Prospect theory

, who won the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for his work developing prospect theory Prospect theory is a theory of behavioral economics, judgment and decision making that was developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in 1979.

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, who won the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for his work developing prospect theory Prospect theory is a theory of behavioral economics, judgment and decision making that was developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in 1979. The theory was cited in the decision to award Kahneman the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics.

Based on results from controlled studies, it describes how individuals assess their loss and gain perspectives in an asymmetric manner (see loss aversion). For example, for some individuals, the pain from losing $1,000 could only be compensated by the pleasure of earning $2,000.

Thus, contrary to the expected utility theory (which models the decision that perfectly rational agents would make), prospect theory aims to describe the actual behavior of people. In the original formulation of the theory, the term prospect referred to the predictable results of a lottery.

However, prospect theory can also be applied to the prediction of other forms of behaviors and decisions. Prospect theory challenges the expected utility theory developed by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944 and constitutes one of the first economic theories built using experimental methods.

History

In the draft received by the economist Richard Thaler in 1976, the term "Value Theory" was used instead of Prospect Theory. Later on, Kahneman and Tversky changed the title to Prospect Theory to avoid possible confusions. According to Kahneman, the new title was 'meaningless.'

Model

The theory describes the decision processes in two stages: During an initial phase termed editing, outcomes of a decision are ordered according to a certain heuristic. In particular, people decide which outcomes they consider equivalent, set a reference point and then consider lesser outcomes as losses and greater ones as gains. The editing phase aims to alleviate any framing effects.

It also aims to resolve isolation effects stemming from individuals' propensity to often isolate consecutive probabilities instead of treating them together. The editing process can be viewed as composed of coding, combination, segregation, cancellation, simplification and detection of dominance.

In the subsequent evaluation phase, people behave as if they would compute a value (utility), based on the potential outcomes and their respective probabilities, and then choose the alternative having a higher utility. The formula that Kahneman and Tversky assume for the evaluation phase is (in its simplest form) given by: V = \sum_{i=1}^n \pi(p_i)v(x_i) where V is the overall or expected utility of the outcomes to the individual making the decision, x_1,x_2,\ldots,x_n are the potential outcomes and p_1,p_2,\dots,p_n their respective probabilities and v is a function that assigns a value to an outcome.

The value function that passes through the reference point is s-shaped and asymmetrical. Losses hurt more than gains feel good (i.e., there is loss aversion). This differs from expected utility theory, in which a rational agent is indifferent to the reference point, i.e. does not care how the outcome of losses and gains are framed.

The function \pi is a probability weighting function and captures the idea that people tend to overreact to small probability events, but underreact to large probabilities. Let (x,p;y,q) denote a prospect with outcome x with probability p and outcome y with probability q , and nothing with probability 1-p-q . If (x,p;y,q) is a regular prospect (i.e., either p+q , or x \geq 0 \geq y , or x \leq 0 \leq y ), then: V(x,p;y,q)=\pi(p)\nu(x)+\pi(q)\nu(y) However, if p+q=1 and either x>y>0 or x , then: V(x,p;y,q)=\nu(y)+\pi(p) \left[ \nu (x)- \nu (y) \right] It can be deduced from the first equation that \nu(y)+\nu(-y)>\nu(x)+\nu(-x) and \nu(-y)+\nu(-x)>\nu(x)+\nu(-x) . The value function is thus defined on deviations from the reference point, generally concave for gains and commonly convex for losses and steeper for losses than for gains.

If (x,p) is equivalent to (y,pq) then (x,pr) is not preferred to (y,pqr) , but from the first equation it follows that \pi(p)\nu(x)+\pi(pq)\nu(y)=\pi(pq)\nu(y) , which leads to \pi(pr)\nu(x) \leq \pi(pqr)\nu(y) , therefore: \frac{\pi \left( pq \right)}{\pi \left( p \right)}\leq\frac{\pi \left( pqr \right)}{\pi \left( pr \right)} This means that for a fixed ratio of probabilities the decision weights are closer to unity when probabilities are low than when they are high. In prospect theory, \pi is never linear.

In the case that x>y>0 , p>p' and p+q=p'+q' prospect (x,p';y,q) dominates prospect (x,p';y,q') , which means that \pi(p)\nu(x)+\pi(q)\nu(y)>\pi(p')\nu(x)+\pi(q')\nu(y) , therefore: \frac{\pi \left( p \right)-\pi(p')}{\pi \left( q' \right)-\pi\left( q \right)}\leq \frac{\nu\left( y \right)}{\nu\left( x \right)} As y \rightarrow x , \pi(p)-\pi(p') \rightarrow \pi(q')-\pi(q) , but since p-p'=q'-q , it would imply that \pi must be linear; however, dominated alternatives are brought to the evaluation phase since they are eliminated in the editing phase. Although direct violations of dominance never happen in prospect theory, it is possible that a prospect A dominates B, B dominates C but C dominates A. The value function is normally concave for gains, commonly convex for losses, and is generally steeper for losses than for gains.

These geometric properties indicate risk-aversion for gains and risk-seeking for losses, thereby characterizing loss aversion. These properties were derived inductively from experimental observations. The first purely deductive, mathematical proof of the value function's properties is presented after decades.

The proof demonstrates a first-principles derivation of the S-shape, loss-averse value function using a partial differential equation (PDE) \beta^2 U_{xx}=U_{yy} . This provides a microfoundation to shed light on the empirical rule.

Example

To see how prospect theory can be applied, consider the decision to buy insurance. Assume the probability of the insured risk is 1%, the potential loss is $1,000 and the premium is $15. If we apply prospect theory, we first need to set a reference point.

This could be the current wealth or the worst case (losing $1,000). If we set the frame to the current wealth, the decision would be to either 1. Pay $15 for insurance, which yields a prospect-utility of v(-15) , OR 2.

Enter a lottery with possible outcomes of $0 (probability 99%) or −$1,000 (probability 1%), which yields a prospect-utility of \pi(0.01) \times v(-1000) + \pi(0.99) \times v(0) = \pi(0.01) \times v(-1000) . According to prospect theory, \pi(0.01) > 0.01 , because low probabilities are usually overweighted; v(-15) / v(-1000) > 0.015 , by the convexity of value function in losses.

The comparison between \pi(0.01) and v(-15) / v(-1000) is not immediately evident. However, for typical value and weighting functions, \pi(0.01)>v(-15) / v(-1000) , and hence \pi(0.01) \times v(-1000) . That is, a strong overweighting of small probabilities is likely to undo the effect of the convexity of v in losses, making the insurance attractive.

If we set the frame to -$1,000, we have a choice between v(985) and \pi(0.99) \times v(1000) . In this case, the concavity of the value function in gains and the underweighting of high probabilities can also lead to a preference for buying the insurance.

The interplay of overweighting of small probabilities and concavity-convexity of the value function leads to the so-called fourfold pattern of risk attitudes: risk-averse behavior when gains have moderate probabilities or losses have small probabilities; risk-seeking behavior when losses have moderate probabilities or gains have small probabilities. Below is an example of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes.

The first item in each quadrant shows an example prospect (e.g. 95% chance of winning $10,000 is high probability and a gain). The second item in the quadrant shows the focal emotion that the prospect is likely to evoke. The third item indicates how most people would behave given each of the prospects (either Risk Averse or Risk Seeking).

The fourth item states expected attitudes of a potential defendant and plaintiff in discussions of settling a civil suit. Probability distortion is that people generally do not look at the value of probability uniformly between 0 and 1.

Lower probability is said to be over-weighted (that is, a person is overly concerned with the outcome of the probability) while medium to high probability is under-weighted (that is, a person is not concerned enough with the outcome of the probability). The exact point in which probability goes from over-weighted to under-weighted is arbitrary, but a good point to consider is probability = 0.33.

A person values probability = 0.01 much more than the value of probability = 0 (probability = 0.01 is said to be over-weighted). However, a person has about the same value for probability = 0.4 and probability = 0.5. Also, the value of probability = 0.99 is much less than the value of probability = 1, a sure thing (probability = 0.99 is under-weighted).

A little more in depth when looking at probability distortion is that π(p) + π(1 − p) < 1 (where π(p) is probability in prospect theory).

Limits and extensions

The original version of prospect theory gave rise to violations of first-order stochastic dominance. That is, prospect A might be preferred to prospect B even if the probability of receiving a value x or greater is at least as high under prospect B as it is under prospect A for all values of x, and is greater for some value of x. Later theoretical improvements overcame this problem, but at the cost of introducing intransitivity in preferences.

A revised version, called cumulative prospect theory overcame this problem by using a probability weighting function derived from rank-dependent expected utility theory. Cumulative prospect theory can also be used for infinitely many or even continuous outcomes (for example, if the outcome can be any real number).

An alternative solution to overcome these problems within the framework of (classical) prospect theory has been suggested as well. The reference point in the prospect theory inverse s-shaped graph also could lead to limitations due to it possibly being discontinuous at that point and having a geometric violation.

This would lead to limitations in regards to accounting for the zero-outcome effect, the absence of behavioral conditionality in risky decisions as well as limitations in deriving the curve. A transitionary concave-convex universal system was proposed to eliminate this limitation.

Critics from the field of psychology argued that even if Prospect Theory arose as a descriptive model, it offers no psychological explanations for the processes stated in it. Furthermore, factors that are equally important to decision making processes have not been included in the model, such as emotion.

A relatively simple ad hoc decision strategy, the priority heuristic, has been suggested as an alternative model. While it can predict the majority choice in all (one-stage) gambles in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and predicts the majority choice better than cumulative prospect theory across four different data sets with a total of 260 problems, this heuristic, however, fails to predict many simple decision situations that are typically not tested in experiments and it also does not explain heterogeneity between subjects.

Beyond these theoretical developments, research on the description–experience gap has extended prospect theory to situations in which people learn about risk from feedback rather than from explicit probability information. When individuals repeatedly sample outcomes and receive feedback, they often underweight rare events, whereas when they make choices based only on descriptive information, they tend to overweight the same rare events.

Studies comparing experience-based and description-based choices show that the probability weighting posited by prospect theory can reverse depending on how information about outcomes is acquired. This line of work suggests that the subjective transformation of probabilities is shaped not only by the formal structure of a prospect but also by learning processes, sampling variability, and the presence or absence of immediate feedback, highlighting important boundary conditions for the application of prospect theory.

An international survey in 53 countries, published in Theory and Decision in 20171, confirmed that prospect theory describes decisions on lotteries well, not only in Western countries, but across many different cultures. The study also found cultural and economic factors influencing systematically average prospect theory parameters.

A study published in Nature Human Behaviour in 20201 replicated research on prospect theory and concluded that it successfully replicated: "We conclude that the empirical foundations for prospect theory replicate beyond any reasonable thresholds."

Critiques

Although prospect theory is a largely celebrated idea in behavioral economics it does have limitations. The reference point has been argued to be difficult to precisely determine in any given context. Many external factors can influence what the reference point is and thus makes it difficult to define what a “gain” and a “loss” actually is.

Kőszegi and Rabin (2007) present the idea of a personal equilibrium in decision making. This is essentially the premise that expectations and context have a large impact on determining the reference point and therefore the perception of “gains” and “losses”.

Considering personal equilibrium and choice with risk creates even more ambiguity about the perception of what the reference point may be. Some critics have charged that while prospect theory seeks to predict what people choose, it does not adequately describe the actual process of decision-making.

For example, Nathan Berg and Gerd Gigerenzer claim that neither classical economics nor prospect theory provide a convincing explanation of how people actually make decisions. They go so far as to claim that prospect theory is even more demanding of cognitive resources than classical expected utility theory.

Moreover, scholars have raised doubts about the degree to which framing effects matter. For instance, John List argues that framing effects diminish in complex decision environments. His experimental evidence suggests that as actors gain experience with the consequences of competitive markets, they behave more like rational actors and the impact of prospect theory diminishes.

Steven Kachelmeier and Mohamed Shehata find little support for prospect theory among experimental subjects in China. They do not, however, make a cultural argument against prospect theory. Rather, they conclude that when payoffs are large relative to net wealth, the effect of prospect theory diminishes.

Further reading

Easterlin, Richard A. "Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot?", in Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler (1991). “Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (1): 193–206.

Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky, eds. (2000). Choices, Values, and Frames. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Quattrone, George A., and Amos Tversky (1988). “Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice.” American Political Science Review 82 (3): 719–736.

An introduction to Prospect Theory Prospect Theory

Text derived from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1372777528 under CC BY-SA 4.0; modifications have been made.

References

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