Lesson plan

Preimage attack

In cryptography, a preimage attack on cryptographic hash functions tries to find a message that has a specific hash value. A cryptographic hash function should resist attacks on its preimage (set of possible inputs). In the context of attack, there are two types of preimage resistance: * preimage resistance: for essentially all pre-specified outputs, it is computationally infeasible to find any input that hashes to that output; i.e., given , it is difficult to find an such that . * second-preimage resistance: for a specified input, it is computationally infeasible to find another input which produces the same output; i.e., given , it is difficult to find a second input such that . These can be compared with a collision resistance, in which it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs , that hash to the same output; i.e., such that . Collision resistance implies second-preimage resistance, but does not guarantee preimage resistance. However, under certain assumptions of the range of the hash function, collision resistance does imply preimage resistance (by a provisional implication) . Conversely, a second-preimage attack implies a collision attack (trivially, since, in addition to , is already known right from the start). Via the provisional implication, a preimage attack will also imply a second-preimage attack, which then also extends to a collision attack.

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Article summary

In cryptography, a preimage attack on cryptographic hash functions tries to find a message that has a specific hash value. A cryptographic hash function should resist attacks on its preimage (set of possible inputs). In the context of attack, there are two types of preimage resistance: * preimage resistance: for essentially all pre-specified outputs, it is computationally infeasible to find any input that hashes to that output; i.e., given , it is difficult to find an such that . * second-preimage resistance: for a specified input, it is computationally infeasible to find another input which produces the same output; i.e., given , it is difficult to find a second input such that . These can be compared with a collision resistance, in which it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs , that hash to the same output; i.e., such that . Collision resistance implies second-preimage resistance, but does not guarantee preimage resistance. However, under certain assumptions of the range of the hash function, collision resistance does imply preimage resistance (by a provisional implication) . Conversely, a second-preimage attack implies a collision attack (trivially, since, in addition to , is already known right from the start). Via the provisional implication, a preimage attack will also imply a second-preimage attack, which then also extends to a collision attack.

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Discussion questions

  1. Summarise the article in your own words. Which single claim would you verify first, and why?
  2. Which claim in this article is most likely to be revised as the sources update? How would you check its current status?
  3. If two sources disagreed about one of these facts, what would you need in order to trust one over the other?

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Key claims and bibliography are generated from the same tracked claims and sources as the article page.