Manhattan Project

The Manhattan Project was a research and development program undertaken during World War II to produce the first nuclear weapons.

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The Manhattan Project was a research and development program undertaken during World War II to produce the first nuclear weapons. It was led by the United States in collaboration with the United Kingdom and Canada. The Manhattan Project employed nearly 130,000 people at its peak and cost nearly US$2 billion (equivalent to about $  billion in ).

From 1942 to 19461, the project was directed by Major General Leslie Groves of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Nuclear physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer was the director of the Los Alamos Laboratory that designed the bombs.

The Army program was designated the Manhattan District, as its first headquarters were in Manhattan; the name superseded the initial codename, Development of Substitute Materials, for the entire project. The project absorbed its earlier British counterpart, Tube Alloys. Over 80 percent of project cost was for building and operating the fissile material production plants.

The project proposed both highly enriched uranium and plutonium as fuel for nuclear weapons. Enriched uranium was produced at the Clinton Engineer Works in Tennessee. Plutonium was produced in the world's first industrial-scale nuclear reactors at the Hanford Engineer Works in Washington.

These sites were supported by dozens of other facilities across Canada, the US and the UK. The weapons' designs were produced at the Los Alamos Laboratory (Project Y) in New Mexico, and resulted in two weapon designs used during the war: Little Boy (enriched uranium gun-type) and Fat Man (plutonium implosion). The Fat Man design was initially a low priority fallback option, as it was complex and required explosive lenses, but in 1944 it was confirmed that plutonium from Hanford was not suitable for a gun-type bomb because of the high proportion of plutonium-240.

The first nuclear device ever detonated was an implosion-type bomb during the Trinity test, conducted at White Sands Proving Ground in New Mexico on 16 July 19451. The project was responsible for developing the specific means of delivering the weapons onto military targets, and for the use of the Little Boy and Fat Man bombs in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

The project was also charged with gathering intelligence on the German nuclear weapon project. Through Operation Alsos, Manhattan Project personnel served in Europe, sometimes behind enemy lines, where they gathered nuclear materials and documents and rounded up German scientists. Despite the Manhattan Project's own emphasis on security, Soviet atomic spies penetrated the program.

In the immediate postwar years, the Manhattan Project conducted weapons testing at Bikini Atoll as part of Operation Crossroads, developed new weapons, promoted the development of the network of national laboratories, supported medical research into radiology, and laid the foundations for the nuclear navy. It maintained control over American atomic weapons research and production until the formation of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in January 1947. , Arthur H. Compton, Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant, Karl T. Compton, and Alfred L. Loomis|alt=Six men in suits sitting on chairs, smiling and laughing As part of the scientific exchange, the MAUD Committee's findings were conveyed to the United States.

One of its members, the Australian physicist Mark Oliphant, flew to the US in late August 1941 and discovered that data provided by the MAUD Committee had not reached key American physicists. Oliphant set out to find out why the committee's findings were apparently being ignored; the report had been received by Briggs, who had locked it in a safe.

Oliphant met with the Uranium Committee and visited Berkeley, California, where he spoke persuasively to Ernest O. Lawrence. Lawrence was sufficiently impressed to commence his own research. He in turn spoke to James B. Conant, Arthur H. Compton and George B. Pegram.

Oliphant's mission was a success; key American physicists were now aware of the wartime feasibility of an atomic bomb. On 9 October 1941, during a meeting with Vannevar Bush about the British conclusions, President Roosevelt approved accelerating the atomic program.

He created a Top Policy Group consisting of himself—although he never attended a meeting—Vice President Henry A. Wallace, Bush, Conant, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and the Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall. Roosevelt chose the Army to run the project rather than the Navy, because the Army had more experience with managing large-scale construction.

He agreed to coordinate the effort with the British and on 11 October sent a message to Prime Minister Winston Churchill, suggesting that they correspond on atomic matters. Bush had, by this point, already begun expanding and altering the leadership of the OSRD Section on Uranium, retaining Briggs as chairman but adding and elevating other personnel.

The section itself was renamed to Section S-1. )|alt=A series of doodles In the spring of 1942, Arthur Compton asked theoretical physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer of the University of California to take over research into fast neutron calculations—key to calculations of critical mass and weapon detonation—from Gregory Breit, who had quit on 18 May 1942 because of concerns over lax operational security. John H. Manley, a physicist at the Metallurgical Laboratory, was assigned to assist Oppenheimer by coordinating experimental physics groups scattered across the country.

Oppenheimer and Robert Serber of the University of Illinois examined the problems of neutron diffusion—how neutrons moved in a nuclear chain reaction—and hydrodynamics—how the explosion produced by a chain reaction might behave. To review this work and the general theory of fission reactions, Oppenheimer and Fermi convened meetings at the University of Chicago in June and at the University of California in July 1942 with theoretical physicists Hans Bethe, John Van Vleck, Edward Teller, Emil Konopinski, Robert Serber, Stan Frankel, and Eldred C. (Carlyle) Nelson, and experimental physicists Emilio Segrè, Felix Bloch, Franco Rasetti, Manley, and Edwin McMillan.

They tentatively confirmed that a fission bomb was theoretically possible. The properties of pure uranium-235 were relatively unknown, as were those of plutonium, which had only been isolated by Glenn Seaborg and his team in February 1941.

The scientists at the July 1942 conference envisioned creating plutonium in nuclear reactors where uranium-238 atoms absorbed neutrons that had been emitted from fissioning uranium-235. At this point no reactor had been built, and only tiny quantities of plutonium were available from cyclotrons. Even by December 1943, only two milligrams had been produced.

There were many ways of arranging the fissile material into a critical mass. The simplest was shooting a "cylindrical plug" into a sphere of "active material" with a "tamper"—dense material to focus neutrons inward and keep the reacting mass together to increase its efficiency.

They also explored designs involving spheroids, a primitive form of "implosion" suggested by Richard C. Tolman, and the possibility of autocatalytic methods to increase the efficiency of the bomb as it exploded. As the idea of the fission bomb was theoretically settled—at least until more experimental data was available—Edward Teller pushed for discussion of a more powerful bomb: the "super", now usually referred to as a "hydrogen bomb", which would use the heat from a detonating fission bomb to start a nuclear fusion reaction in a mass of deuterium and tritium.

Such a weapon could theoretically be thousands of times more powerful than a fission bomb. The complexity of the physics, and the number of unknowns involved, made it difficult to establish whether such a weapon would work at the time.

As any "super" bomb would first require a fission weapon, relatively few resources were dedicated to investigating the "super" during the war, and knowledge that it was a possibility was kept even more secret than other project work. During the initial discussion about fusion reactions, Teller raised the speculative possibility that an atomic bomb might "ignite" the atmosphere because of a hypothetical fusion reaction of nitrogen nuclei.

Bethe calculated that it was "extremely unlikely", but the worry was great-enough that Oppenheimer reported on it to Arthur Compton. Oppenheimer visited Compton in person to discuss it, and Compton stated that if "the chances were more than approximately three in a million" it could happen, the project would have to stop.

The theorists ultimately concluded that "for practical purposes" it had a "negligible" chance of happening. A postwar report co-authored by Teller concluded that "whatever the temperature to which a section of the atmosphere may be heated, no self-propagating chain of nuclear reactions is likely to be started." and Groves at the remains of the Trinity test in September 1945, two months after the test blast and just after the end of World War II.

The white overshoes prevented fallout from sticking to the soles of their shoes. |alt=A man smiling in a suit in suit and one in a uniform chat around a pile of twisted metal. Vannevar Bush became dissatisfied with Colonel Marshall's failure to get the project moving forward expeditiously and felt that more aggressive leadership was required.

He spoke to Harvey Bundy and Generals Marshall, Somervell, and Styer about his concerns, advocating that the project be placed under a senior policy committee, with a prestigious officer, preferably Styer, as director. Somervell and Styer selected Groves for the post; General Marshall ordered that he be promoted to brigadier general, as it was felt that the title "general" would hold more sway with the academic scientists working on the project.

Groves' orders placed him directly under Somervell rather than Reybold, with Colonel Marshall now answerable to Groves. Groves established his headquarters in Washington, D.C., in the New War Department Building, where Colonel Marshall had his liaison office. He assumed command of the Manhattan Project on 23 September 1942.

Later that day, he attended a meeting called by Stimson, which established a Military Policy Committee, responsible to the Top Policy Group, consisting of Bush (with Conant as an alternate), Styer and Rear Admiral William R. Purnell. Tolman and Conant were later appointed as Groves' scientific advisers.

On 19 September, Groves went to Donald Nelson, the chairman of the War Production Board, and asked for broad authority to issue a AAA rating whenever it was required. Nelson initially balked but quickly caved in when Groves threatened to go to the president. Groves promised not to use the AAA rating unless it was necessary.

It soon transpired that for the routine requirements of the project the AAA rating was too high but the AA-3 rating was too low. After a long campaign, Groves finally received AA-1 authority on 1 July 1944. According to Groves, "In Washington you became aware of the importance of top priority.

Most everything proposed in the Roosevelt administration would have top priority. That would last for about a week or two and then something else would get top priority". One of Groves' early problems was to find a director for Project Y, the group that would design and build the bomb.

The obvious choice was one of the three laboratory heads, Urey, Lawrence, or Arthur Compton, but they could not be spared. Compton recommended Oppenheimer, who was already intimately familiar with the bomb design concepts.

However, Oppenheimer had little administrative experience, and, unlike Urey, Lawrence, and Compton, had not won a Nobel Prize, which many scientists felt that the head of such an important laboratory should have. There were also concerns about Oppenheimer's security status, as many of his associates were communists, including his wife, Kitty; his girlfriend, Jean Tatlock; and his brother, Frank.

A long conversation in October 1942 convinced Groves and Nichols that Oppenheimer thoroughly understood the issues involved in setting up a laboratory in a remote area and should be appointed as its director. Groves personally waived the security requirements and issued Oppenheimer's clearance on 20 July 1943. , the head of the British Mission.|alt=A large man in uniform and a bespectacled thin man in a suit and tie sit at a desk.

By March 1943 Conant decided that James Chadwick and one or two other British scientists were important enough that the bomb design team at Los Alamos needed them, despite the risk of revealing weapon design secrets. In August 1943 Churchill and Roosevelt negotiated the Quebec Agreement, which established the Combined Policy Committee to coordinate the efforts of the US and UK; Canada was not a signatory, but the Agreement provided for a Canadian representative on the Combined Policy Committee in view of Canada's contribution to the effort.

An agreement between Roosevelt and Churchill known as the Hyde Park Aide-Mémoire, signed in late September 1944, extended the Quebec Agreement to the postwar period and suggested that "when a 'bomb' is finally available, it might perhaps, after mature consideration, be used against the Japanese, who should be warned that this bombardment will be repeated until they surrender". When cooperation resumed after the Quebec Agreement, the Americans' progress and expenditures amazed the British.

Chadwick pressed for British involvement in the Manhattan Project to the fullest extent and abandoned hopes of an independent British project during the war. With Churchill's backing, he attempted to ensure that every request from Groves for assistance was honored.

The British Mission that arrived in the United States in December 1943 included Niels Bohr, Otto Frisch, Klaus Fuchs, Rudolf Peierls, and Ernest Titterton. More scientists arrived in early 1944.

While those assigned to gaseous diffusion left by the fall of 1944, the thirty-five working under Oliphant with Lawrence at Berkeley were assigned to existing laboratory groups and most stayed until the end of the war. The nineteen sent to Los Alamos also joined existing groups, primarily related to implosion and bomb assembly, but not the plutonium-related ones.

The Quebec Agreement specified that nuclear weapons would not be used against another country without the mutual consent of the US and UK. In June 1945, Wilson agreed that the nuclear bombing of Japan would be recorded as a decision of the Combined Policy Committee. The Combined Policy Committee created the Combined Development Trust in June 1944, with Groves as its chairman, to procure uranium and thorium ores on international markets.

The Belgian Congo and Canada held much of the world's uranium outside Eastern Europe, and the Belgian Government in Exile was in London. Britain agreed to give the United States most of the Belgian ore, as it could not use most of the supply without restricted American research. In 1944, the Trust purchased of uranium oxide ore from companies operating mines in the Belgian Congo.

To avoid briefing US Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr., a special account not subject to the usual auditing and controls was used to hold Trust monies. Between 1944 and his resignation from the Trust in 1947, Groves deposited a total of $37.5 million.

Groves later said that the British scientists' direct contributions to the Manhattan Project were "helpful but not vital," but "there probably would have been no atomic bomb to drop on Hiroshima" without Britain's (particularly Churchill's) impetus. The British wartime participation was crucial to the success of their independent nuclear weapons program when the McMahon Act of 1946 temporarily ended American nuclear cooperation. in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, on 11 August 1945.

By May 1945, 82,000 people1 were employed at the Clinton Engineer Works. Photograph by the Manhattan District photographer Ed Westcott.|alt=Workers, mostly women, pour out of a cluster of buildings. A billboard exhorts them to "Make C.E.W. COUNT continue to protect project information!"

The day after he took over the project, Groves went to Tennessee with Colonel Marshall to inspect the proposed site there, and Groves was impressed. On 29 September 1942, United States Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson authorized the Corps of Engineers to acquire of land by eminent domain at a cost of $3.5 million. An additional was subsequently acquired.

About 1,000 families were affected by the order, which came into effect on 7 October. Protests, legal appeals, and a 1943 Congressional inquiry were to no avail. By mid-November U.S. Marshals were posting notices to vacate on farmhouse doors, and construction contractors were moving in.

Some families were given two weeks' notice to vacate farms that had been their homes for generations. The ultimate cost of the land acquisition, which was not completed until March 1945, was only about $2.6 million—around $47 an acre.

When presented with a proclamation declaring Oak Ridge a total exclusion area that no one could enter without military permission, the governor of Tennessee, Prentice Cooper, angrily tore it up. Initially known as the Kingston Demolition Range, the site was officially renamed the Clinton Engineer Works (CEW) in early 1943.

While Stone & Webster concentrated on the production facilities, the architectural and engineering firm Skidmore, Owings & Merrill developed a residential community for 13,000. The community was located on the slopes of Black Oak Ridge, from which the new town of Oak Ridge got its name.

The Army presence at Oak Ridge increased in August 1943 when Nichols replaced Marshall as head of the Manhattan Engineer District. One of his first tasks was to move the district headquarters to Oak Ridge, although the name of the district did not change.

In September 1943 the administration of community facilities was outsourced to Turner Construction Company through a subsidiary, the Roane-Anderson Company. Chemical engineers were part of "frantic efforts" to make 10% to 12% enriched uranium 235, with tight security and fast approvals for supplies and materials.

The population of Oak Ridge soon expanded well beyond the initial plans, and peaked at 75,000 in May 1945, by which time 82,000 people were employed at the Clinton Engineer Works, and 10,000 by Roane-Anderson. were young women who monitored calutron control panels at Y-12. Gladys Owens, seated in the foreground, was unaware of what she had been involved in. |alt=A long corridor with many consoles with dials and switches, attended by women seated on high stools Responsibility for the design and construction of the electromagnetic separation plant, which came to be called Y-12, was assigned to Stone & Webster in June 1942.

The design called for five first-stage processing units, known as Alpha racetracks, and two units for final processing, known as Beta racetracks. In September 1943 Groves authorized construction of four more racetracks, known as Alpha II. Construction began in February 1943.

The second Alpha I was operational at the end of January 1944, the first Beta and first and third Alpha I's came online in March, and the fourth Alpha I was operational in April. The four Alpha II racetracks were completed between July and October 1944. Tennessee Eastman was contracted to manage Y-12.

The calutrons were turned over to trained Tennessee Eastman operators known as the Calutron Girls. The calutrons initially enriched the uranium-235 content to between 13% and 15%, and shipped the first few hundred grams of this to Los Alamos in March 1944. Only 1 part in 5,825 of the uranium feed emerged as product.

Much of the rest was splattered over equipment in the process. Strenuous recovery efforts helped raise production to 10% of the uranium-235 feed by January 1945. In February the Alpha racetracks began receiving slightly enriched (1.4%) feed from the new S-50 thermal diffusion plant, and the next month they received enhanced (5%) feed from the K-25 gaseous diffusion plant.

By August, K-25 was producing uranium sufficiently enriched to feed directly into the Beta tracks. site, June 1944|alt=An aerial view of the Hanford B-Reactor site from June 1944. At center is the reactor building. Small trucks dot the landscape and give a sense of scale.

Two large water towers loom above the plant. As at Oak Ridge, the most difficulty was encountered while canning the uranium slugs, which commenced at Hanford in March 1944. They were pickled to remove dirt and impurities, dipped in molten bronze, tin, and aluminum-silicon alloy, canned using hydraulic presses, and then capped using arc welding under an argon atmosphere.

Finally, they were tested to detect holes or faulty welds. Disappointingly, most canned slugs initially failed the tests, resulting in an output of only a handful per day. But steady progress was made and by June 1944 production increased to the point where it appeared that enough canned slugs was available to start Reactor B on schedule in August 1944.

Work began on Reactor B, the first of six planned 250 MW reactors, on 10 October 1943. The reactor complexes were given letter designations A through F, with B, D and F sites developed first, as this maximized the distance between the reactors. They were the only ones constructed during the Manhattan Project.

Some of steel, of concrete, 50,000 concrete blocks and 71,000 concrete bricks were used to construct the high building. Construction of the reactor itself commenced in February 1944. Watched by Compton, Matthias, DuPont's Crawford Greenewalt, Leona Woods and Fermi, who inserted the first slug, the reactor was powered up beginning on 13 September 1944.

Over the next few days, 838 tubes were loaded and the reactor went critical. Shortly after midnight on 27 September, the operators began to withdraw the control rods to initiate production. At first all appeared well but around 03:00 the power level started to drop and by 06:30 the reactor had shut down completely.

The cooling water was investigated to see if there was a leak or contamination. The next day the reactor started up again, only to shut down once more. Fermi contacted Chien-Shiung Wu, who identified the cause of the problem as neutron poisoning from xenon-135, which has a half-life of 9.2 hours.

Fermi, Woods, Donald J. Hughes and John Archibald Wheeler then calculated the nuclear cross section of xenon-135, which turned out to be 30,000 times that of uranium. DuPont engineer George Graves had deviated from the Metallurgical Laboratory's original design in which the reactor had 1,500 tubes arranged in a circle, and had added an additional 504 tubes to fill in the corners.

The scientists had originally considered this overengineering a waste of time and money, but Fermi realized that by loading all 2,004 tubes, the reactor could reach the required power level and efficiently produce plutonium. Reactor D was started on 17 December 1944 and Reactor F on 25 February 1945. at Los Alamos|alt=A shack surrounded by pine trees. There is snow on the ground.

A man and a woman in white lab coats are pulling on a rope, which is attached to a small trolley on a wooden platform. On top of the trolley is a large cylindrical object. The ultimate task of the metallurgists was to determine how to cast plutonium into a sphere.

The difficulties became apparent when attempts to measure the density of plutonium gave inconsistent results. At first contamination was suspected, but it was soon determined that there were multiple allotropes of plutonium. The brittle α phase that exists at room temperature changes to the plastic β phase at higher temperatures.

Attention then shifted to the even more malleable δ phase that normally exists in the 300 °C to 450 °C range. It was found that this was stable at room temperature when alloyed with aluminum, but aluminum emits neutrons when bombarded with alpha particles, which would exacerbate the pre-ignition problem.

The metallurgists then hit upon using a plutonium-gallium alloy, which stabilized the δ phase and could be hot pressed into the desired spherical shape. As plutonium was found to corrode readily, the sphere was coated with nickel. The work proved dangerous.

By the end of the war, half the chemists and metallurgists had to be removed from work with plutonium when unacceptably high levels of the element was detected in their urine. A minor fire at Los Alamos in January 1945 led to a fear that a fire in the plutonium laboratory might contaminate the whole town, and Groves authorized the construction of a new facility for plutonium chemistry and metallurgy, which became known as the DP-site.

The hemispheres for the first plutonium pit (or core) were produced and delivered on 2 July 1945. Three more hemispheres followed on 23 July and were delivered three days later. In contrast to the plutonium Fat Man, the uranium gun-type Little Boy weapon was straightforward if not trivial to design.

Overall responsibility for it was assigned to Parsons's Ordnance (O) Division, with the design, development, and technical work at Los Alamos consolidated under Lieutenant Commander Francis Birch's group. The gun-type design now had to work with enriched uranium only, and this allowed the design to be greatly simplified.

A high-velocity gun was no longer required, and a simpler weapon was substituted. Research into the Super was also pursued, although it was considered secondary to the development of a fission bomb. The effort was directed by Teller, who was its most enthusiastic proponent.

The F-1 (Super) Group calculated that burning of liquid deuterium would release the energy of , enough to devastate . In a final report on the Super in June 1946, Teller remained upbeat about the prospect of it being successfully developed, although that opinion was not universal. .|alt=Soldiers and workmen, some wearing steel helmet, clamber over what looks like a giant manhole.

The Alsos Mission to Italy questioned physics laboratory staff at the University of Rome following the capture of the city in June 1944. Meanwhile, Pash formed a combined British and American Alsos mission in London under the command of Captain Horace K. Calvert to participate in Operation Overlord.

Groves considered the risk that the Germans might attempt to disrupt the Normandy landings with radioactive poisons was sufficient to warn General Dwight D. Eisenhower and send an officer to brief his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith. Under the codename Operation Peppermint, special equipment was prepared and Chemical Warfare Service teams were trained in its use.

Following in the wake of the advancing Allied armies, the Alsos team interrogated scientists and searched facilities in liberated areas of France and Germany to learn about the German work. Goudsmit concluded in November 1944 that the German nuclear program had never made it beyond the laboratory stage.

As he put it later: "The evidence at hand proved definitely that Germany had no atom bomb and was not likely to have one in any reasonable time." Interrogation of German prisoners indicated that uranium and thorium were being processed in Oranienburg, so Groves arranged for it to be bombed on 15 March 1945 to deny its capture by the Soviet Union.

An Alsos team went to Stassfurt in the Soviet Occupation Zone and retrieved 11 tons of ore from WIFO. In April 1945, Pash, in command of a composite force known as T-Force, conducted Operation Harborage, a sweep behind enemy lines of Hechingen, Bisingen, and Haigerloch—the heart of the German nuclear effort.

T-Force captured nuclear laboratories, documents, equipment and supplies, including heavy water and 1.5 tons of metallic uranium. Alsos teams rounded up German scientists including Kurt Diebner, Otto Hahn, Walther Gerlach, Werner Heisenberg, and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker. They were taken to England and interned at Farm Hall, where they were surreptitiously surveilled.

B-29 Straight Flush. The tail code of the 444th Bombardment Group is painted on for security reasons.|alt=A shiny metal four-engined aircraft stands on a runway. The crew pose in front of it.

The only Allied aircraft capable of carrying the long Thin Man or the wide Fat Man was the British Avro Lancaster, but using a British aircraft would have caused difficulties with maintenance. Groves hoped that the American Boeing B-29 Superfortress could be modified to carry a Thin Man by joining its two bomb bays together.

This became unnecessary after Thin Man was abandoned, as a Little Boy was short enough to fit into a B-29 bomb bay, but modifications were still required. The Army Air Forces Materiel Command at Wright Field, Ohio, began Silverplate, the codename for the modification of the B-29, in November 1943.

Test drops were carried out at Muroc Army Air Field and the Naval Ordnance Test Station in California with Thin Man and Fat Man pumpkin bombs to test their ballistic, fuzing and stability characteristics. The 509th Composite Group was activated on 17 December 1944 at Wendover Army Air Field, Utah, under the command of Colonel Paul W. Tibbets.

Its 393rd Bombardment Squadron, equipped with Silverplate B-29s, practiced long-distance flights over water and dropped pumpkin bombs. A special unit known as Project Alberta was formed at Los Alamos under Parsons's command to assist in preparing and delivering the bombs. The 509th Composite Group deployed to North Field on Tinian in July 1945.

Most of the components for the Little Boy left San Francisco on the cruiser on 16 July and arrived on Tinian on 26 July. The remaining components, which included six highly enriched uranium rings, were delivered by three Douglas C-54 Skymasters of the 509th Group's 320th Troop Carrier Squadron.

Two Fat Man assemblies traveled to Tinian in specially modified 509th Composite Group B-29s, and the first plutonium core went in a special C-54. At the end of December 1944, worried by the heavy losses occurring in the Battle of the Bulge, Roosevelt instructed Groves and Stimson that if the atomic bombs were ready before the war with Germany ended, they should be ready to drop them on Germany, but Japan was regarded as more likely.

In late April 1945, a targeting committee was established to determine which cities should be targets, and it recommended Kokura, Hiroshima, Niigata, and Kyoto. Stimson intervened, announcing that he would be making the targeting decision, and that he would not authorize the bombing of Kyoto on the grounds of its historical and religious significance. Nagasaki was substituted.

In May 1945, the Interim Committee was created to advise on wartime and postwar use of nuclear energy. The Interim Committee in turn established a scientific panel consisting of Arthur Compton, Fermi, Lawrence, and Oppenheimer that offered its opinion not just on the likely physical effects of an atomic bomb, but on its probable military and political impact.

In a meeting on 1 June, the Interim Committee resolved that "the bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible; that it be used on a war plant surrounded by workers' homes; and that it be used without prior warning". At the Potsdam Conference in Germany, President Harry S. Truman told Stalin that the US had "a new weapon of unusual destructive force", without giving any details.

As he showed "no special interest," Truman erroneously assumed that Stalin did not understand. In reality, Soviet spies had kept Stalin informed of the work and the planned test.

A strike order from General Thomas T. Handy to General Carl Spaatz was approved by Marshall and Stimson on 25 July which specified that the "first special bomb" be used "after about 3 August 1945," and that "additional bombs" would be used "as soon as made ready by the project staff". The operational plan was to drop the first bomb on 2 August, the second bomb on 10 August, and a third bomb around 24 August.

However, due to weather conditions over Japan and the desire for visual bombing, the date of the first bombing mission was pushed back to 6 August, and the second was moved forward to 9 August. , Japan, 6 August 1945 (left) and Nagasaki, Japan, 9 August 1945 (right)|alt=Two mushroom clouds rise vertically. On the morning of 9 August 1945, the Bockscar, a second B-29 piloted by the 393d Bombardment Squadron's commander, Major Charles W. Sweeney, lifted off with a Fat Man on board.

This time, Ashworth served as weaponeer and Kokura was the primary target. When they reached Kokura, they found cloud cover had obscured the city, prohibiting the visual attack required by orders. After three runs and with fuel running low, they headed for the secondary target, Nagasaki.

Ashworth decided that a radar approach would be used if the target was obscured, but a last-minute break in the clouds over Nagasaki allowed a visual approach as ordered. The Fat Man was dropped over the city's industrial valley midway between the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works in the south and the Mitsubishi-Urakami Ordnance Works in the north.

The resulting explosion had a blast yield equivalent to 21 kilotons of TNT, roughly the same as the Trinity blast, but was confined to the Urakami Valley, and a major portion of the city, including the city center, was protected by the intervening hills. About 44% of the city was destroyed, and estimates of casualties range from 40,000 to 80,000 people killed and at least 60,000 injured.

Overall, an estimated 35,000–40,000 people were killed and 60,000 injured. Groves expected to have another atomic bomb ready for use on 19 August, with three more in September and a further three in October. Two more Fat Man assemblies were readied, and scheduled to leave Kirtland Field for Tinian on 11 and 14 August.

At Los Alamos, technicians worked 24 hours straight to cast another plutonium core. Although cast, it still needed to be pressed and coated, which would take until 16 August. On 10 August, Truman was informed that another bomb was being prepared.

He ordered that no additional atomic bombs could be used without his express authority. According to Henry A. Wallace, Truman told his cabinet that "the thought of wiping out another 100,000 people was too horrible. He didn't like the idea of killing, as he said, 'all those kids.'"

Groves suspended the third core's shipment on 13 August. On 11 August, Groves phoned Warren with orders to organize a survey team to report on the damage and radioactivity at Hiroshima and Nagasaki as soon as the war ended.

A party equipped with portable Geiger counters arrived in Hiroshima on 8 September headed by Farrell and Warren, with Japanese Rear Admiral Masao Tsuzuki, who acted as a translator. They remained in Hiroshima until 14 September and then surveyed Nagasaki from 19 September to 8 October.

This and other scientific missions to Japan provided valuable data on the effects of the atomic bomb, and led to the creation of the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission. In anticipation of the bombings, Groves had commissioned physicist Henry DeWolf Smyth to prepare a sanitized technical history of the project for public consumption.

The idea of releasing such information freely was controversial; the decision to do so was made by Truman personally. The "Smyth Report" was released to the public on 12 August 1945. Japan announced its surrender on 15 August.

The necessity of the bombings became a subject of controversy among historians. Some questioned whether "atomic diplomacy" would have attained the same goals, and the relative weight that the bombs and the Soviet declaration of war had on the Japanese willingness to surrender.

The Franck Report was the most notable effort pushing for a demonstration but was turned down by the Interim Committee's scientific panel. The Szilárd petition, drafted in July 1945 and signed by dozens of scientists working on the Manhattan Project, was a late attempt at warning Truman about his responsibility in using such weapons. at Los Alamos on 16 October 1945.

Standing, left to right: J. Robert Oppenheimer, unidentified, unidentified, Kenneth Nichols, Leslie Groves, Robert Gordon Sproul, William Sterling Parsons.|alt=Men in suits and uniforms stand on a dais decorated with bunting and salute. The Manhattan Project became instantly famous after the bombing of Hiroshima and the partial lifting of its secrecy.

It was widely credited with ending the war, and Groves worked to credit its contractors, whose work had hitherto been secret. Groves and Nichols presented them with Army–Navy "E" Awards, and over 20 Presidential Medals for Merit were awarded to key contractors and scientists, including Bush and Oppenheimer. Military personnel received the Legion of Merit.

The Manhattan Project persisted until 31 December 1946, and the Manhattan District to 15 August 1947. During this time, it suffered from numerous difficulties caused by technical problems, the effects of rapid demobilization, and a lack of clarity on its long-term mission.

At Hanford, plutonium production declined as Reactors B, D and F wore out, poisoned by fission products and swelling of the graphite moderator known as the Wigner effect. The swelling damaged the charging tubes where the uranium was irradiated to produce plutonium, rendering them unusable.

Production was curtailed and the oldest unit, B pile, was closed down so at least one reactor would remain available. Research continued, with DuPont and the Metallurgical Laboratory developing a redox solvent extraction process as an alternative plutonium extraction technique to the bismuth phosphate process, which left unspent uranium in a state from which it could not easily be recovered.

Bomb engineering was carried out by the Z Division, initially located at Wendover Field but moved to Oxnard Field, New Mexico, in September 1945 to be closer to Los Alamos. This marked the beginning of the Sandia Base. Nearby Kirtland Field was used as a B-29 base for aircraft compatibility and drop tests.

As reservist officers were demobilized, they were replaced by about fifty hand-picked regular officers. Nichols recommended that S-50 and the Alpha tracks at Y-12 be closed down. This was done in September.

Although performing better than ever, the Alpha tracks could not compete with K-25 and the new K-27, which had commenced operation in January 1946. In December, the Y-12 plant was closed, cutting the Tennessee Eastman payroll from 8,600 to 1,500 and saving $2 million a month. signs the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, establishing the United States Atomic Energy Commission.|alt=A man in a suit is seated at a desk, signing a document.

Seven men in suits gather around him. Nowhere was demobilization more of a problem than at Los Alamos, where there was an exodus of talent. Much remained to be done.

The bombs used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki needed work to make them simpler, safer and more reliable. Implosion methods needed to be developed for uranium in place of the wasteful gun method, and composite uranium-plutonium cores were needed now that plutonium was in short supply. However, uncertainty about the future of the laboratory made it hard to induce people to stay.

Oppenheimer returned to his job at the University of California and Groves appointed Norris Bradbury as an interim replacement; Bradbury remained in the post for the next 25 years. Groves attempted to combat the dissatisfaction caused by the lack of amenities with a construction program that included an improved water supply, three hundred houses, and recreation facilities.

Manhattan Project personnel participated in the first postwar nuclear tests, Operation Crossroads, conducted at Bikini Atoll in July 1946. Two Fat Man-type bombs were detonated — one as an airburst, one as an underwater burst — to investigate the effect of nuclear weapons on warships. Press and international observers were allowed to attend, making the tests an international spectacle.

Following a domestic debate over the peacetime management of the nuclear program, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 created the United States Atomic Energy Commission to take over the project's functions and assets. It established civilian control over atomic development. Military aspects were taken over by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP).

After the bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a number of Manhattan Project physicists founded the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (1945) and Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists (1946), which began as an emergency action undertaken by scientists who saw urgent need for an educational program about atomic weapons. In the face of the destructiveness of the bombs and in anticipation of the nuclear arms race several project members including Bohr, Bush and Conant expressed the view that it was necessary to reach agreement on international control of nuclear research and atomic weapons.

The Baruch Plan, unveiled in a speech to the newly formed United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) in June 1946, proposed the establishment of an international atomic development authority, but was not adopted.

Technical histories

(1967 interview with Groves) (Available on Wikimedia Commons)

Participant accounts

Manhattan Project and Allied Scientists Collections at the University of Chicago Special Collections Research Center

Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1376923826 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.

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