Logical behaviorism
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In the philosophy of mind, logical behaviorism (also known as analytical behaviorism, dispositional behaviorism or philosophical behaviorism) is the thesis that the meaning of mental concepts can be explained in terms of behavioral concepts. Logical behaviorism was first stated by the Vienna Circle, especially Rudolf Carnap. Other philosophers with sympathies for behaviorism included C. G. Hempel, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and W. V. O. Quine. A more moderate form of analytical behaviorism was put forward by the Oxford philosopher Gilbert Ryle in his book The Concept of Mind (1949).
In the philosophy of mind, logical behaviorism (also known as analytical behaviorism, dispositional behaviorism or philosophical behaviorism) is the thesis that the meaning of mental concepts can be explained in terms of behavioral concepts. Logical behaviorism was first stated by the Vienna Circle, especially Rudolf Carnap. Other philosophers with sympathies for behaviorism included C. G. Hempel, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and W. V. O. Quine. A more moderate form of analytical behaviorism was put forward by the Oxford philosopher Gilbert Ryle in his book The Concept of Mind (1949).
See also
Methodological behaviorism
References
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