Nagarjuna
1961 film by Yaragudipati Varada Rao
≈ 12 min read
Names in other languages
- EnglishNagarjuna
- knನಾಗಾರ್ಜುನ
Article bodies are English and are not machine-translated. A name in another language is not a translation of the article.
Nāgārjuna (Sanskrit, from Nāga + Arjuna; Chn. Lóngshù 龍樹; Tib. Klu sgrub; ) was an Indian scholar-monk, philosopher, and teacher (acharya) of Mahayana Buddhism from south India.
He is considered the founder of the Madhyamaka (Centrism, Middle Way) school. Nāgārjuna is widely considered to be the most important Buddhist philosopher after the Buddha himself. Indeed, in Tibetan Buddhism, he is even called the "second Buddha".
He was a well known defender of the Mahāyāna movement and his treatises (śāstras) are the foundational texts of a school of Buddhist philosophy known as the view of emptiness (Śūnyatāvāda) or Madhyamaka. Nāgārjuna remains a key figure in all contemporary traditions of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and his philosophical writings on the doctrine of “emptiness” (śūnyatā) influenced Indian philosophy for a millennium, as well as being an indispensable doctrinal source for Mahāyāna doctrine in East Asian Buddhism and Indo-Tibetan Buddhism.
Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Root Verses on Madhyamaka, MMK) is the most important text on the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness. The MMK inspired a large number of commentaries in Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan, Korean and Japanese and continues to be studied today.
Works
There exist a number of influential texts attributed to Nāgārjuna; however, as there are many pseudepigrapha attributed to him, lively controversy exists over which are his authentic works. The Chinese Canon includes over 22 texts attributed to Nāgārjuna, while the Tibetan Tanjur contains over 140 works attributed to Nāgārjuna.
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK, Root Verses on the Middle Way) is Nāgārjuna's best-known work. It is a rich philosophical text made up of concise aphoristic Sanskrit kārikā verses which explains the theory of emptiness through numerous topics and arguments. The bulk of the verses focus on defeating and deconstructing arguments for substance theories.
The work also relies on earlier sources like the Kātyāyana Sutra and the Perfection of Wisdom sutras to expound on the theory of dependent arising and the universal emptiness of all things. The earliest translation of and commentary on the MMK is found in the Chinese translation of Kumārajīva, called the Madhyamakaśāstra (Zhong lun 中論; T. 1564), which merges the root text with a commentary attributed to a certain Qingmu (青目, *Piṅgala).
Major attributed works
, Telangana. According to David Seyfort Ruegg, the Madhyamakasastrastuti attributed to Candrakirti ( c. 600 – c. 650) refers to eight texts by Nagarjuna: the (Madhyamaka)karikas, the Yuktisastika, the Sunyatasaptati, the Vigrahavyavartani, the Vidala (i.e. Vaidalyasutra/Vaidalyaprakarana), the Ratnavali, the Sutrasamuccaya, and Samstutis (Hymns).
This list covers not only much less than the grand total of works ascribed to Nagarjuna in the Chinese and Tibetan collections, but it does not even include all such works that Candrakirti has himself cited in his writings. According to one view, that of Christian Lindtner, the works definitely written by Nāgārjuna are: Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā (Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way, MMK), available in three Sanskrit manuscripts and numerous translations. Śūnyatāsaptati (Seventy Verses on Emptiness), accompanied by a prose commentary ascribed to Nagarjuna himself.
Vigrahavyāvartanī (The End of Disputes). (Pulverizing the Categories), a prose work critiquing the categories used by Indian Nyaya philosophy. Vyavahārasiddhi (Proof of Convention).
(Sixty Verses on Reasoning). (Four Hymns): Lokātīta-stava (Hymn to transcendence), Niraupamya-stava (to the Peerless), Acintya-stava (to the Inconceivable), and Paramārtha-stava (to Ultimate Truth). Ratnāvalī (Precious Garland), subtitled (rajaparikatha), a discourse addressed to an Indian king (possibly a Satavahana monarch).
(Verses on the heart of Dependent Arising), along with a short commentary (Vyākhyāna). Sūtrasamuccaya, an anthology of various sutra passages. (Exposition of the awakening mind).
(Letter to a Good Friend). (Requisites of awakening), a work the path of the Bodhisattva and paramitas, it is quoted by Candrakirti in his commentary on Aryadeva's four hundred. Now only extant in Chinese translation (Taisho 1660).
Other scholars have challenged and argued against some of the above works being Nagarjuna's. David F. Burton notes that Christian Lindtner is "rather liberal" with his list of works and that other scholars have called some of these into question. He notes how Paul Williams argued convincingly that the must be a later text.
In his study, Burton relies on the texts that he considers "least controversial": Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā, Vigrahavyāvartanī, Śūnyatāsaptati, , , and Ratnāvalī. Similarly, Jan Westerhoff notes how there is uncertainty about the attribution of Nagarjuna's works (and about his life in general).
He relies on six works: MMK, Vigrahavyāvartanī, Śūnyatāsaptati, , and Ratnāvalī, all of which "expound a single, coherent philosophical system", and are attributed to Nagarjuna by a variety of Indian and Tibetan sources. The Tibetan historian Buston considers the first six to be the main treatises of Nāgārjuna (this is called the "yukti corpus", rigs chogs), while according to Tāranātha only the first five are the works of Nāgārjuna.
TRV Murti considers Ratnāvalī, Pratītyasamutpādahṝdaya and Sūtrasamuccaya to be works of Nāgārjuna as the first two are quoted profusely by Chandrakirti and the third by Shantideva.
Teaching and philosophy
temple in Elista, Kalmykia, Russia Nāgārjuna's teachings bring together key Buddhist doctrines, particularly emptiness, not-self and pratītyasamutpāda ("dependent origination"), to refute the metaphysics of some of his contemporaries and present a coherent Mahayana Buddhist worldview. The core of his thought is based on refuting all metaphysical theories of svabhāva (substances), which leads to the middle way (madhyamā pratipad), which avoids metaphysically extreme views of existence (astitva/bhāva) and views of nonexistence (nāstitva/abhāva), also known as the views of eternalism (śāśvata) and annihilationism (uccheda).
Because of this, Nāgārjuna's philosophical teaching is called the "middling" or "centrist" view (Madhyamaka), though this term was first introduced by Bhavaviveka in the sixth century. Apart from the more famous rational works which focus on emptiness (called the "yukti" corpus), Nāgārjuna also wrote various texts which discuss other aspects of the Buddhist religion, including texts that discuss the bodhisattva path such as the Ratnāvalī (Precious Garland), Suhṛllekha (Letter to a Good Friend), and the Bodhisaṃbhāraśāstra (Requisites of Awakening).
These sources contain most of his discussions on ethics and religious practice and are forerunners to later Mahayana treatises on the bodhisattva path. Furthermore, there is a set of four religious hymns (the Catuḥstava) widely attributed to Nāgārjuna. These describe the ultimate truth in more poetic and positive ways than the rationalistic writings.
Some scholars such as Fyodor Shcherbatskoy and T.R.V. Murti held that Nāgārjuna was the inventor of the emptiness doctrine; however, more recent work by scholars such as Choong Mun-keat, Yin Shun and Dhammajothi Thero argue that Nāgārjuna was the main defender of a doctrine already found in earlier sources, including early Buddhist works as well as Mahayana sutras.
Emptiness
Sutras, relief at Buddhavanam Stupa, Telangana. The Prajñaparamita texts are a major source for the Mahayana doctrine of emptiness.
A central theme of Nāgārjuna's writings, especially his philosophical texts, is the key Mahayana concept of śūnyatā (Sanskrit, translated into English as "emptiness"), which for Nāgārjuna means that all things are empty of svabhāva (inherent existence, intrinsic nature). Jan Westerhoff notes that the meaning of svabhāva has metaphysical and cognitive dimensions.
Metaphysically it is a kind of unchanging substance, a primary existent (dravyasat), an "objective and irreducible constituent of the world" which exists independently and by itself, without depending on anything else. This concept, which was defended in some way or another by Buddhist schools like Vaibhāṣika and by non-buddhist schools like Vaiśeṣika, is the main target of Nāgārjuna's arguments.
Regarding the cognitive aspect, this relates to how sentient beings reify objects by mentally superimposing svabhāva, contributing to craving and suffering. It is only by deconstructing and letting go of our cognitive faults that we can attain liberation from suffering. Thus, Nāgārjuna's philosophy of emptiness is always done with this soteriological goal in mind.
For Nāgārjuna, it is not merely sentient beings that are without an unchanging self (ātman); all phenomena (dharmas) are without any svabhāva and thus without any underlying unchanging essence or substance. This is so because all things always arise dependent on other causes and conditions: not by their own power.
Indeed, for Nāgārjuna, emptiness is just another way of speaking about the Buddhist doctrine of dependent arising (Sanskrit: pratītyasamutpāda). All phenomena are thus empty of being independently existent or having any independent being or nature.
Nāgārjuna's "argumentative" or "reasoning" works (Sanskrit: yukti) focus on defending the doctrine of emptiness and refuting any substantialist or foundationalist theories of svabhāva, which include any nature that is not produced by causes (akrtaka), and which is not dependent on anything else. To say that all things are 'empty' is to deny any kind of ontological foundation; therefore Nāgārjuna's view is often seen as a kind of ontological anti-foundationalism or a metaphysical anti-realism by modern philosophers.
Two truths
Nāgārjuna was also instrumental in the development of the two truths doctrine, which claims that there are two levels of truth in Buddhist teaching, the ultimate truth (paramārtha satya) and the conventional or superficial truth (saṃvṛtisatya). As Nāgārjuna writes in the twenty fourth chapter of the MMK: 8.
The Dharma teaching of the Buddha rests on two truths: conventional truth and ultimate truth. 9. Who do not know the distinction between the two truths, they do not understand reality in accordance with the profound teachings of the Buddha.
10. The ultimate truth is not taught independently of customary ways of talking and thinking. Not having acquired the ultimate truth, nirvana is not attained.
For Nāgārjuna, the ultimate truth is the fact that that everything is empty, and this includes emptiness itself ("the emptiness of emptiness"). While some (Murti, 1955) have interpreted this by positing Nāgārjuna as a neo-Kantian and thus making ultimate truth a metaphysical noumenon or an "ineffable ultimate that transcends the capacities of discursive reason", the more traditional and standard interpretation, defended by modern scholars like Westerhoff, Mark Siderits and Jay L. Garfield holds that Nāgārjuna's view is that "the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth" (Siderits) and that Nāgārjuna is a "semantic anti-dualist" who posits that there are only conventional truths.
Hence as Garfield explains: Suppose that we take a conventional entity, such as a table. We analyze it to demonstrate its emptiness, finding that there is no table apart from its parts [...]. So we conclude that it is empty.
But now let us analyze that emptiness [...]. What do we find? Nothing at all but the table's lack of inherent existence.
[...]. To see the table as empty [...] is to see the table as conventional, as dependent. Thus, when we understand the ultimate truth, "all one is left with is conventional truth" (Westerhoff), which is based on commonly accepted practices, conventions, language and concepts.
While these inevitably distort and veil reality itself, there is no other way of perceiving and investigating the world but through these conventions, since it is these very conventional processes which generate the very idea of a world in the first place. This does not mean that one cannot pragmatically treat such conventions as being related to the world in some way and that one could not seek to further improve our understandings of the world.
But ultimately these are still just convenient and useful fictions to the Madhyamaka anti-realist, since they would never accept that such conventional truths are grounded in a world that is independent of our concepts, cognition and interests. Where does this leave emptiness? Is it not the ultimate truth that explains how things really always are?
For Nāgārjuna, emptiness should never be seen as a ground, foundation or even an ultimate account of things that is independent of human concepts and conventions. Its real purpose is to dissolve our conceptual impositions of svabhāva on all phenomena.
This absence of svabhāva has no existence of its own, apart from all empty things or sentient minds, nor is it a quality inherent in things. Thus, it is merely a corrective to wrong views, and, once it has dissolved all such wrong views, it then dissolves itself.
Nāgārjuna thus states that holding a false view of emptiness by seeing it as an ultimate metaphysical reality is dangerous, "like a serpent wrongly held or a spell wrongly executed," it destroys the dull witted. In articulating this view of the two truths doctrine in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Nāgārjuna draws on and quotes an early Buddhist source (Kātyāyanagotrasūtra), which distinguishes definitive meaning (nītārtha) from interpretable meaning (neyārtha) and discusses a "teaching via the middle" between the extremes of existence and non-existence.
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1377704528 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.