Radio Battalion
The 1st, 2d, and 3d Radio Battalions are United States Marine Corps Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) units whose missions are to provide tactical SIGINT, ground Electronic Warfare (EW), limited cyberspace operations, and Special Intelligence…
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The 1st, 2d, and 3d Radio Battalions are United States Marine Corps Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) units whose missions are to provide tactical SIGINT, ground Electronic Warfare (EW), limited cyberspace operations, and Special Intelligence communications tasked by the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) to support MEFs and their subordinate elements. Radio Battalions function primarily as intelligence-gathering and analytic organizations with capabilities connected to and integrated with theater and national SIGINT communities.
Radio Battalions are responsible for establishing, operating, and maintaining Intelligence Information Architectures to accomplish this mission.
Structure and Composition
Radio Battalions are largely populated by enlisted Marines in the 2600 Occupational Career Code (OCC) Field, but also Headquarters and Support elements drawn from other career fields. Marines in the 2600 OCC Field who may be assigned to Radio Battalions include: Special Communications Signals Collection Operator/Analysts, Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Intercept Operator/Analysts, Cryptologic Language Analysts, and Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) Systems Engineers.
Commissioned Officers assigned to Radio Battalions include Signals Intelligence/Ground Electronic Warfare Officers. Radio Battalions have traditionally consisted of a battalion headquarters, headquarters and service company, and designated operational companies.
Operational components may include: Operational Control and Analysis Center (OCAC): senior SIGINT authority in a Marine Area of Operations, located within the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) CE intelligence operations center OCACs typically include the following positions: OCAC Officer in Charge (OIC), Watch Officer/Watch Chief, Collection Manager, Senior Analyst, SIGINT Geospatial analysts, Digital Network Intelligence analysts, Cryptologic Linguists, SIGINT report writers, and Special Intelligence Communications Operational Command Elements (OCEs): subordinate to the OCAC;
provide the Radio Battalion with extended command and control over SIGINT/EW (SIEW) teams and SIGINT operations. OCEs are task-organized based on the scope of their functions SIEW teams: primarily collection assets that perform low level analysis for Indications and Warnings purposes Capabilities include: survey, collection, and exploitation of enemy signal(s), including digital networks; geolocation of enemy units;
and dissemination and utilization of intelligence at the lowest tactical echelons E.g. SIGINT Support Teams (SSTs) and Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System (MEWSS) teams Radio Reconnaissance Teams (RRT): specially trained and equipped SIGINT Marines who may support ground reconnaissance and surveillance elements Radio reconnaissance platoons are trained in special insert and extract means and basic reconnaissance capabilities.
They are sometimes leveraged to enhance understanding of threat operations prior to the arrival of other SIGINT support unit forces Receive tactical movement direction from the ground reconnaissance commander and technical SIGINT direction from the Radio Battalion commander All Radio Battalion operations, from the OCAC to individual teams, occur within sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs). SCIFs may be static locations, temporary tactical fixtures, or mobile facilities to support and adjust to dynamic forward deployed operations.
Oversight
Radio Battalion intelligence collection capabilities fall under the purview of DIRNSA/CHCSS (Director of the National Security Agency/Chief of the Central Security Service), controls the activities of SIGINT organizations down to the smallest tactical teams. The two sections of the United States Code relevant to Radio Battalions are Title 10 and Title 50.
Title 10 furnishes the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) with the authority to "organize, train, and equip" SIGINT Marines and sets forth oversight mechanisms. Title 50 describes intelligence and its sub categories and establishes the DIRNSA as the executive agent of SIGINT for the US Government.
The tactical SIGINT capabilities of Radio Battalions are also governed by Executive Order (EO), Department of Defense Directive (DoDD), Department of Defense Instruction (DODI), Department of Defense Regulation, Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST), and Marine Corps Order (MCO). Executive Order (EO) 12333 is a foundational authority, which, very generally and among other things, limits the collection/interception of communications to foreign persons that occur wholly outside the United States as part of NSA's role as a combat support agency.
Radio Battalions, therefore, are unable to conduct domestic SIGINT collection operations and instead rely on canned scenarios and scripts to create facsimiles of potential real-world operations. , including positions on outlying hills.|alt=Map of Khe Sanh Combat Base along the Rào Quán river, which rises in the mountains north of Khe Sanh. Key locations marked include Khe Sanh Combat Base, a Special Forces Camp near Lang Vei, and positions on outlying hills, including 881 S.]] In 1967, Gray, by then a Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol), assumed command of 1st Radio Battalion in Vietnam.
Around November 1967, a detachment of 1st Radio Battalion Marines set up a post near the landing zone on Hill 881 South, north of Khe Sahn. During a briefing to III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) leaders at the end of November, LtCol Gray shared reports derived from intercepts of People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) radio traffic indicating Khe Sanh would likely be targeted by a PAVN offensive.
After much debate, then LtGen Robert E. Cushman Jr. accepted LtCol Gray's hypothesis and resolved to reinforce Khe Sanh "when the time came". Following subsequent intelligence reports bolstering Gray's initial assessment, 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines were hastily airlifted to Khe Sanh on 13 December 1967, for Operation Scotland in advance of the January 1968 Siege of Khe Sanh by PAVN forces.
Throughout January 1968, SIGINT reporting produced by Radio Battalion Marine continued to reflect significant PAVN troop movements into the northern part of Quảng Trị Province. Customarily, the SIGINT detachment at Khe Sanh recorded transmissions and shipped them to its headquarters at Da Nang for translation, but when fighting began in earnest on 21 January it became immediately evident that this process was too lengthy to effectively support combat operations.
On 22 January the detachment at Khe Sanh was reinforced with a Vietnamese language voice exploitation team from Da Nang. During the siege, Colonel David Lownds, commander of the 26th Marine Regiment, frequently visited the detachment's bunker, sometimes multiple times a day, to request the latest intelligence reports.
In 1969, 1st Radio Battalion continued its support to III MAF, monitoring not only for enemy communications, but also friendly transmissions to identify communications security (COMSEC) violations or compromises. The battalion averaged roughly 4,000 "fixes" (radio direction finding) for enemy transmitter sites per month and in March 1969, reported 194 COMSEC violations in 118,920 monitored messages.
The battalion was headquartered at Camp Horn, with its Headquarters and Service Company at nearby Camp Hoa Long, on the South China Sea just outside Da Nang, and its Operations Company at Dong Ha. Six task-organized platoons were spread throughout fire support bases and observation posts in Quảng Trị and Quảng Nam, where they provided immediate tactical support for both regimental and division operations.
In October 1969, the unit established a Joint Tactical Processing Center in Dong Ha to onboard Army SIGINT agencies to assume mission support following the Marines' departure. By January 1970, III MAF had grown into an inter-service headquarters in I CTZ, with support from Marines, Navy, and Army units.
While originally scheduled for redeployment, a majority of Radio Battalion personnel remained in theater following a discussion in June 1970, in which the value and necessity of their intelligence products were highlighted. The battalion participated in large operations, including Pickens Forest, Catawba Falls, and Imperial Lake, with direct support units accompanying command groups to provide immediate, rapid exploitation capabilities.
In late 1970, III MAF Deputy G-3, Colonel John W. Haggerty III, stated that 1st Radio Battalion was producing "probably the best intelligence that the Marine Corps has ever had . . . . We always knew what the enemy was going to do and could always prepare for it". Redeployments in January–June 1971 dissolved the Marine intelligence posture.
1st Radio Battalion began deactivation and redeployment in early March 1971, while the battalion's command group and colors departed Vietnam on 15 April 1971. A radio detachment of six officers and 79 enlisted Marines remained attached to 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade's Headquarters and Service Company until all Marine intelligence collection activities in Vietnam ceased on 7 May 1971.
Following the battalion's redeployment to Hawaii in April 1971, a small detachment continued to support combat operations in Southeast Asia. During the Easter Offensive of 1972, Captain Clarence W. Phillips commanded Detachment "N," composed of 12 Marines from 1st Radio Battalion. Detachment "N" operated from the radio spaces of the as part of Task Force 76's Joint Intelligence Center.
The detachment was augmented by additional Radio Battalion personnel and, from 24 April 1972, provided direct support simultaneously from naval gunfire ships and the Blue Ridge. In July 1972, Captain Phillips and his men moved to the when the Blue Ridge returned to the United States, while the detachment's analysts rotated to the Naval Communications Station, San Miguel, Philippines.
Detachment "N" was deactivated on 21 January 1973. 1st Radio Battalion elements participated in Operation Eagle Pull, the 12 April 1975 helicopter evacuation of Phnom Penh as Cambodia fell to the Khmer Rouge, and Operation Frequent Wind, the 29–30 April 1975 evacuations of U.S. personnel and at-risk locals in Saigon.
In May 1975, the battalion supported the recovery of the SS Mayaguez. in 2003. |alt=A U.S. Marine in woodland camouflage utilities and a camouflage field cover crouches on a patch of solid ground amidst green and yellowed flora, adjusting a handheld radio connected by cable to a manpack SATCOM antenna mounted on a tripod stand in the foreground. Three M16A2 rifles are propped against equipment to his left and right.
The ground around him is covered in dry grass and scattered military gear including a large rucksack, ammunition cans, and carrying cases.]] 2d Radio Battalion's lineage documents additionally note general support to operations in the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Arabian Gulf, Mediterranean, Somalia, Haiti, and Liberia throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, reflecting the battalion's sustained forward presence through MEU deployments during this period.
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