Philebus
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, Clarke 39) The Philebus ( , ) is a work by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato. Written in dialogue form, it presents a fictional conversation between Plato's teacher Socrates and two young Athenians, Philebus and Protarchus. The main topic is the ethical evaluation of pleasure. Philebus and Protarchus are hedonists who consider pleasure as the highest good and equate it with the absolute Good. Socrates represents the opposing view, prioritizing reason and insight. While he does not dispute the legitimacy and value of pleasure, he points out the diversity of pleasures and argues for a more nuanced assessment. He rejects some forms of pleasure as harmful and assigns a subordinate rank in the hierarchical value order to the remaining "pure" pleasures. The distinction between types of pleasure leads to general considerations about the unity and plurality of types that are subsumed under a generic term, and about the categories into which all being can be divided. Socrates explores the causes, origins, and characteristics of various forms and mixtures of pleasure and pain that occur in human life and their changing combinations, which result in diverse emotional states. The specifics of each form of pleasure are analyzed, and the reasons for their varying evaluations are explained. At the end of the dialogue, Socrates presents a universal value order.…
, Clarke 39)]] The Philebus ( , ) is a work by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato. Written in dialogue form, it presents a fictional conversation between Plato's teacher Socrates and two young Athenians, Philebus and Protarchus. The main topic is the ethical evaluation of pleasure. Philebus and Protarchus are hedonists who consider pleasure as the highest good and equate it with the absolute Good. Socrates represents the opposing view, prioritizing reason and insight. While he does not dispute the legitimacy and value of pleasure, he points out the diversity of pleasures and argues for a more nuanced assessment. He rejects some forms of pleasure as harmful and assigns a subordinate rank in the hierarchical value order to the remaining "pure" pleasures. The distinction between types of pleasure leads to general considerations about the unity and plurality of types that are subsumed under a generic term, and about the categories into which all being can be divided. Socrates explores the causes, origins, and characteristics of various forms and mixtures of pleasure and pain that occur in human life and their changing combinations, which result in diverse emotional states. The specifics of each form of pleasure are analyzed, and the reasons for their varying evaluations are explained. At the end of the dialogue, Socrates presents a universal value order. In this, proper measure, proportionality, takes the highest place, and pleasure – as far as it is justified – takes the lowest. Harmful pleasures are to be avoided. The right mixture of desired factors is supposed to enable a successful life and bring about a balanced emotional state. Protarchus agrees, while Philebus no longer comments. The Philebus is considered one of Plato's most challenging dialogues. Manuscripts of the work give it the subtitle "peri hēdonēs, ēthikos" ("ethics/moral concerning pleasure") implying that its topic is "concerning pleasure" and it is a work on ethics — that is, the question of what way of life is best. However, in addition to the core theme of pleasure, it discusses a range of other philosophical questions; "there are large parts in the dialogue that deal with dialectics and ontology but have nothing to do with pleasure and ethics, or if so, only indirectly". In modern research, the classification of all being into four classes by Socrates and the relationship of this classification to Plato's Theory of Forms and to his "unwritten doctrines" receive particular focus.
Socrates
, Paris)]] Socrates, as in most Platonic dialogues, is the main character, the knowledgeable philosopher who leads and dominates the debate and helps the others gain insights. Unlike in the early dialogues, where he holds back his own opinion and leads his interlocutors to new thoughts with purposeful questions, here he develops his own theory. Since the dialogue is a fictional literary construct, the concept that Plato puts in Socrates' mouth should not necessarily be regarded as the position of the historical Socrates, although some scholars have noted that the ethical attitude of the dialogue character roughly corresponds to that of his real-life model.
Philebus
Philebus is young, more a teenager than a young man. His beauty is repeatedly emphasized. His special relationship with the goddess of love Aphrodite, to whom he gives the name of pleasure (Hedone), apparently reflects his view that his commitment to hedonism is in line with the goddess. It is notable that Philebus, while being the title character and putting forward the initial thesis, leaves the defense of the thesis to Protarchus, while he himself rests and listens. He rarely speaks, and at the end, he silently accepts the refutation of his thesis. He is lazy, interested only in enjoyment, and shies away from the mental effort of a debate. His worldview is simple. His appearance and entire demeanor match the negative image of an incompetent, self-satisfied, and unteachable hedonist that the author wants to present to the reader. Friedländer suggests that Philebus does not participate in the philosophical investigation because he embodies an irrational principle that does not give an account of itself. There is no evidence outside the dialogue for the existence of a historical acquaintance of Socrates named Philebus. It is quite possible that he is a purely fictional character. This is suggested by the fact that no historical bearer of this name is known, and it is a nickname that fits the character ("youth lover" or "friend of youthful pleasure"). Further indicators of fictionality are that the name of his father is not mentioned, and Plato has not given him a profile that would allow for historical classification. It is possible that Plato attributed features of the mathematician and philosopher Eudoxus of Cnidus to Philebus. Eudoxus, a younger contemporary of Plato, was a hedonist, and the critique of hedonism in Philebus was, according to a research hypothesis, directed against his doctrine.
Protarchus
As a dialogue character, Protarchus, like Philebus, represents the Athenian upper class, in which educational efforts were valued and philosophical topics sparked interest during the time of Socrates. In contrast to Philebus, Protarchus proves to be willing to learn and flexible. He is modest and open to subjecting his hedonistic worldview to an unbiased examination, whereas Philebus declares from the beginning that he will not change his opinion. Eventually, Protarchus is convinced by Socrates, after having tried to defend his position for some time. Protarchus is considered by some scholars as more likely to be a historical person than Philebus, though doubts still exist. In the dialogue, Socrates calls him "son of Callias". Dorothea Frede believes that Protarchus was one of the two sons of the wealthy Athenian known in the scholarly literature as "Callias III" who are mentioned in Plato's Apology. They were, according to Plato's statements there, taught by the Sophist Euenus of Paros. In Philebus, Protarchus speaks respectfully of the famous rhetoric teacher Gorgias and identifies himself as his eager student. It is also possible that Plato's Protarchus is identifiable with an author – apparently a Rhetorician – of the same name cited by Aristotle.
Developing the preconditions (11a-31b)
Closer examination of pleasure and pain (31b-55c)
Pleasurable, painful, and moderate living (42c-53c)
Socrates now takes a new approach, starting from the observation that only relatively strong bodily changes are perceived and provoke pleasure and pain. He argues that there is not only a life shaped by pleasure and a life shaped by suffering, but also a third, neutral way of living where pleasure and pain hardly appear because the fluctuations in body condition are weak. With this statement, Socrates counters the doctrine of certain influential philosophers, who only distinguish between pleasure and pain and claim that pleasure consists of nothing other than the absence of pain or freedom from pain, thus in the neutral state. By defining pleasure merely as the absence of pain, they deny it any independent reality. Thus, they prove to be the sharpest opponents of hedonism. An argument by the pleasure-hostile philosophers could be: The strongest forms of pleasure and pain generate the greatest desires. Sick people experience more severe deficiencies than healthy ones. Therefore, they have more intense desires and feel stronger pleasure when these are satisfied. Their pleasure exceeds that of the healthy not in quantity but in intensity. Similarly, it is with the extravagant, who tend to excess: Their pleasure is more intense than that of the prudent and moderate, who do not overdo anything. This means: A poor state of body and soul enables the greatest pleasure. Thus, pleasure has its origin not in excellence (aretḗ), but in its opposite. For the purpose of testing the argument, Socrates first considers the three types of pleasure: those caused solely by physical conditions, those purely mental, and those caused by both factors. It turns out that in all three types, the most intense pleasures are by no means particularly pure – that is, free from aspects of displeasure. Rather, all of them are characterized by a significant admixture of displeasure. In the case of purely mental pleasures, this can be well observed in the theater, for example, in a tragedy, where the audience sheds tears and rejoices at the same time. In comedy, too, the mixture becomes apparent: The audience laughs, thus feeling pleasure, but the enjoyment is based on envy, a negative emotion, which is a form of displeasure. It is joy about an evil. One rejoices because the theater characters are ridiculous and fall victim to their ignorance and inability. Thus, pleasure and displeasure are mixed. This happens not only when watching events in the theater but also in the tragedy and comedy of life. The same applies to feelings such as anger, longing, grief, fear, and jealousy. All of these are not pure but mixed with pleasure and displeasure. Socrates has shown that many of the pleasures desired by humans – especially the most intense ones – cannot be explained as states of pure pleasure, but are based on a specific mixture of pleasure and displeasure. From this perspective, the designation "false pleasure" is justified. True or genuine are therefore only pure pleasures, i.e., pleasures that neither arise from the elimination of a displeasure nor themselves have an admixture of displeasure. The pure pleasures consist, as Socrates now explains, not in the absence of displeasure, but have their own reality and nature. They relate, for example, to beautiful colors and shapes as well as to pleasant smells and sounds. This also includes the joy of learning, of gaining knowledge. Such joys are moderate in contrast to the violent pleasures. Socrates emphasizes that it only depends on the purity of the pleasure, not on its quantity or intensity; the slightest pure pleasure is more pleasant, more beautiful, and truer than the greatest impure pleasure.
Transience of pleasure (53c-55c)
Socrates now raises another topic: the relationship of pleasure to Being and Becoming. This refers to the philosophical distinction between the eternal, perfect, and self-sufficient Being on the one hand, and the transient, imperfect, and dependent Becoming on the other. Being is cause, Becoming is caused. All pleasure arises and passes away. Since it belongs to the realm of the caused and transient, it has no true being, but only becoming. From this, its inferiority is evident, for all that becomes and is subject to decay is by nature defective and always in need of something else. Here Socrates returns to the initial question of the dialogue. His argument is: Everything that becomes is oriented towards a superior Being. Becoming is not an end in itself, but every process of becoming takes place for the sake of a Being. Thus, the Good as the highest value cannot be something that arises for the sake of something else, but only that for which Becoming arises. In this, Socrates believes he has shown that equating pleasure with the Good is ridiculous. He adds further arguments. Protarchus recognizes the cogency of the proof.
Investigation of reason (55c-59c)
Following the examination of the value of pleasure, Socrates subjects reason and knowledge to a similar scrutiny. Again, the question of "purity" and "truth" arises, here relating to the accuracy and reliability of the results provided by various fields of knowledge – crafts and sciences. When considering the utility of these fields from this perspective, the superiority of those disciplines involving calculation and measurement over the less precise ones, which rely on observation and estimation, becomes evident. At the same time, it becomes clear that pure theory, which deals with absolute facts, is fundamentally superior to Empirical science, which only deals with approximations. In this sense, pure geometry is above architecture as applied geometry. Of crucial importance for the systematics of science is the quality of the approach. In this respect, Dialectics, the expert, systematic analysis following the rules of logic, is superior to all other sciences. It deserves precedence because it provides the clearest and most accurate results with the highest degree of truth. Its object is the realm of the unchangeable being, to which absolute purity and truth belong. The more transient something is, the farther it is from the truth. There can be no reliable knowledge about changeable things.
Hierarchy of goods (59d-67b)
From the considerations so far, the hierarchy of goods emerges. Reason is closer to the True, the Real, the absolutely Good than pleasure, hence it stands above it in the hierarchy. However, reason is not identical with the Good, for otherwise it would suffice for man alone and pleasure would be unnecessary. In determining what is good in terms of human life, Socrates draws on the already gained knowledge that life is mixed with pleasure and displeasure, and therefore it depends on the right mix. Human life is a mixture of different factors. Now the question arises as to which types of knowledge should be included in the mix. It turns out that not only the highest and most reliable knowledge, pure theory, is needed for a successful life, but also some empirical and technical knowledge despite its inaccuracy. No subordinate knowledge can ever be harmful if the superior one is present, thus all types of knowledge are welcome. The case is different with pleasure. The greatest and most intense pleasures are very harmful, as they destroy knowledge. Therefore, only the "true" pleasures, which are pure and in harmony with temperance, are permissible. Now it is to be investigated what constitutes the good, valuable mix that enables a successful life. The question arises whether this crucial factor is more related to pleasure or to reason. Socrates finds the answer simple, even trivial, because everyone knows it: The quality of a mix always depends on the right measure and proportionality. Where these are lacking, there is always ruinous chaos. The right measure manifests itself in the form of beauty and excellence. Moreover, truth must always be mixed in. In human life, the Good does not appear immediately in its unity, but it can be grasped as beauty, appropriateness, and truth. The efficacy of the Good has "found refuge in the nature of the Beautiful". From these considerations, the exact determination of the hierarchical order of goods finally emerges. Reason is far superior to pleasure, as it has a greater share in truth as well as in measure and beauty. The highest of the goods below the absolutely Good is the right measure, followed by beauty, and thirdly reason. Fourth place is occupied by the sciences, arts, and true opinions, and fifth by the pure pleasures. This finding remains unchanged even if all oxen, horses, and other animals collectively advocate for the precedence of pleasure by pursuing it. Protarchus agrees to this also in the name of Philebus. Philebus no longer speaks.
Notes
Explanatory notes
Page numbers
Citations
References
Texts and translations
Philebus Jowett translation at StandardEbooks Bury, Robert G. (ed.). The Philebus of Plato. Cambridge University Press, 1897. Greek text, Introduction and notes. Greek text and parallel English translation by Fowler at Perseus Translations of the Philebus with Commentary Ancient and Medieval Commentaries with Translations
Modern secondary sources
Heinrich Dörrie, Matthias Baltes: Platonism in Antiquity, Vol. 3, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1993, p. 198. Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini (CPF), Part 1, Vol. 1***, Firenze 1999, p. 285–289, 508–512. Michael Franz: Schelling's Tübingen Plato Studies, Göttingen 1996, pp. 258 f., 269–276, 279. Pierre Garniron, Walter Jaeschke (eds.): Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Part 3, Hamburg 1996, pp. 30 f. Hermann Krings: Genesis and Matter. In: Hartmut Buchner (ed.): F. W. J. Schelling: “Timaeus” (1794), Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1994, pp. 115–155, here: 117–120, 123, 127 f., 140–142, 145; Lecture notes in: Friedrich Nietzsche: Works. Critical Complete Edition, Division 2, Vol. 4, Berlin 1995, p. 139 Dominic O’Meara: Neoplatonic Readings of the Philebus by Plato. In: Monique Dixsaut (ed.): The Fracture of Pleasure, Vol. 2, Paris 1999, p. 191–201. Gerd Van Riel (ed.): Damascius: Commentary on Plato's Philebus, Paris 2008, p. XII–XVII. Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: Plato. His Life and Works, 5th edition, Berlin 1959 (1st edition Berlin 1919), pp. 497 f.
Further reading
Schofield, Malcolm (1998, 2002). "Later dialogues" In E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved May 2019. Seeck, Gustav Adolf (2014). Platons Philebos. Ein kritischer Kommentar [Plato's Philebus. A Critical Commentary]. Zetemata, vol. 148. Munich: Beck, . 'Measure for Measure' section on the Philebus in "Plato's Ethics: An Overview" at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy The Unity of Plato's Philebus MW Isenberg - Classical Philology, 1940 More on the Structure of the "Philebus" S MacClintock - Phronesis, 1961 Interpreting the "Philebus" O Letwin - Phronesis, 1981 The limits of being in the Philebus RM Dancy - Apeiron, 2007 The Philebus C Meinwald - The Oxford Handbook of Plato, 2008
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