Pirate decryption

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Pirate decryption is the decryption, or decoding, of pay TV or pay radio signals without permission from the original broadcaster. The term "pirate" is used in the sense of copyright infringement. The MPA and other groups which lobby in favour of intellectual property (specifically copyright and trademark) regulations have labelled such decryption as "signal theft" and object to it, arguing that losing out on a potential chance to profit from a consumer's subscription fees counts as a loss of actual profit.

Pirate decryption is the decryption, or decoding, of pay TV or pay radio signals without permission from the original broadcaster. The term "pirate" is used in the sense of copyright infringement. The MPA and other groups which lobby in favour of intellectual property (specifically copyright and trademark) regulations have labelled such decryption as "signal theft" and object to it, arguing that losing out on a potential chance to profit from a consumer's subscription fees counts as a loss of actual profit.

Terminology and Definitions

Some of the terminology used to describe various devices, programs and techniques dealing with Pay-TV piracy is named for the particular hacks. The "Season" interface for example is named after the Season7 hack on Sky TV which allowed a PC to emulate a legitimate Sky-TV smartcard. The Season7 referred to the seventh and final season of Star Trek: The Next Generation which was then showing on Sky One. The "Phoenix" hack was named after the mythical bird which can reanimate itself. The hack itself reactivated smartcards that had been switched off by the providers. Some of the terminology used on Internet discussion sites to describe the various devices, programs and techniques used in dealing with video piracy is strange, non-standard, or specific to one system. The terms are often no different from the brand names used by legitimate products and serve the same function.

ISO/IEC 7816 smartcard terminology

ATR is the answer-to-reset data from an ISO/IEC 7816-compliant smartcard. A card reader would provide power, clock and reset signals to a smartcard, along with a bidirectional serial data interface to permit communication. On reset, the card would send a standard block of serial data (nominally at 9600 bit/s) to identify the card type and indicate the desired bitrate for further communication. The frequency of clock to be supplied may vary from one system or card type to another as it appears not to have been specified in the ISO standard. A smart card reader is a device that allows a computer to communicate with a smartcard. Technically, these are simple devices consisting of a smartcard socket, some voltage level conversion circuitry and a crystal oscillator to supply the card with its clock signal. Early models were connected to the serial port on computers so the interface circuitry had to convert between the ISO/IEC 7816 card voltage levels and the RS-232 voltage levels used by the computer's serial port. More recent models use a USB connection to the computer. The simplest of earlier devices was the Phoenix interface. More sophisticated readers are often used in systems where the personal computer itself is to be secured using smartcard systems. AVR and ATmega are trade names for a series of general-purpose 8-bit microcontroller chips manufactured by Atmel Corporation. The terms have been misused widely to refer to blank smartcards or various other hardware devices which were built around these processors. The widely available European funcard series of blank generic ISO/IEC 7816 smartcards were based upon the Atmel processor series; there was also a PIC card based on the Microchip Corporation PIC series of processors. Emulation refers to the use of a personal computer in place of a smartcard using an ISO/IEC 7816-compatible "Season" interface. The PC, as far as the decoder is concerned, becomes a legitimate smartcard due to the program running on it. The program responds like a legitimate smartcard. Sometimes, for development purposes, the PC is programmed to simulate the entire instruction set of the smartcard's microcontroller to allow smartcard code to be developed more readily. As some encryption systems require an application-specific IC (ASIC) on the card to perform decryption, a pirate would also use a card which had been "auxed" (reprogrammed to pass received computer data directly to the application-specific decryption chip) in order to employ such an emulation system. Alternatively, pirates can sometimes emulate the functionality of the ASIC itself to gain access to the encrypted data. A looped smartcard is one where defective or malicious program code written to non-volatile memory causes the smartcard's microcontroller to enter an endless loop on power-up or reset, rendering the card unusable. This is typically a countermeasure used by encryption system owners to permanently deactivate smartcards. In many cases, not even the ISO/IEC 7816 ATR message would be sent. Unloopers were smartcard repair stations intended to cause the card to skip one or more instructions by applying a "glitch" in some form to the power or clock signal in the hope of allowing the smartcard's microcontroller to exit from the endless loop. Bootloaders were hardware which used a similar "glitch" to break a card out of an endless loop on power-up each time the card was used; these did not provide any smartcard reprogramming ability. These could permit DirecTV "H" cards (now no longer in use) to operate despite the permanent damage done by malicious code during the "Black Sunday" attack of 2001. These devices are currently believed to be obsolete.

Receiver (IRD) and microprocessor terminology

DVB is an international standard for digital video broadcasting used by virtually all European broadcasters; some North American providers use incompatible proprietary standards such as DSS (DirecTV) or DigiCipher (Motorola) which predate the DVB standardisation effort. The packet size, tables and control information transmitted by proprietary systems require proprietary non-DVB receivers, even though the video itself nominally in some form will often still adhere to the MPEG-2 image compression standard defined by the Moving Picture Experts Group. An IRD is an integrated receiver-decoder, in other words a complete digital satellite TV or radio receiver; "decoder" in this context refers not to decryption but to the decompression and conversion of MPEG video into displayable format. FTA is often used to refer to receivers and equipment which contain no decryption hardware, built with the intention of being able to receive unencrypted free-to-air broadcasts; more properly FTA refers to the unencrypted broadcasts themselves. A CAM or conditional-access module is defined by the DVB standard as an interface between a standardised DVB Common Interface receiver and one or more proprietary smartcards for signal decryption. It is not the smartcard itself. The standard format of this module follows PCMCIA specifications; some receivers bypass the requirement for a separate module by providing embedded CAM functionality in the receiver to communicate with specific proprietary smartcards such as Nagravision, Conax, Irdeto, Viaccess, Betacrypt. In the North American market, most "package receivers" sold by signal providers provide embedded CAM operation; terminology is therefore often misused to misidentify the smartcard as a CAM. JTAG is a standard test interface defined by the Joint Test Action Group and supported on many late-model digital receivers for factory test purposes. Operating using a six-wire interface and a personal computer, the JTAG interface was originally intended to provide a means to test and debug embedded hardware and software. In the satellite TV world, JTAG is most often used to obtain read-write access to nonvolatile memory within a digital receiver; initially programs such as Wall and JKeys were used to read box keys from receivers with embedded CAMs but JTAG has since proven its legitimate worth to satellite TV fans as a repair tool to fix receivers where the firmware (in flash memory) has been corrupted. The Sombrero de Patel is another device used to obtain direct memory access to a receiver without physically removing memory chips from the board to place them in sockets or read them with a specialized device programmer. The device consists of a standard PLCC integrated circuit socket which has been turned upside-down in order to be placed directly over a microprocessor already permanently soldered to a printed circuit board in a receiver; the socket makes electrical contact with all pins of the microprocessor and is interfaced to one or more microcontrollers which use direct memory access to pause the receiver's microprocessor and read or write directly to the memory. The term sombrero is used for this hack as the novel use of an inverted IC socket somewhat resembles a hat being placed upon the main processor.

Counter-piracy techniques

A number of strategies have been used by providers to control or prevent the widespread pirate decryption of their signals. One approach has been to take legal action against dealers who sell equipment which may be of use to satellite pirates; in some cases the objective has been to obtain lists of clients in order to take or threaten to take costly legal action against end-users. Providers have created departments with names like the "office of signal integrity" or the "end-users group" to pursue alleged pirate viewers. As some equipment (such as a computer interface to communicate with standard ISO/IEC 7816 smartcards) is useful for other purposes, this approach has drawn strong opposition from groups such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation. There have also been US counter-suits alleging that the legal tactics used by some DBS providers to demand large amounts of money from end-users may themselves appear unlawful or border on extortion. Much of the equipment is perfectly lawful to own; in these cases, only the misuse of the equipment to pirate signals is prohibited. This makes provider attempts at legal harassment of would-be pirates awkward at best, a problem for providers which is growing due to the Internet distribution of third-party software to reprogram some otherwise legitimate free-to-air DVB receivers to decrypt pay TV broadcasts with no extra hardware. US-based Internet sites containing information about the compromised encryption schemes have also been targeted by lawyers, often with the objective of costing the defendants enough in legal fees that they have to shut down or move their sites to offshore or foreign Internet hosts. In some cases, the serial numbers of unsubscribed smartcards have been blacklisted by providers, causing receivers to display error messages. A "hashing" approach of writing arbitrary data to every available location on the card and requiring that this data be present as part of the decryption algorithm has also been tried as a way of leaving less available free space for third-party code supplied by pirates. Another approach has been to load malicious code onto smartcards or receivers; these programs are intended to detect tampered cards and maliciously damage the cards or corrupt the contents of non-volatile memories within the receiver. This particular Trojan horse attack is often used as an ECM (electronic countermeasure) by providers, especially in North America where cards and receivers are sold by the providers themselves and are easy targets for insertion of backdoors in their computer firmware. The most famous ECM incident was the "Black Sunday" attack launched against tampered DirecTV "H" on January 21, 2001. It intended to destroy the cards by overwriting a non-erasable part of the cards internal memory in order to lock the processor into an endless loop. DirectTV could remotely reprogram specific smart cards as well as receivers, and receivers were programmed to reject unwritable cards, which were used by pirates to prevent card deactivation. Then smart cards were remotely reprogrammed to boot loop. This remote programming technique was used by DirectTV several times in the 1990s and early 2000s. The results of a provider resorting to the use of malicious code are usually temporary at best, as knowledge of how to repair most damage tends to be distributed rapidly by hobbyists through various Internet forums. There is also a potential legal question involved (which has yet to be addressed) as the equipment is normally the property not of the provider but of the end user. Providers will often print on the smartcard itself that the card is the property of the signal provider, but at least one legal precedent indicates that marking "this is mine" on a card, putting it in a box with a receiver and then selling it can legally mean "this is not mine anymore". Malicious damage to receiver firmware puts providers on even shakier legal ground in the unlikely event that the matter were ever to be heard by the judiciary. The only solution which has shown any degree of long-term success against tampered smartcards has been the use of digital renewable security; if the code has been broken and the contents of the smartcard's programming widely posted across the Internet, replacing every smartcard in every subscriber's receiver with one of different, uncompromised design will effectively put an end to a piracy problem. Providers tend to be slow to go this route due to cost (as many have millions of legitimate subscribers, each of which must be sent a new card) and due to concern that someone may eventually crack the code used in whatever new replacement card is used, causing the process to begin anew. Premiere in Germany has replaced all of its smartcards with the Nagravision Aladin card; the US DirecTV system has replaced its three compromised card types ("F" had no encryption chip, "H" was vulnerable to being reprogrammed by pirates and "HU" were vulnerable to a "glitch" which could be used to make them skip an instruction). Both providers have been able to eliminate their problems with signal piracy by replacing the compromised smartcards after all other approaches had proved to provide at best limited results. Dish Network and Bell Satellite TV had released new and more tamper-resistant smart cards over the years, known as the ROM2, ROM3, ROM10, ROM11 series. All these cards used the Nagravision 1 access system. Despite introducing newer and newer security measures, older cards were typically still able to decrypt the satellite signal after new cards were released (A lack of EEPROM space on the ROM2 cards eventually led to them being unable to receive updates necessary to view programming). In an effort to stop piracy, as by this point the Nagravision 1 system had been thoroughly reverse-engineered by resourceful hobbyists, an incompatible Nagravision 2 encryption system was introduced along with a smart card swap-out for existing customers. As more cards were swapped, channel groups were slowly converted to the new encryption system, starting with pay-per-view and HDTV channels, followed by the premium movie channels. This effort culminated in a complete shutdown of the Nagravision 1 datastream for all major channels in September 20051. Despite these efforts to secure their programming, a software hack was released in late August 2005, allowing for the decryption of the new Nagravision 2 channels with a DVB-S card and a PC. Just a few months later, early revisions of the Nagravision 2 cards had been themselves compromised. Broadcast programming currently uses a simulcrypt of Nagravision 2 and Nagravision 3, a first step toward a possible future shutdown of Nagravision 2 systems. Dish Network gradually replaced the smart cards of all paying customers to allow for a shutdown of previous vulnerable encryption systems, eliminating pirates with it. During this replacement, since pirate cards could decrypt all channels without discrimination, only pirate cards could access a special channel broadcasting an anti piracy video on a loop, offering viewers dish network subscriptions. Regular cards could not decrypt this channel. Murdoch Victory, Jury Rejects Spying Charges BBC - Canal+ TV firm sues over 1-bn 'piracy' loss Murdoch caught up in corporate sabotage scandal Echostar joins piracy fight DirecTV hacker sentenced to seven years Murdoch's Satellite-TV Hacker Tells All DSS Piracy History Lesson

Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1373597993 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.

References

  1. ↩Wikipedia “Pirate decryption” revision 1373597993 · retrieved 2026-10-20 release date (×1) · confidence 0.95 revision URL