Ontological commitment

Uses your system voice; voice and rate in settings.

Snapshot

≈ 4 min read

Names in other languages

No names in other languages are held for this entry yet.

Article bodies are English and are not machine-translated. A name in another language is not a translation of the article.

In formal semantics, an ontological commitment of a language is one or more objects postulated to exist by that language. The 'existence' referred to need not be 'real', but exist only in a universe of discourse. As an example, legal systems use vocabulary referring to 'legal persons' that are collective entities that have rights. One says the legal doctrine has an ontological commitment to non-singular individuals. In information systems and artificial intelligence, where an ontology refers to a specific vocabulary and a set of explicit assumptions about the meaning and usage of these words, an ontological commitment is an agreement to use the shared vocabulary in a coherent and consistent manner within a specific context. In philosophy, a "theory is ontologically committed to an object only if that object occurs in all the ontologies of that theory."

In formal semantics, an ontological commitment of a language is one or more objects postulated to exist by that language. The 'existence' referred to need not be 'real', but exist only in a universe of discourse. As an example, legal systems use vocabulary referring to 'legal persons' that are collective entities that have rights. One says the legal doctrine has an ontological commitment to non-singular individuals. In information systems and artificial intelligence, where an ontology refers to a specific vocabulary and a set of explicit assumptions about the meaning and usage of these words, an ontological commitment is an agreement to use the shared vocabulary in a coherent and consistent manner within a specific context. In philosophy, a "theory is ontologically committed to an object only if that object occurs in all the ontologies of that theory."

Ontological parsimony

Whatever process one uses to determine the ontological commitments of a theory, that does not prescribe what ontological commitments one should have. Quine regarded this as a matter of epistemology, which theory one should accept. "Appeal is made to [concerns of] explanatory power, parsimony, conservatism, precision, and so on". Ontological parsimony can be defined in various ways, and often is equated to versions of Occam's razor, a "rule of thumb, which obliges us to favor theories or hypotheses that make the fewest unwarranted, or ad hoc, assumptions about the data from which they are derived." Glock regards 'ontological parsimony' as one of the 'five main points' of Quine's conception of ontology. Following Quine, Baker states that a theory, T, is ontologically committed to items F if and only if T entails that F′s exist. If two theories, T 1 and T 2 , have the same ontological commitments except that T 2 is ontologically committed to F′s while T 1 is not, then T 1 is more parsimonious than T 2 . More generally, a sufficient condition for T 1 being more parsimonious than T 2 is for the ontological commitments of T 1 to be a proper subset of those of T 2 . These ideas lead to the following particular formulation of Occam's razor: 'Other things being equal, if T 1 is more ontologically parsimonious than T 2 then it is rational to prefer T 1 to T 2 .' While a common formulation stipulates only that entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity, this version by contrast, states that entities should not be multiplied other things being equal, and this is compatible with parsimony being a comparatively weak theoretical virtue.

See also

Conceptualization (information science) Holophrastic indeterminacy Indeterminacy of translation

External links

Ontological commitment, a category in Philosophical Papers maintained by Henry Laycock

Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1340055029 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.

Sources cited in this revision

23 named source(s) extracted from the cited revision. A source with no author is shown by its publication; nothing is invented.