Paraconsistent logic

Paraconsistent logic is a type of non-classical logic that allows for the coexistence of contradictory statements without leading to a logical explosion where anything can be proven true.

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Paraconsistent logic is a type of non-classical logic that allows for the coexistence of contradictory statements without leading to a logical explosion where anything can be proven true. Specifically, paraconsistent logic is the subfield of logic that is concerned with studying and developing "inconsistency-tolerant" systems of logic, purposefully excluding the principle of explosion.

Inconsistency-tolerant logics have been discussed since at least 1910 (and arguably much earlier, for example in the writings of Aristotle); however, the term paraconsistent ("beside the consistent") was coined in 1976, by the Peruvian philosopher Francisco Miró Quesada Cantuarias, under request of Newton da Costa, who is often credited as the creator of the field. The study of paraconsistent logic has been dubbed paraconsistency, which encompasses the school of dialetheism.

Definition

In classical logic (as well as intuitionistic logic and most other logics), contradictions entail everything. This feature, known as the principle of explosion or ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet (Latin, "from a contradiction, anything follows") can be expressed formally as Which means: if P and its negation ¬P are both assumed to be true, then of the two claims P and (some arbitrary) A, at least one is true.

Therefore, P or A is true. However, if we know that either P or A is true, and also that P is false (that ¬P is true) we can conclude that A, which could be anything, is true. Thus if a theory contains a single inconsistency, the theory is trivial – that is, it has every sentence as a theorem.

The characteristic or defining feature of a paraconsistent logic is that it rejects the principle of explosion. As a result, paraconsistent logics, unlike classical and other logics, can be used to formalize inconsistent but non-trivial theories.

Comparison with classical logic

The entailment relations of paraconsistent logics are propositionally weaker than classical logic; that is, they deem fewer propositional inferences valid. The point is that a paraconsistent logic can never be a propositional extension of classical logic, that is, propositionally validate every entailment that classical logic does.

In some sense, then, paraconsistent logic is more conservative or cautious than classical logic. It is due to such conservativeness that paraconsistent languages can be more expressive than their classical counterparts including the hierarchy of metalanguages due to Alfred Tarski and others.

According to Solomon Feferman: "natural language abounds with directly or indirectly self-referential yet apparently harmless expressions—all of which are excluded from the Tarskian framework." This expressive limitation—where in classical logic, tautologies are considered redundant—can be overcome in paraconsistent logic.

Philosophy

In classical logic, Aristotle's three laws, namely, the excluded middle (p or ¬p), non-contradiction ¬ (p ∧ ¬p) and identity (p iff p), are regarded as the same, due to the inter-definition of the connectives. Moreover, traditionally contradictoriness (the presence of contradictions in a theory or in a body of knowledge) and triviality (the fact that such a theory entails all possible consequences) are assumed inseparable, granted that negation is available.

These views may be philosophically challenged, precisely on the grounds that they fail to distinguish between contradictoriness and other forms of inconsistency. On the other hand, it is possible to derive triviality from the 'conflict' between consistency and contradictions, once these notions have been properly distinguished.

The very notions of consistency and inconsistency may be furthermore internalized at the object language level.

Tradeoffs

Paraconsistency involves tradeoffs. In particular, abandoning the principle of explosion requires one to abandon at least one of the following two principles: Both of these principles have been challenged. One approach is to reject disjunction introduction but keep disjunctive syllogism and transitivity.

In this approach, rules of natural deduction hold, except for disjunction introduction and excluded middle; moreover, inference A⊢B does not necessarily mean entailment A⇒B. Also, the following usual Boolean properties hold: double negation as well as associativity, commutativity, distributivity, De Morgan, and idempotence inferences (for conjunction and disjunction). Furthermore, inconsistency-robust proof of negation holds for entailment: (A⇒(B∧¬B))⊢¬A. Another approach is to reject disjunctive syllogism.

From the perspective of dialetheism, it makes perfect sense that disjunctive syllogism should fail. The idea behind this syllogism is that, if ¬ A, then A is excluded and B can be inferred from A ∨ B. However, if A may hold as well as ¬A, then the argument for the inference is weakened. Yet another approach is to do both simultaneously.

In many systems of relevant logic, as well as linear logic, there are two separate disjunctive connectives. One allows disjunction introduction, and one allows disjunctive syllogism. Of course, this has the disadvantages entailed by separate disjunctive connectives including confusion between them and complexity in relating them.

Furthermore, the rule of proof of negation (below) just by itself is inconsistency non-robust in the sense that the negation of every proposition can be proved from a contradiction. Strictly speaking, having just the rule above is paraconsistent because it is not the case that every proposition can be proved from a contradiction.

However, if the rule double negation elimination ( \neg \neg A \vdash A ) is added as well, then every proposition can be proved from a contradiction. Double negation elimination does not hold for intuitionistic logic.

Logic of Paradox

One example of paraconsistent logic is the system known as LP ("Logic of Paradox"), first proposed by the Argentinian logician Florencio González Asenjo in 1966 and later popularized by Priest and others. One way of presenting the semantics for LP is to replace the usual functional valuation with a relational one.

The binary relation V\, relates a formula to a truth value: V(A,1)\, means that A\, is true, and V(A,0)\, means that A\, is false. A formula must be assigned at least one truth value, but there is no requirement that it be assigned at most one truth value.

The semantic clauses for negation and disjunction are given as follows: V( \neg A,1) \Leftrightarrow V(A,0) V( \neg A,0) \Leftrightarrow V(A,1) V(A \lor B,1) \Leftrightarrow V(A,1) \text{ or } V(B,1) V(A \lor B,0) \Leftrightarrow V(A,0) \text{ and } V(B,0) (The other logical connectives are defined in terms of negation and disjunction as usual.) Or to put the same point less symbolically: not A is true if and only if A is false not A is false if and only if A is true A or B is true if and only if A is true or B is true A or B is false if and only if A is false and B is false (Semantic) logical consequence is then defined as truth-preservation: \Gamma\vDash A if and only if A\, is true whenever every element of \Gamma\, is true.

Now consider a valuation V\, such that V(A,1)\, and V(A,0)\, but it is not the case that V(B,1)\, . It is easy to check that this valuation constitutes a counterexample to both explosion and disjunctive syllogism. However, it is also a counterexample to modus ponens for the material conditional of LP.

For this reason, proponents of LP usually advocate expanding the system to include a stronger conditional connective that is not definable in terms of negation and disjunction. As one can verify, LP preserves most other inference patterns that one would expect to be valid, such as De Morgan's laws and the usual introduction and elimination rules for negation, conjunction, and disjunction.

Surprisingly, the logical truths (or tautologies) of LP are precisely those of classical propositional logic. (LP and classical logic differ only in the inferences they deem valid.) Relaxing the requirement that every formula be either true or false yields the weaker paraconsistent logic commonly known as first-degree entailment (FDE).

Unlike LP, FDE contains no logical truths. LP is only one of many paraconsistent logics that have been proposed. It is presented here merely as an illustration of how a paraconsistent logic can work.

P \to (Q \to P) ** for deduction theorem and ?→{t,b} = {t,b} (P \to (Q \to R)) \to ((P \to Q) \to (P \to R)) ** for deduction theorem (note: {t,b}→{f} = {f} follows from the deduction theorem) \lnot (P \to Q) \to P ** {f}→? = {t} \lnot (P \to Q) \to \lnot Q ** ?→{t} = {t} P \to (\lnot Q \to \lnot (P \to Q)) ** {t,b}→{b,f} = {b,f} \lnot \lnot P \to P ** ~{f} = {t} P \to \lnot \lnot P ** ~{t,b} = {b,f} (note: ~{t} = {f} and ~{b,f} = {t,b} follow from the way the truth-values are encoded) P \to (P \lor Q) ** {t,b}v? = {t,b} Q \to (P \lor Q) ** ?v{t,b} = {t,b} \lnot (P \lor Q) \to \lnot P ** {t}v? = {t} \lnot (P \lor Q) \to \lnot Q ** ?v{t} = {t} (P \to R) \to ((Q \to R) \to ((P \lor Q) \to R)) ** {f}v{f} = {f} \lnot P \to (\lnot Q \to \lnot (P \lor Q)) ** {b,f}v{b,f} = {b,f} (P \land Q) \to P ** {f}&? = {f} (P \land Q) \to Q ** ?&{f} = {f} \lnot P \to \lnot (P \land Q) ** {b,f}&? = {b.f} \lnot Q \to \lnot (P \land Q) ** ?&{b,f} = {b,f} (\lnot P \to R) \to ((\lnot Q \to R) \to (\lnot (P \land Q) \to R)) ** {t}&{t} = {t} P \to (Q \to (P \land Q)) ** {t,b}&{t,b} = {t,b} (P \to Q) \to ((\lnot P \to Q) \to Q) ** ? is the union of {t,b} with {b,f} Some other theorem schemas: P \to P (\lnot P \to P) \to P ((P \to Q) \to P) \to P P \lor \lnot P \lnot (P \land \lnot P) (\lnot P \to Q) \to (P \lor Q) ((\lnot P \to Q) \to Q) \to (((P \land \lnot P) \to Q) \to (P \to Q)) ** every truth-value is either t, b, or f. ((P \to Q) \to R) \to (Q \to R) ((\lnot P \to R) \to R) \to (((P \to Q) \to R) \to R) ** counter-factual for {b,f}→? = {t,b} (inconsistent with b→f = f) b = \lnot b = (b \to b) = (b \lor b) = (b \land b) We must make b a kind of truth (in addition to t) because otherwise there would be no tautologies at all. To ensure that modus ponens works, we must have (b \to f) = f , that is, to ensure that a true hypothesis and a true implication lead to a true conclusion, we must have that a not-true (f) conclusion and a true (t or b) hypothesis yield a not-true implication.

If all the propositional variables in Γ are assigned the value b, then Γ itself will have the value b. If we give X the value f, then (\Gamma \to X) = (b \to f) = f . So Γ→X will not be a tautology. Limitations: (1) There must not be constants for the truth values because that would defeat the purpose of paraconsistent logic.

Having b would change the language from that of classical logic. Having t or f would allow the explosion again because \lnot t \to X or f \to X would be tautologies.

Note that b is not a fixed point of those constants since b ≠ t and b ≠ f. (2) This logic's ability to contain contradictions applies only to contradictions among particularized premises, not to contradictions among axiom schemas. (3) The loss of disjunctive syllogism may result in insufficient commitment to developing the 'correct' alternative, possibly crippling mathematics.

(4) To establish that a formula Γ is equivalent to Δ in the sense that either can be substituted for the other wherever they appear as a subformula, one must show (\Gamma \to \Delta) \land (\Delta \to \Gamma) \land (\lnot \Gamma \to \lnot \Delta) \land (\lnot \Delta \to \lnot \Gamma) . This is more difficult than in classical logic because the contrapositives do not necessarily follow.

See also

Deviant logic Formal logic Fuzzy logic Probability logic Intuitionistic logic Table of logic symbols

"World Congress on Paraconsistency, Ghent 1997, Juquehy 2000, Toulouse, 2003, Melbourne 2008, Kolkata, 2014" Paraconsistent First-Order Logic with infinite hierarchy levels of contradiction LP#. Axiomatical system HST#, as paraconsistent generalization of Hrbacek set theory HST

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