Point 5353

Point 5353 (also called Point 17561, and Marpo La Peak ) is a mountain peak on the Line of Control dividing the Indian- and Pakistani-administered portions of Kashmir in the vicinity of Dras in the Kargil district.

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Point 5353 (also called Point 17561, and Marpo La Peak ) is a mountain peak on the Line of Control dividing the Indian- and Pakistani-administered portions of Kashmir in the vicinity of Dras in the Kargil district. It is the highest peak along the Marpo La ridge and dominates the entire area on both the sides of the Line of Control.

The peak became a subject of controversy after the Kargil War. Soon after the war had ended The Hindu correspondent Praveen Swami and an Indian opposition party leader, Ram Kumar Anand claimed that the peak was inside the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) and it was captured by the Pakistan Army during the Kargil War.

They also claimed that the Indian troops had unsuccessfully tried to recapture Point 5353 on 18 May 1999. The report also added that Indian troops captured Point 5310 on the Pakistani side of LoC in retaliation in April 2000.

The Pakistani military has held possession of Point 5353 from the time of the war, whereas the Indian Army has held the peaks in its surrounding on either side with a view to counteract any Pakistani activity on 5353.

Strategic significance, and the surrounding area

The Marpo La ridge originates from the Pakistani side of the Line of Control and consists of a succession of mountain peaks that overlook the Mashkoh and Dras valleys in the Indian-administered Kashmir. It dominates the entire Dras sector. Point 5353 is a prominent peak on this ridge, overlooking the strategic National Highway 1 of India linking Srinagar to Leh.

It is at an aeral distance of 12 km from Dras, which lies on the National Highway 1. In 1999, Pakistani forces occupied the high peaks that the Indian army had vacated with the onset of the winter in the region and directed artillery fire at the highway, which led to Indian retaliation and the small-scale conflict known as the Kargil War.

The Indian Army fought to regain control of peaks it had lost to the intruders on its side of the LoC. These included Tiger Hill and Tololing peaks and ridgelines, which posed a more direct threat to the highway. Point 5353 was not cleared during the war. Its status, along with that of the nearby peaks—Points 5165 and 5240—was settled during the negotiations after the end of hostilities.

The two sides had then agreed to leave Point 5353 as well Points 5165 and 5240, the heights which surround it on either side on the Marpola ridge, unoccupied, based on the consensus that had been reached during the negotiations. However, the consensus did not survive the immediate post-Kargil period.

The Indians reoccupied Point 5240, besides Point 5165, in August 1999, while the Pakistanis, in turn, took control of Point 5353. For Pakistan, the strategic significance and their purpose for holding onto this feature lie in the fact that it provides them a view of the strategically important Marpo La pass, which India dominates.

According to one assessment, without Point 5353, they had been finding it difficult to do so. Even before the Kargil war, the Pakistani military planners had been becoming increasingly concerned about their vulnerabilities in this region, having lost posts on the LoC at Marpo La to India before in the pre-Kargil period.

To the south of the feature on the Pakistani side, however, lies a strongly glaciated tract, rendering the terrain inhospitable to the Pakistani army, which as a result has been pushed 5–6 km at the back, along the Shingo river, for building defences. This, as a result, has greatly degraded the tactical usefulness of this feature.

India, in turns, controls Point 5070, a strategically important peak along the Marpo La pass. It lies on the Pakistani side of the LoC, about 10 km west of Point 5353. The rest of the area in this region is glaciated, including what is called the Pariyon Ka Talab (literally meaning, "the pond of fairies").

Whereas the Indian supplies are moved along a path hugging the Sando nullah, Pakistani supplies are moved through the Palawar-Bunyal road, which runs along the Shingo river. Their supplies are first off-loaded in nearby villages such as Gultari and Farnshat, then sent to frontline positions including Point 5353.

The Indian deployment on the 18,400 feet (5608 metres) mountain feature in the Kaksar sector along the LoC assumes significance in this context, for this feature overlooks the Shingo river valley in Pakistan. Sitting at this height, the Indian troops can subject the Palawar-Bunyal road to artillery fire at their convenience.

Indian troops are also deployed on the adjacent Point 5240, which is another important feature that allows observation of the area. Both Points 5070 and 5240 also overlook the Pakistani supply route for Point 5353. Point 5353, in turn, dominates the eastern shoulder of the Marpo La pass and the Sando nullah approach to the pass.

Since it is the tallest peak in the immediate area, it is said to be a "dominating feature". For the Pakistani army, the access to this peak has not led to a significant increase in their capacity to observe the Indian highway. Several of its posts, on its side of the LoC, such as Point 5108, Twin Bumps and Taimur offer it a comparatively better view of the highway.

According to a senior Indian army artillery officer who had served in the area, India enjoys the advantage in this region, for it can subject greater stretches of Palawar-Bunyal Road under artillery fire. According to him, a number of Indian posts offer the Indian army an "unrivalled visibility" of the road.

The Indian Army says that the Pakistani occupation of Point 5353 does not pose a great threat to the National Highway or to its supply lines, and that the peak is not comparable in strategic importance to Tololing and Tiger Hill. Former Lt. Col. Kuldip Singh Ludra states, Point 5353 "dominates, by observation and fire, the complete area on both side of the Line of Control."

In 2000, Praveen Swami claimed in his reports that from Point 5353, the Pakistani army could direct artillery fire up to a 20 km stretch of the Indian highway. In the wake of artillery duels during Operation Parakram, however, he noted that the Pakistani soldiers at Point 5353 were unable to do so, whereas the Indians were able to blow up the Pakistani positions on Point 5353 using Bofors howitzers from the surrounding heights of Point 5165, Point 5240 and Point 5100.

Indian army officers state, citing what they call an "intervisibility exercise on a detailed contour map" that the Pakistani soldiers from a point 12 km away could observe only about 0.5 to 1 km of the road.

The pre-Kargil period

In his book, MASHKOH: Kargil as I saw it, Brigadier Umesh Singh Bawa, who was the commanding officer of his unit 17 Jat at that time, writes that in June 1998, when his unit was sent to Uplona, Baramulla for a mountain warfare course, he knew "something was brewing" over the LoC in the wake of the nuclear explosions that the two countries had carried out earlier in the same year. At that time, the Pakistani army had been shelling the Indian highway to specifically target the Indian vehicles that were being used to transport supplies for the forthcoming winter.

In retribution for the shelling, the Indian senior commanders had ordered Bawa's 17 Jat, besides 14 JAK RIF, which was till then held in reserves, for carrying out offensive operations across the LoC. Bawa's unit was then moved to Sonamarg in early-September 1998, and was allowed the time for the requisite acclimatization and preparation. Bawa narrates that his unit was allotted the task of capturing Point 5353, "across the LoC, close to Marpo La", with a view to silence the artillery observation post that had been supervising the shelling on the Indian highway and elsewhere in Dras.

Bawa's objective was in the area of responsibility of 16 Grenadiers, which was the holding battalion, based in Dras, and had two companies deployed on the LoC in the area. Its commanding officer, Colonel Pushpinder Oberoi, Bawa learned through liaison, was not keen on the prospect of carrying out offensive operations across the LoC, as he thought that would entail changing the status quo, which would have created tensions in the region.

But Bawa states, "I had a task in hand and had to complete what come may". Bawa proceeded about his task collecting information and drawing up his plan.

He wanted the 16 grenadiers to send patrols to guide his unit as they were new to the area, but as it turned out the 16 grenadiers themselves had no idea about the terrain, for they had not sent patrols across the LoC hitherto themselves. Bawa realized during the planning that the task at hand was going to be daunting, and fraught with peril.

The feature had extremely steep slopes on the front face, due to which an assault from the front could not be mounted. The rear slopes were found to be more gradual, but attacking from the rear, Bawa said, entailed crossing the LoC at night and the risk of getting detected by dawn as the area lacked any cover.

Bawa was still contemplating about his course of action, when, in late September 1998, the Indian PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee initiated a peace process with the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, in the form of back channel efforts. Thereafter, the operations were put on hold and ultimately countermanded by the army.

Point 5353 during the Kargil war

Some correspondents state that during the Kargil War itself there was never any doubt about the orientation of Point 5353 or the Army's intent to recapture it. For instance, PTI reported in August 1999, "Meanwhile, fighting is still going on for recapturing the point 5353 in Mushkoh valley, situated on the Line of Control (LOC), which Islamabad claims to be part of Pakistan."

Controversy after the Kargil War

Soon after the Kargil War was over, some Indian media reported that Point 5353, a strategically important peak in the Dras sector, was still under Pakistan's control. After this, the Indian Army said that the media reports were an "inspired" campaign to malign their image. They said that the peak was never in Indian possession.

Other commentaries

General Malik, in an interview to Rediff.com on 27 July 2001, when asked about to "clarify the controversy about Point 5353, which has reportedly been taken over by Pakistan?", said: "That is not true. The 1972 letter clearly shows, both on the map and in writing, that the LoC passes through 5353.

Some of the Point's features are occupied by them and some by us. But the fact is that if you want to attack Point 5353, you would have to come via the Pakistani side. It is not with us. We had never occupied it. Point 5353 had been vacated by them for a while when the talks were going on.

Then they reoccupied it, that's all. I don't know how this controversy started. But I saw the hand-sketched map in which somebody had put 5353 right next to Tiger Hill.

That is wrong!" In June 2004, in the wake of the Subramaniam Committee report, Retired Brigadier Surinder Singh, who commanded the 121 Infantry Brigade and was sacked for alleged poor performance, claimed that the Point 5353, which was "adjacent to Tiger Hill", was 300 meters inside Indian territory.

While rejecting the reports of the Subramaniam Committee, he told reporters that this committee was instituted to "cover up government`s failure and save the army`s top brass," while demanding the then Indian defence minister Pranab Mukherjee`s intervention for checking into the "authenticity" of the Pakistani troops' occupancy at Point 5353.

See also

List of mountains in Pakistan Shangruti

Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1376786750 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.

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