Mfecane

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, one of the affected peoples of the Mfecane The was a historical period of heightened military conflict and migration associated with state formation and expansion in Southern Africa. It resulted from the complex interplay of pre-existing trends of political centralisation with the effects of international trade, environmental instability, and European colonisation. The exact range of dates that comprise the Mfecane varies between sources.

At its broadest, the period lasted from the late eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, but scholars often focus on an intensive period from the 1810s to the 1840s. Traditional estimates for the death toll range from 1 million to 2 million; however, these numbers are controversial, and some recent scholars revise the mortality figure significantly downwards and attribute the root causes to complex political, economic, and environmental developments.

The is significant in that it saw the formation of new states, institutions, and ethnic identities in southeastern Africa. The historiography itself is also historically significant, with different versions having been employed to serve a range of political purposes since its inception as a historical concept.…

, one of the affected peoples of the Mfecane The was a historical period of heightened military conflict and migration associated with state formation and expansion in Southern Africa. It resulted from the complex interplay of pre-existing trends of political centralisation with the effects of international trade, environmental instability, and European colonisation. The exact range of dates that comprise the Mfecane varies between sources.

At its broadest, the period lasted from the late eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, but scholars often focus on an intensive period from the 1810s to the 1840s. Traditional estimates for the death toll range from 1 million to 2 million; however, these numbers are controversial, and some recent scholars revise the mortality figure significantly downwards and attribute the root causes to complex political, economic, and environmental developments.

The is significant in that it saw the formation of new states, institutions, and ethnic identities in southeastern Africa. The historiography itself is also historically significant, with different versions having been employed to serve a range of political purposes since its inception as a historical concept.

The label first emerged in the 1830s and blamed the disruption on the actions of King Shaka, who was alleged to have waged near-genocidal wars that depopulated the land and sparked a chain reaction of violence as fleeing groups sought to conquer new lands. Since the latter half of the 20th century, this interpretation has fallen out of favour among scholars due to a lack of historical evidence.

Causes

The resulted from the complex interplay of pre-existing trends of political centralisation with the effects of international trade, environmental instability, and European colonisation. State formation and expansion had already been intensifying in Southeastern Africa as of at least the late 1700s, but these processes were greatly accelerated after the international ivory trade opened. The trade allowed leaders to amass unprecedented amounts of wealth, which they could then use to cultivate greater political power.

Wealth and power became mutually reinforcing, as wealth enabled leaders to develop state instruments of control and expropriation, which they used to extract further wealth through taxation and military action. The consequence of this cycle was an increasing political and wealth disparity within and between polities, particularly in concern to productive land and food stores.

Political centralisation became problematic in the early 19th century when deep drought (aggravated by the atmospheric effects of volcanic eruptions in 1809 and 1815) struck Southeastern Africa. Whereas previous droughts had not caused serious famine, the unequal distribution of land and food stores lessened the ability of average people to meet their needs. Though far less susceptible to famine, leaders faced threats to their power as (taxable) agricultural production dropped and ivory became scarcer due to overhunting.

Faced with the challenges of fighting famine and maintaining wealth flows, leaders were incentivised to turn to raiding and conquest. Conquest protected conquering peoples against famine by providing immediate access to the conquered peoples' livestock and grain stores and, in the long term, by securing arable land and the people (particularly women) to farm it at greater intensities than before.

Here another self-reinforcing cycle set in as famine and warfare promoted insecurity and militarism, which promoted political centralisation and more warfare as strong leaders expanded their authority by offering a desperately-needed escape from famine to loyal followers. A second stage of turmoil from the 1820s to the 1830s was driven in large part by slave and cattle raiding by Griqua, Basters, and other Khoekhoe-European groups armed and mounted by European settlers, who benefitted from trading their plunder.

The increasing economic pull of the international slave trade also incentivised greater warfare and disruption between polities close to international ports such as Delagoa Bay.

Consequences for Nguni societies

. The rise of the Zulu Empire under Shaka forced other chiefdoms and clans to flee across a wide area of southern Africa. Clans fleeing the Zulu war zone included the Soshangane, Zwangendaba, Ndebele, Hlubi, Ngwane, and the Mfengu. . Around 1821, the Zulu general Mzilikazi of the Khumalo clan defied Shaka, and set up his own kingdom. He quickly made many enemies: not only the Zulu king, but also the Boers, and the Griqua and Tswana. Defeats in several clashes convinced Mzilikazi to move north towards Swaziland.

Going north and then inland westward along the watershed between the Vaal and the Limpopo rivers, Mzilikazi and his followers, the AmaNdebele, (called Matebele in English) established a Ndebele state northwest of the city of Pretoria. During this period, the Matebele left a trail of destruction in their wake. From 1837 to 1838, the arrival of Boer settlers and the subsequent battles of Vegtkop and Mosega, drove the Matebele north of the Limpopo. They settled in the area now known as Matabeleland, in present-day southern Zimbabwe.

Mzilikazi set up his new capital in Bulawayo. The AmaNdebele drove the MaShona of the region northward and forced them to pay tribute. This caused resentment that has continued to the current day in modern Zimbabwe. At the Battle of Mhlatuze River in 1818, the Ndwandwe were defeated by a Zulu force under the direct command of Shaka. Soshangane, one of Zwide's generals, fled to Mozambique with the remainder of the Ndwandwe. There, they established the Gaza kingdom.

They oppressed the Tsonga people living there, some of whom fled over the Lebombo Mountains into the Northern Transvaal. In 1833, Soshangane invaded various Portuguese settlements, and was initially successful. But a combination of internal disputes and war against the Swazi caused the downfall of the Gaza kingdom. The Ngwane people lived in present-day Eswatini (Swaziland), where they had settled in the southwest. They warred periodically with the Ndwandwe and the Tembe.

Zwangendaba, a commander of the Ndwandwe army, fled north with Soshangane after his defeat in 1819. Zwangendaba's followers were henceforth called Ngoni. Continuing north of the Zambezi River, they formed a state in the region between lakes Malawi and Tanganyika. Maseko, who led another part of the Ngoni people, founded another state to the east of Zwangendaba's kingdom. To the east, refugee clans and tribes from the fled to the lands of the Xhosa people. Some of them such as the amaNgwane were driven back by force and defeated.

Those who were accepted were obliged to be tributary to the Xhosas and lived under their protection. They were assimilated into the Xhosa cultural way of life, becoming part of the Xhosa people. After years of oppression by the Xhosas, they later formed an alliance with the Cape Colony.

Consequences for the Sotho-Tswana peoples

Southern Tswana populations had experienced an increase in conflict as early as the 1780s. There was significant population growth in the region which lead to more competition for resources. There was an increasing amount of trade with the Cape colony and the Portuguese; this had the consequence of separate chiefdoms becoming more eager to conquer land for themselves in order to control trade routes.

Dutch settlers from the Cape Colony encroaching upon the Khoikhoi and San into regions where Tswana people live resulted in the formation of the Korana who started to launch raids on other communities by the 1780s. The fact that many of them had access to firearms and horses likely exacerbated the devastation caused by their raiders. Xhosa who were escaping the already violent region of the Eastern Cape often launched their own raids as well. All of these events led to making the region progressively more unstable.

Missionary interference, internal politics, and raids by Dutch settlers also impacted the region. By the start of the 19th century, the most powerful Tswana chiefdom, the Bahurutse, were increasingly being challenged by the Bangwaketse. Moshoeshoe I gathered the mountain clans together in an alliance against the Zulus. Fortifying the easily defended hills and expanding his reach with cavalry raids, he fought against his enemies with some success, despite not adopting the Zulu tactics, as many clans had done.

The territory of Moshoeshoe I became the kingdom of Lesotho. The Tswana were pillaged by two large invading forces set on the move by the . Sebetwane gathered the Bafokeng of Patsa, who are part of the Basotho and were later to be called Kololo ethnic groups near modern Lesotho and wandered north across what is now Botswana, plundering and killing many of the Tswana people in the way. They also took large numbers of captives north with them, finally settling north of the Zambezi River in Barotseland, where they conquered the Lozi people.

The next force was the Mzilikazi and the Matebele who moved across Tswana territory in 1837. Both of these invading forces continued to travel north across Tswana territory without establishing any sort of state. In addition to these major kingdoms, a number of smaller groups also moved north into Tswana territory, where they met with defeat and ultimately vanished from history. Among those involved in these invasions were European adventurers such as Nathaniel Isaacs (who was later accused of slave trading).

Controversy

In 1988, Rhodes University professor Julian Cobbing advanced a different hypothesis on the rise of the Zulu state; he contended the accounts of the Mfecane were a self-serving, constructed product of apartheid-era politicians and historians. According to Cobbing, apartheid-era historians had mischaracterised the as a period of internally induced Black-on-Black destruction.

Instead, Cobbing argued that the roots of the conflicts lay in the labour needs of Portuguese slave traders operating out of Delagoa Bay, Mozambique and European settlers in the Cape Colony. The resulting pressures led to forced displacement, famine, and war in the interior, allowing waves of Afrikaner settlers to colonise large swaths of the region. Cobbing's views were echoed by historian Dan Wylie, who argued that colonial-era white writers such as Isaacs had exaggerated the brutality of the to justify European colonialism.

Cobbing's hypothesis generated an immense volume of polemics among historians; the discussions were termed the "Cobbing Controversy". While historians had already embarked upon new approaches to the study of the in the 1970s and 1980s, Cobbing's paper was the first major source that overtly defied the hegemonic "Zulu-centric" explanation at the time. This was followed by fierce discourse in the early 1990s prompted by Cobbing's hypothesis.

Many agree that Cobbing's analysis offered several key breakthroughs and insights into the nature of early Zulu society. The historian Elizabeth Eldredge challenged Cobbing's thesis on the grounds that there is scant evidence of the resumption of the Portuguese slave trade out of Delagoa Bay before 1823, a finding that undermines Cobbing's thesis that Shaka's early military activities were a response to slave raids.

Moreover, Eldredge argues that the Griqua and other groups (rather than European missionaries as asserted by Cobbing) were primarily responsible for the slave raids coming from the Cape. Eldredge also asserts that Cobbing downplays the importance of the ivory trade in Delagoa Bay, and the extent to which African groups and leaders sought to establish more centralised and complex state formations to control ivory routes and the wealth associated with the trade.

She suggests these pressures created internal movements, as well as reactions against European activity, that drove the state formations and concomitant violence and displacement. She still agreed with Cobbing's overall sentiment in that the Zulu-centric explanation for the is not reliable. By the early 2000s, a new historical consensus had emerged, recognising the to be not simply a series of events resulting from the founding of the Zulu Kingdom but rather a multitude of factors caused before and after Shaka Zulu came into power.

The debate and controversy within Southern African historiography over the has been compared to similar debates about the Beaver Wars of the seventeenth century in northeastern North America, due to the alleged similarity of the narratives of indigenous "self-vanishing" that were propagated by apologists for European colonialism about the and the Beaver Wars.

References

Sources

Further resources

J. D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Bantu Africa, Longmans, 1978: Norman Etherington, The Great Treks: The Transformation of Southern Africa, 1815–1854, Longman, 2001: Carolyn Hamilton, The Mfecane Aftermath: Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History, Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1995:

Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1368366613 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.

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