Putinism

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at the party congress of United Russia in 2011 Putinism ( ) is the social, political, and economic system of Russia formed during the political leadership of Vladimir Putin. It is characterized by the concentration of political and financial powers in the hands of "siloviks", current and former "people with shoulder marks", coming from a total of 22 governmental enforcement agencies, the majority of them being the Federal Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, Armed Forces of Russia, and National Guard of Russia. According to Arnold Beichman, "Putinism in the 21st century has become as significant a watchword as Stalinism was in the 20th." The "Chekist takeover" of the Russian state and economic assets has been allegedly accomplished by a clique of Putin's close associates and friends who gradually became a leading group of Russian oligarchs and who "seized control over the financial, media and administrative resources of the Russian state", and restricted democratic freedoms and human rights. According to Julie Anderson, Russia has been transformed to an "FSB state". Mass de-politicization has been described as an important element of Putinism's social course. Mass social involvement being discouraged, politics are reduced to "pure management" left to those who are in power, free from interference by the masses.…

at the party congress of United Russia in 2011 Putinism ( ) is the social, political, and economic system of Russia formed during the political leadership of Vladimir Putin. It is characterized by the concentration of political and financial powers in the hands of "siloviks", current and former "people with shoulder marks", coming from a total of 22 governmental enforcement agencies, the majority of them being the Federal Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, Armed Forces of Russia, and National Guard of Russia. According to Arnold Beichman, "Putinism in the 21st century has become as significant a watchword as Stalinism was in the 20th." The "Chekist takeover" of the Russian state and economic assets has been allegedly accomplished by a clique of Putin's close associates and friends who gradually became a leading group of Russian oligarchs and who "seized control over the financial, media and administrative resources of the Russian state", and restricted democratic freedoms and human rights. According to Julie Anderson, Russia has been transformed to an "FSB state". Mass de-politicization has been described as an important element of Putinism's social course. Mass social involvement being discouraged, politics are reduced to "pure management" left to those who are in power, free from interference by the masses. In foreign affairs, Putinism has been described as nationalist and neo-imperialist.

Terminology

Putinism was first used in the article by Andrey Piontkovsky published on 11 January 2000 in Sovetskaya Rossiya, and placed on the Yabloko website on the same day. He characterized Putinism as "the highest and final stage of bandit capitalism in Russia, the stage where, as one half-forgotten classic said, the bourgeoisie throws the flag of the democratic freedoms and the human rights overboard; and also as a war, 'consolidation' of the nation on the ground of hatred against some ethnic group, attack on freedom of speech and information brainwashing, isolation from the outside world and further economic degradation".

Characteristics of Putinism highlighted by publicists and journalists

Authoritarianism; Personality cult of Putin as a "national hero", through glorification in the media; Strong presidential power, strengthened even in comparison with the era of Boris Yeltsin; Strong state control over property; "sovereign democracy", i.e. a system where Putin works with the "oligarchs created by chaotic, free-market, crony capitalism", who in turn show "absolute fealty"; Elements of nepotism (cooperative Ozero); Reliance on siloviki (people from several dozen security agencies, many of whom worked with Putin before he came to power); Selective application of justice, arbitrary application of the law ("Everything is for the friends, the law is for the enemies"); Relatively liberal but non-transparent financial and tax policies; "manual control" mode, a weak technical government that does not have any political weight, with real control of the country from the presidential administration; Utmost secrecy of power and backstage making of key decisions; "conservative resistance" to the Western "decadence" of irreligion, "same-sex marriage, radical feminism, homosexuality, mass immigration", that is being globalized "under the cover of democracy and human rights"; Embrace of the values of orthodox Christianity against liberal cosmopolitanism but also support for other anti-liberal, hard right authoritarians outside of Russia; Using the claim of protecting "our common Fatherland, Great Rus", as a "spiritual cover for ... kleptocracy"; Authorities' dislike of freedom to express their opinion, censorship; , 2015. Putin has promoted religious traditionalism and the rejection of some Western liberal principles, such as toleration of homosexuality. Strategic relations with The Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, protecting the property interests of the church, and a policy of promoting clericalization of society; , who is considered close to Putin, formulated many of the core ideas that led to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Eurasianism that posits that Russian civilization does not belong in the "European" or "Asian" categories but instead to the geopolitical concept of Eurasia, therefore making Russia a standalone civilization; All-Russian variant of ultranationalism; In the international arena, Putinism is characterized by nostalgia for Soviet times and a desire to regain the situation before 1989 when the Soviet Union competed on a strong footing with United States in international affairs. Energy is used as an instrument of international politics (so-called "pipeline diplomacy"); In response to the Russo-Ukrainian war, Putinism has been characterised by Western politicians as "authoritarianism, ... imperialism, ... ethno-nationalism."

Characteristics of Putinism highlighted by political scientists

Centralization, Dutch sociologist Marcel Van Herpen Putinism . Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; January 2013. strong presidential power, weakening of the political influence of regional elites and big business; Establishment of direct or indirect state control over the main television channels of the country, censorship; The ever-increasing use of the "administrative resource" (fraud) in elections at the regional and federal levels; The actual elimination of the system of separation of powers, the establishment of control over the judicial system; Non-public style of political behavior; Monopolization of political power in the hands of the president; Priority of state interests over the interests of the individual, restriction of the rights of citizens, reprisals against civil society; Creating an image of a "besieged fortress", equating opposition activities with hostility, and ousting it from the political field; , the embodiment of state succession in it after a serious injury from the collapse of the Soviet Union; Bureaucratic authoritarianism, the presence of the ruling party merged with the bureaucratic apparatus; State corporativism; Strong state control over property; Aggressive foreign policy (jingoism); Focus on order and conservative values; Ideology of national greatness; Anti-Western sentiment.

Silovik influence

(second left) and Sergei Ivanov with Putin, 8 April 2015 A sociological investigation unveiling the phenomena was done in 2004 by Olga Kryshtanovskaya, who determined the proportion of siloviks in the Russian political elite to be 25%. In Putin's "inner circle" which constitutes about 20 people, the amount of siloviks rises to 58%, and fades to 18–20% in Parliament and 34% in the Government. According to Kryshtanovskaya, there was no capture of power as Kremlin bureaucracy has called siloviks in order to "restore order". The process of siloviks coming into power allegedly started in 1996, Boris Yeltsin's second term. "Not personally Yeltsin, but the whole elite wished to stop the revolutionary process and consolidate power." When silovik Vladimir Putin was appointed prime minister in 1999, the process was boosted. According to Kryshtanovskaya, "Yes, Putin has brought siloviks with him. But that's not enough to understand the situation. Here's also an objective aspect: the whole political class wished them to come. They were called for service... There was a need of a strong arm, capable from point of view of the elite to establish order in the country." Kryshtanovskaya has also noted that there were people who had worked in structures "affiliated" with the KGB/FSB. Structures usually considered as such are the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Governmental Communications Commission, Ministry of Foreign Trade, Press Agency News and others. "The itself work in such agencies doesn't involve necessary contacts with special services, but makes you think about it." Summing up numbers of official and "affiliated" siloviks she got an estimate of 77% of such in the power. Putin's chief national security adviser, Nikolai Patrushev, who believed that the West has been in an undeclared war with Russia for years, was a leading figure behind Russia's updated national security strategy, published in May 20211. It stated that Russia may use "forceful methods" to "thwart or avert unfriendly actions that threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation".

Classification

Intelligence state

According to former Securitate general Ion Mihai Pacepa, "In the Soviet Union, the KGB was a state within a state. Now former KGB officers are running the state. They have custody of the country's 6,000 nuclear weapons, entrusted to the KGB in the 1950s, and they now also manage the strategic oil industry renationalized by Putin. The KGB successor, rechristened FSB, still has the right to electronically monitor the population, control political groups, search homes and businesses, infiltrate the federal government, create its own front enterprises, investigate cases, and run its own prison system. The Soviet Union had one KGB officer for every 428 citizens. Putin's Russia has one FSB-ist for every 297 citizens." "Under Russian Federation President and former career foreign intelligence officer Vladimir Putin, an "FSB State" composed of chekists has been established and is consolidating its hold on the country. Its closest partners are organized criminals. In a world marked by a globalized economy and information infrastructure, and with transnational terrorism groups utilizing all available means to achieve their goals and further their interests, Russian intelligence collaboration with these elements is potentially disastrous", said politologist Julie Anderson. Former KGB officer Konstantin Preobrazhenskiy shares similar ideas. When asked "How many people in Russia work in FSB?", he replied: "Whole country. FSB owns everything, including Russian Army and even own Church, the Russian Orthodox Church... Putin managed to create new social system in Russia". "Vladimir Putin's Russia is a new phenomenon in Europe: a state defined and dominated by former and active-duty security and intelligence officers. Not even fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, or the Soviet Union – all undoubtedly much worse creations than Russia – were as top-heavy with intelligence talent", said intelligence expert Reuel Marc Gerecht.

Corporation-state

Andrei Illarionov considers the political system in Russia as a variety of corporatism. According to Illarionov, a former advisor of Vladimir Putin, this is a new socio-political order, "distinct from any seen in our country before". He said that members of the Corporation of Intelligence Service Collaborators took over the entire body of state power, follow an omerta-like behavior code, and "are given instruments conferring power over others – membership "perks", such as the right to carry and use weapons". According to Illarionov, this "Corporation has seized key government agencies – the Tax Service, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Parliament, and the government-controlled mass media – which are now used to advance the interests of [Corporation] members. Through these agencies, every significant resource of the country – security/intelligence, political, economic, informational and financial – is being monopolized in the hands of Corporation members". Members of the Corporation created an isolated caste. A former KGB general said that "a Chekist is a breed... A good KGB heritage—a father or grandfather, say, who worked for the service—is highly valued by today's siloviki. Marriages between siloviki clans are also encouraged."

Single-party bureaucratic state

Russian politician Boris Nemtsov and activist Vladimir Kara-Murza defined Putinism in 2004 as "a one party system, censorship, a puppet parliament, ending of an independent judiciary, firm centralization of power and finances, and hypertrophied role of special services and bureaucracy, in particular in relation to business".

State gangsterism

Political analyst Andrei Piontkovsky considers Putinism as "the highest and culminating stage of bandit capitalism in Russia". He believes that "Russia is not corrupt. Corruption is what happens in all countries when businessmen offer officials large bribes for favors. Today's Russia is unique. The businessmen, the politicians, and the bureaucrats are the same people. They have privatized the country's wealth and taken control of its financial flows." Russian-American journalist Masha Gessen has also described Russia as a "mafia state". Such views are shared by politologist Julie Anderson who said the same person can be a Russian intelligence officer, an organized criminal, and a businessman. She also cited former CIA director James Woolsey who said: "I have been particularly concerned for some years, beginning during my tenure, with the interpenetration of Russian organized crime, Russian intelligence and law enforcement, and Russian business. I have often illustrated this point with the following hypothetical: If you should chance to strike up a conversation with an articulate, English-speaking Russian in, say, the restaurant of one of the luxury hotels along Lake Geneva, and he is wearing a $3,000 suit and a pair of Gucci loafers, and he tells you that he is an executive of a Russian trading company and wants to talk to you about a joint venture, then there are four possibilities. He may be what he says he is. He may be a Russian intelligence officer working under commercial cover. He may be part of a Russian organized crime group. But the really interesting possibility is that he may be all three and that none of those three institutions have any problem with the arrangement." According to political analyst Dmitri Glinski, "The idea of Russia, Inc.--or better, Russia, Ltd.--derives from the Russian brand of libertarian anarchism viewing the state as just another private armed gang claiming special rights on the basis of its unusual power." "This is a state conceived as a "stationary bandit" imposing stability by eliminating the roving bandits of the previous era." In April 2006, the effective privatization of the customs sphere infuriated Putin himself, where businessmen and officials "merged in ecstasy".

Ideology

, stated in 2014, "If there is Putin, there is Russia. If there is no Putin, there is no Russia!" Analysts have described Russia's state ideology under Putin as nationalist and neo-imperialist. Andrey Kolesnikov describes Putin's regime since his third term as melding nationalist imperialism with conservative Orthodoxy and authoritarian aspects of Stalinism. Politologist Irina Pavlova said that Chekists are not merely a corporation of people united to expropriate financial assets. They have long-standing political objectives of transforming Moscow into the Third Rome and anti-American ideology of containing the United States. Columnist George Will emphasized the nationalistic nature of Putinism. He said that "Putinism is becoming a toxic brew of nationalism directed against neighboring nations, and populist envy, backed by assaults of state power, directed against private wealth. Putinism is national socialism without the demonic element of its pioneer ...". According to Illarionov, the ideology of chekists is Nashism ("ours-ism"), the selective application of rights". on a billboard in Ryazan with the hashtag ( ) In February 2021, Putin linked his own personal thought and ideology to that of Lev Gumilyov, stating that he too believed in 'passionarity', the rise and fall of societies as described by this theory and specifically that Russia was a nation 'has not yet attained its highest point', with an 'infinite genetic code'. According to Michael Hirsh, a senior correspondent at Foreign Policy:

Anti-Americanism

during Xi's state visit to Moscow, May 2015 In response to the growing anti-Americanism after the Russo-Georgian War in the Russian intellectual-political class, the director of the Institute of Globalization and Social Movements, Boris Kagarlitsky, said, "Ironically, one of the dominant trends here is that we are anti-American because we want to be exactly like America. We are angry that Americans are allowed to invade minor nations and we are not." In recent Russian polls, the United States and its allies have consistently topped the list of Russia's greatest enemies. However, survey results published by the Levada-Center indicate that, as of August 20181, Russians increasingly viewed the United States positively following the Russia–U.S. summit in Helsinki in July 2018. According to the Pew Research Center, "57% of Russians ages 18 to 29 see the U.S. favorably, compared with only 15% of Russians ages 50 and older." According to Moscow Carnegie Center Director Dmitri Trenin, anti-Americanism in Russia is becoming the basis for official patriotism. Further researcher states that the Russian ruling elite have stopped pretending that it follows the West and cherishes its declared values. Now, Moscow openly states that its values are not completely common with modern Western values in such fields as democracy, human rights, national sovereignty, role of government, the church, and the nature of family. Putin's Russia has formed alliances with anti-American regimes in non-Western countries such as China and Iran. According to some Russian experts, anti-American sentiments are driven largely by domestic political climate and has little relationship to US foreign policy.

Putinism and fascism

The experts generally believe that Putin's Russia is not fascist. Although they note the existence of some similarities between Putinism and fascism, such as revanchism and "hypermasculine authority", they argue that Putin's Russia lacks the mass mobilization and the revolutionary nationalism which were fundamental characteristics of fascist movements. Additionally, it doesn't seek "transcendence" to create a "new man" like fascist movements did. Instead, Putin's Russia has been generally described as reactionary and authoritarian conservative. Oxford historian Roger Griffin compared Putin's Russia to World War II-era Japan, saying that like Putin's Russia, it "emulated fascism in many ways, but it was not fascist." American historian Stanley G. Payne argued that Putin's political system is "more a revival of the creed of Tsar Nicholas I in the 19th century that emphasized 'Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality' than one resembling the revolutionary, modernizing regimes of Hitler and Mussolini." He argued that fascist regimes, imbued with revolutionary ideas and seeking to implement changes which would push society into a new order, relied on the mobilization of the masses of the population and their active participation in politics in order to implement these changes. Putinism, on the other hand, is counter-revolutionary, it strictly opposes any social reforms and social mobilization and it aims to de-politicize society, which it sees as a threat to its existence. The mass social involvement of the population is discouraged, the exercise of politics is reduced to "pure management" which is left to those who are in power, free from the interference of the masses. In exchange for the population's non-involvement in politics, Putinism's social contract offers economic development and an important amount of freedom in private life, "bread and entertainment". According to Sheri Berman, Hitler and Mussolini both came to power through a "very large mass movement" and in front of people, their images as the leaders of the masses and their images as leaders who felt "a sort of direct connection to them stuck in the minds of the people", while Putin's regime "is not a mass regime that came to power or operates on the basis of mass mobilization", on the contrary, Putin "came up as an apparatchik" and has not built "a dynamic and charismatic movement in the fascist style", preferring to see his people de-mobilized and usually best remembered "sitting alone at the end of the table". However, some have argued that Putin's Russia is fascist. The historian Timothy Snyder and other authors note that during speeches which he has made on various occasions, Vladimir Putin has quoted the pro-Fascist ultranationalist white émigré Russian philosopher Ivan Ilyin, who is a major ideological inspiration for him, according to some observers. Aleksandr Dugin, a formerly marginal contemporary apologist for Eurasianism and conservative revolution, whose views are close to Fascism, has become a semi-official philosopher of the Putin regime and headed 2023 establishment the Ivan Ilyin Higher School of Politics at the Russian State University for the Humanities. Russian journalist Andrei Malgin compared Putin's desire to restore a "lost" empire and his support for the church and "traditional values" to the policies of Italian fascist leader Benito Mussolini. Russian political scientist Andrey Piontkovsky argues that the ideology of Rashism is in many ways similar to German fascism (Nazism), while the speeches of President Vladimir Putin reflect similar ideas to those of Adolf Hitler. Van Herpen compares in detail what he considers as similarities between Putin's regime and that of Weimar Germany and Mussolini's Italy, indicating the presence of strong fascist elements in Putin's Russia. However, he argues that these elements are tempered by other elements that show a resemblance with the Bonapartism from Napoleon III's France and the post-modern populism of Silvio Berlusconi, creating a hybrid system which he calls 'Fascism-lite'. According to Van Herpen, although 'Putinism' has a softer face than Mussolinian Fascism, it still contains a hard core of ultra-nationalism, militarism, and neo-imperialism. In 2010, Peter Sucia, an American historian and a contributor to The National Interest, was one of the first publicists to explicitly describe Putin as a leader who is sincerely convinced that his fascist values are righteous. Sucia wrote: "Some historians and economists have noted that fascism is actually an anti-Marxist form of socialism, especially as it favors class collaboration and supports the concept of nationalism — the latter being something that Marxists could never support. A diehard Marxist leader wouldn't get on a plane and fly halfway around the world to try and win support for the Olympics to be hosted in his country, even his hometown. But a tried and true Fascist might do so."

Putinism and Russian ethnic nationalism

Professing its own vision of Russian nationalism, primarily based on a predominantly civil understanding of Russian national identity, Putinism has been challenged by the alternative form of Russian nationalism based on ethnic roots. Ethnic nationalists are critical of Putin's immigration policy, which allows migration of millions of people from post-Soviet Central Asia and Caucasus to Russia's traditionally Slavic heartland. Highlighting his stance on "Russia for Russians" slogan in a 2003 television broadcast, Putin said the people who act upon such slogan are "either idiots or provocateurs" who want to weaken the Russian Federation, which he framed as multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country. The law against "extremism" being adopted in 2002 has resulted in closures of many prominent nationalist organizations in Russia, including the Movement Against Illegal Immigration and the Slavic Union. Putin government had repressed ethno-nationalism since the early 2010s and was closer to fascistic state-nationalism. According to Robert Horvath of La Trobe University, during the 1990s, when Russia saw waves of racist violence and Putin became president in 2000, his regime exploited this threat to introduce anti-extremism legislation that was also used to target pro-democracy and left-wing activists. The Kremlin's "managed nationalism" would "co-opt and mobilise radical nationalist militants" to fight against the opposition. Afterward, the violent radical nationalists got jailed while others flourished to promote pro-Putin Russian nationalism. On 25 December 2022, in a TV interview, Putin, apparently for the first time, openly declared that Russia's goal—territorially "to unite the Russian people" (the Russians as ethnic group).

Putinism and the Western far-right

in Moscow, 24 March 2017 in Alaska, 15 August 2025 A number of far-right politicians and parties in the European Union have been linked with Putin, including Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini, and parts of the Alternative for Germany. Putinism has also received support from a number of American far-right figures. Some populists started to distance themselves from Putin after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Richard Shorten of the University of Birmingham has stated that Putin "has been appealing, not just for extreme 'manosphere' white supremacists, but also for more 'mainstream' western reactionaries attracted by an unapologetic social conservatism." Jason Stanley of Yale University argued that Putin was "the leader of Russian Christian nationalism" and "has come to view himself as the global leader of Christian nationalism, and is increasingly regarded as such by Christian nationalists around the world."

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Further reading

External links

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