Oligopoly
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An oligopoly ( ) is a market in which pricing control lies in the hands of a few sellers. As a result of their significant market power, firms in oligopolistic markets can influence prices through manipulating the supply function. Firms in an oligopoly are mutually interdependent, as any action by one firm is expected to affect other firms in the market and evoke a reaction or consequential action. As a result, firms in oligopolistic markets often resort to collusion as means of maximising profits.
Nonetheless, in the presence of fierce competition among market participants, oligopolies may develop without collusion. This is a situation similar to perfect competition, where oligopolists have their own market structure. In this situation, each company in the oligopoly has a large share in the industry and plays a pivotal, unique role. Many jurisdictions deem collusion to be illegal as it violates competition laws and is regarded as anti-competition behaviour.
The EU competition law in Europe prohibits anti-competitive practices such as price-fixing and competitors manipulating market supply and trade. In the US, the United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission are tasked with stopping collusion.…
An oligopoly ( ) is a market in which pricing control lies in the hands of a few sellers. As a result of their significant market power, firms in oligopolistic markets can influence prices through manipulating the supply function. Firms in an oligopoly are mutually interdependent, as any action by one firm is expected to affect other firms in the market and evoke a reaction or consequential action. As a result, firms in oligopolistic markets often resort to collusion as means of maximising profits.
Nonetheless, in the presence of fierce competition among market participants, oligopolies may develop without collusion. This is a situation similar to perfect competition, where oligopolists have their own market structure. In this situation, each company in the oligopoly has a large share in the industry and plays a pivotal, unique role. Many jurisdictions deem collusion to be illegal as it violates competition laws and is regarded as anti-competition behaviour.
The EU competition law in Europe prohibits anti-competitive practices such as price-fixing and competitors manipulating market supply and trade. In the US, the United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission are tasked with stopping collusion. In Australia, the Federal Competition and Consumer Act 2010 details the prohibition and regulation of anti-competitive agreements and practices. Although aggressive, these laws typically only apply when firms engage in formal collusion, such as cartels.
Corporations may often thus evade legal consequences through tacit collusion, as collusion can only be proven through direct communication between companies. Within post-socialist economies, oligopolies may be particularly pronounced. For example in Armenia, where business elites enjoy oligopoly, 19% of the whole economy is monopolized, making it the most monopolized country in the region.
Many industries have been cited as oligopolistic, including civil aviation, electricity providers, the telecommunications sector, rail freight markets, food processing, funeral services, sugar refining, beer making, pulp and paper making, and automobile manufacturing. Economies of scale occur where a firm's average costs per unit of output decreases while the scale of the firm, or the output being produced by the firm, increases. Firms in an oligopoly who benefit from economies of scale have a distinct advantage over firms who do not.
Their marginal costs are lower, such that the firm's equilibrium at MR = MC would be higher. Economies of scale are seen prevalently when two firms in oligopolistic market agree to a merger, as it allows the firm to not only diversify their market but also increase in size and output production, with negligible relative increases in output costs.
These sorts of mergers are typically seen when companies expand into large business groups by appreciating and increasing capital to buy smaller companies in the same markets, which consequently increases the profit margins of the business. The equilibrium is the intersection of the two firm's reaction functions, which show how one firm reacts to the quantity choice of the other firm. The reaction function can be derived by calculating the first-order condition (FOC) of the firms' optimal profits.
The FOC can be calculated by setting the first derivative of the objective function to zero. For example, assume that the firm 1 's demand function is P = (M - Q_2) - Q_1 , where Q_2 is the quantity produced by the other firm, Q_1 is the amount produced by firm 1 , and M=60 is the market. Assume that marginal cost is C_M=12 . By following the profit maximisation rule of equating marginal revenue to marginal costs, firm 1 can obtain a total revenue function of R_T = Q_1 P = Q_1 (M - Q_2 - Q_1) = MQ_1 - Q_1 Q_2 - Q_1^2 .
The marginal revenue function is R_M = \frac{\partial R_T}{\partial Q_1} = M - Q_2 - 2 Q_1 . R_M = C_M M - Q_2 - 2Q_1 = C_M 2Q_1 = (M - C_M) - Q_2 Q_1 = \frac{M - C_M}{2} - \frac{Q_2}{2} = 24 - 0.5 Q_2 [1.1] Q_2 = 2(M - C_M) - 2Q_1 = 96 - 2Q_1 [1.2] Equation 1.1 is the reaction function for firm 1 . Equation 1.2 is the reaction function for firm 2 . The Nash equilibrium can thus be obtained by solving the equations simultaneously or graphically. Reaction functions are not necessarily symmetric.
Firms may face differing cost functions, in which case the reaction functions and equilibrium quantities would not be identical. Sales are split evenly if P_A = P_B The only Nash equilibrium is P_A = P_B = \text{MC} . In this situation, if a firm raises prices, it will lose all its customers. If a firm lowers price, P , then it will lose money on every unit sold. The Bertrand equilibrium is the same as the competitive result. Each firm produces where P = \text{MC} , resulting in zero profits.
A generalization of the Bertrand model is the Bertrand–Edgeworth model, which allows for capacity constraints and a more general cost function.
Further reading
Bayer, R. C. (2010). Intertemporal price discrimination and competition. Journal of economic behavior & organization, 73(2), 273–293. Harrington, J. (2006). Corporate leniency programs and the role of the antitrust authority in detecting collusion. Competition Policy Research Center Discussion Paper, CPDP-18-E. Ivaldi, M., Jullien, B., Rey, P., Seabright, P., & Tirole, J. (2003). The economics of tacit collusion.
Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1377167686 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.