Noise Protocol Framework

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The Noise Protocol Framework, sometimes referred to as "Noise" or "Noise Framework", is a public domain cryptographic framework for creating secure communication protocols based on Diffie–Hellman key exchange. Developed by Trevor Perrin, the framework defines a series of handshake patterns—predefined sequences of message exchanges—that outline how parties initiate communication, exchange keys, and establish shared secrets. These patterns can be combined and customized to meet specific security requirements such as mutual authentication, forward secrecy, and identity protection. Several popular software applications and protocols, including the messaging platforms WhatsApp and Slack and the VPN protocol WireGuard, have used implementations of the Noise Framework to ensure end-to-end encryption for user communications. The framework remains a topic of development, including post-quantum adaptations. The framework is currently at revision 34, published in July 20181.

The Noise Protocol Framework, sometimes referred to as "Noise" or "Noise Framework", is a public domain cryptographic framework for creating secure communication protocols based on Diffie–Hellman key exchange. Developed by Trevor Perrin, the framework defines a series of handshake patterns—predefined sequences of message exchanges—that outline how parties initiate communication, exchange keys, and establish shared secrets. These patterns can be combined and customized to meet specific security requirements such as mutual authentication, forward secrecy, and identity protection. Several popular software applications and protocols, including the messaging platforms WhatsApp and Slack and the VPN protocol WireGuard, have used implementations of the Noise Framework to ensure end-to-end encryption for user communications. The framework remains a topic of development, including post-quantum adaptations. The framework is currently at revision 34, published in July 2018.  Example handshake pattern having 3 messages:   IK         ← s         ...         → e , es , s , ss         ← e , ee , se  Handshake names are formulaic: I = Static key for initiator Immediately transmitted to responder, despite reduced or absent identity hiding K = Static key for initiator Known to responder  The line(s) before ... represent a message prior to DH AKE such as an out-of-band transfer of a public key. The specification lists three one-way handshake patterns, and 12 fundamental interactive handshake patterns. There are variations of some of these: deferred patterns, where the authentication DHs are deferred to the next message. A numeral 1 is used after the first and/or second character, e.g. NK1 or X1X1 a pre-shared symmetric key to support protocols where both parties have a 32-byte shared secret key, e.g. Npsk0 or Xpsk1 compound protocols in which the roles of initiator and responder get reversed as a negotiation mechanism via the fallback modifier. A Noise Pipe is an example found in §10.4 A real-world example comes from WireGuard whose Construction on page 10 of the Whitepaper is Noise_IKpsk2_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s . Each handshake pattern can be combined with one of the 16 combinations of the 8 cryptographic algorithms listed in the Specification. As those algorithms are of comparable quality and do not enlarge the design space. The Specification outlines an API in §5 using the following objects each having a small set of methods : A CipherState object contains k and n variables, which it uses to encrypt and decrypt ciphertexts. During the handshake phase, each party has a single CipherState , but during the transport phase, each party has two CipherState objects: one for sending, and one for receiving. A SymmetricState object contains a CipherState plus ck and h variables. It is so-named because it encapsulates all the "symmetric crypto" used by Noise. During the handshake phase, each party has a single SymmetricState , which can be deleted once the handshake is finished. A HandshakeState object contains a SymmetricState plus DH variables ( s , e , rs , re ) and a variable representing the handshake pattern. During the handshake phase, each party has a single HandshakeState , which can be deleted once the handshake is finished. The implementation of a concrete protocol involves the design of message representation, as well as aspects outside the Noise Framework. An example of the latter happens with protocols using UDP transports, such as WireGuard, which uses a sliding window to handle out-of-order arrival. Security properties of several handshake patterns are described in the Specification and can support mutual authentication, forward secrecy, zero round-trip encryption, identity hiding, and other advanced features. Formal cryptographic analyses of common handshake patterns have appeared in the academic literature. The second effort has resulted in the online tool Noise Explorer. Much of the following consists of excerpts from the Specification with formatting: IK for protocol names consisting of handshake patterns, cryptography, and modifiers ck for variables in the handshake state machine e for tokens in a message pattern § prefixes references to sections in the Specification with the focus on: handshake patterns security properties and tradeoffs application responsibilities and security considerations

Handshake pattern name section §8.1

A handshake pattern name section contains a handshake pattern name plus a sequence of zero or more pattern modifiers. The handshake pattern name must be an uppercase ASCII string containing only alphabetic characters or numerals (e.g. XX1 or IK ). Pattern modifiers specify arbitrary extensions or modifications to the behavior specified by the handshake pattern. For example, a modifier could be applied to a handshake pattern, which transforms it into a different pattern according to some rule. The psk0 and fallback modifiers are examples of this and will be defined later in this document. A pattern modifier is named with a lowercase alphanumeric ASCII string that must begin with an alphabetic character (not a numeral). The pattern modifier is appended to the base pattern as described below: The first modifier added onto a base pattern is simply appended. Thus, the fallback modifier, when added to the XX pattern, produces XXfallback . Additional modifiers are separated with a plus sign. Thus, adding the psk0 modifier would result in the name section XXfallback+psk0 , or a full protocol name such as Noise_XXfallback+psk0_25519_AESGCM_SHA256 . In some cases, the sequential ordering of modifiers will specify different protocols. However, if the order of some modifiers does not matter, then they are required to be sorted alphabetically (this is an arbitrary convention to ensure interoperability). N = No static key for sender K = Static key for initiator Known to responder X = Static key for sender Xmitted ("transmitted") to recipient N : s ... -> e , es K : -> s s ... -> e , es , ss X : s ... -> e , es , s , ss N is a conventional DH-based public-key encryption. The other patterns add sender authentication, where the sender's public key is either known to the recipient beforehand ( K ) or transmitted under encryption ( X ). N = N o static key for initiator K = Static key for initiator K nown to responder X = Static key for initiator X mitted ("transmitted") to responder I = Static key for initiator I mmediately transmitted to responder, despite reduced or absent identity hiding The second character refers to the responder's static key: N = N o static key for responder K = Static key for responder K nown to initiator X = Static key for responder X mitted ("transmitted") to initiator NN 0 0 #1         -> e 0 1 #2         e , ee 0 1 #3         -> NK #1         s            ... 0 2 #2         -> e , es 2 1 #3         e , ee 0 5 #4         -> NX 0 0 #1         -> e 2 1 #2         e , ee , s , es 0 5 #3         -> XN 0 0 #1         -> e 0 1 #2         e , ee 2 1 #3         -> s , se 0 5 #4         XK #1         s            ... 0 2 #2         -> e , es 2 1 #3         e , ee 2 5 #4         -> s , se 2 5 #5         XX 0 0 #1         -> e 2 1 #2         e , ee , s , es 2 5 #3         -> s , se 2 5 #4         KN #1         -> s            ... 0 0 #2         -> e 0 3 #3         e , ee , se 2 1 #4         -> 0 5 #5         KK #1         -> s #2         s            ... 1 2 #3         -> e , es , ss 2 4 #4         e , ee , se 2 5 #5         -> 2 5 #6         KX #1         -> s            ... 0 0 #2         -> e 2 3 #3         e , ee , se , s , es 2 5 #4         -> 2 5 #5         IN 0 0 #1         -> e , s 0 3 #2         e , ee , se 2 1 #3         -> 0 5 #4         IK #1         s            ... 1 2 #2         -> e , es , s , ss 2 4 #3         e , ee , se 2 5 #4         -> 2 5 #5         IX 0 0 #1         -> e , s 2 3 #2         e , ee , se , s , es 2 5 #3         -> 2 5 #4         The first two columns in the table above, prior to each message pattern, lists the security properties for Noise handshake and transport payloads for all the one-way patterns in §7.4 and the fundamental patterns in §7.5. Each payload is assigned a "source" property regarding the degree of authentication of the sender provided to the recipient, and a "destination" property regarding the degree of confidentiality provided to the sender. For the sender: 0. No authentication. This payload may have been sent by any party, including an active attacker. Used by: IN #1, IN #2, IN #4, IX #1, KN #2, KN #3, KN #5, KX #2, NK #2, NK #4, NN #1, NN #2, NN #3, NX #1, NX #3, XK #2, XN #1, XN #2, XN #4, XX #1 1. Sender authentication vulnerable to key-compromise impersonation (KCI). The sender authentication is based on a static-static DH ( ss ) involving both parties' static key pairs. If the recipient's long-term private key has been compromised, this authentication can be forged. Note that a future version of Noise might include signatures, which could improve this security property, but brings other trade-offs. Used by: IK #2, IN #3, KK #3, KN #4, NK #3, NN #2, NN #3, NX #2, XK #3, XN #2, XN #3, XX #2 2. Sender authentication resistant to key-compromise impersonation (KCI). The sender authentication is based on an ephemeral-static DH ( es or se ) between the sender's static key pair and the recipient's ephemeral key pair. Assuming the corresponding private keys are secure, this authentication cannot be forged. Used by: IK #2, IK #3, IK #4, IK #5, IN #3, IX #2, IX #3, IX #4, KK #3, KK #4, KK #5, KK #6, KN #4, KX #3, KX #4, KX #5, NK #2, NK #3, NX #2, XK #2, XK #3, XK #4, XK #5, XN #3, XX #2, XX #3, XX #4 For the recipient: 0. No confidentiality. This payload is sent in cleartext. Used by: IN #1, IN #2, IN #4, IX #1, KN #2, KN #3, KN #5, KX #2, NK #2, NK #4, NN #1, NN #2, NN #3, NX #1, NX #3, XK #2, XN #1, XN #2, XN #4, XX #1 1. Encryption to an ephemeral recipient. This payload has forward secrecy, since encryption involves an ephemeral-ephemeral DH ( ee ). However, the sender has not authenticated the recipient, so this payload might be sent to any party, including an active attacker. Used by: IK #2, IN #3, KK #3, KN #4, NK #3, NN #2, NN #3, NX #2, XK #3, XN #2, XN #3, XX #2 2. Encryption to a known recipient, forward secrecy for sender compromise only, vulnerable to replay. This payload is encrypted based only on DHs involving the recipient's static key pair. If the recipient's static private key is compromised, even at a later date, this payload can be decrypted. This message can also be replayed, since there's no ephemeral contribution from the recipient. Used by: IK #2, IK #3, IK #4, IK #5, IN #3, IX #2, IX #3, IX #4, KK #3, KK #4, KK #5, KK #6, KN #4, KX #3, KX #4, KX #5, NK #2, NK #3, NX #2, XK #2, XK #3, XK #4, XK #5, XN #3, XX #2, XX #3, XX #4 3. Encryption to a known recipient, weak forward secrecy. This payload is encrypted based on an ephemeral-ephemeral DH and also an ephemeral-static DH involving the recipient's static key pair. However, the binding between the recipient's alleged ephemeral public key and the recipient's static public key hasn't been verified by the sender, so the recipient's alleged ephemeral public key may have been forged by an active attacker. In this case, the attacker could later compromise the recipient's static private key to decrypt the payload. Note that a future version of Noise might include signatures, which could improve this security property, but brings other trade-offs. Used by: IN #2, IX #2, KN #3, KX #3 4. Encryption to a known recipient, weak forward secrecy if the sender's private key has been compromised. This payload is encrypted based on an ephemeral-ephemeral DH, and also based on an ephemeral-static DH involving the recipient's static key pair. However, the binding between the recipient's alleged ephemeral public and the recipient's static public key has only been verified based on DHs involving both those public keys and the sender's static private key. Thus, if the sender's static private key was previously compromised, the recipient's alleged ephemeral public key may have been forged by an active attacker. In this case, the attacker could later compromise the intended recipient's static private key to decrypt the payload (this is a variant of a "KCI" attack enabling a "weak forward secrecy" attack). Note that a future version of Noise might include signatures, which could improve this security property, but brings other trade-offs. Used by: IK #3, KK #4 5. Encryption to a known recipient, strong forward secrecy. This payload is encrypted based on an ephemeral-ephemeral DH as well as an ephemeral-static DH with the recipient's static key pair. Assuming the ephemeral private keys are secure, and the recipient is not being actively impersonated by an attacker that has stolen its static private key, this payload cannot be decrypted. Used by: IK #4, IK #5, IN #4, IX #3, IX #4, KK #5, KK #6, KN #5, KX #4, KX #5, NK #4, NX #3, XK #4, XK #5, XN #4, XX #3, XX #4 NK NK1     <- s     <- s     ...     ...     -> e , es     -> e     -> e , ee    -> e , ee , es XX X1X     -> e      -> e     <- e , ee , s , es      <- e , ee , s , es     -> s , se      -> s           <- se XX1           -> e           <- e , ee , s           -> es , s , se X1X1           -> e           <- e , ee , s           -> es , s           <- se 20 minute talk at Real World Crypto 2018 by Trevor Perrin 25 minute talk by David Wong

Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1377754053 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.

References

  1. ↩Wikipedia “Noise Protocol Framework” revision 1377754053 · retrieved 2026-10-20 publication date (×1) · confidence 0.95 revision URL