Pegasus (spyware)

Pegasus is spyware created by the Israeli cyber-arms company NSO Group that is designed to be covertly and remotely installed on mobile phones running iOS and Android.

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Pegasus is spyware created by the Israeli cyber-arms company NSO Group that is designed to be covertly and remotely installed on mobile phones running iOS and Android. While NSO Group markets Pegasus as a product for fighting crime and terrorism, governments around the world have routinely used the spyware to surveil journalists, lawyers, political dissidents, and human rights activists.

The sale of Pegasus licenses to foreign governments must be approved by the Israeli Ministry of Defense. As of September 2023, Pegasus operators were able to remotely install the spyware on iOS versions through 16.6 using a zero-click exploit.

While the capabilities of Pegasus may vary over time due to software updates, Pegasus is generally capable of reading text messages, call snooping, collecting passwords, location tracking, accessing the target device's microphone and camera, and harvesting information from apps. The spyware is named after Pegasus, the winged horse of Greek mythology.

Cyber watchdog Citizen Lab and Lookout Security published the first public technical analyses of Pegasus in August 20161 after they captured the spyware in a failed attempt to spy on the iPhone of human rights activist Ahmed Mansoor. Subsequent investigations into Pegasus by Amnesty International, Citizen Lab, and others have garnered significant media attention, including in July 20211 with the release of the Pegasus Project investigation, which centered on a leaked list of 50,000 phone numbers reportedly selected for targeting by Pegasus customers.

Azerbaijan

The list of spied-upon citizens included dozens of journalists and activists from Azerbaijan. It was alleged that their mobile phones were tapped. The head of Azerbaijani service of Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe (Azadliq) Jamie Fly expressed his anger when it was revealed that the phones of his five current and former employees were tapped with Pegasus.

Bangladesh

Reports and investigations indicate Bangladesh is among 45 countries where Pegasus spyware infections were detected between 2016 and 2018, according to research by Citizen Lab. The spyware, developed by Israel's NSO Group, enables undetected access to smartphones' messages, cameras, and microphones.

Citizen Lab identified an operator codenamed "GANGES" using politically themed domains to target devices in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. During the 2018 elections, opposition figures reported phone intrusions consistent with Pegasus infections, although no direct government link was proven. The government denies purchasing or using Pegasus, calling allegations "baseless".

Bangladesh lacks comprehensive cybersecurity laws, relying on the ICT Act (2006) and Digital Security Act (2018), which prohibit unauthorized surveillance but remain inadequate against advanced spyware. Constitutional Article 43(B) and ICT Act Section 63 protect communication privacy, but enforcement gaps persist.

Israeli surveillance equipment reached Bangladeshi authorities through intermediaries despite no formal diplomatic ties. While Pegasus specifically remains unconfirmed in these transactions, the sales underscore Bangladesh's access to advanced monitoring tools.

Bahrain

Citizen Lab revealed the government of Bahrain used the NSO Group's Pegasus to hack activists, bloggers, members of Waad (a secular Bahraini political society), a member of Al Wefaq (a Shiite Bahraini political society), and members of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights. Bahrain reportedly acquired access to spyware in 2017.

As per the report, the mobile phones of a total of nine rights activists were "successfully hacked" between June 20201 and February 2021. Those hacked included three members of Waad, three of the BCHR, one of Al Wefaq, and two of the exiled dissidents who reside in London.

The Citizen Lab attributed "with high confidence" that a Pegasus operator, LULU, was used by the Bahraini government to breach the phones of at least four of the nine activists. In January 2022, Bahrain was accused of using the Pegasus spyware to hack a human rights defender, Ebtisam al-Saegh.

The prominent activist's phone was hacked at least eight times between August and November 2019. As per the Citizen Lab, following the hacking attempt, al-Saegh faced incidents where she was harassed by the Bahrain authorities. It included being summoned to a police station, interrogation, rape threats, and physical and sexual assault.

The attack left the rights defender in a state of "daily fear and terror". In February 2022, an investigation by Citizen Lab and Amnesty International revealed that the Pegasus spyware was used to infect the devices of a lawyer, an online journalist, and a mental health counsellor in Bahrain.

All of the three activists were critical of the Bahraini authorities and were targeted with Pegasus between June and September 2021. One of the three activists remained anonymous, while the other two were Mohammed al-Tajer and Sharifa Swar (mental health counselor).

In December 2022, an exiled Bahraini activist, Yusuf al-Jamri filed a lawsuit against the Bahraini government and the NSO Group, alleging his phone was hacked using the Pegasus spyware in August 2019. The hacking was confirmed by the Citizen Lab researchers, who claimed that the servers that targeted al-Jamri were connected to Bahrain.

Yusuf al-Jamri fled to the UK with his family in 2017, after facing multiple detentions, and episodes of interrogation, torture, sexual assault, and rape threats. Experts claimed that he was hacked days after posting tweets about Moosa Mohammed, the Bahraini activist who protested the executions in Bahrain and climbed to the roof of the country's embassy in London.

India

In late 2019, Facebook initiated a suit against NSO, claiming that Pegasus had been used to intercept the WhatsApp communications of a number of activists, journalists, and bureaucrats in India, leading to accusations that the Indian government was involved. 17 individuals including human rights activists, scholars, and journalists confirmed to an Indian publication they had been targeted.

Phone numbers of Indian ministers, opposition leaders, ex-election commissioners and journalists were allegedly found on a database of NSO hacking targets by Pegasus Project in 2021. Phone numbers of Koregaon Bhima activists who had compromising data implanted on their computers through a hack were found on a Pegasus surveillance phone number list.

Independent digital forensic analysis conducted on 10 Indian phones whose numbers were present in the data showed signs of either an attempted or successful Pegasus hack. The results of the forensic analysis threw up shows sequential correlations between the time and date a phone number is entered in the list and the beginning of surveillance.

The gap usually ranges between a few minutes and a couple of hours. Eleven phone numbers associated with a female employee of the Supreme Court of India and her immediate family, who accused the former Chief Justice of India, Ranjan Gogoi, of sexual harassment, were also allegedly found on a database indicating possibility of their phones being snooped.

Records also indicate that phone numbers of some of the key political players in Karnataka appear to have been selected around the time when an intense power struggle was taking place between the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Janata Dal (Secular)-Congress-led state government in 2019. In October 2023, Apple warned Indian journalists and opposition politicians that they may have been targets of state-sponsored attacks using Pegasus spyware.

A Washington Post investigation found that the Indian government officials pressured Apple to rescind the warnings. Apple instead sent out emails saying the warnings could have been a false alarm and asked media to mention the same in their articles, while government officials told media that it could have been an "algorithmic malfunction".

Minister of Commerce Piyush Goyal said that the warnings were a "prank" by Apple. An advisor to the government, Sanjeev Sanyal, alleged that the warnings were part of a conspiracy involving Access Now, George Soros, Apple and opposition politicians to falsely accuse the government of hacking.

Israel

Israeli police use In January 2022, it was reported that Pegasus was unlawfully used by the Israeli Police to monitor citizens as well as foreign nationals who were accidentally or intentionally infected by the software. The surveillance was ordered by high-ranking police officers, and was carried out without warrants or judicial supervision.

The legal basis for use of spyware against citizens is disputed. The police had allegedly targeted civilians not suspected of any crime, including organisers of antigovernmental protesters, mayors, anti-LGBT parade activists, employees of government-owned companies, an associate of a senior politician, and former government employees.

In one case, it was alleged that police targeted an activist who was not suspected of a crime, allegedly to gather information about the activist's extra-marital affairs and use it as leverage. In some cases, Pegasus was used to obtain information unrelated to an ongoing investigation to be used later to pressure the subject of an investigation.

In some cases, police used Pegasus to obtain incriminating information from suspects' devices, and then concealed the source of the incriminating information claiming it would expose intelligence assets. While the Israeli Police formally denied the allegations in the report, some senior police officials have hinted that the claims were true.

The report led to the announcement of a number of parallel investigations into the police's conduct, with some officials demanding a Commission of inquiry. Although the Attorney General launched an internal probe into the allegations, the Privacy Protection Council (which advises the Minister of Justice), demanded that a state commission of inquiry be created.

On 1 February, the police admitted that there was, in fact, misuse of the software. On February 7, the widespread extent of the warrantless surveillance was further revealed to have included politicians and government officials, heads of corporations, journalists, activists, and even Avner Netanyahu, the son of then-Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.

This has led to renewed calls for a public inquiry, including from the current police commissioner Kobi Shabtai himself (appointed January 2021), as well as from the Minister of the Interior, Ayelet Shaked and others. Later in the day, the Minister of Public Security (the minister responsible for the police), Omer Bar-Lev, announced that he would be forming a commission of inquiry, to be chaired by a retired judge.

Bar-Lev stressed that this commission will essentially be granted all the powers of a state commission (whose formation requires full cabinet support), including having the authority to subpoena witnesses, "regardless of seniority," whose testimony may be used in future prosecutions. Despite this, calls for a state commission persisted from several ex-ministry heads who were targeted.

The next day, the State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman, calling the crisis a "trampling on the values of democracy and privacy," said that the investigation launched by his office will also be extensive, adding that it will not only include the police, but also the Ministry of Justice and the State Attorney's Office. In September 2023, Apple issued an emergency software patch after it had been warned that Israel's NSO Group had injected its Pegasus spyware remotely and surreptitiously on to iPhones and iPads.

Kazakhstan

Activists in Kazakhstan were targeted, in addition to top-level officials, like Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Askar Mamin and Bakytzhan Sagintayev. Among the 2000 targeted Kazak numbers were government critic Bakhytzhan Toregozhina, as well as journalists Serikzhan Mauletbay and Bigeldy Gabdullin. Most of these victims were involved in a civic youth movement Oyan, Qazaqstan.

Morocco

In 2019, two Moroccan pro-democracy campaigners were notified by WhatsApp that their phones had been compromised with Pegasus. In June 2020, an investigation by Amnesty International alleged that Moroccan journalist Omar Radi was targeted by the Moroccan government using the Israeli spyware Pegasus.

The rights group claimed that the journalist was targeted three times and spied on after his device was infected with an NSO tool. Meanwhile, Amnesty also claimed that the attack came after the NSO group updated their policy in September 2019. Reda Benzaza, a Riffian pro-democracy activist exiled in Spain, was targeted by Pegasus along with her lawyer.

In July 2021, it was revealed that the Moroccan PM Saad Eddine el-Othamani and Moroccan King Mohammed VI were selected for targeting – apparently by Moroccan state actors themselves. According to revelations from July 2021, Morocco had targeted more than 6,000 Algerian phones, including those of politicians and high-ranking military officials, with the spyware.

The Algerian government subsequently severed diplomatic relations with Morocco in August 2021, citing alleged Moroccan deployment of Pegasus against Algerian officials as one of the "hostile actions" that undergirded the decision.

Use against Catalan and Basque officials and independence proponents

According to an investigation by The Guardian and El País, Pegasus software was used by the government of Spain to compromise the phones of several politicians active in the Catalan independence movement, including President of the Parliament of Catalonia Roger Torrent, and former member of the Parliament of Catalonia Anna Gabriel i Sabaté. The scandal resurfaced in April 2022 following the publication of a report of a CitizenLab investigation that revealed widespread use of Pegasus against Catalan politicians and citizens, as well as Basque politician Arnaldo Otegi and MP Jon Iñarritu.

A total of 63 victims was identified, with targets including elected officials (including high-ranking ones) and civil society members (including activists, journalists, lawyers, and computer scientists). The true extent of the targeting was potentially far larger as Android devices are far more common in Spain while CitizenLab tools are specialised to uncover infiltration of Apple devices.

Citizen Lab did not attribute the responsibility for the attacks to any perpetrators, but did note that circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the attacks were perpetrated by the Spanish Government. On May 5, 2022, the Spanish Defense Minister admitted to surveillance of 20 people involved in the Catalan independence movement.

Use against Spanish government officials

In May 2022, the Spanish Government revealed that the smartphones of Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and Defense Minister Margarita Robles had been targeted by Pegasus in May 2021. Prime Minister Sanchez's device was infected twice, and Robles' device was infected once.

A total of over 2.7GB of data was exfiltrated from the PM device, while only 9MB of data was extracted from the Defense Minister's device. Morocco was believed to be behind the attack given the diplomatic tensions between the two at the time of the target.

In 2025, the Spanish high criminal court dismissed its investigation from 2023 (which was a re-opened from the incident in 2022 due to new evidence showing that Pegasus targeted French politicians, lawyers and journalists) due to lack of co-operation from Israeli authorities in responding to requests for information.

Uganda

It has been reported that Muhoozi Kainerugaba brokered a deal to use Pegasus in Uganda, paying between $10 and $20 million in 2019. The software was later used to hack the phones of 11 US diplomats and employees of the US embassy in Uganda some time during 2021.

United Arab Emirates

In December 2020, it was reported that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates deployed a zero-click iMessage Pegasus exploit against two London-based reporters and 36 journalists at the Al Jazeera television network in Qatar. Qatar reportedly attempted to hire Israeli-based cybersecurity firm Sdema Group for a "several dozen million-euro contract to provide physical and cyber-security services to Qatar's World Cup facilities.".

The United Arab Emirates used Pegasus to spy on the members of Saudi-backed Yemeni government according to an investigation published in July 2021. The UAE used the spyware to monitor and spy on the ministers of the internationally recognized government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, including Yemeni president and his family members, former Prime Minister Ahmed Obaid Bin Dagher, former Foreign Minister Abdulmalik Al-Mekhlafi, and current Minister of Youth and Sports, Nayef al-Bakri.

In August 2021, Amnesty International confirmed that David Haigh, a prominent British Human Rights lawyer and founder of Human Rights NGO Detained International, was the first British person to have evidence on his mobile phone that it had been hacked by NSO spyware. It is believed the illegal hacking was carried out in August 2020 by the government of Dubai.

At the time of the infection, David Haigh was the lawyer representing Dubai Princess Latifa bint Mohammed Al Maktoum who was being held hostage, and he was assisting Princess Haya bint Hussein and her legal team as well. Haigh had been exchanging videos and text messages in secret for more than a year and a half with Princess Latifa through a phone that had been smuggled into the Dubai villa where she was being held.

She stopped responding on July 21, 2020, according to a screenshot of the messages Haigh shared. The analysis shows that Haigh's phone was hacked two weeks later. On 24 September 2021, The Guardian reported that the telephone of Alaa al-Siddiq, executive director of ALQST, who died in a car accident in London on 20 June 2021, was infected with the Pegasus spyware for 5 years until 2020.

Citizen Lab confirmed that the Emirati activist was hacked by a government client of Israel's NSO Group. The case represented a worrying trend for activists and dissidents, who escaped the UAE to live in the relative safety, but were never out of the reach of Pegasus.

In October 2021, the British High Court ruled that agents of Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum used Pegasus to hack the phones of his (ex)-wife, Princess Haya bint Hussein, her solicitors (including baroness Fiona Shackleton), a personal assistant and two members of her security team in the summer of 2020. The court ruled that the agents acted "with the express or implied authority" of the sheikh; he denied knowledge of the hacking.

The judgment referred to the hacking as "serial breaches of (UK) domestic criminal law", "in violation of fundamental common law and ECHR rights", "interference with the process of this court and the mother's access to justice" and "abuse of power" by a head of state. NSO had contacted an intermediary in August 2020 to inform Princess Haya of the hack and is believed to have terminated its contract with the UAE.

On 7 October 2021, the NSO Group stated that it had terminated its contract with the UAE to use its Pegasus spyware tool after the ruling by UK's High Court that Dubai's ruler misused the firm's Pegasus software to spy on his ex-wife and her legal advisers. In 2022, sources revealed that a unit of Abu Dhabi's Mubadala Investment Company, Mubadala Capital was one of the largest investors in €1 billion Novalpina Capital private equity fund, which bought the NSO Group in 2019.

Since then, Mubadala has been an investor in the firm with its commitment of €50 million, acquiring a seat on the committee of largest investors of the equity fund. Journalists, human rights defenders and the women of Dubai's royal family were traced to have been hacked using the Pegasus spyware during the same time.

A report by the Citizen Lab revealed that Pegasus spyware linked to an Emirati operative was used to hack into the phones at the Downing Street and the Foreign Office. One of the spyware attack on No 10 was on 7 July 2020, which was asserted to have infected the phone of British Prime Minister Boris Johnson.

Besides, at least five attacks were identified on Foreign Office phones by UK allies, including the UAE, between July 2020 and June 2021. The UAE was also accused of hiring a firm to "monitor" Jeremy Corbyn.

United Kingdom (UK)

In April 2022, Citizen Lab released a report stating that 10 Downing Street staff had been targeted by Pegasus, and that the United Arab Emirates was suspected of originating the attacks in 2020 and 2021.

United States (US)

NSO Group pitched its spyware to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which declined to purchase it due to its high cost. In August 2016, NSO Group (through its U.S. subsidiary Westbridge) pitched its U.S. version of Pegasus to the San Diego Police Department (SDPD).

In the marketing material, Westbridge emphasized that the company is U.S.-based and majority-owned by a U.S. parent company. An SDPD Sergeant responded to the sales pitch with "sounds awesome". The SDPD declined to purchase the spyware as it was too expensive.

In July 2021, it was revealed that the phone numbers of about a dozen U.S. citizens – including diplomats, journalists, aid workers, and dissident expatriates – were on a list of prospective targets for Pegasus infiltration, but it was not known whether an attack was ever attempted or completed against any of their devices. Among the phone numbers discovered on the list were those of the Obama administration's chief negotiator of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as well as those of several United Nations diplomats residing in the U.S. NSO Group has said that Pegasus is not deployed against any device located within the territory of the U.S., but it has been suggested that U.S. citizens can become targets when abroad.

In November 2021, the Biden administration placed NSO Group on a Commerce Department blacklist from government contracts, after determining NSO Group action was "contrary to the foreign policy and national security interests of the US." In December 2021, it was reported that Pegasus spyware was found in the preceding months on the iPhones of at least nine U.S. State Department employees, all of whom were either stationed in Uganda or worked on matters related to Uganda. Later the same month, AP reported that a total of 11 U.S. State Department employees stationed in Uganda had their iPhones hacked with Pegasus.

The US government blacklisted the NSO Group to stop what it called "transnational repression". In January 2022, it was reported that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had secretly bought the Pegasus spyware in 2019 and had seen a demonstration of Phantom, a newer tool capable of targeting American phone numbers.

The FBI went on to test both tools, and considered their use for domestic surveillance in the U.S., which reportedly led to discussions between the FBI and United States Department of Justice; ultimately the FBI decided against using NSO spyware. However, despite the 2021 decision rejecting use of NSO software, Pegasus equipment is still in the FBI's possession at a New Jersey facility.

Responding to the reports, FBI officials played down the domestic surveillance aspect of the Pegasus testing, instead stressing counter-intelligence as their purported main goal. A document later obtained by The New York Times clearly showed that the agency weighed using Pegasus and Phantom in domestic law enforcement cases.

L3Harris, a U.S. defense contractor, was in talks to acquire NSO Group, the maker of Pegasus. L3Harris reportedly had the backing of U.S. intelligence in undertaking the acquisition negotiations. After months of negotiations, the talks were scuttled after they were made known to the public by the news media in June 2022, with the U.S. government publicly rebuking the acquisition attempt.

In March 2023, President Joe Biden signed an executive order that prohibited "operational use by the United States Government of commercial spyware that poses risks to national security or has been misused by foreign actors to enable human rights abuses around the world." This helped trigger a hold on a Department of Homeland Security contract with NSO competitor Paragon Solutions in late 2024, but the incoming Trump Administration reinstated the contract a year later.

With the transition from the Biden to Trump administrations in January 2025, NSO Group began heavily investing in lobbying efforts to overturn the Commerce Department ban on their products. NSO hired Vogel Group lobbyists with close ties to the Trump administration, and spent over $1.8 million on Republican political campaigns in the 2024 United States elections.

In May 2025, NSO Group was ordered by a US district court to pay $167 million in damages to WhatsApp for exploiting their messaging systems for Pegasus spyware injections. The order also included deletion of data collected by targeted activists and also cease targeting of the affected Whatsapp users and barred them of doing said activities again in the future.

This amount was later adjusted to proper standard of 4 million, due to a cap on punitive damages.

WhatsApp

On 20 October 2019, Meta Platforms Inc.’s WhatsApp filed a lawsuit against NSO Group for exploiting a bug in its WhatsApp messaging app to install spyware (Pegasus) that allowed the surveillance of 1400 people in 20 countries, including journalists, human rights activists, political dissidents and diplomats. WhatsApp said it was seeking a permanent demand to block NSO from using its service, and asked lawmakers to bar the use of cyberweapons like those NSO Group has sold to governments.

In 2020, NSO Group appealed a trial judge’s refusal to award it “conduct-based immunity”, a common law doctrine which protects foreign officials acting in their official capacity. The company's argument was that it was immune from being sued because it was acting as an agent for unidentified foreign governments when it installed the Pegasus spyware, and that Pegasus "helps law enforcement and intelligence agencies fight crime and protect national security".

On 9 January 2023, the Supreme Court of the United States denied the appeal and decided against reversing the decision of the lower court, allowing WhatsApp's lawsuit to continue. In December 2024, the court found NSO Group liable for attacks on approximately 1,400 WhatsApp users, including activists and journalists, and ruled that NSO Group violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, dismissing the company's defense that it was not liable because Pegasus was operated by their clients.

On 6 May 2025, Meta Platforms Inc. announced that a jury ruled that NSO Group owed Meta $167.3 million in punitive damages and $444,719 in compensatory damages. On 18 October 2025 U.S. District Court Judge Phyllis Hamilton, U.S. issued a permanent injunction prohibiting NSO Group from targeting WhatsApp and its users.

In the same decision, the judge reduced the jury-awarded punitive damages down to about $4 million, citing limits on punitive‐to‐compensatory damage ratios.

Apple

On 23 November 2021, Apple announced that it had filed a lawsuit against NSO Group and its parent company OSY Technologies for allegedly surveilling and targeting iPhone users with its Pegasus spyware. Apple stated that contrary to NSO's claim of targeting terrorists and criminals, their spyware has also been used against activists, politicians, and journalists.

Apple's statement said the company is seeking a permanent injunction to bar NSO Group from using Apple's software, services, or devices to prevent further abuse and harm to users.

Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1378485332 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.

Words in each sectionUnited Arab EmiratesUnited Arab EmiratesUnited Arab Emirates: 789 words789United States (US)United States (US)United States (US): 763 words763MoroccoMoroccoMorocco: 542 words542IsraelIsraelIsrael: 529 words529BahrainBahrainBahrain: 413 words413IndiaIndiaIndia: 393 words393WhatsAppWhatsAppWhatsApp: 324 words324BangladeshBangladeshBangladesh: 171 words171AppleAppleApple: 111 words111AzerbaijanAzerbaijanAzerbaijan: 57 words57KazakhstanKazakhstanKazakhstan: 51 words51UgandaUgandaUganda: 48 words48United Kingdom (UK)United Kingdom (UK)United Kingdom (UK): 35 words35
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