Preference falsification

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Preference falsification is the act of misrepresenting a preference under perceived public pressure. It involves publicly expressing a preference that differs from one's underlying privately held preference (or simply, a public preference at odds with one’s private preference).

People frequently convey to each other preferences that differ from what they would communicate privately under credible cover of anonymity (such as in opinion surveys to researchers or pollsters). Techniques such as list experiments can be used to uncover preference falsification.

The term was coined by economist and political scientist Timur Kuran in a 1987 article, "Chameleon voters and public choice." In the article, Kuran argued that widely disliked policies may appear popular when controversial issues induce preference falsification.

The distribution of public preferences, which Kuran defines as public opinion, may differ greatly from private opinion, which is the distribution of private preferences known only to individuals themselves. Kuran developed the implications in a 1995 book, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification.

He argues that preference falsification is not only ubiquitous but has major social and political consequences.…

Preference falsification is the act of misrepresenting a preference under perceived public pressure. It involves publicly expressing a preference that differs from one's underlying privately held preference (or simply, a public preference at odds with one’s private preference).

People frequently convey to each other preferences that differ from what they would communicate privately under credible cover of anonymity (such as in opinion surveys to researchers or pollsters). Techniques such as list experiments can be used to uncover preference falsification.

The term was coined by economist and political scientist Timur Kuran in a 1987 article, "Chameleon voters and public choice." In the article, Kuran argued that widely disliked policies may appear popular when controversial issues induce preference falsification.

The distribution of public preferences, which Kuran defines as public opinion, may differ greatly from private opinion, which is the distribution of private preferences known only to individuals themselves. Kuran developed the implications in a 1995 book, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification.

He argues that preference falsification is not only ubiquitous but has major social and political consequences. He provides a theory of how preference falsification shapes collective illusions, sustains social stability, distorts human knowledge, and conceals political possibilities.

Collective illusion is an occurrence when most people in a group go along with an idea or a preference that they don't agree with, because they incorrectly believe that most people in the group agree with it.

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Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1378289126 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.

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