Newcomb's problem

Uses your system voice; voice and rate in settings.

Snapshot

≈ 7 min read

Names in other languages

No names in other languages are held for this entry yet.

Article bodies are English and are not machine-translated. A name in another language is not a translation of the article.

In philosophy and mathematics, Newcomb's problem, also known as Newcomb's paradox, is a thought experiment posing a decision problem in which a player must decide whether to choose one of two or both boxes under conditions in which a being, often called the "predictor", decides in advance what they contain, and is able to predict the player's choices with near-certainty. Newcomb's paradox was created by William Newcomb of the University of California's Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. It was first analyzed in a philosophy paper by Robert Nozick in 1969 and appeared in the March 1974 issue of Scientific American, in Martin Gardner's "Mathematical Games". Today it is a much debated problem in the philosophical branch of decision theory.

In philosophy and mathematics, Newcomb's problem, also known as Newcomb's paradox, is a thought experiment posing a decision problem in which a player must decide whether to choose one of two or both boxes under conditions in which a being, often called the "predictor", decides in advance what they contain, and is able to predict the player's choices with near-certainty. Newcomb's paradox was created by William Newcomb of the University of California's Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. It was first analyzed in a philosophy paper by Robert Nozick in 1969 and appeared in the March 1974 issue of Scientific American, in Martin Gardner's "Mathematical Games". Today it is a much debated problem in the philosophical branch of decision theory.

Definition

In the standard version of Newcomb's problem, two boxes are designated A and B. The player is given a choice between taking only box B or taking both boxes A and B. The player knows the following: Box A is transparent, or open, and always contains a visible $1,000. Box B is opaque, or closed, and its content has already been set by the predictor: If the predictor has predicted that the player will take both boxes A and B, then box B contains nothing. If the predictor has predicted that the player will take only box B, then box B contains $1,000,000. The player does not know what the predictor predicted or what box B contains while making the choice.

Strategies

In his 1969 article, Nozick noted that "To almost everyone, it is perfectly clear and obvious what should be done. The difficulty is that these people seem to divide almost evenly on the problem, with large numbers thinking that the opposing half is just being silly." The problem continues to divide philosophers today. In a 2020 survey, a modest plurality of professional philosophers chose to take both boxes (39.0% versus 31.2%). Decision theory offers two strategies for this game that rely on different principles: the expected utility principle and the strategic dominance principle. The problem is sometimes considered a paradox (although this classification is disputed) because two seemingly logical analyses yield conflicting answers regarding which choice maximizes the player's payout. Expected utility: Due to the high accuracy of the predictor, it can seem that it is not realistically open to the player (or in the limit case, open at all to the player) to make a choice that the predictor did not predict. Considering the expected utility in such conditions, the player should choose to take only box B. This choice, called one-boxing, statistically maximizes the player's winnings, resulting in approximately $1,000,000 per game. (This argument from expected utility was given by Nozick and echoed by other one-boxers such as Horgan, but Huemer believes that a correct interpretation of expected-utility maximization would support two-boxing.) Strategic dominance: Since the predictor has already made its prediction, it can seem that choosing both boxes A and B will always yield $1,000 more than only choosing B, and that if this turns out to equal exactly $1,000, then the option of getting a million from box B was simply not open to the player. Under the strategic dominance principle, the player should then choose the strategy that is always better, and take both boxes (two-boxing). David Wolpert and Gregory Benford point out that paradoxes arise when not all relevant details of a problem are specified, and there is more than one "intuitively obvious" way to fill in those missing details. They suggest that, in Newcomb's paradox, the debate over which strategy is "obviously correct" stems from the fact that interpreting the problem details differently can lead to two distinct noncooperative games. Each strategy is optimal for one interpretation of the game but not the other. They then derive the optimal strategies for both of the games, which turn out to be independent of the predictor's infallibility, questions of causality, determinism, and free will. A similar analysis of different interpretations of the problem is given in below. Newcomb's problem has been used as an argument against causal decision theory, on the premise that causal decision theory supports taking both boxes in Newcomb's problem, but taking only one box is the superior choice (on expected-utility grounds). Caspar Oesterheld and Vincent Conitzer, for instance, have argued against the use of causal decision theory when applied to Newcomb's paradox. They argue that there exist multiple scenarios where the use of causal decision theory causes the agent to voluntarily lose money, and that causal decision theorists are subject to diachronic Dutch books.

Interpretations

Different interpretations as to why the predictor is so accurate yield different rational solutions to the problem. Some such interpretations are illustrated in this section with diagrams in a convention similar to Mackie's 1977 paper "Newcomb's Paradox and the Direction of Causation", using white squares for events whose outcome is "open" to the player's rational deliberation, black squares for events whose outcome is not open to deliberation, and arrows for causal connections. In the diagrams, references to a choice being "free" refer to the choice being open to influence by decision-theoretical reasoning about the rational choice in the decision problem, not necessarily in some broader "free will" sense, although some cited authors have discussed such broader conceptions.

See also

Causal decision theory Evidential decision theory Focal point (game theory) Unexpected hanging paradox Shita-kiri Suzume

Notes

References

Campbell, Richmond and Sowden, Lanning, ed. (1985), Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoners' Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. (an anthology discussing Newcomb's Problem, with an extensive bibliography). Collins, John. "Newcomb's Problem", International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Neil Smelser and Paul Baltes (eds.), Elsevier Science (2001). (An article discussing the popularity of Newcomb's problem.)

Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1362260221 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.

Sources cited in this revision

18 named source(s) extracted from the cited revision. A source with no author is shown by its publication; nothing is invented.