulgated a national political constitution on 17 July and elected Syngman Rhee as president on 20 July. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) was established on 15 August 1948.

In the Soviet-Korean Zone of Occupation, the Soviets agreed to the establishment of a communist government led by Kim Il Sung. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) was established on 10 July 1948. The 1948 North Korean parliamentary elections took place in August. The Soviet Union withdrew its forces in 1948 and the US in 1949.

Chinese Civil War (1945–1949)

With the end of the war with Japan, the Chinese Civil War resumed in earnest between the Communists and the Nationalist-led government. While the Communists were struggling for supremacy in Manchuria, they were supported by the North Korean government with matériel and manpower. According to Chinese sources, the North Koreans donated 2,000 railway cars worth of supplies while thousands of Koreans served in the Chinese PLA during the war. North Korea also provided the Chinese Communists in Manchuria with a safe refuge for non-combatants and communications with the rest of China. As a token of gratitude, between 50,000 and 70,000 Korean veterans who served in the PLA were sent back along with their weapons, and they later played a significant role in the initial invasion of South Korea. China promised to support the North Koreans in the event of a war against South Korea.

Communist insurgency in South Korea (1948–1950)

By 1948, a North Korea-backed insurgency had broken out in the southern half of the peninsula. This was exacerbated by the undeclared border war between the Koreas, which saw division-level engagements and thousands of deaths on both sides. The ROK was almost entirely trained and focused on counterinsurgency, rather than conventional warfare.

They were equipped and advised by a force of a few hundred American officers, who were successful in helping the ROKA to subdue guerrillas and hold its own against North Korean military (Korean People's Army, KPA) forces along the 38th parallel. Approximately 8,000 South Korean soldiers and police officers died in the insurgent war and border clashes. The first socialist uprising occurred without direct North Korean participation, though the guerrillas still professed support for the northern government.

Beginning in April 1948 on Jeju Island, the campaign saw arrests and repression by the South Korean government in the fight against the South Korean Labor Party, resulting in 30,000 violent deaths, among them 14,373 civilians, of whom 2,000 were killed by rebels and 12,000 by ROK security forces. The Yeosu–Suncheon rebellion overlapped with it, as several thousand army defectors waving red flags massacred right-leaning families. This resulted in another brutal suppression by the government and between 2,976 and 3,392 deaths.

By May 1949, both uprisings had been crushed. Insurgency reignited in the spring of 1949 when attacks by guerrillas in the mountainous regions (buttressed by army defectors and North Korean agents) increased. Insurgent activity peaked in late 1949 as the ROKA engaged so-called People's Guerrilla Units.

Organized and armed by the North Korean government, and backed by 2,400 KPA commandos who had infiltrated through the border, these guerrillas launched an offensive in September aimed at undermining the South Korean government and preparing the country for the KPA's arrival in force. This offensive failed. However, the guerrillas were now entrenched in the Taebaek-san region of the North Gyeongsang Province and the border areas of the Gangwon Province.

While the insurgency was ongoing, the ROKA and KPA engaged in battalion-sized battles along the border, starting in May 1949. Border clashes between South and North continued on 4 August 1949, when thousands of North Korean troops attacked South Korean troops occupying territory north of the 38th parallel. The 2nd and 18th ROK Infantry Regiments repulsed attacks in Kuksa-bong, and KPA troops were "completely routed". Border incidents decreased by the start of 1950.

Meanwhile, counterinsurgencies in the South Korean interior intensified; persistent operations, paired with worsening weather, denied the guerrillas sanctuary and wore away their fighting strength. North Korea responded by sending more troops to link up with insurgents and build more partisan cadres; North Korean infiltrators had reached 3,000 soldiers in 12 units by the start of 1950, but all were destroyed or scattered by the ROKA. On 1 October 1949, the ROKA launched a three-pronged assault on the insurgents in South Cholla and Taegu.

By March 1950, the ROKA claimed 5,621 guerrillas killed or captured and 1,066 small arms seized. This operation crippled the insurgency. Soon after, North Korea made final attempts to keep the uprising active, sending battalion-sized units of infiltrators under the commands of Kim Sang-ho and Kim Moo-hyon. The first battalion was reduced to a single man over the course of engagements by the ROKA 8th Division.

The second was annihilated by a two-battalion hammer-and-anvil maneuver by units of the ROKA 6th Division, resulting in a toll of 584 KPA guerrillas (480 killed, 104 captured) and 69 ROKA troops killed, plus 184 wounded. By the spring of 1950, guerrilla activity had mostly subsided; the border, too, was calm.

Prelude to war (1950)

By 1949, South Korean and US military actions had reduced indigenous communist guerrillas in the South from 5,000 to 1,000. However, Kim Il Sung believed widespread uprisings had weakened the South Korean military and that a North Korean invasion would be welcomed by much of the South Korean population. Kim began seeking Stalin's support for an invasion in March 1949, traveling to Moscow to persuade him. Kim and second-in-command Pak Hon-yong tried to enlist Soviet ambassador Terentii Shtykov.

Kim met with the ambassador on 12 August 1949; Shtykov said that an outright invasion was out of the question unless South Korea attacked first and that he only willing to consider a limited operation targeting the Ongjin peninsula. Mun Il visited Soviet chargé d'affaires Grigory Tunkin on 3 September 1949. Tunkin's report to the Soviet government was more neutral than previous Soviet diplomats, who were more skeptical. Stalin initially did not think the time was right for a war in Korea.

PLA forces were still embroiled in the Chinese Civil War, while US forces remained stationed in South Korea. After learning about Kim and Pak's plans, he told Tunkin to talk to Kim to produce an assessment of the South Korean and North Korean armed forces. After assessing both sides, Tunkin suggested against an invasion, to which Stalin agreed to and also banned the limited strike on the Ongjin peninsula. Kim continued his insistence on an invasion. On 17 January 1950, he told Soviet diplomats that South Korea needed to be liberated.

By 1950, Stalin was more open to suggestions and believed that the strategic situation had changed: PLA forces under Mao Zedong had secured final victory, US forces had withdrawn from Korea, and the Soviets had detonated their first nuclear bomb, breaking the US monopoly. As the US had not directly intervened to stop the communists in China, Stalin calculated they would be even less willing to fight in Korea, which had less strategic significance.

The Soviets had cracked the codes used by the US to communicate with their embassy in Moscow, and reading dispatches convinced Stalin that Korea did not have the importance to the US that would warrant a nuclear confrontation. On 30 January 1950, Stalin telegraphed Shtykov, saying that any invasion "would need extensive preparations" and that "it should be organized without taking too big a risk", effectively giving the green light for preparations.

Stalin began a more aggressive strategy in Asia based on these developments, including promising economic and military aid to China through the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. Kim spent almost a month in the Soviet Union from 30 March to 25 April, during which invasion plans were finalized. In April 1950, Stalin permitted Kim to attack the government in the South, under the condition that Mao would agree to send reinforcements if needed. For Kim, this was the fulfillment of his goal to unite Korea.

Stalin made it clear Soviet forces would not openly engage in combat, to avoid a direct war with the United States. Kim met with Mao in May 1950 and differing historical interpretations of the meeting have been put forward. According to Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgeng, Mao agreed to support Kim despite concerns of American intervention, as China desperately needed the economic and military aid promised by the Soviets. Kathryn Weathersby cites Soviet documents which said Kim secured Mao's support.

According to Park, Mao told Kim that "if the Americans would enter the war, China will help North Korea with troops". Along with Mark O'Neill, she says this accelerated Kim's war preparations. Chen Jian argues Mao never seriously challenged Kim's plans and Kim had every reason to inform Stalin that he had obtained Mao's support. Citing more recent scholarship, Zhao Suisheng contends Mao did not approve of Kim's war proposal and requested verification from Stalin, who did so via a telegram.

Mao accepted the decision made by Kim and Stalin to unify Korea but cautioned Kim over possible US intervention. The coming Korean War was one of three wars that the Soviet and Chinese leaders had planned across East Asia in 1950. The first was a North Korean invasion of South Korea, which was to be backed by Chinese forces if necessary; they also planned a Chinese invasion of Taiwan later that year, and a Viet Minh revolution in Vietnam, which was to be backed by Chinese advisors and weaponry.

Kim told his inner circle about the preparations, including Pak Hon-yong, Aleksei Hegay, Supreme People's Assembly Presidium President Kim Tu-bong, Minister of Defense Choe Yong-gon and Minister of Justice Lee Sung-yop. Soviet generals with extensive combat experience from World War II were sent to North Korea as the Soviet Advisory Group. They completed plans for attack by May and called for a skirmish to be initiated in the Ongjin Peninsula on the west coast of Korea. Kim suggested the invasion start in late June.

Soviets thought the North Koreans needed more time to prepare, but as the rain season was about to begin in July, which could make North Korean advances harder, they ultimately accepted Kim's proposal. The North Koreans would then launch an attack to capture Seoul and encircle and destroy the ROK. The final stage would involve destroying South Korean government remnants and capturing the rest of South Korea, including the ports. On 7 June 1950, Kim called for a Korea-wide election on 5–8 August 1950 and a consultative conference in Haeju on 15–17 June.

On 11 June, the North sent three diplomats to the South as a peace overture, which Rhee rejected outright. On 15 June, the invasion date was set to 25 June. On 21 June, Kim revised his war plan to involve a general attack across the 38th parallel, rather than a limited operation in Ongjin. Kim was concerned that South Korean agents had learned about the plans and that South Korean forces were strengthening their defenses. Stalin agreed to this change. On 24 June, division commanders received their invasion orders.

The KPA planned defeating the South Koreans in twenty-two to twenty-seven days. While these preparations were underway in the North, there were clashes along the 38th parallel, especially at Kaesong and Ongjin, many initiated by the South. The ROK was being trained by the US Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). On the eve of the war, KMAG commander General William Lynn Roberts voiced utmost confidence in the ROK and boasted that any North Korean invasion would merely provide "target practice".

For his part, Syngman Rhee repeatedly expressed his desire to conquer the North, including when US diplomat John Foster Dulles visited Korea on 18 June. Though some South Korean and US intelligence officers predicted an attack, similar predictions had been made before and nothing had happened. The Central Intelligence Agency noted the southward movement by the KPA but assessed this as a "defensive measure" and concluded an invasion was "unlikely". On 23 June, UN observers inspected the border and did not detect that war was imminent.

Course of the war

Battle of Incheon (September 1950)

Against the rested and rearmed Pusan Perimeter defenders and their reinforcements, the KPA were undermanned and poorly supplied; unlike the UN, they lacked naval and air support. To relieve the Pusan Perimeter, MacArthur recommended an amphibious landing at Incheon, near Seoul, well over behind the KPA lines. On 6 July, he ordered Major General Hobart R.

Gay, commander of the US 1st Cavalry Division, to plan an amphibious landing at Incheon; on 12–14 July, the 1st Cavalry Division embarked from Yokohama, Japan, to reinforce the 24th Infantry Division inside the Pusan Perimeter. Soon after the war began, MacArthur began planning an Incheon landing, but the Pentagon opposed him. When authorized, he activated a combined US Army and Marine Corps, and ROK force. The X Corps, consisted of 40,000 troops of the 1st Marine Division, the 7th Infantry Division, and around 8,600 ROK soldiers.

By 15 September, the amphibious force faced few KPA defenders at Incheon: military intelligence, psychological warfare, guerrilla reconnaissance, and protracted bombardment facilitated a light battle. However, the bombardment destroyed most of Incheon.

Breakout from the Pusan Perimeter

tanks during the Second Battle of Seoul in September 1950. In the foreground, UN troops round up North Korean prisoners of war. On 16 September, the Eighth Army began its breakout from the Pusan Perimeter. Task Force Lynch, 3rd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, and 70th Tank Battalion units advanced through of KPA territory to join the 7th Infantry Division at Osan on 27 September. X Corps rapidly defeated the KPA defenders around Seoul, thus threatening to trap the main KPA force. On 18 September, Stalin dispatched General H. M.

Zakharov to advise Kim to halt his offensive around the Pusan Perimeter, and redeploy his forces to defend Seoul. Chinese commanders were not briefed on North Korean troop numbers or operational plans. Zhou suggested the North Koreans should attempt to eliminate the UN forces at Incheon only if they had reserves of at least 100,000 men; otherwise, he advised the North Koreans to withdraw their forces north. On 25 September, Seoul was recaptured by UN forces. US air raids caused heavy damage to the KPA, destroying most of its tanks and artillery.

KPA troops in the south, instead of effectively withdrawing north, rapidly disintegrated, leaving Pyongyang vulnerable. During the retreat, only 25,000 to 30,000 KPA soldiers managed to reach the KPA lines. On 27 September, Stalin convened an emergency session of the Politburo, where he condemned the incompetence of the KPA command and held Soviet military advisers responsible for the defeat.

UN forces invade North Korea (September–October 1950)

On 27 September, MacArthur received secret National Security Council Memorandum 81/1 from Truman reminding him operations north of the 38th parallel was authorized only if "at the time of such operation there was no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcements of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily". On 29 September, MacArthur restored the government of the Republic of Korea under Syngman Rhee.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 September sent MacArthur a comprehensive directive: it stated the primary goal was the destruction of the KPA, with the unification of the Peninsula under Rhee as a secondary objective "if possible"; the Joint Chiefs added this objective was dependent on whether the Chinese and Soviets would intervene, and was subject to changing conditions. attacking railroads south of Wonsan on the eastern coast of North Korea On 30 September, Zhou warned the US that China was prepared to intervene if the US crossed the 38th parallel.

Zhou attempted to advise KPA commanders on how to conduct a general withdrawal by using the same tactics that allowed Chinese Communist forces to escape Nationalist encirclement campaigns in the 1930s, but KPA commanders did not use these tactics effectively. Bruce Cumings argues, however, that the KPA's rapid withdrawal was strategic, with troops melting into the mountains from where they could launch guerrilla raids on the UN forces spread out on the coasts.

By 1 October, the UNC had driven the KPA past the 38th parallel, and ROK forces pursued the KPA northwards. MacArthur demanded the KPA's unconditional surrender. On 7 October, with UN authorization, the UN Command forces followed the ROK forces northwards. The US Eighth Army drove up western Korea and captured Pyongyang on 19 October. On 20 October, the US 187th Airborne Regiment made their first of their two combat jumps during the war at Sunchon and Sukchon.

The mission was to cut the road north to China, prevent North Korean leaders from escaping Pyongyang, and rescue US prisoners of war. At month's end, UN forces held 135,000 KPA prisoners of war. As they neared the Sino-Korean border, the UN forces in the west were divided from those in the east by of mountainous terrain. In addition to the 135,000 captured, the KPA had suffered some 200,000 soldiers killed or wounded, for a total of 335,000 casualties since the end of June 1950, and lost 313 tanks.

A mere 25,000 KPA regulars retreated across the 38th parallel, as their military had collapsed. The UN forces on the peninsula numbered 229,722 combat troops (including 125,126 Americans and 82,786 South Koreans), 119,559 rear area troops, and 36,667 US Air Force personnel. MacArthur believed it necessary to extend the war into China to destroy depots supplying the North Korean effort. Truman disagreed and ordered caution at the Sino-Korean border.

China intervenes (October–December 1950)

On 15 October, Truman and MacArthur met at Wake Island. This was much publicized because of MacArthur's discourteous refusal to meet the president in the contiguous US. To Truman, MacArthur speculated there was little risk of Chinese intervention in Korea, and the PRC's opportunity for aiding the KPA had lapsed. He believed the PRC had 300,000 soldiers in Manchuria and 100,000 to 125,000 at the Yalu River.

He concluded that, although half of those forces might cross south, "if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter" without Soviet air force protection. Meanwhile, on 13 October, the Politburo decided China would intervene even without Soviet air support, basing its decision on a belief superior morale could defeat an enemy that had superior equipment. To that end, 200,000 Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) troops crossed the Yalu into North Korea.

UN aerial reconnaissance had difficulty sighting PVA units in the daytime, because their march and bivouac discipline minimized detection. The PVA marched "dark-to-dark" and aerial camouflage (concealing soldiers, pack animals, and equipment) was deployed. Meanwhile, daylight advance parties scouted for the next bivouac site. During daylight activity or marching, soldiers remained motionless if an aircraft appeared; PVA officers were under orders to shoot security violators.

Such battlefield discipline allowed a three-division army to march the from An-tung, Manchuria, to the combat zone in 19 days. Another division night-marched a circuitous mountain route, averaging daily for 18 days. in action near the Ch'ongch'on River (20 November 1950) After secretly crossing the Yalu River on 19 October, the PVA 13th Army Group launched the First Phase Offensive on 25 October, attacking advancing UN forces near the Sino-Korean border. This decision made solely by China changed the attitude of the Soviet Union.

Twelve days after PVA troops entered the war, Stalin allowed the Soviet Air Forces to provide air cover and supported more aid to China. After inflicting heavy losses on the ROK II Corps at the Battle of Onjong, the first confrontation between Chinese and US military occurred on 1 November 1950. Deep in North Korea, thousands of soldiers from the PVA 39th Army encircled and attacked the US 8th Cavalry Regiment with three-prong assaults—from the north, northwest, and west—and overran the defensive position flanks in the Battle of Unsan.

On 13 November, Mao appointed Zhou overall commander and coordinator of the war effort, with Peng Dehuai as field commander. On 25 November, on the Korean western front, the PVA 13th Army Group attacked and overran the ROK II Corps at the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River, and then inflicted heavy losses on the US 2nd Infantry Division on the UN forces' right flank. Believing they could not hold against the PVA, the Eighth Army began to retreat, crossing the 38th parallel in mid-December.

In the east, on 27 November, the PVA 9th Army Group initiated the Battle of Chosin Reservoir. Here, the UN forces fared better: like the Eighth Army, the surprise attack forced X Corps to retreat from northeast Korea, but they were able to break out from the attempted encirclement by the PVA and execute a successful tactical withdrawal. X Corps established a defensive perimeter at the port city of Hungnam on 11 December and evacuated by December 24, to reinforce the depleted Eighth Army to the south.

About 193 shiploads of UN forces and matériel (approximately 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies) were evacuated to Pusan. The was noted for evacuating 14,000 refugees, the largest rescue operation by a single ship, even though it was designed to hold 12 passengers. Before escaping, the UN forces razed most of Hungnam, with particular attention to the port. In early December UN forces, including the British Army's 29th Infantry Brigade, evacuated Pyongyang along with refugees.

Around 4.5 million North Koreans are estimated to have fled south or elsewhere abroad. On 16 December, Truman declared a national state of emergency with Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99 (1953), which remained in force until September 1978. The next day, 17 December, Kim Il Sung was deprived of the right of command of KPA by China.

Fighting around the 38th parallel (January–June 1951)

bomb logistics depots in Wonsan, North Korea, 1951 A ceasefire presented by the United Nations to the PRC, after the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River on 11 December, was rejected by the PRC, which was convinced of the PVA's invincibility after its victory in that battle and the wider Second Phase Offensive. With Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway assuming command of the Eighth Army on 26 December following the death of previous Eighth Army commander Walton Walker, the PVA and the KPA launched their Third Phase Offensive on New Year's Eve.

Using night attacks in which UN fighting positions were encircled and assaulted by numerically superior troops, who had the element of surprise, the attacks were accompanied by loud trumpets and gongs, which facilitated tactical communication and disoriented the enemy. UN forces had no familiarity with this tactic, and some soldiers panicked, abandoning their weapons and retreating to the south. The offensive overwhelmed UN forces, allowing the PVA and KPA to capture Seoul for the second time on 4 January 1951.

These setbacks prompted MacArthur to consider using nuclear weapons against the Chinese or North Korean interiors, intending radioactive fallout zones to interrupt the Chinese supply chains. However, upon the arrival of the charismatic General Ridgway, the esprit de corps of the bloodied Eighth Army revived. , 21 February 1951 UN forces retreated to Suwon in the west, Wonju in the center, and the territory north of Samcheok in the east, where the battlefront stabilized.

The PVA had outrun its logistics capability and was unable to press on beyond Seoul as food, ammunition, and matériel were carried nightly, on foot and bicycle, from the border at the Yalu River to the battle lines. On 25 January, upon finding that the PVA had abandoned their battle lines, Ridgway ordered a reconnaissance-in-force, which became Operation Thunderbolt. A full-scale advance exploiting the UN's air superiority, concluding with the UN forces reaching the Han River and recapturing Wonju.

Following the failure of ceasefire negotiations in January, the UN General Assembly passed UNGA Resolution 498 on 1 February, condemning the PRC as an aggressor and calling upon its forces to withdraw from Korea. In early February, the ROK 11th Division ran an operation to destroy guerrillas and pro-DPRK sympathizers in the South Gyeongsang Province. The division and police committed the Geochang and Sancheong–Hamyang massacres. In mid-February, the PVA counterattacked with the Fourth Phase Offensive and achieved victory at Hoengseong.

However, the offensive was blunted by US IX Corps at Chipyong-ni in the center. The US 23rd Regimental Combat Team and French Battalion fought a short but desperate battle that broke the attack's momentum. The battle is sometimes known as the "Gettysburg of the Korean War": 5,600 US and French troops were surrounded by 25,000 PVA.

UN forces had previously retreated in the face of large PVA/KPA forces instead of getting cut off, but here they stood and won. move out over rugged mountain terrain while closing with North Korean forces In the last two weeks of February, Operation Thunderbolt was followed by Operation Killer, carried out by the revitalized Eighth Army. It was a full-scale, battlefront-length attack staged for maximum exploitation of firepower to kill as many KPA and PVA troops as possible.

Operation Killer concluded with US I Corps reoccupying the territory south of the Han River, and IX Corps capturing Hoengseong. On 7 March, the Eighth Army attacked with Operation Ripper, expelling the PVA and the KPA from Seoul on 14 March. This was the fourth and final conquest of the city in a year, leaving it a ruin; the 1.5 million pre-war population was down to 200,000 and people suffered from food shortages.

On 6 March, MacArthur gave a press conference where he stated "Assuming no diminution of the enemy's flow of ground forces and materiel to the Korean battle area, a continuation of the existing limitation upon our freedom of counter-offensive action, and no major additions to our organizational strength, the battle lines cannot fail in time to reach a point of theoretical stalemate." No one in Washington disputed MacArthur's prediction that a stalemate would develop.

But a victory, because of the commitments and risks to achieve it would entail, was no longer considered practical. The preferred course, because it would be consistent with the greater strategy and preparations against the possibility of world war, was to seek a cease-fire and negotiated settlement of Korean issues. On 12 March, Ridgway gave a press conference at his command post at Yoju stating that regaining the 38th parallel would be a "tremendous victory" for the Eighth Army.

It would mean the encroachment of communism in Korea had been stopped – exactly what the UNC had set out to accomplish. Conversely, if the Chinese failed to drive the UNC out of Korea, they would have "failed monumentally". In any case, he emphasized, "we didn't set out to conquer China". In late April, Peng sent his deputy, Hong Xuezhi, to brief Zhou in Beijing. What Chinese soldiers feared, Hong said, was not the enemy, but having no food, bullets, or trucks to transport them to the rear when they were wounded.

Zhou attempted to respond to the PVA's logistical concerns by increasing Chinese production and improving supply methods, but these were never sufficient. Large-scale air defense training programs were carried out and the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) began participating in the war from September. The Fourth Phase Offensive had not matched the achievements of the Second Phase or the limited gains of the Third Phase.

The UN forces, after earlier defeats and retraining, proved much harder to infiltrate by Chinese light infantry than previously. From 31 January to 21 April, the Chinese suffered 53,000 casualties. On 11 April, Truman relieved General MacArthur as supreme commander for several reasons. MacArthur had crossed the 38th parallel in the mistaken belief China would not enter the war, leading to allied losses. He believed use of nuclear weapons should be his decision, not the president's. MacArthur threatened to destroy China unless it surrendered.

While MacArthur felt total victory was the only honorable outcome, Truman was more pessimistic about his chances once involved in a larger war, feeling a truce and orderly withdrawal could be a valid solution. MacArthur was the subject of congressional hearings in May and June 1951, which determined he had defied the president's orders and thus violated the US Constitution.

A popular criticism of MacArthur was he never spent a night in Korea and directed the war from the safety of Tokyo. , March 1951 Ridgway was appointed supreme commander, and he regrouped the UN forces for successful counterattacks while General James Van Fleet assumed command of the Eighth Army. Further attacks depleted the PVA and KPA forces; Operations Courageous (23–28 March) and Tomahawk (23 March) were joint ground and airborne infiltrations meant to trap PVA forces between Kaesong and Seoul.

UN forces advanced to the Kansas Line, north of the 38th parallel. The PVA counterattacked in April 1951, with the Fifth Phase Offensive, with three field armies (700,000 men). The first thrust of the offensive fell upon I Corps, which fiercely resisted in the Battle of the Imjin River (22–25 April) and Battle of Kapyong (22–25 April), blunting the impetus of the offensive, which was halted at the No-name Line north of Seoul.

Casualty ratios were grievously disproportionate; Peng had expected a 2:1 ratio, but Chinese combat casualties from 22 to 29 April totaled between 40,000 and 60,000 compared to only 4,000 for the UN: a ratio between 10:1 and 15:1. By the time Peng had called off the attack in the western sector on 29 April, the three participating armies had lost a third of their front-line combat strength within a week. On 15 May, the PVA commenced the second impulse of the spring offensive and attacked the ROK and US X Corps in the east at the Soyang River.

Approximately 370,000 PVA and 114,000 KPA troops had been mobilized, with the bulk attacking in the eastern sector, with about a quarter attempting to pin the I Corps and IX Corps in the western sector. They were halted by 20 May and repulsed, with Western histories designating 22 May as the end of the offensive. At month's end, the Chinese planned the third step of the Fifth Phase Offensive (withdrawal), which they estimated would take 10–15 days for their 340,000 remaining men, and set the date for 23 May.

They were caught off guard when the Eighth Army counterattacked and regained the Kansas Line on 12 May, twenty-three hours before the expected withdrawal. The surprise attack turned the retreat into "the most severe loss since our forces had entered Korea"; between 16 and 23 May, the PVA suffered another 45,000 to 60,000 casualties before their soldiers managed to evacuate. The Fifth Phase Offensive as a whole had cost the PVA 102,000 soldiers (85,000 killed/wounded, 17,000 captured), with significant losses for the KPA.

The end of the Fifth Phase Offensive preceded the UN May–June 1951 counteroffensive. During the counteroffensive, the US-led coalition captured land up to about north of the 38th parallel, with most forces stopping at the Kansas Line and a minority going to the Wyoming Line. PVA and KPA forces suffered greatly, especially in the Chuncheon sector and at Chiam-ni and Hwacheon; in the latter sector alone the PVA/KPA suffered over 73,207 casualties, including 8,749 captured, compared to 2,647 total casualties of the IX Corps.

The halt at the Kansas Line and offensive action stand-down began the stalemate that lasted until the armistice of 1953. The disastrous failure of the Fifth Phase Offensive "led Chinese leaders to change their goal from driving the UNC out of Korea to merely defending China's security and ending the war through negotiations".

Stalemate (July 1951 – July 1953)

tanks, painted with tiger heads thought to demoralize Chinese forces For the rest of the war, the UN and the PVA/KPA fought but exchanged little territory. Large-scale bombing of North Korea continued, and protracted armistice negotiations began on 10 July 1951 at Kaesong in the North. On the Chinese side, Zhou directed peace talks, and Li Kenong and Qiao Guanghua headed the negotiation team. Combat continued; the goal of the UN forces was to recapture all of South Korea and avoid losing territory.

The PVA and the KPA attempted similar operations and later effected military and psychological operations to test the UN Command's resolve to continue the war. The sides constantly traded artillery fire along the front, with American-led forces possessing a large firepower advantage over Chinese-led forces. In the last three months of 1952 the UN fired 3,553,518 field gun shells and 2,569,941 mortar shells, while the communists fired 377,782 field gun shells and 672,194 mortar shells: a 5.8:1 ratio.

The communist insurgency, reinvigorated by North Korean support and scattered bands of KPA stragglers, resurged in the south. In the autumn of 1951, Van Fleet ordered Major General Paik Sun-yup to break the back of guerrilla activity. The UN's limited offensive (31 August – 12 November) to shorten and straighten sections of the lines, acquire better defensive terrain, and deny the enemy key vantage points, saw heavy fighting by UN forces, with I Corps and X Corps making limited tactical advances against PVA and KPA forces.

The campaign resulted in approximately 60,000 casualties, including 22,000 Americans. The intense battles at Bloody Ridge, the Punchbowl, and Heartbreak Ridge underscored the challenges of penetrating the Chinese "active defense". Despite PVA/KPA losses of 100,000 to 150,000 troops, these were not crippling, and the PVA forces remained resolute. By November, the UN Command abandoned major offensive operations, and the PVA launched counterattacks with some success.

From December 1951 to March 1952, ROK security forces claimed to have killed 11,090 partisans and sympathizers and captured 9,916 more. PVA troops suffered from deficient military equipment, logistical problems, overextended communication and supply lines, and the constant threat of UN bombers. These factors led to a rate of Chinese casualties far greater than the casualties suffered by UN troops. The situation became so serious that in November 1951 Zhou called a conference in Shenyang to discuss the PVA's logistical problems.

It was decided to accelerate the construction of railways and airfields, to increase the trucks available to the army, and to improve air defense by any means possible. These commitments did little to address the problems. In the months after the Shenyang conference, Peng went to Beijing several times to brief Mao and Zhou about the heavy casualties and the increasing difficulty of keeping front lines supplied with basic necessities. Peng was convinced the war would be protracted and that neither side would be able to achieve victory in the near future.

On 24 February 1952, the Military Commission, presided over by Zhou, discussed the PVA's logistical problems with members of government agencies. After government representatives emphasized their inability to meet the war demands, Peng shouted: "You have this and that problem ... You should go to the front and see with your own eyes what food and clothing the soldiers have! Not to speak of the casualties! For what are they giving their lives? We have no aircraft. We have only a few guns. Transports are not protected.

More and more soldiers are dying of starvation. Can't you overcome some of your difficulties?" The atmosphere became so tense Zhou was forced to adjourn the conference.

Zhou called a series of meetings, where it was agreed the PVA would be divided into three groups, to be dispatched to Korea in shifts; to accelerate training of pilots; to provide more anti-aircraft guns to front lines; to purchase more military equipment and ammunition from the Soviet Union; to provide the army with more food and clothing; and to transfer the responsibility of logistics to the central government. General Mark W. Clark replaced General Ridgway as commander of the UN Command on 12 May 1952.

With peace negotiations ongoing, the Chinese attempted a final offensive in the final weeks of the war to capture territory: on 10 June, 30,000 Chinese troops struck South Korean and US divisions on a front, and on 13 July, 80,000 Chinese soldiers struck the east-central Kumsong sector, with the brunt of their attack falling on 4 South Korean divisions. The Chinese had success in penetrating South Korean lines but failed to capitalize, particularly when US forces responded with overwhelming firepower.

Chinese casualties in their final major offensive (above normal wastage for the front) were about 72,000, including 25,000 killed compared to 14,000 for the UN (most were South Koreans, 1,611 were Americans). While Chinese forces grappled with significant logistical and supply difficulties, the stalemate also stemmed from mounting frustrations within the UNC. Despite superior firepower, the war proved difficult to fight and the US public was becoming impatient of a war that was lacking a victory.

By mid-1951, the stalemate had worn away Truman's public approval, and political pressures mounted on the Truman administration to seek an end to the fighting. By October 1952, Van Fleet alleged he was not receiving sufficient ammunition to continue supporting the American involvement, prompting a public controversy. US Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett denied these charges, arguing that shortages were due to army-level logistics rather than a lack of support and mismanagement from the Pentagon. On 29 November 1952 US President-elect Dwight D.

Eisenhower went to Korea to learn what might end the war. Eisenhower took office on 20 January 1953 and his administration prioritized containment over rollback and sought to reduce American involvement in the conflict, contributing to the later armistice.

Armistice (July 1953 – November 1954)

, June 1953 The on-again, off-again negotiations for the armistice spanned over two years (1951–1953), first at Kaesong, then Panmunjom. and was the longest negotiated armistice in history. A problematic point was prisoner of war repatriation. The PVA, KPA and UN Command could not agree on a system of repatriation because many PVA and KPA soldiers refused to be repatriated back to the north, which was unacceptable to the Chinese and North Koreans.

On 3 December 1952 the UN General Assembly accepted India's proposed Korean War armistice, voted as Resolution 610(VII), and thus was born the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Stalin died on 5 March. The new Soviet leaders, engaged in their internal power struggle, had no desire to continue supporting China's efforts and called for an end to the hostilities. China could not continue without Soviet aid, and North Korea was no longer a major player.

Armistice talks entered a new phase especially after the May 1953 test of the novel nuclear artillery shell by the Americans. The KPA, PVA and UN Command signed the armistice agreement on 27 July 1953. South Korean President Syngman Rhee refused to sign. The war ended at this point, even though there was no peace treaty. North Korea nevertheless claims it won the war. Under the agreement, the belligerents established the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) which mostly follows the 38th parallel.

In the eastern part, the DMZ runs north of the 38th parallel; to the west, it travels south of it. Kaesong, site of the initial negotiations, was in pre-war South Korea but is now part of North Korea. The DMZ has since been patrolled by the KPA and the ROKA, with the US still operating as the UN Command. Operation Glory was conducted from July to November 1954, to allow combatants to exchange their dead.

The remains of 4,167 US Army and US Marine Corps dead were exchanged for 13,528 KPA and PVA dead, and 546 civilians dead in UN POW camps were delivered to the South Korean government. After Operation Glory, 416 Korean War unknown soldiers were buried in the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific, on Oahu, Hawaii. Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) records indicate the PRC and North Korea transmitted 1,394 names, of which 858 were correct. From 4,167 containers of returned remains, forensic examination identified 4,219 individuals.

Of these, 2,944 were identified as from the US, and all but 416 were identified by name. From 1996 to 2006, North Korea recovered 220 remains near the Sino-Korean border.

Continued division (1954–present)

The Armistice Agreement provided for monitoring by an international commission. Since 1953, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, composed of members from the Swiss and Swedish armed forces, has been stationed near the Korean Demilitarized Zone. In April 1975, South Vietnam's capital of Saigon was captured by the People's Army of Vietnam. Encouraged by that communist success, Kim Il-sung saw it as an opportunity to invade South Korea. Kim visited China in April 1975 and met with Mao and Zhou to ask for military aid.

Despite Pyongyang's expectations, Beijing refused to help North Korea in another war. Since the armistice, there have been incursions and acts of aggression by North Korea. From 1966 to 1969, many cross-border incursions took place in what has been referred to as the Korean DMZ Conflict or Second Korean War. In 1968, a North Korean commando team unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate South Korean president Park Chung Hee in the Blue House Raid. In 1976, the Korean axe murder incident was widely publicized.

Since 1974, four incursion tunnels leading to Seoul have been uncovered. In 2010, a North Korean submarine torpedoed and sank the South Korean corvette , resulting in the deaths of 46 sailors. Again in 2010, North Korea fired artillery shells on Yeonpyeong island, killing two military personnel and two civilians. After a new wave of UN sanctions, on 11 March 2013, North Korea claimed that the armistice had become invalid.

On 13 March, North Korea confirmed it ended the Armistice and declared North Korea "is not restrained by the north–south declaration on non-aggression". On 30 March, North Korea stated it entered a "state of war" and "the long-standing situation of the Korean peninsula being neither at peace nor at war is finally over". Speaking on 4 April, US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said that Pyongyang "formally informed" the Pentagon that it "ratified" the potential use of a nuclear weapon against South Korea, Japan, and the US, including Guam and Hawaii.

Hagel stated the US would deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-ballistic missile system to Guam because of a credible and realistic nuclear threat. In 2016, it was revealed North Korea approached the US about conducting formal peace talks to end the war officially. While the White House agreed to secret peace talks, the plan was rejected because North Korea refused to discuss nuclear disarmament as part of the treaty. In 2018, it was announced that North Korea and South Korea agreed to talk to end the conflict.

They committed themselves to the complete denuclearization of the Peninsula. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in signed the Panmunjom Declaration. In September 2021, Moon reiterated his call to end the war formally, in a speech at the UN.

Characteristics

The ground war saw armored offensives with the North's invasion and UN operations, and tunnel warfare by Chinese forces. The air war saw the first large jet aircraft battles, and an early use of US nuclear deterrence.

Aerial warfare

Naval warfare

, North Korea, 21 October 1950 Because neither Korea had a significant navy, the war featured few naval battles. A skirmish between North Korea and the UN Command occurred on 2 July 1950; the US Navy cruiser , the Royal Navy cruiser and the Royal Navy frigate fought four North Korean torpedo boats and two mortar gunboats, and sank them. USS Juneau later sank several ammunition ships that had been present.

The last sea battle of the Korean War occurred days before the Battle of Incheon; the ROK ship PC-703 sank a North Korean minelayer in the Battle of Haeju Island, near Incheon. Three other supply ships were sunk by PC-703 two days later in the Yellow Sea. During most of the war, the UN navies patrolled the west and east coasts of North Korea, sinking supply and ammunition ships and denying the North Koreans the ability to resupply from the sea.

Aside from very occasional gunfire from North Korean shore batteries, the main threat to UN navy ships was from magnetic mines. During the war, five US Navy ships were lost to mines: two minesweepers, two minesweeper escorts, and one ocean tug. Mines and coastal artillery damaged another 87 US warships.

Casualties

About 3 million people were killed in the war, mostly civilians, making it perhaps the deadliest conflict of the Cold War era. Samuel Kim lists the Korean War as the deadliest conflict in East Asia, and the region most affected by armed conflict related to the Cold War.

Military

, South Africa

Environmental impact

Aftermath

Notes

References

Citations

Historiography

External links

Records of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) (1950–1973) at the United Nations Archives

Historical

THE KOREAN WAR (1) - ROK Ministry of National Defense Institute for Military History, 1997 (E-BOOK) THE KOREAN WAR (1) - ROK Ministry of National Defense Institute for Military History, 1997 (PDF) THE KOREAN WAR (2) - ROK Ministry of National Defense Institute for Military History, 1998 (E-BOOK) THE KOREAN WAR (2) - ROK Ministry of National Defense Institute for Military History, 1999 (PDF) THE KOREAN WAR (3) - ROK Ministry of National Defense Institute for Military History, 1999 (E-BOOK) THE KOREAN WAR (3) - ROK Ministry of National Defense Institute for Military History, 1998 (PDF) History of the Just Fatherland Liberation War of the Korean People (PDF) The Research Institute of History, Academy of Sciences of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Anniversary of the Korean War Armistice: Truman on Acheson's Crucial Role in Going to War Shapell Manuscript Foundation Korean War resources, Dwight D.

Eisenhower Presidential Library North Korea International Documentation Project Grand Valley State University Veteran's History Project digital collection The Forgotten War, Remembered  – four testimonials in The New York Times Collection of Books and Research Materials on the Korean War an online collection of the United States Army Center of Military History Korean War, US Army Signal Corps Photograph Collection U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, Pennsylvania Koreanwar-educator.org

Media

West Point Atlas of the Korean War The Korean War You Never Knew – slideshows by Life magazine U.S. Army Korea Media Center official Korean War online image archive Rare pictures of the Korean War from the U.S. Library of Congress and National Archives Land of the Morning Calm Canadians in Korea – multimedia project including veteran interviews Pathé Online newsreel archive featuring films on the war CBC Digital Archives – Forgotten Heroes: Canada and the Korean War

Organizations

Korea Defense Veterans of America Korean War Ex-POW Association Korean War Veterans Association The Center for the Study of the Korean War

Memorials

Korean Children's War Memorial Chinese 50th Anniversary Korean War Memorial

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References

2 claims could not be tied to a specific sentence and are listed in the table below instead.

  1. ↩Wikipedia “Korean War” revision 1378577549 · retrieved 2026-10-20 date of formation (×1) · confidence 0.95 revision URL