Multiple realizability
In the philosophy of mind, multiple realizability is the thesis that the same mental property, state, or event can be implemented by different physical properties, states, or events.
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In the philosophy of mind, multiple realizability is the thesis that the same mental property, state, or event can be implemented by different physical properties, states, or events. Philosophers of mind have used multiple realizability to argue that mental states are not the same as—and cannot be reduced to—physical states. They have also used it to defend or criticize many versions of functionalism, especially machine-state functionalism.
Arguments against
Some philosophers accept the thesis that mental states are multiply realizable but deny that multiple realizability gives rise to functionalism or other forms of non-reductive physicalism.
See also
Supervenience
References
Putnam, Hilary. Representation and Reality. 1988.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Fodor, Jerry. The Language of Thought.
1975. New York. Thomas Cromwell.
External links
PhilPapers bibliography on multiple realizability
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